MIND IN JAINISM
Morris in his Six Theories of Mind, has stated that there have been three stages in the history of speculation concerning mind: (i) a period in which mind and nature are vaguely conceived and differentiated; (ii) a period in which they are regarded as different and sharply opposed; and (iii) a period in which the effort is to restore, at a more complex level, the relation between mind and nature which was vaguely conceived in the beginning. Early man made no distinction between mind and nature, between his personal experience and the world outside. The lispings of the early philosophers in the West faced the same problem, and they could not free themselves from the difficulties of primitive man. There was no opposition between mind and the world. It was not regarded as a private isolated substance but as a principle of motion and the order of the world. It lacked psychological orientation. Anaximenes held that air was the life of the world just as breath was the life of the body. Heraclitus suggested that reason guides all things. Empedocles spoke of God as only mind, sacred and ineffable mind. Anaxagoras said that mind is infinite and self-ruled and is mixed with nothing. ,Over all mind is the ruler”, he said, -and over the whole revolving universe mind held sway so that it caused it to revolve in the beginning.”’ These were the groupings of the early philosophers regarding the principle of the universe, and there was a marked absence of any clear distinction between mind and the world of sense. Aristotle writes that, on the one hand, the atomists and the sophists identified sense and reason, and, on the other, Parmenides and Democritus made a distinction between thought and sense. The early Greek philosophers struggled with the problem of mind and its relation to the physical world.
The problem of mind eludes the grasp of philosophers and psychologists, because it can be analyzed into both metaphysical and psychological problems. Metaphysically; it refers to mind as the principle of the universe standing in relation to the phenomenal world. This is the cosmic principle which is emphasized by the idealists as the primary principle. Psychologically, it is the individual mind, the individual’s system of psychic states in relation to the world of sense. We are, here, more concerned with the psychological significance of the mind, although the metaphysical shades do influence the psychological analysis. The early philosophers could not make a distinction between the two aspects of the problem. This is evident in the different stages of the speculation concerning mind.
The Indian thinkers were also groping to grasp the intangible, the ineffable, and the immaterial. But they could not free themselves easily from the material. The distinction between mind and matter, the mental and the physical, was vague and unclear. In the pre-Upanisadir thought, the principle of Rta became the principle of order in the universe. It is the underlying dynamic force at the basis of the universe. It compels every animate and inaminate being to follow the law of its existence. “Even the Gods cannot transgress it.” We see in the conception of Rta the
development from the physical to the devine. “It is by the force of Rta that human brains function.” Man knows by the driving force of the same immanent power which makes fire to burn and river to flow.” The interpretation of the famous Rgvedic hymn of creation “nasadasinno sadasittadanim” and again of “Kamastadagre samavartatndhi ntanaso retah prathamam yadasit. Sato baudhumasati niravindahrdi pratisiya kavayo martisa” gives a description that for the first time there arose kama which had the primaeval germ of manas within it. Similarly the word kratu is shown to be the antecedent of the word mauas or prajita. In Sat. Bra. 4. 1. 4. 1 there is a statement that when a man wishes, “may I do that, may I have that,” that is Kratu, when he attains it, that is Daksa. The same term later changed its meaning to manas and prajna.
In the Upatzisads the importance of the mind and its function was gradually realized, although it was still in the pre-analytic stage. In
the Upanisads man was spoken of as prartatnaya and matmornaya. We also hear the utterance of the sages, “I was elsewhere in my mind-T could not see-I could not hear.” In the Chsndogyopanisad 7, 3. 1, it is said that, when a man directs his manas to the study of the sacred hymns, he studies them; or when to the accomplishing of work, he accomplishes them. Again in the Brhadaranyakopanisad . 1. 6, we read that by the manas is the man compelled towards his wife and begets from her a son who is like him. Thus the Vedic and the Upanisadic philosophers were trying to find the cosmic principle which is the root of the universe. But their thought was still in the pre-analytic stage, or, as Renan calls it, the syncretic stage. This is perhaps because of the synthetic approach of the Indian thinkers. Mrs. Rhys Davids mentions that Bergson had asked what would have happened if the development of thought had started with psychology. Mrs. Davids answers that in India to some extent it did so happen.
The analysis of the Jaina theory of mind shows there has been a conflict between the metaphysical and the psychological approaches to the problem. It is predominantly a realistic approach. The mind and its states are analysed on the empirical level. Still, the Jaina ideal is moksa, freedom of the soul from the impurities of karma. The purity and the divinity of the soul are the basic concepts of the Jaina philosophy, and mind has to be linked with the soul and interpreted in metaphysical terms. The Jaina approach was also synthetic. The evidence of the conflict can be found in the description of the various aspects of the mind.
The Jaina theory of the mind, as developed by the Jaina acaryas, is a theory in which mind and nature are regarded as different in kind and as sharply separated and opposed. If the classification of the stages in the speculation of the concept as presented by Morris can be used, it can be said to be in the second stage of development, although elements of the first and the third stages are not altogether absent. Traces of the primitive speculation were still found. The primitive conceptions of the mind lingered in the minds of the philosophers. Yet they also tried to overcome the conflict between mind and nature and establish the intimate relation between them. An analysis of the Jaina conception of mind will bear testimony to the view presented here.
