A study of Jainism in terms of Western thought is much needed to day. With over-specialization in the empirical sciences and in philosophy, we are apt to lose the wood in the trees. In this age of ‘analysis’ it is necessary to re-assess the place of a synthetic approach to the fundamental problems of philosophy and psychology.
The present publication is essentially the same as the thesis submitted by me for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy to the Karnatak University, Dharwar. It is an attempt to interpret the problems of Jaina psychology in terms of Western thought. I am aware that it is not possible to compare the ancient Indian thought with the concepts of modern psychology. However, it would be sufficient if I could succeed in pointing out some possible similarities between ways of thinking out problems by ancient Indian Philosophers including the Bainas and thinkers of the West.
I am grateful to the Karnatak University for getting the work published. I acknowledge my indebtedness to the eminent scholars. A. More of the University of Hawaii, A. N. Upadhye of Rajaram College, Kolhapur and Principal A. Menezes, Professor of English, Karnatak University, who have suggested ways of improving the work. Principal Menezes went through the entire manuscript with an eye to language and diction. It is not possible to mention the names of all the persons who have been of help to me in the completion of the work. However, mention must be made of my colleague Shri A. M. Jalihal and my friends Shri S. K. Mutalik and Shri B. B. Hungund who have read the proofs. I also thank the Sarada Press, Mangalore, for their cooperation.
19th October, 1961.
T. G. KALGHATGI.
The Karnatak University, Dharwar is grateful to the University imission, New Delhi, for the 50% financial assistance towards the of this thesis under the scheme of publications of Approved Research wrote Theses (Humanities).
The aim of this treatise is to present some problems of Jaina psychology with reference to ancient Indian and Western thought including Western psychological thought, specially of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
Jainism is a realistic philosophy. As a religion it is a polemic against the authority of the Vedas and the pseudo-spiritualism of the elaborate sacrificial system of worship. Jainism is an old religion which prevailed even before Parsva and Vardhamana, the last two tirthankaras. The Yajurveda mentions Rsabha, Ajita and Aristanemi as tirthankaras. The Bhagavata Purana endorses the view that Rsabha was the founder of Jainism. Jainism reflects the cosmology and anthropology of a much older pre-Aryan upper class of North-Eastern India. Jacobi has traced Jainism to early primitive currents of metaphysical speculation. But the Jaina metaphysics, epistemology and psychology have arisen as a result of the interaction of the ‘orthodox’ ways of Indian thought. The Jaina system of thought arose out of the need to re-assert the Jaina faith against the academic invasions of Hindu thought. Elements of the Hindu and Buddhist theories have been incorporated in the Jaina theory of knowledge. As an example of such interaction we may mention the Jaina theory of pratyaksa as a source of knowledge. The original Jaina theory of pratyaksa as a direct source of knowledge of the soul and paroksa as knowledge due to the sense organs were modified in the light of the prevailing views of other systems of Indian thought. However, in this treatise we are not directly concerned with the problems of the antiquity of Jainism and the chronological order of the Jaina epistemological and psychological theories.
The Indian mind is synthetic. It is the synthetic view that has made our philosophy embrace all branches of knowledge into one comprehensive view. In recent times, the sciences have become independent and they have freed themselves from the bonds of philosophy. But in ancient India, as also in the ancient West, philosophy included all the sciences. For instance, there was no special science of psychology. It was a philosophy of the mind. The term psychology, belongs to our ‘new world’. Even half a century ago it was a philosophy of the mind or it was at least a mental physiology. Contemporary psychology, especially the British and the American psychology, may be considered as a science detached from the prevailing philosophical systems. But, as Murphy shows, German psychology was and still is related to philosophy, and changes in psychology can be traced to developments in philosophy.
