The Jaina holds with prabhakara that cognition is always apprahended by the self. Cognitio reeas itsef, the self and it s object. Every act of cognition coginizses itself, the cognizig subject and the cognized object. But the Jaina denies that consciousnee alosne is self- luminous. He regards self is the subject of interna perception. Whe I feel that I am happy have a distinct and immediate apprehension of the self as an obeject of internal perception, just as pkeasure can be perceive though it is without form. “Oh Fautama” said Mahavira,”the self is pratyaksa even to you The soul is cognizeabel even to you.46 again unlike the view of prabhakara. The Jainas hold that it is the object of perception ad it is maifested by external and internal perception. To the question “how can the subject be an object of erception?” the Jaina replies that whatever is experienced is an object of perception

      William James made a distinction between the empirical self, the me, and the transcedental self, the I. The self is party the known and partly the knower, partly object and partly subject. The empirical ego is the self as knowm, the pure ego is the knower. It is that which at any moment is conscuous.” Whereas the me is ony one of the thig which it is conscious of. But this thinker is not a passint state. It is something deeper and less mutable.49  prof. Ward holds that tha pure self is always immaent in experience, in the sense that experience, without the experient will be uninteligible. It is also transcedental, in the sese that it can never be the object of our experece.50    The Jainas were aware that consciousness of self is not possible by ordiary cognition Therefore, they said it is due to internal perception.

      Self- consciouses does not belong to the ream of pure cosciousewss which is foungational ad withou limitaiton. That is the cetaa which is the esssential quality of the soul. But whe we descend to the practical leve, te realm of vyavahara, we find the distinction between subject ad object in consciousness. The question whether the self is perceived by direct experiece likes the iternal perception of the Jainas. , or by the immediate untuition, (pratibha jnana) of the Cedantins is raise das a consequece of this distction. In all this, the question is answered from the empirical pointof view on this basis, we any say that there are two aspects of consciousness: a) emprirical consciousness. Atma is pure consiousneess. Jiva is consciousness limited by the organism. Atma is the subject of conscounees. It is also te object of interna perception. But only in sense that it is immanent in conscousness though ot clearly cognised as object. Jiva is both the subject and the object of cosciousness, because it is the cognizer as well as the cognized.

      iv. The Agama theroy of knowledge is very  old and probabalu orginated in the premahavirea period . the jana pravada formed a part of the purvasrut which formed a par of the ancient literature. Jinabhadra in his Visesavasykabhasya, quotes a purva Gatha on nana. There seems to have been no diffecence of opioon between the fooowers of parsvea and mahavira rearding the diision of kowledge. Both of them accept the five fold distinction of kowledge. The agamas have also preseted the five dividions of knowledge.

      Knowledge is iherent I the soul, but owing to perversity of attitude arisig out of the veil of Karman , we may get wrong knowedge, ajana. Knowledge is perfect when the veil of Karman is totally reoved. It is imperfect evetn when there is partial subsidence or destruction of Karman. The soul ca get perfect knoledge directly whe the veio of Karma is remoed,. That is pratyaksa jana. But empriical knowledge experience of this world, is possible with the help of the sense orgas indirectly. Such knowledge was acalled paroksajnana. Matinahana(sense experience), aremanahaparayaya (telepathy), and Kevalajanana (omniscience), were called pratykasa.  But later, in ordet to brig the Jaina theory of knowledge in line with the throies of other systems of Indian thought, they modidied their conception of pratyaksa and paroksa Jnana. In the anuyougadvara sutra, we we fing a hage in terminology. Matiand sruta began to be alled pratyaksa as they wer possibel through the operation of the sense organs. Jinabhadra als the two samyavahaara pratyaksa.   Alongside of Jnana, we have direct itutition of the object it is darsana. Darsana has similar subdiisions. The genra cassification of knowledge and intuition mentioning their perersities is shown in table I. The subsidence ad destruction of the veil of karman is a necessary condition of knowdege and intuition. Wrong knowledge is characterise as samasay (doubt) viparayaya (perversity,) and anadhayavasaya (wrog knowledge caused erence.) Owing to the lack of discrimination between the rea and the unral, the lack of discraination between the real and the unrea the soul with wrong knowledge, ike the lunati, knows thig accordig to its ow whims. Perersity of attitude veils the faculty of perception and knowledg, becomes vitated. It becomes ajana.55








       Pratyaksa                                                            paroksa                                     




Samvyavaharika             paraarthika    samaraa       pratyabhijna     rarka     auumana    agama


                                                      Sakala      vikala

Indriya                    Anindriya

 nibandhana             nibandhana   kevala    




Avagraa             Iha            Avaya       Dharaba     Avadhi      Manahpryaya















          Pratyaksa                                                                       paroksa



Avadhi            Maahaprayaya     kevala                     Mati                           sruta



Jnana                           Ajnana      Jnana                         Ajnana      Jnana                      Ajana                                                                                       

                            (vibhagavadhi)                                   (kumati)                                (kusruta)


      Note: this is based on the analysis give by s.o. Ghoshal I his edition of the Dravyasamraha

