But, before we get a sense experience, like sight, certain psychological impediments hare to be removed. For instance, diversion of attention, and subjective conditions like prejudice and bias, have to be minimised if we are to get a correct sense experience. For instance, as I Vulcan says, for every sense experience we have a mental set which determines a type of the specific sense experience that we get.- This set may be inherited or acquired. This psychological factor may be compared to the labdhi of the bhavend. Yiya, which is the expression of the hormic force in the specific form due to the partial destruction zind subsidence of the knowledge-obscuring karmas relating to that sense.
The problem of the contact of the sense organs with the object of stimulation is an important one in Indian thought. It has a great psychological significance. Almost all the systems of Indian thought were aware of this problem and have expressed themselves in one form or another. The Nyaya Vaisesika, the Sariikhya, the Mimamsaka and the Vedanta schools of thought believe that all the sense organs get sensory experience through direct contact of the object of stimulation with the sense organ. This refers to the physical contact of the object of stimulation with the sense organ and the sense organs having such contact are called prapyakari. The sense organs in which there is no such physical contact with the external stimulation’s are called aprapya kari. According to the orthodox systems of Indian philosophy mentioned above, the sense organs are prapyakari because there is physical contact with the stimulation. In fact, it is maintained by them that the sense organs move out to the object in the form of vrtti, or modification, and by taking in their form apprehend them. The Buddhists believe that the visual sense organ and the auditory sense organ cognize their objects without coming into direct contact with them. They are aprapyalrari. For all of them, however, the mind is aprapyakerri, because it does not come in direct contact with the object. The Jainas maintain that the visual organ, like the mind, is apnipyakari, because it does not come in contact with the object. For instance, we get visual experience of the moon and mountains alike. According to the Jainas, the eye does not go round to the mountain and then fix a point to form the vrtti, nor does it go round the stars and then fix on the moon to get the experience. Such a movement of the eye round the objects of stimulation is absurd, and it contradicts our experience. The Jainas say that light and dark ness do not involve the eye going out ‘to see light. Moreover, the eye is not an external organ, bahyendriya. The Jainas maintain that it is not true to say that there is a physical contact either of the nature of anugraha or upaghata for the eye. Seeing the blazing sun is not upaghata, because the eye is the organ of light (tejasendriycr); and matter of the same nature does not bring arrugraha and upaghata. But the eye is not active while seeing the sun after the clouds have gone because there is deficiency of light. The rays in the eyes are few compared to the abounding rays of the sun. However, when we see the blazing sun our eyes do not ache.
The Samkhyayikas object to maintaining that the eye alone, like the mind, is aprapyakari, and the other four sense organs are prapyakari. If that were the case, we may as well argue, they say, that all the sense organs are aprapyakart, because we, for instance, hear distant sounds and smell the fragrance of a flower from a distance. But the Jainas say that this objection is not convincing. They point out that even those sense organs which are prapyakari do not go out to meet the objects for getting experience; the objects themselves come in contact with the sense organs and the sense organs remain where they were. It means that external stimulation’s, like sound waves, affect the ears and as a result we hear.
The Buddhists say that even the ear may be called aprapyakari, because we hear from a distance, and as there is no direct contact of the object with the sense organ. It is aprapyakari because, in any type of auditory experience there is no physical contact. For instance, a new-born infant will give the same type of response to the stimulation of a loud sound or of a pleasant sound. Even if there is thunder, auditory experience may not be possible. But the Jainas say this is not a correct explanation, because in the case of the infant the sense organs are not as yet well adapted and developed. They have not sufficient capacity for grasping the sound. The appropriateness of stimulation is one of the conditions of sensory experience. In the case of hearing, the sound waves are received only when the sense organ is suitably developed and also when other conditions are favorable. That is why they go to the appropriate places, yogya desavasthita. For instance, a low tone is not generally heard, but if the beloved speaks in a low tone the lover quickly hears. This refers to the psychological factor of interest which is a condition of specific sense experience. We may include this in the labdhi of the bhavendriya. In the case of the auditory sense, the Jainas point out that, although the ear is a prnpyakari and although some form of physical contact is necessary for the auditory experience, it is not direct physical contact with the stimulation as in the case of smell or taste. In the case of taste specially, the stimulation is directly physical. The particles of food, for instance, come actually in contact with the tongue. Such direct phsical contact is called baddha sprsta.z The Jainas say that in the case of the auditory sense organ the contact is there but it is indirect. Stimulation like sound waves issuing from the object come in touch with the organ of hearing and we get the auditory experience.
Modern physiologists describe the process of audition in these terms. The sound waves are transmitted through the external auditory meatus to beat against the tympanic membrane. As a result, the tympanic membrane is caused to vibrate in harmony with the frequency of sound waves. The movement of the tympanic membrane in response to sound waves causes the auditory ossicles to move with it. Under normal conditions, sound waves pass through the external auditory meatus and strike the ear-drum. This energy is transmitted to the fluid of the inner ear and the hair cells in the organ of corti are caused to move and initiate an auditory impulse. There are two theories concerning the mechanism by which the movement of the hair cells gives rise to impulses in the auditory nerve: (i) through a microphonic effect, and (ii) through a chemical mediator. At present, evidence is not conclusive for either theory.