In the Jaina thought, as also in the ancient Indian thought the problems of epistemology and the problems of psychology were indistinguishable. Epistemology was the basis for the psychological analysis of mental states and events. Many problems of psychology were unintelligible without consideration of the basic metaphysical problems. Psychology was possible only under the shadow of metaphysics. And the Jaina psychology, if it may be called psychology, may be considered to be academic and rational psychology. It did not use the method of experiment. It relied on introspection and the insight of seers and to some extent on the observation of the behavior of others. The insight of the ancient sages of India gave them a vivid picture of the reality in its various colours. It is the insight and the vision of the Jaina sages that built the superstructure of the mental philosophy of experience for the Jainas. They did not base their conclusions on experimental investigations. This was because the Jaina, as also the Indian mind generally, was not interested in the analysis of the things of the world. Experimental investigation had little meaning for them.
This treatise is analytic and interpretative. It is not possible to compare the problems of Jaina psychology with the present problems in psychology, because psychology in the present day has become an objective and a concrete science using experimental methods for investigation. In the modern age, increase in knowledge has meant increase in specialization. The specialized developments of the problems of modern psychology cannot be easily compared with the ancient psychological problems that the Jaina and the other Indian thought presented. We can only show that some problems in Western psychology have developed on similar lines to those presented in the Jaina philosophy. The problems of modern psychology have developed in a more exact and measurable direction. This cannot be said of the ancient Jaina thought. However, the basic problems were the same and the approach was similar. In this sense, some theories of psychology have been mentioned here by way of comparison. The object is to show a few possible similar developments in the field of psychological investigations in the Jaina, ancient Indian and Western thought.
This work begins with the study of the self in Jaina philosophy. Discovery of the self was the main problem of Indian philosophy. The effort of Indian philosophy has been to know the self and make the knowledge effective in human life.
The first chapter, therefore, discusses the problem of the soul in Jaina thought. The idea of the soul has occupied an important position in Indian thought. Jainism makes a dichotomous division of the categories into jiva and ajiva. Jainism considers the soul from the noumenal point of view, niscaya naya, and the phenomenal point of view, the vyavahara naya. The psychological implications of the nature of the soul have been discussed in this chapter.
The second chapter deals with the Jaina theory of mind in all its aspects. Jainas make a distinction between the two phases of the mind as (i) the material phase (dravya manas) and the mental phase (bhava manas). The first phase refers to the structural aspect, and the second refers to the mental and functional aspects. The Jainas make mind a quasi-sense organ. Similarly, it is aprapyakari, as it does not come into physical contact with the object. These problems have been fully discussed with special reference to Indian and Western thought.
The main problems in the third chapter are the interpretation of upayoga, jnana and darsana. Upayoga is the essential characteristic of the soul. It is interpreted here as the horme of the modern psychologists. Cetana, or consciousness, is the psychic background of all experiences. Jnaua and darsana are the manifestations of upayoga in the light of the psychic background of cetana. Other problems concerning consciousness, like the states of consciousness and self-consciousness, have also been analysed. The Jainas, as other Indian philosophers, were aware of the unconscious in its psychological and metaphysical aspects. In the end, a note on pasyatta, interpreted as mneme, is also added.
In the fourth chapter we come to the analysis of sense organs and sense qualities. The Jainas have given a detailed description of the nature and function of the sense organs. They have accepted five sense organs. They do not recognize motor organs of experience. They make a distinction between the structural aspect (dravyendriya), and the psychic aspect (bhavendriya). The visual sense organ is aprapyakari, as it does not come into physical contact with the object. The other four sense organs are prapyakari, because of the physical contact with the object for cognition. Similarly, the psychological analysis of the sense qualities, as presented by the Jainas, is given in this chapter.
The fifth chapter deals with the problem of empirical experience. It is the problem of perception. The Jaina analysis of perception is complex and elaborate. It has a great psychological significance. The Jainas mention four stages of perception: (i) avagraha, the stage of sensation, (ii) Mil, the stage of integration of sense impressions, (iii) avaya, perceptual judgment, and (iv) dharana, retention. These problems have been discussed in the light of the analysis of perception.