      Prtyksa: we may now consider sense perception or pratyakasa jnana, as the nandisutra4-5 calls it . it is knowledge obtained through the operation of the sese organs and the manuas. Heachandra describes in the pramanaminasa that pratyaksa is that which is immediate, clear and unambiguous. He analyses the various defiitions of pratyaksa of other schools and shows that they are not adequate. The Naiyayika defination of perception as unerring cognition which is produced by the ssnese object cotact is ot adequate. How can the sensse object contact and the like, he asks, which is not of the nature of cognition, function as efficient instrument for the determination the object? The Buddhists have given a definition of perceptual cognition as that which is free from conceptual construction and is ot erroneous. But hemacandra says that this defination is irrational since it has no bearing on practical ctivit. It has no pragmatic value. Jaimini defines perception as that which is engendered in the mind of a person upon the actual contact of the sense organ with the object. This definition is also too wide, snce it overlaps such cognition, as doubt; and illusions also occur as a result of sense contact. The older exponents of the Samkhya School define perceptual cognition to be modification of the sense orgas such as the organ of hearig. But sense ograngs are devoid of consciousness, theresore, their modifications cannot be conscious. If on the other hand it is assumed to derive its conscient chracter from its association with a concious principle like the self, then the status of the organ of knowledge should be accorded to the self. Therefore, Hemacandra said perceptual cognition is immediate and lucid.56

     In plato’s dialogue Theaetetus, Socreated said that, ‘if knowedge and perception are the same, it leads to an impossibility, because a ma who has come to know a thig and still remembers it does not know it, since he does not see it and that would be a monstrous conclusion.57    In the Nandisutra a distinction is made between indriyapratyaksa and anindeiya pratyakass. Indriya pratyaksa is cognition which is immediate ad direct ad arises out of the operation of the five sese organs. There are therefore five types of sense perception- the isul , auditory, tactual, olfactory ad gustatory. The experiece that does not need the sense orgas and is immediate ay be caled extra-sesory perception. It isalso pratyaksa, becaust it is immediate ad direct it is of three types avdhi, aah- paryaya ad kevalpratyaksa. The old Jaina thinkers thought that knowledge born with the help of the five seses as well as the manas maybe called matijanaa. But in indriya-pratyaksa they included kowledge bor of the five sese organs as the mid is ot for thej exactly a sese organ. It is a quasi-sssese organ, Uasavati defines matijanana as knowledge caused by the senses and mind, since mind is a quasi sense no indriya.58  The commentator Siddhasenaganin mentions three types of mati: (i) knowledge born of the sense organs, (ii) knowledgeborn of the mind , and  (iii) knowledge due to the jointactivity of the sense organs and mid.59 However, from the Bhasya of the Tattvarthasutra wefind that Matijnana can be distingushed into different types , as (i) knowledge due to sense organs, like sense perception; (ii) knowledge due to the mind oly, like cinta; (iii) knowledge due to the jount actiity of the mind and the senses. Memory and recognition can be included in Matijnana. Senses perception (indeiya-pratyaksa), as a species of Mati jnana is of fice types based on the nature and function of tice sese organs.60   The five senses possess the capacity of sense experience becausse the cogition of the stimulation must be conditioned by the reevant instruments. The Jaia analysis of sense perception has a great psychologial significance, alsothoug perception was a loical ad metaphysical problem for the Jainas as for other Indian philosophers in fact, even in the wesst, phuilosophers were first busy with the logical and the metaphysial analysis of the problem of perception, but with the advancement of psychology as a science may have realized that perception is more a problem for psychology. Bertarand Rusel says that, the problem of perception has trubled philosoohers from a very early date . My ow beief is that the problem is scientific, ot philosophical or  rather no onger philosohical’ 61

      The contact of the sense organs with the object is a condition of perception as metioned by the Naiyayikas 62.’   Although, according to the Jaias, such a contact is not necessary I the case of visual experience. Hemachadra said that objects and ight are not conditios of experience., because of lack of concomitance between te two .63  But it is not denied that they are remote conditions, like time and space , which subseve the subsicence and destruction of the knowedge obscuring Karmas. They are indirectly useful to the visual organs, like collyrium. Perception of a particular object is I fact, according to the Jainas, due to the destruction and subsidence of the relevat knowledge-obsucurig Karmas, Jnanavaraniya Karma. This implies a psychological factor. An appropriate physica condition in the destruction and subsideseof knowledge-obcuring Karama is a necessary factor I the perceptual experience. It also depends on the competencey of the apprpriate psychica factor. The psychic factor of selective attention is needed before we get the sense experiece. This is possible when all psychic impediments are partially or wholly removed through the destruction ad susidece of knowledge- aoscuring Karma. 64   such a psychic factor may be desribed as a metal set which is ecessary for the perceptual experiece. Emphasis on the menta factor in perception has been mentioned in Upaisads also in westen thought Aristotle was clearly aware that perception is not possibe merely throught the sense organs.65 For him, perception cnsists in beigng moved ad affected sense perception does not arise from the senses themseves, as orgas of sense perception are potentially and not actually.loke writes that whatever alteations are made in the body,if they reach not the mind; whatever impressions are mad in theoutwrd part, if they are not taken notice of within, there is no perception. For we may burn our body with no other effect thatn it does a billetunless the motion be countinued to the brain; and there the sese of hurt or idea of pain be produced in the mind, wherein consits actual perception. 66   in modern psycholoty prof. Woodworth gives a formula ‘W-S-O-W’ for explaining the facinatiing problem of how an individual perceives an objective fact. At any given miment a man is set for the present situation. He might be listenting to a low hum just as smooth tone. But if he tries to make out what the sund can be he is more likelty to perceeive it as the hum of an aeropane.67  