The function of mind, which is an inner organ, is knowing and thinking. Stharrnliga describes it as sarhkalpcr vyaparavati. Anuvarfisika gives the citta vijnana as equivalent of the manas. “Citta manovijiiarzam iti paryayah.” Visesa’vasyakabhasya defines manas in terms of mental processes.l It is taken in the substantive sense. Nyayakosa defines manas in the sense of the inner organ which controls the mental functions. It is difficult to define mind. If at all it is to be defined, it is always in terms of its own processes. Even the psychologists of the present day find it difficult to give a definition of mind without reference to the mental processes. Older psychologists meant by mind something that expresses its nature, powers and functions in the modes of individual experiences and of bodily activity. McDougall also says that we are bound to postulate that “something”; and “I do not think”, he writes, ,,that we can find a better word to denote something than the old fashioned word mind.”il McDougall defines mind as an organized system of mental and purposive forces. Wundt says that mind is a pre-scientific concept. It covers the whole field of internal experience.l
The old metaphysical problem whether mind and soul are distinct or identical, faced the early philosophers. Aristotle, in hiss De Anima, says that Democritus regarded mind as identical with the soul for the fineness of its particles. Anaxagoras is less exact. He speaks of mind as the cause of goodness or order, and, therefore, different from the soul. Mind, alone of things is simple, unmixed and pure. Elsewhere. he identifies it with soul, where he attributes it to all animals great and small, high or low. Titus Lucretius Carus says that mind and soul are kept together in close union and make up a single nature. It is the head so to speak, and it reigns paramount in the whole body. The Jaina thinkers asserted the distinction between soul and mind. Mahavira was asked by Gautama whether mind was different from the soul. -Oh Gautama”, said Mahavira, -mind is not the soul, as speech, like mind, is different from the soul, although non-living substances have no mind.”
The Jaina thinkers did not merely postulate the existence of mind without any evidence. They found the evidence in the experiences of the world. They also give the empirical proof for the operation of the mind. The contact of the sense organ with the soul alone does not give cognition in the relevant experiences, because there is the absence of manas. Something else is necessary for the cognition, and that is the mind. Again, the mind has the functional connotation which speaks for its nature: “Just as speech signifies the function of speaking, fire expresses the function of burning and the light shows the light.”
Orthodox schools of Hindu philosophy postulate the existence of mind as an internal sense organ. On the evidence of cognition the contact of the soul with the sense organ is not sufficient. We must posit the existence of a manas, some additional condition which brings them together. For instance, a man may not hear a sound or see an object when the mind is pre-occupied, when the mind is elsewhere, as we read in the Upanisads. There is also the positive evidence in the facts of memory and of experiences like pleasure and pain. As mind is not tangible, the proof of mind has always to be indirect, and not direct. McDougall infers the structure of the mind from its functions. He writes that we have to build up our description of the mind by gathering all possible facts of human experience and behaviour, and by inferring from these the nature and structure of mind. He thus makes a distinction between the facts of mental activities and the facts ’, mental structure. It is comparable to the structure and the functions of the mechanical toy; and one who wishes to ascertain the nature of the machinery within it, can only watch its movements under various conditions. There is nothing scientifically wrong in such a procedure. Even the psychologists of our time have adopted a similar procedure. The structure of the molecules, for instance, was inferred on the basis of the observation of their behaviour. Recent comparative psychologists have also tried to find evidence of mind in animal behaviour. Miss Washburn says that there is no objective proof for the presence of mind. Evidence from behaviour has been suggested. Variability of behaviour is said to be a criterion. But this criterion was not found to be satisfactory, because from our own experience we see that very often variability is due to the physiological condition. There is nothing in the mental process to account for the variability. Romans and other psychologists have suggested that the criterion is based on the variation of behaviour as a result of previous individual experience. Miss Washburn writes, “the fact is that the proof for the existence of mind can be derived from animal learning by experience only if learning is rapid.” But this evidence is not very satisfactory. Yerkes and Lukas try to find structural evidence for the presence of mind. The similarity of the structure can be taken as evidence for the presence of mind. Lukas suggested morphological, physiological and teleological criteria for the presence of mind. Yerkes mentions six criteria, like the general form of the organs, the nervous system, the neural organization and specialization in the nervous system. Mind functions in various ways. Descartes said that mind is a substance which thinks. Although it is called a thing which thinks, it is an attribute of the soul. It is a thing “which doubts, understands, affirms, denies, wills, refuses, which also imagines and feels.” Nyaya Bhasya, in Indian thought, describes the activities of the mind as “remembrance, inference, verbal cognition., doubt, intuition, pratyaksa, dream, imagination, (uha) as also perception of pleasure and pain and the rest”. They are indicative of the existence of the manas. The operation of the mind is necessary in every act of perception. This is shown by the fact that even when there is the contact of the sense organs with the respective object, there is no simultaneity of perception of all these objects. This is due to the fact that there is no such contact of the manas with other objects. Mind is characterized by mental processes like doubting, imagining, dreaming and expecting. It is also characterized by pleasure and pain and desires. These are the distinguishing marks of mind. Nandisutra describes mind as that which grasps everything (sarvarthagrahanam manah). In Tattvarthadhigamasutra, we are told that cognition of what is stated on authority, like in scriptures is the object of mind, srutamanindriyasya. In Maitri Upanisad, mind is described in its reflective aspect as source of all mental modifications. He sees by mind, by mind alone he hears, and by mind too, he experiences all that we call desire, will and belief, resolution, irresolution. All this is but mind itself. In modern psychology also, Wundt says that mind will be the subject “to which we attribute all the separate facts of internal experience.” Mind, in the popular thought, is not simply a subject in the logical sense, but a substance in real being, and the various activities of the mind are its expressions or notions. But this involves, he says, some metaphysical presuppositions. For him, mind is a logical concept of internal experience.