In the sixth chapter we come to the problem of other sources of empirical experience. Retention (dharana), recollection (smrti), and recognition (pratyabhijna) are factors involved in memory. This chapter gives the analysis of retention as the condition of memory, and recollection and recognition as forms of expressing memory. Similarly, the psychological implications of inference (anumarra) as a source of knowledge have also been analysed.
In the seventh chapter the problem of supernormal perception is discussed. The Jainas believe that sense experience is not sufficient to give the experience of reality. They accept the possibility of direct experience without the instrumentality of the sense organs and the mind. They called this pratyaksa. This is the supernormal perception. All schools of Indian thought, except the Carvaka, accept the possibility of supernormal experience. The Jainas have given three levels of supernormal perception: (i) avadhi, (ii) manahparyaya and (iii) kevala, although avadhi may not be called supernormal experience. Avadhi may be compared to clairvoyance, and manahparyaya may be likened to telepathic cognition. The two forms of supernormal experience have been analysed with reference to the investigations of modern psychical research. For the kevala there is no comparison. It is the state of omniscience.
Chapter eight gives the description of the fourteen stages of the struggle for the realization of the self. They are called gunasthanas in Jainism. The transcendental self is to be realised. The way to self-realization is long and difficult. It is a struggle for emancipation and for the attainment of perfection. In the fourteenth stage one reaches the consummation of self-realization. This is the stage of kaivalya, or rirarijarra. The struggle for perfection in the fourteen stages is psychologically important, although empirical psychology will not be able to explain the significance of these stages.
The problem of the soul has been a perennial problem in religion and speculative philosophy. Primitive man had made a distinction between body and soul. The burial of the dead- with their belongings and even the mummification of the Egyptians are based on such a distinction between body and spirit. The philosophical concept of the soul has developed from such primitive distinctions.
In modern psychology, the idea of the soul is no longer important. In its place has come the notion of self or ‘the centre of interest.’ The word ‘soul’ is ambiguous. Sometimes it stands for mind, sometimes for self and sometimes for both. The English word points to an entity as the cause or vehicle of physical or psychical activities of the individual person. The soul is a spiritual substance. In Indian thought the word atrnan has undergone various changes. It is little used in the Vedas. It primarily meant breath. In the Upanisads another word, prana, is used for breath, and atman stands for the. innermost part of man. Man was atmavat. For the Upanisadic seers, the soul was a presupposition for all experiences. Indian philosophies, with the exception of Mayavada of Samkara and Ksanikavada of the Buddhists, fundamentally agree about the nature of the soul as a permanent, eternal and imperishable substance. But the primitive Aryans believed that the life of man is continued after death in a shadowy existence in some subtle bodily form. This is not the soul of the later philosophers. Jacobi calls it the psyche.’ This is the development of the primitivenotion of life after death lingering in some form. It is found even to-day in the practice of sraddha. The psyche is frequently spoken of as purusa and of the size of the thumb (arzgusta-mdtra). At the time of death it departs from the body. In the oldest Upanisads the psyche is described as constituted by the pranas, psycho-physical factors. Still, these factors were not regarded as principles of personality.
The idea of the soul has occupied an important position in Jaina philosophy. Jainism aims at the liberation of the soul from the cycle of birth and death. The saving of the soul is the Christian ideal. In the Apology, Plato makes Socrates say that his mission was to get men to care for their souls and to make them as good as they can be.
Jainism is dualistic. There is a dichotomous division of categories. All things are divided into living and non-living, souls and non-souls. In the first verse of the Dravyasamgraha, we read, “The ancient among the great Jainas have described the dravyas as jiva and ajiva.” Jim is a category, and jiva personalised becomes atman. Jainism believes in the plurality of souls. Souls are substances distinct from matter. Souls influence one another. But they are quite distinct from one another and not connected in any higher unity. They may be called spiritual monads. Jainism emphasizes the diversity of souls. Amongst the Muslim theologians, Nazam and his school maintained that the soul is a spiritual substance.