      According to the Jainas, sense perception can be analysed into four stages as (i) avagraha, 68   (ii)iha (iii) avaya and  (iv) dharaa  These stages of sense experience arise through the operation of the sense organs and the mind. The earlier forms like Avagraha, develop into the susequent forms, ad al of them partake of the same esssetial nature.69   Avagraha refers to the first simple ad primitive stage of experience this may be said to be merey the stage of sensation. Next omes iha In this stage there is a metal elemet, and it refers to the integratie factors of the mind. In the third stage, we get a cear and decisie cognition of the oject. This is Avaya It implies the presence of the inferental element in perception. Darana is retention of what is already experieced I the perceptual cogition. In fact it is ot actually a stage of perceptual experience.

      Psychologists point out that perception is not a simple process not is it merey the sese-datum. It onsists in the organization and interpretation of senstaions. It is ‘knowledge about, and not merely ‘knowledgeof acquaitance’, as william James said perception involves certain psychilogical caftors like association discrimination, intergration assimilation and racognition perception also inoves iference. We pereie a tabe,ad when we perceive the object as a table we recognize it and we get a defined picute of the object. AsAgell said perception is a synthetic process, and the combination of the new and the od is an essential part of the synthesis. This process of combiig was often caled, by early psychlogists, ‘appercepchologists ike wudt and Titchner analysed perception into sunsations. They said that perceptions combine and fuse together a number of sensory elements as in the process of forming H20. It is ot merely a sum of sensations. It gies a neq psychlogial product, a creative synthesis, ike the mental chemistry of J.S.Mill. later , the Gestalt psychlogists gave a neq turn to the psychlogu of perception. They hold that every perceptual experiecnce is an unaalysesd whole: it has a quality of its own. The Jaias were cocerned with giving logial ad epistemological analysis of the perceptual experince. There fore, they were more interested in giving the conditions and the stages of kowledge. Their anaysis was more on the basis of logic of common sense and on insight;and yet the stages of peception metuoned b the Jainaphilosophers very much correspond to the analysis of perception given by the traditional psychlogy and the strcturalist shclool.

      Acagraha senstion: Avarraha is the first stage of sense experience. It may be said  to be analogous to sensation . it is the level of sensation in which perceptual experience can be analysed. Umasavti defines avagraha as implicit awarencess of the object of sense. He says that grahaa (grasping)alocaa (holdig,) avadharana (prehending), are synonyms of avagraha.70    It is indeterminate. The onject presentaed through sense stimulation is cognized in an undefined and indeterminatae way. In this stage, we ae meraely aware of te presence of the onject without any association, without cognizing the specific features, and in fact iwthout even being aware of its association and name.71   In the Avasyaka- Niryukti Avagraha has been dedied as awarenesss of te sese data.72 Jinabhadra insists that Avagraha is indeternmintae I its characte. He is not prepard t consider that it has refeence to nay specific features of the object, because eve realitve reference is eough to promote experience to the stage of Avaya.

      Sestions, as william James said are the first thigs is cnsciuousness. This does ot mean that all our experiecce is ony fucig and compundig of sendstions our experienced can be analysed into senstation, and these form the eemets of our sensory experience. As stout says, sssenstations are of the nature of immediate experience, like the expeiece of cold ad warm, a specfiic tinge of pain, or a touch located in the body or at the suface of the body. The term sensation is also extended to cover the isual data sound taste, and smell which may enter into immediate experience. Sensations vary not only with the variations in the presented object but also in accordance with the state of the individual.73    During the period of two hundred years between the oublication of locke’sEssay and of James’s principles, two further characteistic, now largely of atiquarian interest were gradualy attibuted ot sensation. Sensations were held to be the siple elemets of which complex ideas ar formd as wel as the matter curude stuff out of which the associative machinery fashions the ouranoized and meaningful world of everda experience.74