Abhidhanarajendra mentions that the word manas has a functional significance, because it describes the functions of the mind like thinking, imagining and expecting. And from this functional significance of the mind the structure of the mind is inferred. The Jaina thinkers make a distinction between two phases of the mind: dravya manas and bhava manas (Manah dvividharic dravya manah bhava manah ca). In the Visesavasyalcabhasya, we get a description of the two phases of the manas. The material mind, which may be called the mental structure, is composed of infinite, fine and coherent particles of matter meant for the function of mind-dravyatah dravya manah. It is further described as a collection of fine particles which are meant for exciting thought processes due to the yoga arising out of the contact of the jiva with the body. In Gommatasnra: Jiva-kanda also there is a description of the material mind as produced in the heart from the coming together of mind molecules like a full blown lotus with eight petals.
The material composition of the mind was not uncommon in the philosophies of the East and West alike. In the Brhadaranyakopanisad, mind was looked upon as material. Upanisadic philosophers supposed that mind for its formation depends on alimentation’. it is supposed to be manufactured out of the food that we take (Annamayam manah hi somya manah). Food takes three different forms: the heaviest becomes excrement, the medium quality becomes flesh, and the subtlest part becomes mind, just as the churning of curds gives the subtlest which is butter. Later, in the days of Bhagavadgita, the three temperaments rajas, tames and sattva were recognized, and they were due to different kinds of food. This may be compared to the modern theory of temperament as depending on the secretion of glands. Therefore, pure food was desirable. The quality of food influenced the quality of mind. In Chandogyopanisad, it is said that when food is pure, the whole nature becomes pure, memory becomes firm ...... In the Nyaya theory it is contended that mind, being an additional sense organ, need not be structurally different from the other sense organs. An atom of earth, water or air can, without any logical inconsistency, be credited with the function of mind. Similarly, it cannot be distinguished from akasa. There has been a controversy between the Naiyayikas and the Mirnamsakas about the material size of the mind. The Naiyayikas believed that mind is atomic in size. Otherwise there would be simultaneous cognition of different things. The impossibility of cognition was referred to in the Brhadaranyakopanisad, “my mind was elsewhere, I could not see...” as quoted earlier. But the Mimarhsakas hold that mind is unlimited in size. The Veddntins believe that mind is a created substance devoid of any parts and it must be of medium size, (madhyama parimana). According to Sa’mkhya Yoga, in the process of evolution, owing to disturbance in the balance of the gunas, buddhi, ahamkara and manas are gradually evolved. They are jada in nature. Hiriyanna says that, according to this view, the functions that we describe as mental are really mechanical processes of the physical organism, wluch assume a psychical character only when illuminated by the spirit. In the Vedanta also the antahkarana is looked upon as bhautika, composed of five elements wherein tejas predominates. Such a description of the non-sentient (jada) aspect of mind is endorsed by the modern theories of mind based on the study of the evolution of behaviour from the primordial amoeba. ‘The fundamental feature of behaviour is irritability and conductivity, with the specialization of structures sensitive to the different forms of energy in nature.’ There arises the nervous system which not only conducts the impulses but also integrates them. Thus, behaviour arises on the basis of “structural modifications which are based on the various types of energy tranformation.”
In Western thought also there were philosophers who conceived of mind as material. Lucretius Carus has said that the nature of mind and also of the soul is bodily. “We perceive that our mind in our body suffers together with the body and feels in unison with it.” Mind is exceedingly fine and is formed of exceedingly minute bodies-also exceedingly round, because, after death, life and mind vanish and weight does not change, just as the flavour of wine vanishes without affecting the quality of wine.
The Jaina philosophers maintained that the bhava manas is the result of the activities of the dravya manas. processes like thinking, and the bhava manas. it is expressed in mental is also described as jiva. It is the thinking self.
Such a description of mind as dravya manas and bhava manas, the structural and the psychical aspect, can be compared to the description of mind given by some modern philosophers. C. D. Broad, in his Mind and its Place in Nature presents a similar view. It is a modification of the instrumental theory according to which mind is a substance that is existentially independent of the body. For Broad, mind is composed of two factors neither of which is and for itself has the property of mind, but which when combined exhibits mental properties. The factors are the bodily and the psychic factors. It is comparable to a chemical compound like NaCl and H20 in which the individual components lose their individual identity when combined. Therefore, ‘mentality is likewise an emergent property composed of living body possessed of (i) the nervous system and something else and (ii) the psychic factor, which possesses some feeling like mental.’ The bodily factor is described as “the living brain and the nervous system.” About the psychic factor, Broad seems to be vague. Neither mental characteristics nor mental events seem to belong to it. It is likely to be sentience only. However, the psychic factor must be capable of persisting for a period at least after the death of the body; and it must be capable, when separated from the body, of carrying ‘traces’ of experience which happen to the mind of which it was formerly a constituent. In other words, it must comprise the anemic mass’. Broad’s view comes nearer to the Buddhist vinnana rather to the Jaina view of bhava manas. Of all the psychic factors in the Buddhist view, vinnancr has a more permanent nature. In the Digha Nikaya it is mentioned that after death the body is dissolved, mind ceases, but vinnana, the coefficient of the desire to enjoy, clings to produce its effects in some other embryo waking elsewhere. With this difference of the psychic factor, the Jaina distinction between the dravya manas and the bhava manas corresponds with Broad’s theory of the composition of mind. In speaking of the mental structure, McDougall has likened it to the structure of a machine. However, McDougall also warns us that it should not be taken in the sense of a material structure or arrangement of parts. He likens it more to the composition of a poem or of music. “The structure of the mind is a conceptual system that we have to build up by inference from the data of the two orders, facts of behavior and the facts of introspection.” The same can be said of the composition of the manas.