Jainism considers the soul from two points of view: the noumenal (niscaya naya) and the phenomenal (vyavahara naya). The Dravyanuyogatarkaya of Bhoja describes the distinction as mentioned in the Vise, savasykabhasya by saying that the niscaya narrates the real things and the vyavhara narrates things in a popular way. In the Samayasara, Kundakundacarya points out that the practical standpoint is essential for the exposition of the inner reality of things, as a non-Aryan is never capable of understanding without the non-Aryan tongue.
The existence of the soul is a presupposition in the Jaina philosophy. Proofs are not necessary. If there are any proofs, we can say that all the pramanas can establish the existence of the soul. “Oh Gautama, the soul is pratyaksa”, said Mahavira, “for that in which your knowledge consists is itself soul.” What is pratyaksa need not be proved like the pleasure and pain of the body. It is pratyaksa owing to the aham pratyaksa, the realization of the ‘I’, which is associated with the functions pertaining to all the three tenses. William James and James Ward present self-consciousness in this form. Ward talks of the ‘internal perception’ or self-consciousness. The last order of knowledge of the duality of subject and object is an indispensable condition of all actual experience however simple. It is, therefore, first in order of existence. It is the subject of experience that we call the pure ego or self. William James says, “For, this central part of the self is felt. It is something by which we also have direct sensible consciousness in which it is present, as in the whole life-time of such moments.- Thus, one who ignores the self-evidence of the soul is like one who says that sound is inaudible and the moon is devoid of the moon. The existence of the soul can be inferred from the behaviour of others. Similarly, the soul exists because, “it is my word, O Gautama!”
The jiva is described from the noumenal and phenomenal points of view. From the noumenal point of view, the soul is described in the pure form. The phenomenal describes the empirical qualities of the soul. From the pure point of view, it is not associated with body or any physical or mental qualities. Mahavira points out to the third Ganadhara that the soul is different from the body and its senses; just as Devadatta recollects an object perceived through the five windows of the palace, which is different from the palace and the five windows, so also a person recollecting an object perceived through the five senses of the body is different from the senses and the body.
The Buddhist impermanence of the soul is also refuted. Buddhists had said that there was no self except the khandas. Kundakundacarya points out that from the noumenal point of view the soul and the body are not one, although in worldly practice the soul having a beautiful body is called beautiful and fair like the beautiful body of the living arhatg In the Chandogyopanisad, in the dialogue between Yajnyavalkya and Janaka, the idea of the self is progressively brought out by showing that it is not physical nor a dream-state.
From the noumenal point of view, the soul is pure and perfect. It is pure consciousness. From the real point of view, the soul is unbound, untouched and not other than itself. The soul is one and not composite. In the Sthananga we get a description of the soul as one (ege atta). The commentator describes it as ekavidhah atmanah.9 In Samayasara, Kundakupdacarya describes the absolute oneness of the soul “on the strength of my self-realization.” This does not mean that the self is one in the Vedantic sense of cosmic self. It does not contradict the plurality of souls in Jainism. It only emphasizes the essential identity of souls. Jivas in all their individual characteristics are essentially the same. If the soul were one, then, “O Gautama! there would not be sukha, duhkha, bandha, etc.” Individual souls are different like the kumbhasll
The nature of jiva has been well described by Nemicalidra in his Dravyasariigraha. He describes the soul both from the noumenal and phenomenal points of view. He says that jiva is characterised by upayoga, is formless and is an agent. It has the same extent as its body. It is the enjoyer of the fruits of karma. It exists in samsara. It is siddha and has a characteristic of upward motion. We get a similar description in the Pancastikayasara of Kundakundacarya. Jiva is formless. It is characterised by upayoga. It is attached to karma. It is the Lord, the agent and the enjoyer of the fruits of karma. It pervades bodies large or small. It has a tendency to go upward to the end being freed from the impuities of Kama. Thattvarthaura characteristic.