      Avagraha has been furthe rdistingushed into twp stages: I) vyanjanavagraha and  ii) arthavagrha.75   Vyajanaagraha is the earlier stage. It is a physiocogial stimulus conditon of the sensation of the immediate experience. In the Visesavasyaka Bhasya we ger a desceiption of Vyanjavagraha. There it is said that what reeals an object , as a lamb reveals a jar, is Vyajaaagraha. It is oly the relation of the sense ogran and the onject in the for of sense stimulation such as sound.76  in the Nandisutra,we get an exmple of the earthe pot and frops of warte malaka-drastanata. It  gies a description of the stage of Vyanjaaargaha aclay pot is to be filled with water. In the brgnning when a person purss out onedrop of water . it is absorbed and there is not sifn of existece of water. He goes on puring drops of water and at a certain stage a drop of water will beviisble. Then the water begins to accumulate . we ay call  this stage whe the waterbecomes avisisble the ‘threshoud of saturation. The drops of water below the treshoud are all abosrbed. Similarly, a person who is asleetp receives sund stimulation successively for some time. The sound atoms reach stimulation sucessively for some time.the sound atoms reach the ears. Innumerable instances have to occur before the ears become full of sund atms. At a partifular stage the person becomes coscius of the sound. So far he was not aware the sound although the auditory stimulation was pouring in . We may acall this stage of first awareness’ the threshold of awareness.’ The sensation of sound starts the moment the tresho is crossed and we become aware of the sound. That is the immediate experence of sound,arthavagraha. So far there was awareness. Of sound although the coditions of stimulatio sor such awareness were operating beow the threshold.77   The stimulus was pouring in constantly although no awareness of sound was possible up to a praticualr stage. Such a preparatory stage of sesation presents physilological ad stimulus conditions ofr the senasationa is indeterminate and undefined.  Vyajanavarraha has been just described as implicti awareness the physiological and sutmulus conditionof awareness. It gradully deelops into awareess ad gives the sentstion. It gradually deelops into awareness and gie the senstion. It is ery often described a scntact awareness’ alothough there is the stimulation flowing in Awreess gradually emerges later’ through the accumulation of stimulation. It is merely potentiality of awareness, or implicit awareness.

      As soon as a person becmes conscious, the stage of Vyanjanavagraha is over, and it transrofm itself into arthavagrha. This may be cale dthe stage of sestaio proper . it is aware ness of the object in the Nandisutra there is stanement that, in this stage, we are aware of the sound as ‘this is sound or coour’ or touch’ but not exactly cognize the nature of the sound colour or touch’, but not exactly cgnze the ature of the sound, colour or touch.78   but in the visesavasyakabhasya’ this kind of determinate awareness as this is sound’s is denied in the stage of sensation. It is merelyawareness of the occurrence of the cognition becauee it lastas oly for one moment.79   It is,therefore indeterinate and indefinite. It does not reach the stage of cogition of specific content.

      On the basis such a distinction regardig the two stages of Avargaha it is stated that yanjanavagaraha lastas for indefinaite mimens gradully proceeding towards the lie of consciounness.80   The physiological and stimulus onditions of awareness in the form of sensation continue to accumulate foe aa nuber f mamets til the threshold of awareness is reached. But once the stage of awareness I the form of sensation is reached, it lastas only for an instant, which is an idivisible point of time ad is infinitesimal.

      Western psychologists like stout deschibe senstion as somethig of the atue of immediately exerienced warm or cold a specific tinge of pain touch loateed in or at the sufae of the body rather than anything outside. Psychogists have exteded the term to cover the isua data, te sounds ad the smes that may enter into immediate edperince Stout fruther says that all refoition of sensation as of a ertain kind, and all apprehension of it as countinuing to be of the same nature or as changing in nature at different momets, inoves a reference beyond this experiecnce . For, sensations are genuine and afactual, while menta construcrs are spruius and artifical. Sensations are new, uncontaminted and untouched by those menta processes which render ideas suspect. They are ot structured by percetpito dimmed and blurred through detention, abridege dthrough for gettig or artifically aranged as a result of fortuitous associations. From hume to Russsell modrn empriricism has tende to regard th einchoate beginnings of knowledge in unformed sensation as more authenti that the cognitive refineet which reent enquiry proide.82

      Iha cognition of object in empirical experience is ot complete with the mere awareness at the sensationa stage. In fact, pure senstions are ot possible. As stout says, we have hardy any prue sensations sensations absooutely devid of meain geither origina or aquied exept perhaps in the case of chingdren sensations transecen the immediate experience because they ar inseparaby conedted with though. They have a regerence to ecteral objects. They mean somethig beyond themselves.

      In the sense, our empirical experiece wil not be complete with avagraha.  Avargaha is not self subsistent. It invloves meaning and it has reference to object. It brings in iha a fatornvolvig meaning. The next stage in experiece’ the is iha. Inavagraha a person simpy hears a sound. I iha he cognises the ature of the sound also.83 jinabhadra sayas that iha is equiry for the distintie features of the objet84. Akalanaka defines iha similarly.85  Hemacandra defines it as strivig for the cognition of the specific deatails of the object apprehaded by senstion .86  It woud be apter to use ‘associative itergration’ as standig for iha Ad iha is the stage in the formation of perceptual experience. It brings in associative iteration of sesory eemets experenceced in the stage of senstion.