Thus, the Jainas believe that the auditory, gustatory, olfactory and tactual sense organs are prapyakari, because the contact of the object with the sense organs is due to upaghata, a gross and subtle physical contact. The touch of a blanket gives the experience of roughness, and contact with the sandal paste gives a sense of coolness. Particles of camphor come in contact with the olfactory sense organs and we experience a smell. Similarly, soft sounds give a pleasant experience. But in the case of the eye there is no contact between the sense organ and the object.
On the basis of the analysis of perception given in modern science it is not possible to say that the Jaina view of the aprapyakari nature of the visual sense organ is not understandable, because some kind of contact of the external object with the sense organ is necessary ,even in this experience. But it should be observed that light is only required to illuminate the object and not to serve as a medium between the eye and the object, for the eye can observe the object being itself untouched by the rays of light illumining the object.
However, the problem of the contact of the sense organ with the abject was viewed differently by the ancient Indian philosophers. Their problem was to explain the possibility of cognition to the sense organ. The Jainas had a realistic approach, and they refused to believe that the sense organ goes out to meet the object.
C. D. Broad says that hearing is projective in its epistemological aspect, and is emanative in its physical aspect. We may say that sight is ostensibly prpensive and not projective in its epistemological aspect, but is emanative in its physical aspect. Touch is ostensibly prehensive in its epistemological aspect, and is non-emanative in its physical aspect.o
The Jaina analysis of the prapyakaritva of the sense organ of hearing and the aprapyakaritva of the sense organ of sight may be compared to the analysis given by Broad, although the epistemological and physical aspects of the problem were not clear to the Jainas in that early stage of knowledge.
Considering the capacity of the sense organs, the Jainas believe that the capacity of the eyes is greater. The eye perceives things like mountains, which are at a distance, and things which are very near, like the parts of the body. But it cannot see the dust in the eyelids. The capacity is limited, because it cannot see things which are beyond a particular limit, like the farthest and the nearest. The Vaisesikas say that it is a defect of the eye. But the Jainas maintain that it is the nature, the svabhdva, of the sense organ. The auditory organ is of a similar nature. But in the case of the ear there is a special power. It grasps sound waves coming from as far as twelve yojauas if the wind is favourable and they are not obstructed. It grasps the sound waves even inside the ear. It is subtler than the sense organ of smell. It receives sound waves of various types, but it grasps only those which are relevant, as the bird picks out milk from a mixture of milk and water-the hamsakstra.
Modern science recognizes that vision is the most important of all the senses. Blind people learn to depend on other senses to a remarkable degree. But for the loss of vision there is never anything like complete compensation. We rely or, vision for protection, for equilibration, for co-ordination, for creation and pleasure. Next comes audition. Then we have olfaction and other sense functions. Audition ranks, perhaps, almost with vision. In the case of man, olfactory acuity has been allowed to be atrophied. The lower animals are far more dependent on their acute sense of smell than we are. Actual survival hinges on the animal’s ability to find food and to avoid enemies. To some extent this was also the case with primitive man. But as man advanced, the olfactory sense began to get restricted in its use. Modern men use the olfactory sense for pleasure. Audition, like vision, is important for protection, because this sense warns us of danger in the environment. It also adds to our enjoyment. Therefore, it is considered as a vital sense.
We may refer to the functions of the senses on the different animal levels. According to the Jainas there are gradations of animal life. At the lowest level, there are the one-sensed organisms called ekendriyas. They may be earth-bodied, water-bodied, air-bodied and fire-bodied. This level includes the vegetable kingdom. Many of the organisms are minute or even microscopic. They pervade the whole world. They are described as sakala loka vyapinah. Some of them may be gross-bodied, and visible. These organisms possess only the sense of touch. No other sensory discrimination has been developed in them. The amoebae, the paramecium and other protozoan animals, similarly coelenterates and even flat-worms, may be included in this list, although the Jainas have not mentioned any specific animal species in this category. Modern comparative psychologists are not agreed on the question of the sensory experience of lower animals. Some maintain that they have a chemical sense. But some scientists like Stealer think the reaction of these animals may be due to mechanical stimulation. Even in food-seeking the sense of touch is predominant. Romances ascribed a certain amount of discrimination among mechanical stimuli to the sea-anemones. In the case of planaria maculate, a species of flatworms, Bardeen has suggested that auricular appendages on the animal’s Also refer to Physiology of’ Man by Lanaley and Cheraskin, Chapter-Special Functions.
back near the head end which are specifically sensitive to the touch, may be delicate organs capable of stimulation by slight currents in the water set up by minute organisms that prey on the animal’s food, so that the primitive reaction when given to food may be really a response to mechanical stimulation.
