Syadvada Va Saptabhangisutra
Avaropparasavekkham, nayavisayam aha pamanavisayam va.
Tam savekkham bhaniyam, niravekkham tana vivariyam. (714)
The object of naya or pramana; if it is conditional, is called relative, and if not, absolute. The object whether of naya or pramana, is called relative, if it is conditional, and absolute, if it is unconditional. (714)
Niyamanisehanasilo, nipadanado ya jo hu khalu siddho.
So siyasaddo bhanio, jo savekkham pasahedi. (715)
The word `Syat’ is said to be one that negates all unconditionally, one that is of the grammatical form called nipata (an underived particle) and one that demonstrates all things as conditional. (715)
Satteva humti bhamga, pamananayadunayabhedajutta vi.
Siya savekkham pamanam, naena naya dunaya niravekkha. (716)
The predications are seven – be they of the form of pramana or a naya proper or a naya improper. The statement characterized by syat (in same respect) is pramana, that which does not rule out the other probabilities is naya proper, and that which absolutely negates the other probabilities is naya proper, and that which absolutely negates the other probabilities is naya improper. (716)
Atthi tti natthi do vi ya, Avvattavvam siena samjuttam.
Avvattavva te taha, pamanabhamgi sunayavva. (717)
`Is’, `is not’, `is and is not’, `is indescribable’, `is and is indescribable’, `is not and indescribable’, and `is, is not and is indescribable’ – these seven predications, each containing the word `syat’ constitute predications of the form of Pramana. (717)
Atthisahavam davvam, saddavvadisu gahiyanaena.
Tam pi ya natthisahavam, paradavvadihi gahiena. (718)
Each substance grasped in the form of `this substance’ etc. is of the nature of something existent, the same grasped in the form of’ a substance other than this one’ etc. is of the nature of something non-existent. (718)
係”this substance‘中每个物质个本质就係存在性；同样，係短语‘ a substance other
than this one‘中个本质就係唔存在性。
Uhayam uhayanaena, avvattavvam ca tena samudae.
Te tiya avvattavva, niyaniyanayaatthasamjoe. (719)
When grasped in both the above forms it is of the nature of something existent as well as non-existent, when simultaneously grasped in both the above forms, it is something indescribable in three additional forms, in as much as, it is at the same time also treated as something existent, something non-existent, or something both existent and not-existent. (719)
Atthi tti natthi uhayam, avvattavvam taheva puna tidayam.
Taha siya nayaniravekkham, janasu davve dunayabhamgi. (720)
`Is’, `Is not’, `is and is not’, `is indescribable’, `is and is indescribable’ `is not and is indescribable’, and `is, not and is indescribable’ – these very seven predications, pertaining to a substance, when characterized by `syat’ (in some respect are called improper nayas). (720)
Ekniruddhe iyaro, padivakkho avare ya sabbhavo.
Savvesim sa sahave, kayavva hoi8 taha bhamga. (721)
When one property of a thing is grasped, the property opposed to it is also grasped automatically because both these properties constitute the nature of this thing. Thus in respect of nature of all things, the aforesaid predications are to be made. (721)