      Avaya: From the stage of associative integration iha we come to the stage of interpretation.sensations are interpreted and a eaing assinged to the sensations are interprted and a meaning assinged to the sensation. That would be perception. Sensation is the first impression of something the meaing of which is not coginsed. Pereptionis the iterpretatio of senstion is which the meaig is known. Avaya followd in the wake of iha in this stage we rach a determinate experiecnt. The strivig fro a cognition of the specific nature of the object. The Avasyakaniryukti defines aaya as determinate cognition.87   Tattarthasutra Bhasaya desricbes avaya as the stage of ascertainmet of the right exlusion of the qrong.89   Avaya may becmpared to the apperception involved in perceptual experience. Perception is complex experiece. The olde psycholoists analysed perception as invoving apperception. A pperception is assimilating new experience to old experience.

      Dharana: Retaention, dharana, is the next stage in perceputal experience . the Nanadisutra defines retention as the act of retaiging a perceptual judgement for number instasns or unnumberabe intssants. Acording to Umasavati retention devlops throug  three stages as I) the nature of the object is finally coginise, ii) the cognition so formed is retained ad iii) the object is recognisesd on future occasios. The Avasykanirukti defies dharana as retetion.90   Jiabhadra says that retention is the absence of the lapse of perceptual cognition. Like Umasvati he also metios three stage os retentionas I) the abseence of the oapse of perceptual judgement, ii) the formation of the menta traces and  iii) the recolection of the cognitio on the future aoccasions. In this description the absence of the lapse, avicyuti meta trace, vasaa, and recolectio sjriti arethree stges icluded in the condception of dharana.


      Thus some logiians make dharana a mere retantion of perceptual exprriene; while some other would make it also a condition of recal of that ecperiecce at a future time. Hemecandra reclls his iew of retntion as the condition of real with the iew as th eabcsense of rtention of the lapse mentioned in the Visesavasyaka Bhasya.  He says that retation is the absese of the lapse of perception but it is included in the perceputal judgement aaya . that is why it has not been separately mentioned by him. Avaya whe it continues for some length of time may be caed retantionas the absece of the lapse of experience. It may also be said that absece of the papse if also a condition of reall in the sense in which he defines Dharana Mere perception without the absence of the lapse give rise to reclooection perceptual judements which are not attendead by reflectie meta stage are almost on the lege of ounattended perception like the touch of gras by a person in hurried motion, and such perceptions are not capable of giving rise ot recolection.

      Hemancandra’s  descripation of Aaya and his analysisi o Dharana comes earer t the psycholgical analysis or perceptio espealy of the structuralist school. Perception is concrete experience in which sesations are aorganised and iterpretred. Meaing is assined to sensations. Without the factor of eaig interpretation of the sense impressions perception would be ipossible.

      The Jainas have gie an exhaustie descriiption of the four stages of Avagraha perceptua experiece, so far discussed. Each of them is of six types as they arise due to the fie sense organs ad due to mind. Again Vyanjanavagraha is of four types nly. Thus there would be twentyeight forms of percepeutal cognition. Each of twenteight forms agai is of twelve types aoeding tot the nature of the ojeject thery can have. Therefore the jainas have mentioned that there are three hudred ad thirtysix tupes of sense experience namey Matijana or Abhinibodhikannaa. This elaborate classification has no psychologial sigifcance, this elaborate classification has to psychologial significace, although it has logical and mathematia interese. The Jaina logicans were fond of presenting eaborate mathimatical calculations. This is found in their eaborate calssification of Karma as gien I the Goata Sara: Karma Kanada. Glasenap in his ‘Doctrine of karma in Jainism’ has given a detailed aylysisi of this division. The same tedency must have inspired the Jiana logicaans to give such an eleborate classification o Aagraha.

      v.  Super-sense Experiece: the problem of super- sesible experiece is not new in Iddian psychoogy. In the process of self-realization, man acquires certain experiences and powers, which are not possible for the common man with thre orma function of the sense organs. All systems of Indian philosophy exvept the Carakas and Mimamsakas, accept the possibility of such experiences. Sridhara argues that by the force of constant mediation on the self, akasa  and other supersensible object, we acquire knwedge of them, because the varying graedes of conscuousness must reach the imit beyond which it annot go . Jayata Bhatta showed that we an dexelop different degrees of perception eading to Yogic perception whih sees all objects past, future remote etc. he gies instances of cats which can see in darkness and the vaultured srom long distances. Yogis can see al objects inculdig the supersensible like dhara.92   such is the nature of divine perception aso with the difference that the divie perception is teternal while the Yogic perception is acquired through the practive of mediation.

      Prasatapada diveds Yogic perception into I) yukta  in ecstati condition; and ii) viyukta, of those who have falled from the ecstactic state. iN the state of ecstacy on eca see one’s own sef, other seves, akasam time and atoms. Those who are not in ecstacy can see the supersensible and hidden objects through a pecuilar contact of the sef, maas sense orgas and the objects. Neo –Naiyyayikas divide yougic perception into: I) perception of those who have attained the union with the Supreme Being; and ii) those who acquire it with some Yougic efforts. The former have constant perception. Arasajana as intuition of sages has also been recogiised.