Every jiva possesses an infinite number of qualities. Glasenapp, ) octriree of Karma in Jaina Philosophy, mentions eight important characteristics:
1. The faculty of omniscience (kevala jhana).
2. The faculty of absolute undifferentiated cognition (kevala darsalza).
3. Superiority over joy and grief.
4. Possession of belief in complete religious truth (samyaktva), and irreproachable moral conduct (caritra).
5. Possession of eternal life (alcsayasthiti).
6. Complete formlessness (amurtatva).
7. Unrestricted energy (viryatva).
8. Complete equality in rank with other jivas.
The first characteristic of the soul is upayoga. The word is difficult to define. It is the source of experience. The cognitive, and affective aspects spring from it. It is a differential of the living organism. Umasvati says that upayoga is the essential character the soul. Upayoga has conative prominence. It may be called horme in the sense that McDougall has used the term. It is a vital or urge to action. P. T. Nunn has stated that horme is the activity that differentiates the living animal from dead matter. It is like Schopenhauer’s ‘will to live’, and Bergson’s elan vital. Jnana and darsana are manifestations of upayoga.
Citta or cetana as a characteristic of the soul is important in Indian philosophy. In the Dravyasamgraha, jiva is described as possessing cetana from the noumenal point of view. Cetana is a sort of inclination which arises from upayoga. This inclination branches directions — jnana and darsana. Darsana may be said to be undifferentiated knowledge. Jnana is cognition defined. The jiva has infinite jnana and darsana. But certain classes of karma, like jnanavaraniya and darsanavaraniya karma, tend to obscure and confuse the nature of the jiva. From the phenomenal point of view, darsana and jnana tend to manifest themselves in eight kinds of jnana and is of darsana.
The possession of upayoga raises the question whether the jiva possesses upayoga and is yet different from it, or whether it is identical with it. The Nyaya theory does not recognize the identity of quality and its possessor. Jainism asserts that only from the phenomenal point of view they are separable. In Pancastikuyasara we read “Only in common parlance do we distinguish darsana and jnana. But in reality there is no separation.” The soul is inseparable from upayoga. Horme is an essential characteristic of the living organism. It is manifested in the fundamental property experienced in the incessant adjustments and adventures that make up the tissue of life and which may be called drive or felt tendency towards an end. Animal life is not merely permeated by physical and chemical processes; it is more than that. Even the simplest animal is autonomous.
The soul is simple and without parts. It is formless. As the soul is immaterial it has no form. This quality has been mentioned in other systems also. The Jaina thinkers were against the Buddhist idea of the soul as a cluster of khandas. Buddhists do not refer to the permanent soul. It is a composite of mental states called kharrdas. “In modern Western thought”, Hume says, “when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble upon some particular perception or other of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never catch myself any time without perception, and never can observe anything but the perception.” Hoffding stated that the ego has been looked for in vain as something absolutely simple. The nature of the ego is manifested in the combination of sensation, ideas and feelings. But Herbart maintains that the soul is a simple being not only without parts but also without qualitative multiplicity. Modern psychology has emphasized substantiality, simplicity, persistence and consciousness as the attributes of the soul. Descartes has said, “-I am the thing that thinks, that is to say who doubts, who affirms . . . who loves, who hates and feels...,” this and he designates this thing as substance.
Hamilton advocated the four characteristics with the greatest explicitness. Other prominent names are those of Porter, Calkins, Angell and Aveling.