In the next stage are the two-sensed organisms called dvendriyas. They have the sense of touch and taste, which is like the chemical sense, although the chemical sense signifies a combined sense of both touch and taste. Comparative psychologists maintain that rudimentary animals, specially the water-dwelling animals, have smell and taste combined. They call it the chemical sense; for, in the aquatic animals smell and taste are actually the same. Lloyd Morgan has proposed the term ‘talaesthetic taste’ for the chemical sense of aquatic animals. But it is said that touch gives mechanical stimulation and is present in all animals. The Jainas say that touch is the basic sense. They describe in detail animals possessing the two senses. They give examples of animal species possessing the two senses. For instance, the conch, candauaka, kapardaka, jelukhi, golaka, and puttaraka, belong to this class. These are the molluscan species. Among comparative psychologists there is general agreement regarding the presence of the chemical sense in the molluscan. animals. Nagel regarded the horn of the marine snails as their most sensitive region. Pieron found that there are three modes of chemical excitability in these animals: (i) an aerial distance excitability on all parts of the body with predominance of the mouth, the anterior edge of the foot, and the siphon; (ii) a contact sensibility in both air and water in the horns in the mouth; and (iii) a delicate distance sensibility in water located in the regions of the mouth, the horns, the anterior edge of the foot and the osphradial region.
Three-sensed organisms possess a sense of touch, taste and smell. Many examples have been quoted. The ants have three senses.. The four-sensed organisms possess the sense of touch, smell, taste
and sight. The bhramara (the bee) has four senses. Many of these belong to the species of insects. But comparative psychologists are not agreed on the place of the sense of sight in insects. The homing of the bees and their recognition of their nest-mates were the two interesting problems which psychologists were faced with. Some scientists thought that vision is the guiding factor in these cases. However, Be the thought that they were not guided by sight. He said there was some unknown force which guided them to their hives. Many scientists believe that smell plays an important part in this case. Modern scientists have observed that even simple animals like the amoebae give reaction to light stimulation. Schaeffer reports a curious fact that the amoebae can ‘sense’ a beam of light 20 microns to 120 microns distant moving towards it. Many jellyfish react to light. Romanes says that they possess a visual sense; but there is no positive evidence. Some of the molluscan species possess eyes of some degree of development, although their reaction to light is very slow. The crustacean are provided with a peculiar visual organ, the compound eye; and the chief function of this eye seems to be that of responding to shadows and movements. As we go higher up in the animal scale, we find that the structure of the eye becomes more complex, and the compound eye gives rise to the simple eye with cones and rods. The vertebrates, like fish (Matsuya), crocodile (niakara), and man are five-sensed organisms. Those possessing the five senses are divided into two groups: (i) those possessing mind and intelligence; these are called sarhjninah; (ii) those who do not possess mind and intelligence, asarhjiainah. It is not possible to say whether the Jainas showed a qualitative distinction between sense and reason. However, they maintained that among the five sensed animals only some of them are samjititls. Human beings belong to this class. They possess specific
mental states like memory, imagination and intellection.. The asahijnins do not possess such mental qualities. A further psychological analysis of this group is made by the Jainas. They say that the saujnins are further divided into those which are incomplete and those which are complete. Incomplete species are those in which the sense capacities do not work freely and are deficient in expression. Such deficiency may be due to a defect of structure in the sense organ or in the mental capacity to grasp the sense experience. This, in brief, is the classification of animals having sense organs. Going higher in the scale of life, there are those beings who are not fettered with the sense organs. They are called anindrivas. They get pure and unalloyed experience, because sense experience, according to the Jainas, is experience at a lower level. It is not direct experience of the soul. It comes through the sense organs, which are a limitation. Beings without sense organs come nearer to the realization of the highest experience. Some of them are complete in mental equipment and capacity. They are perfect beings. They are siddhas. Thus, from the psychological analysis of the development of animal life we go to the metaphysical nature of the soul found in the disembodied being. The embodiment of the soul is a hindrance to the attainment of pure experience. Pure experience is possible by removing the barrier of the senses. The present stage of psychology cannot explain such a phenomenon as super-sensible experience, although it is possible to approach this problem through studies in para-psychology and extra-sensory experience. Research in this direction is both possible and necessary. This problem will be referred to in a later chapter in which extra-sensory perception will be discussed.