      Vijanabhiksu states that the Yogis can come into contace with distant objects by virtue of power acquired through mediatton. This peculiar power of the mid cnsists in its al perasiveness. Through such powers under the unfluence perception. Arsajnana as intuition of sages has also been recognised.

      In the patanjala Yoga, mind is described as a coutunuous stream of functions flowing into fie statges: I)ksipta, ii) mudha,  iii)biksipta, occasionally steady Iv) ekagra oncentrated and  v) nirudha, withdraw. In the fourth and the fifth stages mid is withdraw from the objects and concetrated of one of the objects. I the fourth the mind gets the consciuos ecstacey (samprajanta –samadhi) and in the last there is the supra-conscious state of ecstay(asaprajata-samadhi). The concentration perceeds from the gross objects to the subter . in the different staged os samprajnata samadhi, the Yogi acquires miracuoous powers. The Vedaitins geerall y recognises two kinds of samadhi: samarajaata and asampraajnaata while different distinctions have been made by the Yoga psycholofists.

      Among the Buddhists Anuruddha divides consciousness into two legels: I) subliminal consciousness and ii) supreliminal consciousness, which is supernormal cosciousness. The yougi has t pass through three stages in the supraliminal cosciousness, which is supernormal consciousness. The Yogi has to pass through three stages in the supraliinal cosciousness:  I) rupacitta, where he sees visible and matieial forms. Cairoyance may be included in this form of experience. Ii)arutpacitta.  In this stage the Yogi sees things which are inisible and formless, iii) in the final stage of lokottaracita he reches the stage of transecendentaal consiciousness which is aboe the three worlds. This may be compared to omniscience, the bodhi. A monk has to go through the severe physical and menta discipline oin order to to pass through the different leels of consceousnesss. Concetration of mind has to oproceed through that of grooss objects to highest level of conentration of the four noble truths in graded way.

      According to the Jainas there are two leels of experience: pratyaksa which is pure experience of the soul without the help of the sense organs. Then, on the lower oevel, we have the empriical experience, which is possible through the sense organs. It is not relly direct experience of the soul. It is paroksa indirect experience, as the sense organs are impediments in the diect edperience of the pure soul. It is also called samvyaahara pratyakasa, empirial experience. When the eil of karma is remoed the soul in its pure form gets diecet experience without the helpof sense-organs. These experiences are supersensuous experiences. They hae been cassified into : I) avadhi which is anaogous to chairvoyance ii) manahaparayaya telephy, and iii) kevala, omniscience.

      Avadhi: Avadhi is a for of supersensible perception. In this, we apprehend objects whih are beyondthe reach of the sense organs. However, we perceive thigs in Aadhi which have form and shape. Things without form like the soul ad dharma can not be perceived by Avadhi. This can be compared with clairvoyace. Due to the varying degrees of the destruction and subsidence of the karmic veil the indivisdual can pecerive supersensible objets in different degrees. The highest type of Avadhi can perceie all objects having form. The Jianas interpret the capacity of perception in Avadhi in terms of space and time. They have developed a technique of athematial calculation of the sutleties of time and space. Regarding space Avadhi can extend oer a space offupied by innumerable pradesas of the size of the universe. With reference to time it can pereive through innumerable points of time both past and future. Avadhi can perceive al the modes of the things according to the degree of untensity of peception. The lowest type of Avadhi can perceive an object occupying a ery smal fraction of space ike the angula or finger breadth. Regarding the capacity in terms of time, the lowest type of Aadhi can last for only a short time like a ssecond. It cannot exptend byyond a second. Similarly it cannot know all the modes of the objects. It a only cognise a part of the modes.93   thus Aavadhi which may be compared to clairoyance, differs with different indiiduals accoridng to the capacity of the persons perceining. The apacity is in turn, deteminted by the relatie merits acquired by the persons.

      Modern psychical research has carried perception beyond opaque wall. Precogiiton and fore – knowledge have been of great interest ot para- psychlogy.94    even kant was greatly interested in ostensible clairoyanc eby Swedenborg with regerence to queen Loisa I 1761 and the clairoyant cognition of the Stockholm fire.95   in indian society we get many instaces of such forms of perception ad dreams. A scientific sutdy of such fors of perception is necessary.

      The Jainas do not make Aadhi a form of superormal peception , because beings living in hell, and even the lower animals, are apable of possessing Avadhi. Heavelry beigs and being in hell possess Aadhi naturally from bithh. They are endowed with it from birht. It is bhava pratyaya I them in the case of huma n beings as wel as the fivesensed lower organisms Avadhi is possible due to the desturction and subsidece of the releant vei of karma.96   it is acquired by erit. It is called gunapratyaya.97 The viseasavayaka Bhasya  gives a detailead desceiption of Avadhi from the fouteeen poiints of view and it svarieties with redrence to temporal and spatial extension.98  the pancasitkayasare devides Avadhi into three types with reference to spatia extension: desavadhi, paramavadhi and sarvavadhi. The Nandi-sutra gives  six variteis of Avadhi that ar possible I the case of homeless asceits. It mentions sub- diisions of these.99


      The psychic phenomeana cal ‘Frenceh sensitiveness or sometimes caled as ‘psychometry mind and the sense organs play their parts. C.D. Broad accepts that cairvoyance is non- sensuous perception. Clarivoyant experiences are facts. Eminent philosophers like Sidgwick, price and broad have acepted that there are ases of such experiences.