The Jaina philosophers, however, were aware of both the elements in the mental life of animals, although they were groping to find the relation between the two aspects of the mind. The analysis of the psychic factor and the idea of prana as ‘bodily power’ has led some philosophers like Zimmer to believe that the Jaina categories represent a comparatively primitive archaic analysis and description of human nature, many of the details of which underlie and remain incorporated in the later classic Indian view. Zimmer is suggesting that the analysis of the psyche that prevailed in the classic period in the synthesis of the six systems was originally not a Brahmin contribution, but non-Aryan, having come through Sarnkhya Yoga. Its categories are pre-figured in the Jaina view. Although the roots of the Jaina view may be primitive, the conception as developed by the Jainas presents a view of the composition of the mind which is comparable to the modern theories as already referred to. However, the dravya manas and the bhava manas are not two distinct parts, but two aspects distinguishable only by analysis. They treated manas as one activity with different aspects. The Jainas have refuted the Buddhist theory of mind as a collection of khandas. The Buddhist conception of mind is well described in the Sariryukta Niknya, Vol. II p. 194, “that which is called intelligence arises as a thing and ceases as another”. It is a ‘series of flash points, cinema films, thaumatrope figures welded into an apparent phenomenal unit.’” The Jainas say that the Buddhist theory goes against belief in the other world. Mind for the Jainas is a whole and not a collection, nor even a compound of dravya and bhava manas. Stout says that the unity of the individual mind is the unity of the complex whole which is indivisible inasmuch as its partial ingredients have not an independent existence of their own. The unity of such a mind is beyond comparison.
Each jiva has its own mind, although the general nature of mind is one: “manana laksanatvena say vamanasamekatvat”, because the essential nature of mind is the expression of the mental states. In the Sthananga we read, “ege jivanam match”. In this way and according to the situation, the Gods, men, and assures have each his own mind. In the Tattvarthasutra, the classification of the souls, five-sensed organisms with minds, is mentioned; sanjninah samanaskah. In the five-sensed organisms only some possess minds. Comparative psychologists like Kohler and Alverdes have shown that mind in. the developed form is possible in the case of higher animals having insight. Naiyayikas also believe that each organism possesses a mind and sensitive organs in order that it may be in a position to cognize the objects and to experience pleasure and pain in accordance with past karma. Each self has one mind, because a single mind of atomic magnitude cannot be shared by all. This mind in each self can function only inside the organism with which the self is connected. If there were one common mind for all, there would be simultaneity of cognition. A similar argument was presented by the Jaina thinkers in favour of the jiva being bhavamanarupa. If the jiva were sarvagata, there would be cognition of everything by everyone. Their arguments were more metaphysical and epistemological than psychological. But modern psychology has tried to analyse the same problem from the psychological point of view. McDougall writes, “It seems probable that mind has the same nature wherever and whenever it exists or manifests itself, whether in animals, men or superhuman beings, whether in the new-born infant, the fool or the wise man. On the other hand, the structure of the mind seems to be peculiar to each individual”; not only is it different in the various species of animals (if they have minds) and in man; but the structure of the mind of one man is different from that of every other man; and, in any one man at each stage of his career or life-history, it is not quite the same as at any other stage.
The ancient Indian philosophers were faced with problems concerning the instrumental nature of the mind. It was generally believed that, like other sense organs, mind was also a sense organ, and the instrument of the soul. In the Upanisads we find references to the mind as one of the organs along with the other sense and motor organs, ( jnanendriyas and karrnendriyas). Prasna Upanisad mentions manas as a central organ. Reference to the manas as the driver of the ten organs in the Maitri Upanisad may also be noted. Orthodox Hindu philosophy accepts mind as the internal organ. There were some philosophers who made buddhi, ahatizkara, and manas together to constitute the internal organ antalzkarana. But Jayanta believes that mind is an internal organ. Similarly, Vidyanandi maintains that buddhi and ahamkara cannot be regarded as sense organs. The Nyaya haisesika philosophers regarded mind as the internal organ. But Gautama did not include it in the list of the sense organs; Kanada is also silent. Vatsyayana includes manas under the senses. He calls it the inner sense by which we apprehend the inner states of feelings, desires and cognition’s. The self perceives the inner states by the instrument of the manas. Vatsyayana believes that mind is as good a sense organ as the eye and the like, though there are certain differences. But the Jainas believed that the mind is a no-indriya in the sense that it is different from the five sense organs. Its sense contents and functions are not entirely identical with those of indriyas. The prefix No here does not mean not, but is at times rendered as issued. It is a quasi-sense organ. Still they accept the instrumental function of the mind. In the Gommatasara: Jivakanda, we get a description of mind as the no-indriya. It is through the mind that mental knowledge and mental activity arise. But in the case of the mind there is no external manifestation as in the case of the other sense organs. The function of mind is assimilative. - Pramanamimamsa describes mind as the thing which grasps everything. In the vrtti of the same it is said, “manonindriyamiti no indriyamiti ca ucyate.” In the Tattvarthasutra, the function of mind, which is anindriya, is described as the sruta cognition. The second function is the mati and its modifications. It is called the organ of apprehension of all objects because all sense experiences are apprehended by the mind. The Jainas accepted the instrumental nature (karanatva) of the mind. But it is said that the karana is of two types-bahya karana and antahkarana, and even the dravyamanas is described as the antahkarana, the internal organ. Being the internal organ, it is different from the other sense organs.
However, such a description of mind need not be interpreted in the sense that, according to the Jaina view, mind is not a sense organ; in fact, it is more than a sense organ. Its function is not specific like that of the other sense organs. It is sarvarthagrahanam, as it is stated in the Pramanamimamsa.