From the phenomenal point of view, jiva is also described as possessing four pranas. They are sense (indriya), energy (bala), life (ayu), and respiration. (ana). Pancastikayasara gives the same description. The idea of prana is found in Indian and Western thought. In the Old Testament (Genesis: Book I) we read, “The Lord God breathed into the nostril the breath of life and man became a living soul.” In the primitive minds we find the conception that the wind gave men life. When it ceases to blow, men die. In the Navaho legend there is a description of the life force according to which we see the trace of the wind in the skin at the tips of fingers. Pranas refer to psycho-physical factors of the organism. The jiva assumes the bodily powers when it takes new forms in each new birth. Whatever thing manifests in the four pranas lives and is jiva. The four pranas are manifest in ten forms. The indriya expresses itself in five senses. Bala may refer to the mind, the body and speech. Ayu and ana are one each. These pranas in all their details need not be present in all organisms, because there are organisms with less than five sense organs. But there must be the four main characteristics. The most perfectly developed souls have all the ten prinks and the lowest have only four. This has a great biological and psychological significance. Comparative psychology points out that in the psycho-physical development of the various animal species at the lower level, the chemical sense which is affected by chemical reaction is the only sense function; and it later becomes the separate sense of taste and smell. Experimental investigations carried by Riley and Forel point out that the chemical sense is used by insects like moths even for mating. Forel has given a topo-chemical theory for explaining the behaviour of bees. As we go higher in the scale of life, the chemical sense plays little part. In birds, sight and smell are well developed. In mammals, we find a higher degree of qualitative discrimination of smell. As we go higher still; we get the variability of adaptation which may be called intelligence.
In the Brahmanas and the oldest Upanisads there is a description of the psyche as consisting of five pranas. They are regarded as factors of the physico-psychological life. Occasionally, more than five pranas are mentioned. But still the idea of a permanent self had not shaped itself. In the third adhyaya of the Brhadaranyakopanisad Yajnyavalkya was asked to explain what happens to a person after the body has been dissolved, and the parts of the psyche has been remitted to the fire and wind. He avoids the discussion and suggests that karma remains after death. This was a step forward towards the formation of the permanent self. Brhadaranyakopanisad also contains a discussion about the constituent parts of the soul. Eight instead of five have been suggested. Vijnana and retah are mentioned. This vijnanarraayapurusa comes nearer to the conception of the soul, although personal immortality is not emphasized. In Jainism also, the idea of a permanent soul possessing pranas must have developed on the same lines.
From the phenomenal point of view, the soul is the Lord (prabhu), the doer (karta), enjoyer (bhokta), limited to his body (dehamatra), still incorporeal, and it is ordinarily found with karma. As a potter considers himself as a maker and enjoyer of the clay pot, so, from the practical point of view, the mundane soul is said to be the doer of things like constructing houses and the enjoyer of sense objects. As the soul produces impure thought-activities and as a consequence, the material karmas, it also enjoys thoughts with the help of the material karmas. Thus, jiva enjoys its thought-created activity. However, from the noumenal point of view, jiva is the doer of suddha bhavas or pure thought (karmas); and from the phenomenal point of view, it is the doer of pudgala karmas or karmic matter. The distinction between the formal cause (nimitta), and material cause (upadana), has been introduced for the description of the soul. The Jainas say that the soul is the efficient cause of the material karmas. The jiva possesses consciousness, and consciousness manifests itself in the form of various mental states. These mental states are responsible for activities which produce material karmas. It is, therefore, asserted that jiva is the agent of thought-karmas indirectly of the karmic matter. The Pancastikayasara describes the atman as the agent of its own bhavas. But it is not the agent of pudgala karmas. Jainism emphasizes the activity of the jiva as against the Samkhya view of the passive udasina purusa. As a consequence of activity, the jiva experiences happiness and misery. But Nemicandra says that it is only from the phenomenal point of view. From the noumenal point of view, jiva has consciousness and it enjoyes eternal bliss. In the Dravyasamgraha we read, “Niccayanayado cedana bhavam khu adassa”. The joys and sorrows that jiva experiences are the fruits of dravyakarma. But Buddhism believes that the agent never enjoys the fruits of karma. James Ward giving the general characterization of the varied contents of the empirical self’, says that the self has first of all (a) a unique interest and (b) a certain inwardness, further it is (c) an individual that (d) persists (e) is active, and finally it knows itself.