      Manahaparyaya: Next for of sepernorama pereption, which is manahparyaya. It is the direct experience of the modes of mid substance working in other indiidual mind.The Aasyaka iryukti gives a brief description f the nature of Manahaparyaya knowledge. Manahparyay cognises the object sof though by the minds of other people.100  the visesavasyaka Bhasya stated that a person possessing Maahparyaya directly cogises the meta states of others witout the insturentaity of the sense organs and the mind.101 

      In western thought such a form of cognition was called ‘thought trasferences’ Myers coined the prhase ‘Telepathy’ for desceibing such experiene. Tyrrel gies many instances of Telepathi cognition. He also mentaions instanes of cooenctive teepathy which he calls coooectie telepathic calculations.102  in the pubication called’apparitions’ published by te society for psychincal Reseach many interesting exampled os teepathi coition have been mentioned.

      Manahaparyaya. Telepathic experience, is not easy to get and is not comon for all. Acertaing physical and mental discipline is the condition ofr getting such capacity of the Avasyaka Niruyukti we are tlod tha Manahaparayaya is possible only for humanbeings of character, especialy for homeless ascetics. Human beings acqueire this capacity due to erit and by the practie of mental and moral discipline.103  the nandisutra gie detaile describption of the conditions of the possility of Manahaparyaya in the case of human beigs.104  The conditons for the possession of Manahaparyaya are I)the huma beings in the Karma-bhumi must have fully developed sense ograns and a fuly debeloped peesonality i.e they must be Iparyapta iii) they must possess right attitude, saayg drist. As a cnsequence they must be free from passion. Iii) they must be self controlled and they must be possessed of raddhi, extra ordiary powers the discipline and occout powers attainable by the yogis entioned in the patajala yoga is analogous to sucha descripio of the qualifications f the human beings possessing Manahparyaya siddhasens Divakara says that lower organisms possessing two or more sense organs are also found to possess Manahaprayaya. But the traditional Jaina view does not acetp the posibility of Maahaparyaya in the case of lower animals. Thine says that it is possibelt to find istances of the possibility of such perceptions in the case of olwer anials especially the higher ertebrates. Several experments hae carried in this conections and serval experiment have been carried in this connection and severa instces have been quaoted.105

      The Sthanana recngnise stwo arieties Manahaparyaya as rjumati and vipulmati. 106   Umasacati makes a similar distinrtions 107  he says that Rjumati is less pure and it someties falters. Vipulamati is purer and more lasting . it lasts upto the rise of omniscience. We also get such a desceiption I the pancastikayasara. 108  Rjumati gies a striaight and direct intuition of the thoughts of others, while in Vipulamati the proess of knowing the ideas of others is maidfested in an irregualr way. Puiyapada desceibes the narute of Manahaparyaya as the intuition or oects of the ativities fo the sense ogras of speeh, body and mind.109    He says that Vipulaati knows lesss number of object of the than Rujuatio but whateve it knows it knows perfectly ad bividoly vipulameti is more penetratig and it is more lucid than Rjumati. Rjumati flaters. Onew who is at the upward stage of spiritual development has qcquieed Vipulamati while on ewho is sure to desecent in the spiritual developomet gets the Rjumati Manahparyaya.110



      In the weat the phenoeana of extea-sensory perceptio likeclairvoyace, telepathy, precognition and edumbship have been accepted as fats, Een pschloligists like McDougall are inclined to believe that extra sensory perception like clairvoyance telephathy ad or knowledge seems in a fair way edtabliseh.111  Prof. H.H.Prince says that evideance for clairvoyance and telepathy is ‘abundant and good.112  Prof Rihet admits that telepathi experiences certaialy exist.113   Dr Rhine has doe good work in extra-sensory perception. He syas that extra-sensory pereption in the for of clairvoyance ad telepathy is an actual and demosntrabe occurrence. It is not a sensory phenomenon.114 

      Kevala: Acording to the Jainas the soul, in its pure form is pure consicousness and knowldege. It is omnisient. But it is obcured by the karmas as the mood or the sun is lible be obscured by the eil of dust, for or a patch of cloud.115   when such a veil of karma is removed omniscience dawans. That is kevala jnana. That is a stage aof perfect knowedge and a stage of kaivaya.