Sense organs are instruments by means of which sense experience is possible. The senses are capacities of experience, and the sensible qualities which exist outside are objects of experience. For instance, the common element between the eye and the object is colour, and the common element in the case of hearing is sound. They are stimulation’s. The Jainas have given a psychological analysis of the sense qualities emerging from the experience of the various senses. As Radhakrishnan says, a good deal of psychological analysis is discernible in the division of sense qualities. According to the Jainas, the visual sense quality of colour is classed into five types: black (krsna), blue (nila), yellow (pita), white (sukla), and pink ( pedant).a Young supposed that there exist three distinct sets of nerve fibers, one set sensitive to red, one to green and the third to violet. This theory has been expounded by Helmholtz. There are three primary colour excitations, and the mixture of these three gives different colour experiences. All fibbers are responsive, in some way, to all waves,_ though the red fibbers are excited by the long waves: Green fibres respond to those of medium length. Violet fibres are maximally stimulated by short waves. All colour experience results from these three simultaneous excitations based on the relative strength of the components in the stimulus of light. This is the Trichromatic theory. But Herring and Franklin have objected to this theory. They maintain that yellow and white are as primary as the three colour qualities mentioned by Helmholtz. Herring supposed that the primaries are to be arranged in pairs. There are three complex substances, one mediating white-black, another red-green, and the third responsible for yellow-blue. The white-black material is more plentifully supplied and is more readily excited than others. When activated, it gives purely achromatic brilliance and can be depressed in direction by black only through light adaptation and contrast. The other two substances behave differently, having their activity either depressed or augmented. The red-green substance yields red when ‘torn down’ by light, and green when built up. In the yellow-blue substance, depression produces blue, whereas augmentation results in yellow. The LaddFranklin theory represents, in a sense, a compromise between the Trichromatic combination for mixture and the tetra-chromatic combination in its existence. It points out that there are five primary colour qualities. In fact, Newton presented his celebrated triangle for explaining the natural phenomenon of the spectrum and the scope of the sense of sight. The triangle places green at the apex, red and violet at the lower points, gray in the centre, and purple at the mid-base. The figure is given in Table III. Instead of this triangle, Wound proposed a circle. Titchner gives us a pyramid in which every possible chromatic or achromatic variation finds its due place. Whatever may be the difference between the views of the Jainas and of modern scientists, it may be said to the credit of the Jainas that they were aware that the five sense qualities are responsible for giving the variation in colour experience. Modern scientists like Ladd and Franklin, and even Newton, have mentioned five primary qualities. According to the Ladd-Franklin theory, there is a white-black whole and a yellow-blue whole; similarly, it mentions the red-green whole. The Jainas did not mention red-green as a specific sense quality.
FED PURPLE VIOLET
Regarding sense qualities like touch, taste and smell, the Jainas give a detailed analysis of the different types of sense qualities. Touch is of eight kinds, like hot (usna) and cold (sita); rough (ruksa) and smooth (srzigdha); soft (komala) and hard (kathora); light (laghu) and heavy (guru). Modern scientists have realized that skin has the potentiality of yielding a greater diversity of sensations, because the skin proves to be responsive to a wide range of stimuli, like mechanical, thermal, electrical and chemical. Mechanical stimulation gives rise to sensation. of touch, contact and pressure. Thermal stimulation produces the sense experience of warm and cold in various degrees. Chemical stimuli have been worked to give rise to pain. Chemicals and drugs have been of much interest for their quality of reducing pain. Electrical stimulation of the skin seems capable of arousing all systems of sensibility. Kinaesthetic and organic sensibilities of various types including hunger and organic pain belong to the sense of touch.o The Jainas say that there are five types of taste: pungent (tiktu), bitter (katu), acid (umla), sweet (nzadhura) and astringent (kasaya). Some scientists have accepted salt, sweet, bitter and sour as the primary taste qualities. However, there is no complete agreement on this point. In the Western thought, at the end of the sixteenth century, there were n.ine basic taste qualities, like sweet, sour, sharp, pungent, harsh, fatty, bitter, insipid and salty. By the middle of
the eighteenth century, some of them were gradually dropped, because it was found that they were merely mixtures of different taste qualities. Later, four qualities were accepted as primary. Henning’s ‘taste-tetrahedron’ presents the relation between the four primary taste qualities: saline, sweet, sour and bitter. Various other taste qualities arise out of the inter-action of the primary qualities. However, Henning views taste as one, and not four senses. Henning’s tetrahedron is shown in Table IV.
The Jainas classified smell in only two types, as good, (sugandha) and bad (durgandha). No further distinction has been made,
In the eighteenth century, in Europe, an odour system was devised. Henning has given a scheme of odour prism which is shown in Table V. The Crocker Henderson system posits four fundamental odours, like fragrant, acid, burnt, and caprylic. All these classifications are partly based on experimental investigation and partly on rational insight. But there are difficulties in the grouping of odours, because, as Woodworth points out, in, the analysis of Henning’s classification some odour qualities are not purely odour. They are mixed up with taste qualities. Zwaardemaker classified the smell qualities as ethereal (as in
Henning’s Smell Prism
fruit), aromatic (as in spice), fragrant (as in flowers), ambrosial (as in musk), alliaceous (as in onion), ampyreumatic (as in tar), hircine (as in cheese), repulsive (as in laudanum), and nauseous (as in decaying flesh). This is a very elaborate, even clumsy, classification. It does not mention the primary sense qualities alone. The Jainas gave an analysis of the odour qualities, and in fact of all sense qualities, on the basis of rational insight. They thought it safer to analyse the smell sense qualities into two major categories, as good and bad.
The traditional exposition of the seven fundamental sounds (svara) mixing in various ways to form melodies of various types, has been accepted by the Jainas. The seven sounds are: sadja, rsabha, gandhara, madhyama, paiacama, dhaivata, and nisadha. In the Western sound system, we get the following: Do, re, me, fa, sol, la, and si. In all, there are twenty-seven main kinds which can be combined in innumerable
1. Sparsa—Touch—8 kinds (1) Usna (hot); (2) Sita (cold); (3) Ruksa (rough); (4) Snigdha (smooth); (5) Kornala (soft); (G) Kathora (hard”,; (7) haghu (light); (8) Guru (heavy).