But the process of entanglement in activity and enjoyment is beginningless. It gets entangled in the sarimsara and embodied through the operation of karmas. The soul gets various forms due to the materially caused conditions (upadhic), and it is involved in the cycle of birth and death. It is subjected to the forces of karmas which express themselves first through the feelings and emotions and secondly in the chains of very subtle kinds of matter, invisible to the eye and the ordinary instruments of science. When the soul is embodied, it is affected by the environment-physical, social and spiritual, in different ways. Thus, we get the various types of soul existence. The soul embodies itself and identifies itself with the various functions of the bodily and social environment. William James distinguishes between the self as known or the me, the empirical ego as it is sometimes called, and the self as knower or the I, pure ego. The constituents of the me may be divided into three classes: the material me, the social me and the spiritual me. The body is the innermost part of the material me. Then come the clothes, our home, and property. They become parts of our empirical ego with different degrees of intimacy. A man’s social me is the recognition that he gets from his fellowmen. A man has as many selves as there are individuals and groups who recognize him. The spiritual me also belongs to the empirical me. It consists of the “entire collection of consciousness, my psychic faculties and disposition. taken concretely.” But the pure self, the self as the knower, is very different from the empirical self. It is the thinker, that which thinks. This is permanent, what the philosophers call the soul or the transcendental ego.g James Ward also makes a distinction between the self known or the empirical ego, and the pure self. For him, the empirical ego is extremely complex. It is the presented self. The earliest element is the presented self, the bodily or the somatic consciousness. But they never have the same inwardness as “the sense of embodiment.” We also find a certain measure of individual permanence and inwardness that belongs to the self. We may call this ‘the sensitive and the appetitive self.’ With the development of ideation there arises what we call the inner zone, having still greater unity and permanence. This is the imaging and desiring self. At the level of intellection, we come to the concept that every intelligent person is a person having character and history and his aim in life through social interaction. This gives conscience, a social product as Adam Smith has said. At this stage a contrast between the thinker and the object of thought is clearly formed. This is the thinking and willing self. At this stage, even the inner ideation and desire become outer, no longer strictly self. The duality of subject and object is the last order of knowledge and is the indispensable condition of all actual experience. It is the subject of experience that we call pure ego or self.
The Jaina thinkers made a distinction between the states of the soul as bahiratrnan, antaratman and paramatman. Bahiratman consists in the identification of the self with body and external belongings. It is the bodily self. In this we say, ‘I am the body, I am lean etc.’ This identification is due to ignorance. The same soul is in the karmavastha and is characterized by suddha caitanya and bliss. It is free from all sense of otherness. It has discriminative knowledge. This conscious self is antaratman in the samyagdrsti gunasthana. The pure and perfect self which is free from the impurities of karma is the paramatman. It is characterized by perfect cognition and knowledge. It is freed and is a siddha. This paramatmarc is jnanamaya and is pure consciousness, It cannot be known by the senses. It has no indriyas and no manas. From the noumenal point of view, these are the attributes of the soul. The Jaina approach to the problem is metaphysical. It contains elements of psychological investigation; but the language is the language of metaphysics. Modern psychologists, especially the rational psychologists, stopped at psychological analysis and explained the process of realizing the pure nature of the self from the empirical stage to the stage of pure ego. But the transcendental self is not the subject of psychology. William James has said that states of consciousness are all that psychology needs to do her work with. ‘Metaphysics or theology may prove the existence of the soul; but for psychology the hypothesis of such a substantial principle of unity is superfluous.’