      Omniscience intuits all substane with al theirr modes.116  Nothing remains unknown in omiiscience. It is knowledge of all substances and modes of the pa, preset and the future, all in one. It is lastingand eterna. It is transcedenatl and pure. It is the perfect manifestation of the pure and the real nature of the soul when the obstructie ei of Karma ar removed.117

      This ominiscience is coexistet with the supreme state’of absolute clarity of life monad’ this is precisefly the relase.118  No longer is the monad dimmed with the beclodding passion but open and free and unilimted by the particualrising qualities that constiute indiidualtiu’ The mment the limitation that makes particular experience possibel if eleminated perfect itutuion of everythig is attained. The need of the experenes in dissolove in infinite- this is the postie meaning of kaialya.119  Zimmer says that one is reminded of the rptestof the modren French poet and philosopher Paul valery in his noe mansieru Tests. There are people’ he writes who fee that the prgans of sense ar cutting them off from reality and essence knowledge, a cloud obsruting the essence of being; the shing moon , like darkness or a cataract of the eye! Take it al away so that modern theory of kmowdege from which it arises, is remarkaby close to the old idea which jainism holds:thath of the liiting foce of our varuous faculties of huma n understanding.

      Mimamsakas are not prepared to acetpt the possibility of the ocurrence. The Mimamsakas raised a series of logical objections to the possibility of omminscience. Aording to the Mimamasakas omminicience canot mean the kowedge of al the objects of the word either at the same time or successiveely Nor can omniscience be knowledge of archetypal formas and not of particular things. There can be no omniscience beaaus eknowledge of the past, the  prasent and the future can neve be exhausted . moreover , if al onjet wre known in omiscience at one moment then the next moment it would be unconscience and bank . the ominscient , gain would be tainted by the desire and aveersions of toehters in knowing them.

      But Jainas refute the argument of the Miamsakas regarding the problem of the occurrence of ominiscience. In the pramana Mimamsa we get the refutatuion of the Mimasa arguments against the ocurrence of omisicience. Similarly Mimamasakas have bee replied by prabhacandrai n prameya-kamala-martanda. The Jaisas sy that it is ot corect otdyny the ocurence as the Mimasakes do. Onmisciecnce is the sogle intuition of the whole aord ecause it does not depet upon the sense organs and the mind. The pure intuitio of the omnsicient selfknows a the object simultaeously by a single stirke of intuition since it trasecnds the imits of time and space. Prabhacandra syas that the Mimamsaka obejction theat the omnsiceiet soul woukd be unconscious the next moment of the occurrence of omniscience is not correct, becaude it is a sigel uednig intuition For the omniscient. Cognition and the word are not destroyed the momet the omniscience is possibel. Similarly the Jainas cnted, as agaist the Mimamsakas, that the omiiscient soul knows the past as existingin the past and future as existing in the future0.120  The omniscient selfis absloutely free form the bondae ofphysical existaence as past preset and future. In fact the Mmamasakas also admit tha ti recogition we apprehed the past as we the preset in one cognitionk and a flash intuion called pratibha jnana in emprirical life a apprehed future it is theresore possible for the omiscient soul who ins etreely free from the fetters of karma to have a super-sensous vision of the whole world past prset and future by as asigel unendig flash of intutuon. In the  pramana Mimamsa the possibility of the occurrence omniscience is logially proved by the ecessity of the final consummation of the progressive deelopment of knowledge.121   There are degrees of exellece in kowledge ad the knowledge must reach it sconsummation somehwere Tat is the stage of omiscience when the obsuring Karmas are totally aihilated.122

      The nandi surta metions two types: I) Bhavastha omnisiecne f the liberated who stilive I this world as for instace the omnisciecne of the Tirthamakars ii) Omiscience of the one who is totally liberated which may be caled Siddha.123  The Bhavastha omniscience is again of two types as I) Sayogi and ii) Ayogi. There are sub-divisions in both these. Similarly Siddha omniscience is of two types as I) Anantara- kevala and ii) Paramapara-Kevala, each having it sub-divisions.124

The Jaina view of omniscience may be coparead to the Nyaya view of the divine knowledge, and the Yoga theory of divine perception. Divine knowledge is all-embracing intuition. It is perceptual in character as it is direct and as it is not derived through the instrumentality of any other cognition. The divine perception grasps the past, the present and the future in one eternal ‘now. The soul.accordig to the Jaina, is itself divine and perfect and there is no there is any other transcendental being than the individual soul. Each soul is a God by itself although it is obscured by the Karmic veil in its empirical state. The Kaivalyastate of the individual soul may be compared to the dive omniscience. However, the Naiyayikas and Pratanjali accept that man has sometimes the flash of the intuition of the future, and he can attain omniscience by constant meditation and the practice of austerities. The Jainas believe that the removal of obscuring Karmas by meditation, threefold path and self-control, the individual soul reaches the consummation of omniscience, the state of Kaivalya. That is the finality and the end. But others like the Naiyayikas posit a divine omniscience which is higher, natural and eternal.

It is not possible to establish the possibility of omniscience on the basis of empirical methods of investigation which psychology and empirical science follow. However, its logical possibility cannot be denied. Progressive realization of greater and subtler degrees of knowledge by the individual is accepted by some psychologists especially with the introduction of psychical Research for analysing extra-sensory perception. A consummation of this progressive realization would logically be pure knowledge and omniscience, a single al embracing intuition.