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Sub-Categories of Samansuttam
Mangalasutra
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  Samsaracakrasutra 
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Raga-pariharasutra

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Apramadasutra

  Siksasutra
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  Ratnatrayasutra
  Samyag-Darsana-Sutra
  Samyagjnanasutra
  Samyakcaritrasutra
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  Samiti-Guptisutra
  Avasyakasutra
  Tapasutra
  Dhyanasutra
  Anupreksasutra
  Lesyasutra
  Atmavikasasutra (Gunasthana)
  Samlekhanasutra
  Tattvasutra
  Dravysutra
  Srstisutra
  Anekantasutra
  Pramanasutra
  Nayasutra
  Syadvada Va Saptabhangisutra
  Samanvayasutra
  Niksepasutra
  Samapana
  Virastavana
 

SamanSuttam

40. Syadvada Va Saptabhangisutra

Syadvada & Sptabhangi Sutra

Avaropparasavekkham, nayavisayam aha pamanavisayam va.

Tam savekkham bhaniyam, niravekkham tana vivariyam. (714)

The object of naya or pramana; if it is conditional, is called relative, and if not, absolute.
The object whether of naya or pramana, is called relative, if it is conditional, and absolute, if
it is unconditional. (714)

Niyamanisehanasilo, nipadanado ya jo hu khalu siddho.

So siyasaddo bhanio, jo savekkham pasahedi. (715)


The word `Syat' is said to be one that negates all unconditionally, one that is of the
grammatical form called nipata (an underived particle) and one that demonstrates all things as
conditional. (715)

Satteva humti bhamga, pamananayadunayabhedajutta vi.

Siya savekkham pamanam, naena naya dunaya niravekkha. (716)


The predications are seven - be they of the form of pramana or a naya proper or a naya improper.
The statement characterized by syat (in same respect) is pramana, that which does not rule out
the other probabilities is naya proper, and that which absolutely negates the other probabilities
is naya proper, and that which absolutely negates the other probabilities is naya improper. (716)

Atthi tti natthi do vi ya, Avvattavvam siena samjuttam.

Avvattavva te taha, pamanabhamgi sunayavva. (717)

`Is', `is not', `is and is not', `is indescribable', `is and is indescribable', `is not and
indescribable', and `is, is not and is indescribable' - these seven predications, each containing
the word `syat' constitute predications of the form of Pramana. (717)

Atthisahavam davvam, saddavvadisu gahiyanaena.

Tam pi ya natthisahavam, paradavvadihi gahiena. (718)


Each substance grasped in the form of `this substance' etc. is of the nature of something
existent, the same grasped in the form of' a substance other than this one' etc. is of the nature
of something non-existent. (718)

Uhayam uhayanaena, avvattavvam ca tena samudae.

Te tiya avvattavva, niyaniyanayaatthasamjoe. (719)


When grasped in both the above forms it is of the nature of something existent as well as
non-existent, when simultaneously grasped in both the above forms, it is something indescribable
in three additional forms, in as much as, it is at the same time also treated as something
existent, something non-existent, or something both existent and not-existent. (719)

Atthi tti natthi uhayam, avvattavvam taheva puna tidayam.

Taha siya nayaniravekkham, janasu davve dunayabhamgi. (720)


`Is', `Is not', `is and is not', `is indescribable', `is and is indescribable' `is not and is
indescribable', and `is, not and is indescribable' - these very seven predications, pertaining to
a substance, when characterized by `syat' (in some respect are called improper nayas). (720)

Ekniruddhe iyaro, padivakkho avare ya sabbhavo.

Savvesim sa sahave, kayavva hoi8 taha bhamga. (721)


When one property of a thing is grasped, the property opposed to it is also grasped automatically
because both these properties constitute the nature of this thing. Thus in respect of nature of
all things, the aforesaid predications are to be made. (721)