Another problem that the Jaina thinkers faced along with other Indian philosophers was the prapyakaritva of the mind. This problem is peculiar to Indian philosophers. It refers to the capacity of the sense organ to come in actual contact with the object of experience. According to the Nyaya philosophers mind is prapyakari, because cognition is possible when the mind comes in contact with the object through the sense organs. The speed of the manas in contacting the object is greater than the speed of any other sense organ. But the Jainas believe that the manas is aprapyakari. It does not directly come in contact with the objects. They strongly object to those who argue that it is prapyakari. If, they say, the mind were prapyakari, then the mind would go out of its place and meet the objects, like the idol of Jina on the Mount Meru, both during the waking and the sleeping state. But this is not so; otherwise there would be confusion of experiences. While thinking of fire, we should experience burning. When we think of poison, we should experience poisoning. Similarly, when we think of sandalwood, we should experience coolness.s Even the dravya manas, although it is made of fine particles of the matter, cannot get cognition, because it is unconscious (acetana). Moreover, it is an internal organ unlike the other sense organs. Those who believe that the mind is prapyakari may give dream experience as evidence: the mind goes out of its place to the Jirralaya on the Mount Mercc in the dream. But such experiences are also false because they do not correspond to the facts of experience. They are like the illusion of a moving circle when a burning stick is moved fast (alaycakrabhrama). After waking up, we find that our experience in the dream was false. The argument for the prapyakaritva of the mind on the basis of undifferentiated unanalyzed cognition is also not acceptable.g This problem has a great psychological significance, although it is found even in primitive times. It is intimately connected with the problem of the process of perception.
Ancient philosophers could not free themselves from the animistic ideas in spite of the fact that they had advanced in the direction of conceiving the immaterial as distinct from the material. The Jaina view expresses the naturalistic approach to the analysis of mental states. Still, the metaphysical approach was not absent. The Jainas were trying- to see the problem from a more analytic and empirical point of view. They centered their discussions on the various facts of experience; as in the waking and the dream state, in order to find evidence for the aprapyakri nature of the mind.
One more problem remains, and that is the problem of the relation between body and mind. This has been a perennial problem for philosophers and psychologists of the East and the West. The problem has a metaphysical and a psychological side. There have been philosophers who have made attempts to solve this problem. Whether it refers to individual minds and bodies, or to the general relation of the finite mind with matter, there are various possible solutions to the problem. Materialists say that only the body is real, and the mind or the mental is only the product and dependent upon it. The idealists lay emphasis on the primacy of the mind. The material is unreal, or it is manifestation of the mental. There are other solutions, as of those who say that both are unreal, or two aspects of some higher reality. The realists, on the other hand, emphasize the reality of both matter and mind. Similarly, there are many divergences, specially when referring to the relation between the finite mind and the finite body. The relation between the finite body and the finite mind may be: (a) a complete dependence, as when mind is regarded as the secretion of the brain or a sort of epiphenomenon, a product, a process and similarly by-product of physical processes; (b) that of parallelism, the two series, mental and bodily, corresponding step by step, element for element to each other; (c) that of reciprocity or interaction, the mental processes being the condition of the bodily, and the bodily of the mental. The Jaina philosophers discussed the metaphysical aspect of the problem. They were, at the same time, not unaware of the psychological side of the question. Still, the distinction between the metaphysical and the psychological was not clearly drawn. Mahavira points out to the Ganadhara Vayubhuti that it is not correct to maintain that consciousness is produced by the collection of the bhutas, material elements like earth and water, as intoxication is produced by the mixture of the ghataki flower and jaggery, although it is not found in their constituents separately. On the contrary, cetana is the quality of the soul. It is different from the bodily aspect. In this we find the refutation of the layout view. Similar arguments are found in Sutrakrtriiga. In Paircastikayasara, Kundakundacarya discusses the problem from the side of the effect of karma on the jiva. On account of the rise, annihilation and suppression of karma, jiva has five bhavas. The five physical characteristics of karma like udaya, ksaya etc., determine the corresponding psychic characteristics called bhavas. The last parinamic bhava is not causally connected with samsaa or moksa. It is a niskriya bhava. Being affected by the changes in the karmic material, jiva experiences certain emotional states. But whatever emotional states appear in the consciousness are due to the causal agency of jiva. The extrinsic cause is he physical matter, and the proximate cause is the jiva. Karma is a of two types, dravya karma and bhava karma. Peculiar combinations of paramount (atoms), form the material karma. A change in the material karma may being about a similar change in the psychic states. This conscious change has a predominately affective tone. This is bhava karma. Thus it is really parallelistic. There are two distinct causal agencies, as nimitta karta or efficient cause and upadana karta or substantial cause. Jiva is the substantial cause of psychic changes. Its action is immediate. Bhava is psychic he change; and I can be brought about by a psychic change only. Karmic matte is the substantial cause of the physical changes; these are the two series which correspond to each other. Karmic matte brings about its own changes. Jiva, through its own impure ways of thought the at are conditioned by karmic matte, brings about its own thought changes. These two processes form independent series. This seems to suggest ape psycho-physical parallelism. But the parallelism is not merely the temporal correspondence of the two series. It is transcended by the doctrine of the nimitta karta. As in the Cartesian view, their thinking and unthinking are distinct, yet the two are related by the peculiar concept of causal relation. The unthinking may be the nimitta karta of the other, and the converse also may be true. However, the who causal channels are independent. The Samkhya thinkers raised objections against such a view. If the karmic matte affects its own change and if jiva brings about his own changes, why should he enjoy the fruits of karma for which he is not responsible; and why should the two independent series affect each other? But Kundakundacarya answers that the world space is filled with material bodies, some imperceptible and some perceptible. These constitute the karma. These are he karma varganas. They are physical molecules of a particular constitution which give them the tendency to be attracted by the jiva. This is also known as the karma prayoga pudgala. Jivas and karma varganas coexist. But by the mere fact of contiguity, jiva and karmic matter are brought together as the casket filled with black collyrium powder becomes black by mere contact. The relation of this bhavamanarupa jiva to the body is described on the analogy of the mixture of milk and water: kstraniravat. Similarly, just as the lotushued ruby placed in a cup of milk imparts its lutre o the milk, the jiva residing in the body imparts its lustre o intelligence to the body.