2. Rasa--Taste-5 kinds:
(1) Tikta (pungent); (2’ Amla (acid); (3) Katu (bitter); (4) Madlcura (sweet); (5) Kasaya (astringent).
3. Varna—Colour—5 kinds: (1) Krs”a (black); (2) Nila (blue); (3) Pita (yellow); (4) Sukla (white); (5) Padma (pink).
4. Gandha-Smell-2 kinds: (1) Sugandha (sweet smelling); (2) Durgandha (bad- smelling).
5. Sabda-Sound-7 kinds: (1) Sadja; (2) K,sabha; (4) Madhyama; (S) Pancama; (G) Dlaatvata; (7) Nisadha; i.e. the: Do, re, me, ,;a, sol, la, si.
These are 27 which can be combined in various ways.
Note: In rational beings, mind also assists the senses in bringing knowledge to the soul.
ways. There are two varieties of combination of tones: difference tones and summation tones. The difference tones were discovered by the celebrated Italian violinist, Tartini. Summation tones were discovered after the Helmholtz researches, in 1856 A.D. A difference tone has a pitch determined by the difference between the frequencies of the two other tones. The pitch of the summation tones results from the addition of frequencies. The study of the combination of tones and beats has led to research in auditory harmony. In the case of sound researches, Spearman says that a distinction has been drawn between noise and tone.43 A detailed classification of the Jaina view of sense qualities is shown in Table VI.
Thus, the analysis of sense qualities given by the ancient Jainas has not been arbitrary. It has a great psychological significance, although it has no basis in scientific and experimental research. However, it can be said with confidence that the Jaina analysis of sense qualities shows a good deal of psychological significance, and has shown very deep and clear rational insight. The conclusions drawn by these philosophers may not be adequate and not agree with the modern views of scientists who have worked out the same problems through experimental research in laboratories. It may be noted that there is not either much agreement among modern scientists as to the detailed analysis of sense qualities like colour, sound, smell and taste, although there is a fair agreement on the fundamentals. The same measure of agreement can be found in the views of the Jaina philosophers. In fact, the views presented by the Jaina philosophers on the problem of sense qualities very much agree with the views of other Indian philosophers of ancient times. We find this in a description of sense qualities given by the Naiyayikas. It is needless to say that the psychological significance of the analysis of sense qualities given by the Jainas purely through rational insight and not on the basis of experimental research, cannot be ignored.
THE JAINA THEORY OF SENSE PERCEPTION
The Jainas have made a significant contribution to the theory of sense perception. In order to understand the Jaina theory of sense perception it is necessary to study their epistemology.
The Jaina attitude is empirical and realistic. The Upanisadic philosophers found the immutable reality behind the world of experience. Goutama, the Buddha, denounced everything as fleeting and full of sorrow. Mahavira stood on commonsense and experience and found no contradiction between permanence and change. The Jaina philosophy is based on logic and experience. Moksa is the ultimate aim of life. It is realized by the three-fold path of right intuition, right knowledge and right conduct.’ Right knowledge is one of the major problems of Jaina philosophy. It is necessary to understand the Jaina theory of knowledge and experience for the proper understanding of Jaina thought. The Jaina epistemology is very complex and developed gradually in response to the demands of time.
The Agarrta theory of knowledge is very old and probably originated in the pre-Mahavira period. Jnana pravada formed a part of the Purvasruta which formed a part of the ancient literature. Jinabhadra, in his Visesavasyakabhasya, quotes a pirva gatha on jnaua. There seems to have been no difference of opinion between the followers of ParSva and Mahavira regarding the division of knowledge. Both of them accept the five-fold distinction of knowledge. The Agamas have also presented the five divisions of knowledge.
Knowledge is inherent in the soul, but owing to perversity. of attitude arising out of the veil of karma, we may get wrong knowledge, ajiTa;ta. Knowledge is perfect when the veil of karma is totally removed. It is imperfect even when there is partial subsidence or destruction of karma. The soul can get perfect knowledge directly when the veil of karma is removed. That is pratyaksa jnana. But empirical knowledge, experience of this world, is possible with the help of the sense organs indirectly. Such knowledge was called paroksa jnana. Matijrcana (sense experience), and srutajnana (knowledge due to verbal communication), are paroksa jitana; while avadhi (extra-sensory perception), muraahparvaya (telepathy), and kevala jn”ana (omniscience), were called pratyalcsa. But
[Please this table see file name ‘wide table page no. 13,57,73’]
later, in order to bring the Jaina theory of knowledge in line with the theories of other systems of Indian thought, they modified their conception of pratyaksa and paroksa j0na. In the Anuyogadva’ra Sictra, we find a change in terminology. Mati and sruta began to be called pratyaksa as they were possible through the operation of the sense organs. Jinabhadra calls the two samvyavalzara prat,vaksa.e Alongside of jnana, we have direct intuition of the object. It is darsana. Darsana has similar subdivisions. In the same way, wrong knowledge is also possible in those cases where the veil of karma is not removed and where there is perversity of attitude. Thus, we have mati-ajrcana, srcata-ajn”ana, and avadhi-ajnana. The general classification of knowledge and intuition mentioning their perversities, is shown in Table VII. This classification shows that the Jairlas believed that the subsidence and destruction of the veil of karma is a necessary condition of knowledge and intuition. Wrong knowledge is characterized as samsaya (doubt), viparyaya (perversity), and anadhyava.saya (wrong knowledge caused by carelessness and indifference). Owing to the lack of discrimination between thereal and the unreal, the soul with wrong knowledge, like the lunatic, knows things according to its own whims. Perversity of attitude veils the faculty of perception and knowledge, and knowledge becomes vitiated. It becomes ajilana.s
We may now consider sense perception or pratyaksa jnana, as the Nandisutra calls it. It is knowledge obtained through the operation of the sense organs and the manas. It was called paroksa by Umasvati. Jinabdhara called it sarirvyavahara pratyaksa. It is also called indriya pratyaksa.-I In the Nandisutra, a distinction is made within pratyaksa, between perception (indriya prcrtyaksa), and perception not due to the sense organs (unindriya prat yaksa).s Hemacandra describes in the PramanamFmaritsa that pratyaksa is that which is immediate, clear and unambiguous. He analyses the various definitions of pratyaksa of other schools and shows that they are not adequate. The Naiyayika definition of perception as unerring cognition which is produced by the sense object contact is not adequate. How can the sense object contact and the like, he asks, which is not of the nature of cognition, function as efficient instrument for the determination of the object? The Buddhists have given a definition of perceptual cognition as that which is free from conceptual construction and is not erroneous. But Hemacandra says that this definition is irrational since it has no bearing on practical activity, It has no pragmatic value. Jaimini defines perception as that which is engendered in the mind of a person upon the actual contact of the sense organ with the object. This definition is also too wide, since it overlaps such cognition, as doubt and illusions also occur as a result of sense contact. The older exponents of the Samkhya school define perceptual cognition to be modification of the sense organs such as the organ of hearing. But sense organs are devoid of consciousness; therefore, their modifications cannot be conscious. If, on the other hand, it is assumed to derive its conscient character from its association with a conscious principle like the self; then the status of the organ of knowledge should be accorded to the self: T1-erefore, Hemacandra said, perceptual cognition is immediate and lucid.9
It is not possible that sense perception, which is based upon the stimulation present to the senses, is incapable of knowing the cognitions that preceded and that follow. Even in the case of cognitions arising out of the data present to the senses, the cognitions would be only subjective. It would not be possible to determine their validity or invalidity to the satisfaction of an outsider. It would be difficult to establish objective validity; hence sense perception is one of the sources of knowledge, and not the only source as the Carvakas would maintain.
In Plato’s dialogue, Theaetetus, Socrates examines the doctrine that knowledge is through perception. This is the position of the common notion that knowledge of the external world comes to us through the senses. Socrates points out that the view of Theaetetus is identical with the doctrine of Heraeleitus that all things are in motion, and the Protagerean dictum, homo mensura. Socrates in the end shows that the position adopted by Theaetetus is not acceptable because it leads to an impossibility. Socrates said that, if knowledge and perception are the same, it leads to an impossibility, because a man who has come to know a thing and still remembers it does not know it, since he does not see it, and that would be a monstrous conclusion.Io
Pratyaksa is defined in the Pramanamirnamsa as that which is immediate and lucid. These characteristics are applicable to both perceptual and non-perceptual experience, experience through operation of the sense organs and experience without the help of sense organs. We have seen that in the Nandisutra a distinction is made between pratyaksa as that which is due to the sense organs, and that which does not need the mediation of the sense organs. They are called indriya pratyaksa and unindriya pratyaksa, respectively. Indriya pratyaksa is cognition which is immediate and direct and arises out of the operation of the five sense organs. There are, therefore, five types of sense perception-the visual, auditory, tactual, olfactory and gustatory. The experience that does not need the sense organs and is immediate may be called extra-sensory perception.. It is also pratyaksa, because it is immediate and direct. This was called real (pratyaksa), by the followers of Agama literature. It is of three types, avadhi, manah paryaya and kevala pratyaksa. In this chapter, discussion will be restricted to the sense experience, mdriva pratyaksa. It is also called, as was seen earlier, sarirvyavahara pratyaksa. Emperical knowledge may be called sarimyavahara prcrtyaksha. It is of two kinds, mati and sruta. Matijitana is a species of Samvyavahara pratyak,scr. MatijUina is defined as knowledge due to the sense organs and mind. Irtdriya pratyaksa may, therefore, be regarded as a form of matijnana. This may be called sense perception. Sense perception may be regarded as rnatij~Ona, as it is concerned with the contact of the sense organs with the object. Sense perception of this type may be compared with the definition of pratyaksa given by Gautama, the founder of Nyaya philosophy, already referred to. Gautama defines pratyaksa as knowledge which arises out of the contact of sense organs with its object, inexpressible in words, unerring and well-defined.]’- Gangesa says that this does not include intuitive perception, which is also direct and without mediation of the senses.l The Jainas called the type of perception defined by Gautama a form of matijnana. In the Jaina Agamas, mati jiratra is also known as abhinibodhikay”nana. But the term rnatijnana seems to be older than abhinibodhika-jYana, as matijt:ana is associated with the karma theory which is very old. The old Jaina thinkers thought that knowledge born with the help of the five senses as well as the manas may be called matijrlana. But in indriya pratyaksa they included knowledge born of the five sense organs, as the mind is not for them exactly a sense organ. It is a quasi-sense organ.