Radhakrishnan says that the Jainas accept the dualism of body and mind. They accept the view of parallelism with all its limitations. And to the question why jiva should suffer the fruits of karma for which it is not responsible, ‘ a sort of pre-established harmony’ is usgested. But the Jainas do not speak merely in terms of pre-established harmony. Their theory transcends parallelism and postulates a more intimate connection between body and mind.
Some modern psychologists like Jodi would limit the extent of parallelism. Mind is correlated with body, but only under certain conditions, where there is a certain complexity of organic structure, a central nervous system. Some others like Spencer, hoffdin and Paulson make the parallelism universal. The Jainas have given a modified parallelism with reference o psychic activity as determined by the karmic matter.
The analysis of the Jina concept of mind so far shows that the Jainas were clearly aware of the distinction between mind and body. Metaphysically, they gave the dichotomous division as jiva and ajiva. They presented a sort of psycho-physical parallelism concerning individual minds and bodies. Yet, they were not unaware of the interaction between the mental and the bodily. The empirical approach showed them that there is such mutual influence. The idea of the nimitta-karta was introduced for the solution of the problem. The notion of the structure of the mind (dravya-manas), and the functional aspect of mind (bhava-manas), shows that they were aware o the significance of interaction. A clear and consistent formulation would have been possible if the metaphysical and the psychological analyses were clearly distinguished. The Jaina theory was an attempt at the integration of the metaphysical dichotomy of jiva and ajiva and the establishment of the interaction of the individual mind and body.
THE JAINA THEORY OF UPAYOGA
The Jaina philosophers talked of Upayoga as the fundamental characteristic of life. Upayoga is the defining characteristic of the soul. Upayoga is that by which a function is served: Upayujyate anena iti upayogah. It is also described as that by which a subject is grasped. In the Gommatasara: Jivakanda, Upayoga is described as the drive which leads to the apprehension of objects. It is the source of the psychical aspect of experience. All the three aspects-cognitive, conative and affective, spring from it. It gives rise to the experience of objects, and the experience expresses itself in forms of jnana and darsana. Upayoga is of two types: anakara, formless, and sakara, possessed of form. Anakara upayoga is formless, indeterminate cognition. Sakara upayoga is determinate cognition, a defined form of experience. It would not be out of place to point out that Upayoga is not the resultant of consciousness as it is sometimes maintained. This was one of the earlier attempts to translate upayoga. Nor is it a sort of inclination arising from consciousness. It is the conative drive which gives rise to experience. It is, in fact, the source of all experience. The Jaina philosophers were aware of the driving force of experience, the force by which experience is possible. This may be likened to the ‘horme’ of the modern psychologists.
The biological studies of the lower animals from the amoeba onwards show that all animals are centers of energy in constant dynamical relation with the world, yet confronting it in their own characteristic way. A name was needed to express this fundamental property of life, the drive or a felt tendency towards a particular end. Some psychologists called it conation’ or the conative process. But this drive may not always be conscious.
There is the presence of an internal drive in such processes. ,,To this drive or urge, whether it occurs in the conscious life of men and the higher animals we propose to give a single name-horme”. This activity of the mind is a fundamental property of life. It has various other names, like the will to live, elan vital, the life urge and the libido’ Horme under one form or another has been the fundamental postulate of Lamarck, Butler, Bergson and Bernard Shaw. McDougall took great pains to present the hormic theory of psychology as against the mechanistic interpretation of life and mind.
The hormic force determines experience and behaviour. We get conscious experience because of this drive. The conscious experience takes the form of perception and understanding. Horme operates even in the unconscious behaviour of lower animals. In the plants and animals we see it operate in the preservation of organic balance. In our own physical and mental life we find examples of horme below the conscious level. We circulate our blood, we breathe and we digest our food, and all these are the expressions of the hormic energy. It operates at all levels both in the individual and the racial sense. But the horme expressed and presented by the Jaina philosophers could not be developed and analysed in terms of the modern psychology, because their analysis of upayoga was purely an epistemological problem tempered with metaphysical speculation. They were aware of the fact that there is a purposive force which actuates and determines experience. This is clear from the distinction between jnana and darsana as two forms of upayoga.
As already painted out, the Jainas make a distinction between anakara and snskna upayoga. They say that anakara upayoga (indeterminate cognition) is darsana; and sakara upayoga is jitana. Sakara upayoga is specific cognition and cognize the specific qualities of the objects. The anakara upayoga is indeterminate and undistinguished. It is general cognition. It may be called the knowledge of acquaintance, in the language of William James.