In Jaina literature various synonyms for matijnana have been mentioned. Tattvarthasutra mentions mcrti, smrti (recollection), cinta (thought), and abhinibodha (perceptual cognition), as synonyms. Bhadrabahu mentions iha associative integration, apoha, vimarsa, margana, gavesanU, sarirj’ra and smrti as synonyms? Nandisutra follows Badrabhu. The mention of all these synonyms does not mean that they identified the various forms of cognition mentioned in the synonyms as sense perception, because Bhadrabahu and Umasvati, for instance, would not in the least have meant that smrti is identical with sense perception; nor cinta identical with matijizana. However, what they meant was that, in empirical experience, we find matijnana and such experience as recollection and thought. In this sense, matijizana may be said to include sense experience due to the operation of the five senses and experience through the manas, as the Jaina philosophers following the Agamic literature maintained. In the PramanamFmarirsa, empirical perception is described as perception due to the ~ senses and mind. In the commentary of the same stanza it is said that the phrase ‘due to the sense and mind’, (indriya manonimittam), has both collective and distributive meaning. But matijnana, in the sense of experience due to the five sense organs, is a form of pratyaksa. It is indriya pratyaksa. Umasvati also includes experience due to the mind in matijhana. He defines matijMna as knowledge caused by the senses and mind, since mind is a quasi-sense, no-indriya. The commentator Siddhasenaganin mentions three types of mati: (i) knowledge born of the sense organs, (ii) knowledge born of the mind, and (iii) knowledge due to the joint activity of the sense organs and mind. However, from the Bhasya of the Tattvarthasutra we find that matijiaarra can be distinguished into four types, as (i) knowledge due to sense organs, like sense perception; (ii) knowledge due to the mind only, like cinta; (iii) knowledge due to the joint activity of the mind and the senses. Memory and recognition can be included in matijhana. Akalanka says that memory, recognition and discursive thought are cases of matijitana so long as they are not associated with language. As soon as they are associated with words they become srutaynana, although very few philosophers have supported Akalanka in this respect. However, if matijnana were to include cognition due to the joint activity of the sense organs and the mind, memory and recognition may well be included in matijiiana. In the fourth stage of matijiana, cognitions without the help of the sense organs and the mind are included. For instance, the vague and primitive awareness of the plant life and the instinctive awareness of the lower organisms which have not yet developed sense organs, may be said to be cognition of this type. These are direct forms of awareness. Sense perception (indriya-pratyaksa), as a species of matijnana is of five types based on the nature and function of the five sense organs. The five senses possess the capacity of sense experience because the cognition of the stimulation must be conditioned by the relevant instruments. The sense is the mark which denotes that cognition of the object has been generated by the self. We get a similar description of sense perception in the Nyaya Sutra. The five types of sense perception are based on the special characteristics of knowledge, (buddhi laksana), visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory and tactual. The senses consist of elements endowed with a special quality, and so they are able to perceive the respective objects and not themselves. For instance, the eye sees the external object and not itself. In sense perception, it was seen in the last chapter, the sense of touch is fundamental. Similarly, the sense of sight is vital for human life. Price says that the experiences of seeing and touching are primary, other modes of sense experiences, like hearing and smelling, are only auxiliary. ‘If we possessed them but did not possess either sight or touch we should have no belief about the material world at all, and should lack even the very conception of it’. It was also seen in the last chapter that, according to the Jainas, the sense of sight is of a fundamentally different nature, in that the other sense organs are based on the contact of the sense organs with the object, while the sense of sight does not need any contact with the object.
The nature of sense perception will now be analysed. The task here is to give a psychological analysis of the experience, if possible. It may aptly be said that the Jaina analysis of sense perception has a great psychological significance, although perception was a logical and metaphysical problem for the Jainas as for other Indian philosophers. In fact, even in the West, philosophers were first busy with the logical and the metaphysical analysis of the problem of perception, but with the advancement of psychology as a sceience, philosophers have realized that perception is more prohlcm far psychology. Pretend Russell says that, ‘the problem of perception has troubled philosophers from a very early date. My owl belief is that the problem is scientific, not philosophical, or, rather, no longer philosophical’.