The distinction between the indeterminate and the defined cognition, (the sakara and anskara upayoga), has been a great problem in the Jaina theory of cognition. It is an ancient problem which has its roots in the early distinction between the two types of karma, jnanavaraniya and darsanavaraniya. The Agamas make a clear distinction between jnana and darsana. Kundakundacarya makes a distinction between the two, both from the empirical and the transcendental point of view. He says that the atman, its knowledge ( jnana), and intuition (darsana)-all these are identical, and they reveal the self as well as the non-self However, he does not make a clear distinction between the sakara upayoga and the anakara upayoga on that basis. Acarya Virasena, in his commentary called Dhavalii on Satlchandagama of ’uspadanta, says, What comprehends an external object of the nature of the universal-cum-particular is jnana, and comprehension of the self of the same nature is darsana.’ They are both valid cognition’s, and it is also maintained that jnana comprehends the reality in its complex and universal-cum-particular nature. It is not correct to say that jnana comprehends the particular and darsana apprehends the general only. Virasena says that the only difference between them is that jnana knows the external reality and darsana intuits the internal self. Darsana is arztarrnukha, introvert; while jnana is bahirmukha, extrovert. Brahmadeva in his Vrtti on Dravyasamgraha of Nemicandra gather says that darsana intuits the universal characteristic.] But in his commentary on gsthZi 44, he distinguishes two views, one from the point of view of logic and the other from the point of view of the Scriptures. Logic will give us the conception of darsana as intuition of the universal as for instance sat. all According to the Scriptures, the awareness of one’s self which shows the striving for knowledge, and the subsequent determinate knowledge is jnana. The selfsame consciousness is called darsana as well as jnana with reference to the object of cognition. It is called darsana when it is engaged in intuiting the self and jirancr when engaged in knowing the nonself. Other great thinkers, like Pujyapada, Samantabhadra, Akalatika and Vidyanandi accept the determinate and the indeterminate nature of jnana and darsana respectively. Darsana need not be taken to be identical with indeterminate cognition (nirvikalpa pratyaksa), as it is sometimes maintained. It need not be taken as ‘pure sensation of the existence of objects.l If it were to be identified with sensation, it would be a rudimentary stage of cognition; it would be the first stage of cognition. In that case, we can accept the highest type of darsana like avadhi and kevala. The Jainas accept the possibility of the perfect darsana, kevala darsana. We may call darsana intuition, as against jnana which may be called intellective cognition.
The temporal relation between jnana and darsana is another problem which the Jaina philosophers faced. Acarya Jinabhadra mentions three positions: (i) they occur simultaneously, (ii) there are alternate occurrences, and (iii) they are identical. This problem arises with reference to the perfect being. The Jainas are agreed that in the case of the imperfect jivas there is no simultaneity of occurrence of jnana and darsana. An imperfect being in the mundane existence cannot experience jnana and darsana at the same time. There is no agreement among philosophers. Philosophers following the angelic literature maintain that there is simultaneous occurrence of jnana and darsana even in the case of the kevalin, because Jnana and darsana are both conscious experiences, and as such cannot occur at the same moment of experience even in the case of the kevalin much less in the case of the beings in the mundane existence, the samsarins. In the Visesavasyakabhasya we get a similar view. Here Jinabhadra says that it is not true to say that when the veil of karma is removed the omniscient soul gets the two experiences simultaneously, because both of them are essentially conscious experiences. Umasvati maintains that in the case of the mundane souls jitana and darsana as conscious mental states manifesting themselves in mati, sruta and avadhi occur one after the other and not simultaneously. But in the case of the omniscient, where there is ‘pure knowledge’ and ‘pure intuition’, there is simultaneous occurrence of the two experiences. Kundakundacarya is also of the same opinion. In the case of the kevalira the two experiences occur simultaneously even as the light and the heat of the sun.] - Pujyapada Devanandi gives a similar view. Akalanka and Vidyanandi support the simultaneous occurrence of jnana and darsana in the kevalin. If they were to occur successively, his omniscience would only be a contingent occurrence.l There are some philosophers who do not make any difference between j0na and darsana at the highest level. They advocate the identity between the two. Haribhadra mentions that the ‘old Acaryas’ held the non-difference of the jnana and darsana. As pointed out by Tatia, it is difficult to determine who the old tycaryas’ referred to were.’ Siddhasena Divakara points out that we can distinguish between jnana darsana up to the point of manahparyaya-jnana, but at the level of the kevala jnana there is no difference between jnana and darsana in the case of the omniscient. If the omniscient soul knows all in an instant, he should continue to know for ever, other wise he does not know at all. He also says that darsana is jnana of external objects untouched by or unalienable to the sense organs. But the cognition does not cognize past and future events by means of a linga. Yasovijaya sums up the discussion on this problem with the remark that philosophers looked at the problem from different points of view. Therefore, none of the three positions is untenable. Those who maintained simultaneous occurrence looked at it from the empirical point of view. Jinabhadra resorted to the dusutra, analytic point of view, while Siddhasena looked at it from the samgraha, or synthetic point of view.
Apart from the logical and epistemological implications of this problem it has a great psychological significance. The experience of the kevalin is not possible for us to know. However, it is necessary to analyse the experience in its psychological aspect. The discussion. of the simultaneity and the successive occurrence of jnana and darsana in the case of the kevalin throws light on the fundamental nature of experience in the jnana and the darsana aspect. Experience is concrete, it expresses itself in the analytical and synthetic aspect. Immediate experience is a factor in the concrete psychosis. We also get the analytic experience which is aided by intellective factors. Jnana and darsana have been very often talked of as knowledge about, and knowledge of acquaintance. But knowledge of acquaintance is not a proper phrase for darsana, because knowledge of acquaintance is a single form of cognition. It is analogous to sensation. But darsana is not to be identified with the primitive and the original form of cognition. It is higher, and yet simple. It may be referred to as intuitive experience which apprehends reality directly in a moment of experience. For instance, we very often get the solution of a mathematical problem in a flash. Parraudin, a Swiss hunter, conceived the idea that the huge blocks of rocks had been transported by glacial action. He got this as a sudden flash of insight. It was later proved by more plodding scientists. There has been a good deal of discussion regarding the knowledge of acquaintance or ‘simple apprehension’ in modern psychology. L. T. Hobhouse recognizes ‘simple apprehension’. James talks of the ‘knowledge of acquaintance’. Hobhouse says that thought relations never constitute a content of immediate experience. “The consciousness in which we are directly or immediately aware of the content present to us a state which I venture to call apprehension, is a primitive underived act of knowledge”. Prof. Stout speaks of immediate experience in similar language. Simple apprehension is the term which seems most suitable for the presence of an object to consciousness without indicating any more special relation in which the mind may stand to this object. Bertrand Russell also, in spite of the frequent use of the phrase ,knowledge by acquaintance’, means by it the same kind of experience as Hobhouse and Prof. Stout meant by ‘simple apprehension’. It is better called ‘acquaintance’ and not ‘knowledge based on acquaintance’. We shall say that ‘we have acquaintance with anything of which we are directly aware, without intermediacy of any process of inference,’ or any knowledge of truth’. However, the term darsana cannot be translated in terms of any of these, as acquaintance or simple apprehension; they signify underived knowledge. The terms refer to simple, direct and primitive experience. Stout says that it gives the bare presence of the object to consciousness. If so, darsana would quite differ from such a form of simple apprehension. Darsana has various degrees. It admits of perfect experience which is direct and unerring, kevula darsana. Thus, it would not be appropriate to identify darsana with such a simple and primitive form of knowledge as mentioned by Hobhouse, Russell and Stout. It is best to call it intuitive experience’. Jnana is experience which presents the analytic features of objects. It is not a state of perception, because perception is a stage of experience. It is a stage of jnana as well as darsana; we find that mati jnana and mati-darsana are two species of cognition. Sensation and perception belong to both forms of cognition, jnana and darsana.
In the Dravyasamgraha, Nemicandra says that soul in its pure form has the quality of consciousness. Brahmadeva, in his commentary writes that from the ultimate point of view, jiva is distinguished by its quality of consciousness. It is the most direct and nearest reality of which any one who has introspected is most immediately aware.
Consciousness has been the most important point of discussion for philosophers, psychologists as well as scientists. Attempts have been made to salve the problem from various angles. In the Aitareya Aranyaka, an effort is made to understand the different stages of the development of consciousness in the universe. In the evolution of herbs, trees and all that is animal, the atman is gradually developing. In the herbs, only sap is seen; in the animated beings, citta is seen; in man, there is gradual development of atman, for he is now endowed with prajria. Similarly, in the Chandogyopanisad, Prajapati describes the progressive identification of atman with body consciousness. The physico-psychological method is adopted in the Taittiriyu. Finally, the atman as jnanamaya and anandamaya is emphasized. The Jaina classification of the jivas places the problem of the evolution of consciousness on a scientific basis. Jivas have been classified into one, two, three, four and five-sensed, according to the number of the sense organs possessed by them. Jivas possessing the five senses are divided into those having mind and those without mind. It is now realized that the. rise of consciousness is late in the evolution of life, from physical evolution to the evolution of life, mind and consciousness. However, it is difficult to say whether the ancient philosophers were aware of the evolution of life and consciousness in the sense understood to-day. Still, it would not be inappropriate to say that they were aware of the relatively later growth of mind and consciousness.
From the speculative side, cetana as a fundamental quality of the soul is pure consciousness, a kind of flame without smoke. This consciousness is eternal, although it gets manifested in the course of the evolutionary process of life in the empirical sense. This empirical consciousness arises from the contact of the sense organs with the objects. Thus, cetana in its pure form gets embodied with the atman and comes into contact with the empirical life, with the sense organs and objects. It manifests itself in the form of jnana and darsana. Jnana and darsana are, therefore, aspects of cetana and cetana is the spring-board from which they arise. It is like the flood of light in which objects are illuminated. It is the psychic background and the psychic halo of cognition in its two aspects, jnana and darsana. Cetana, therefore, is the light of consciousness that the soul possesses and through this light the cognition of objects arises.
Now, the problem arises-how to relate concepts like upayoga, cetana, jnana and darsana. Upayoga has been described as of two types, jnana and darsana. We have described upayoga as horme, the psychic force which is driving life and consciousness with a purpose. The purpose may be conscious or unconscious. On the conscious side, upayoga expresses itself into jnana and darsana. This expression is possible in the light of cetana. If cetana were not there, then upayoga would be purely an unconscious drive expressing itself in physiological activities like breathing and blood circulation. But we feel that even these activities are sometimes objects of our marginal consciousness. In any case, there is the psychic overtone of the physiological activities in our lives. This overtone is the light of consciousness, or the light of cetana which is a permanent quality of the soul. In the background of this light the psychic drive or upayoga expresses itself into cognition, as the light of the lamp enables a man to see the objects. This irresistible force of life makes us cognize objects. Thus upayoga is force. It is the fundamental characteristic of the soul. Cetana is the background of light. It is the fundamental quality of the soul. Cognition like jnana and darsana are expressions of the force of upayoga in the background light of cetana.
The Jaina view of the consciousness as the quality of the soul differs from the Nyaya-Vaisesika view. Nyaya-Vaisesika philosophers believe that consciousness is a mechanical and adventitious quality produced by the contact of the various factors inhering in a substance separate from itself. The atman in itself is unconscious, jada. According to Kanada, consciousness is produced in a jar through its connection with fire, agnighatasamyogaja is rohitadigpaavat”. Consciousness conceived to be a product depending upon a suitable concourse of circumstances.