Sense organs are a condition of sense perception. are the instruments by which we get sensory experience. The senses are the marks of the self, and they afford proof of the existence of the self. The senses are instruments like the carpenter’s axe, by which experience is obtained by the sslf. The contact of the sense organs with the object is a condition of perception as mentioned by the Naiyayikas, although, according to the Jainas, such a contact is not necessary in the case of visual experience. According to the Nyaya definition, perception involves defferent factors, viz., (i) sense organs, (ii) their objects, (iii) the contact of the sense organs with the object, and (iv) the cognition produced by them. It is sometimes maintained that the description given by the Jainas of sense experience as cognition due to the senses and the mind is inadequate. Visual perception, for instance, has the additional condition of the presence of light. But it has been pointed out by Hemacandra that objects and light are not conditions of experience, because of lack of concomitance between the two. But it is not denied that they are remote conditions, like time and space, which subserve the subsidence and destruction of the knowledge-obscuring karrnas. They are indirectly useful to the visual organs, like collyrium. The inadequacy of the view that the object and light are conditions of perception can be seen from the fact that illusive perception of water takes place in a mirage. Cats and owls perceive in the dark, where the stimulation of light is absent.g This is meant to show that the Nyaya emphasis on the object as a condition of perception is not acceptable. Perception of a particular object is, in fact, according to the Jainas, due to the destruction and subsidence of the relevant knowledge-obscuring karrnas, jihnavaraniya karma. This implies a psychological factor. An appropriate psychical condition in the destruction and subsidence of knowledge-obscuring karma is a necessary factor in the perceptual experience. It also depends on the competency of the appropriate psychical factor. For instance, even when the object is present we may not see it when our attention is elsewhere engaged. In the Samayasara we read that the presence of stimuli in the external environment and even their coming into contact with the sense organs may not be effective to produce the relevant experience. For instance, we may not see an unpleasant visual foam, even though the stimulation may reach the eyes. The psychic factor of selective attention is needed before we get the sense experience. This is possible when all psychic impediments are partially or wholly removed through the destruction and subsidence of knowledge-obscuring karma. We have described such a psychic factor as a mental set which is necessary for the perceptual experience. Emphasis on the mental factor in perception has been mentioned in the Ilpanisads also. This was referred to in the earlier chapter. We here have the dictum that when the mind is elsewhere we do not see. ‘I was absent in mind, I did not hear’. In Western thought, Aristotle was clearly aware that perception is not possible merely through the sense organs. For him, perception consists in being moved and affected. Sense perception does not arise from the senses themselves, as organs of sense perception are potentiality and not actuality. Lock writes that, whatever alterations are made in the body, if they reach not the mind; whatever impressions are made in the outward part, if they are not taken notice of within, there is no perception. For we may burn our body with no other effect than it does a billet unless the motion be continued to the brain; and there the sense of hurt or idea of pain be produced in the mind, wherein consists actual perception. In modern psychology, Prof. Woodworth gives a formula ‘W-S-O-R-W’ for explaining the fascinating problem of how an individual perceives an objective fact. At any given moment
a man is set for the present situation. He might be listening to a low hum just as a smooth tone. But if he tries to make out what the sound can be, he is more likely to perceive it as the hum of an aeroplane.
Thus we find that the analysis of perceptual experience shows that the sense organs and the contact of the sense organs with the stimulation’s of objects are no doubt conditions of perception. But that alone is not sufficient. A psychological condition is necessary for the experience. This psychological factor consists, negatively, in the removal of the psychic impediments to perception. This may be likened to the subsidence and destruction of the knowledge-obscuring karmas of the Jainas. On the positive side, the psychic condition is selective attention and the ‘mental set’.
According to the Jainas, sense perception can be analysed into four stages as (i) Avagraha, (ii) Ihu, (iii) Avaya, and (iv) Dharana. These stages of sense experience arise through the operation of the sense organs and the mind. In the PramanamJmarizsa we get a description of the four stages of sense experience, salrivyavahara pratyaksa. The four stages mentioned above have been usually described as the four subdivisions of sense experience. In the Narrdi Sutra, they are mentioned as four types, caturvidha. But it would be more appropriate to say that they are the four stages of sense experience, because, psychologically analysed, they express the four stages of perceptual cognition, although perception, in our view, is a concrete psychosis. The correctness of this interpretation can be seen from the fact that in the commentary on sutra of the Pramanamirnarrisa it is stated that the earlier form, like avagraha, develops into the subsequent forms, and all of them partake of the same essential nature. Thus, in the Jaina thought, four stages of matijnana, as mentioned above, have been described. Avczgraha refers to the first simple and primitive stage of experience. This may be said to be merely the stage of sensation. Next comes iha. In this stage there is a mental element, and it refers to the integrative factors of the mind. In the third stage, we get a clear and decisive cognition of the object. This is avaya. It implies the presence of the inferential element in perception. Dharanii is retention of what is already experienced in the perceptual cognition. In fact, it is not actually a stage of perceptual experience although it is included in perceptual experience.
Psychologists point out that perception is not a simple process nor is it merely the sense-datum. It consists in the organization and interpretation of sensations. It is ‘knowledge about’ and not merely ‘knowledge of acquaintance’, as William James said. Perception involves certain psychological factors like association, discrimination, integration, assimilation and recognition. Perception also involves inference. We perceive a table, and when we perceive the object as a table we recognize it and we get a defined picture of the object.