Jainism refers to the size of the soul. Although souls are not of any definite size, they contract and expand according to the size of the body in which they are incorporated for the time being. The soul is capable of adjusting its size to the physical body, as the lamp placed in a large or small room illuminates the whole space of the room. Nemicandra describes it as the phenomenal characteristic of the soul. From the noumenal point of view it is said to exist in innumerable pradesas. In respect of the elasticity of the soul, Jainism differs from the other schools of Indian thought. As Jacobi says, the Jainas have a tenet of the size of the soul which is not shared by other philosophers. Some philosophers like the Vaisesikas, Democritus and the atomists, thought of the soul as atomic. Some others talked of the omnipresence of the soul. Jacobi says that the original Vaisesika was not clear on this point. Some Samkhya writers preferred the soul to be infinitely small, while Isvara Krsna and later writers characterized it as all-pervading. The spatial view of the habitation of the soul had occupied the minds of the Upanisadic philosophers. Upanisadic psychology agrees with the Aristotelian in localizing the soul in the heart. It was later thought that it was in the brain. Yogic and tantric books recognized the cerebro-chemical processes, and consciousness was traced to the brain. In the Taittirpyopanisad (l. 6. 1. 2) we read that the soul in the heart moves by a passage through the bones of the palate, right up to the skull, where the hairs are made to part. The soul in the heart is called manomaya. In ‘the Kausitaki Upanisad the soul is described as the master of all bodily functions. The senses depend on the soul as ‘relatives on the rich’. The self is immanent in the whole body, and is hidden in it. This passage leads to the view, like the Jaina view, that the soul fills the body. Different other accounts are given in the Upanisads. In the Brhadaratzyaka the self is described as small as a grain of rice or barley. In the Kathopanisad we find that the soul is of the size of the thumb. It dwells in the centre of the heart. In the Chandogya, it is said to be of the measure of the span between the head and the chin. William James traces the feeling of self to the cephalic movements. He says that the self of selves when carefully examined is found to consist mainly in the collection of these peculiar motions in the head or between the head and the heart. Desecrates maintains that the seat of the soul is the pineal gland. Fichte holds that the soul is a space filling principle. Lotze says that the soul must be located somewhere in the matrix of the arterial brain events. These accounts tend to make us believe that the soul is something material which occupies space. It is sometimes pointed out that the idea of the spatial attributes of the soul constitutes a contradiction. If the soul has no form it cannot occupy space, even the infinite pradesas; and if it is immaterial, it cannot have form. However, this contradiction is due to the difficulties of expressing the immaterial in terms of the material. This has been the perennial problem of philosophy, because the immaterial has no vocabulary of its own. The Greeks had the same difficulty. Plato had to resort to allegories and myths_ for expressing the immaterial. In Jainism, although the description of the soul is not metaphorical, it is just an attempt to come nearerest to immaterialism. It may be that the difficulty is due to the complexity of substance in Jainism. Jainism gives the cross division of substances as spiritual and non-spiritual, and again as corporeal and non-corporeal. Non-spiritual is ajiva. In the non-spiritual, we get the non-corporeal substance like dharma and adharma; and there is the corporeal which is called pudgala. From the phenomenal point of view, jiva comes under the spiritual but corporeal. The corporeal need not necessarily be material. The classification is as follows :
Corporeal corporeal non-corporeal
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Jiva matter 1. akasa
If this division is accepted, there need be no contradiction. Again, when size is attributed to the soul, it is possible that it refers to the sphere or extent of the influence that is intended. In the Pancastikayasara we read that just as a lotus hued ruby, when placed in a cup of milk, imparts its lustre to the milk, the soul imparts its luster to the whole body.
Jiva is characterized by upward motion. Nemicaridra describes the pure soul as possessing urdhvagati. In the Pancastikayasara it is said, when the soul is freed from all impurities it moves upward to the end of loka. For Plato, the soul was, above all, the source of motion. It is only the self that moves. In the Phcrdrus, Socrates says in his second speech, “The soul is immortal, for that which is ever in motion is immortal.” The self never ceases to move and it is the fountain and the beginning of motion to all that moves. The movement of the soul in samsara is due to its association with karma; but by nature it has the upward motion which it adopts when it is free from karma. But it has to stop at the top of the universe beyond which no movement is possible in pure space which is devoid of the medium for motion. The Jaina conception of the soul as possessing urdhvagati is more an ethical expediency than a metaphysical principle or a psychological fact.
All these attributes belong to the nature of every soul and they are clearly seen if the jivas are pure and free. However, most of the jivas are not pure and free. They are contaminated by some foreign elements which veil their purity and perfection. The foreign element is karma, very fine matter, imperceptible to the senses, and which enters into the soul and causes great changes. The souls are then involved in the wheel of samsara. They become samsarins.
The samsari jivas are classified on the basis of various principles, like the status and the number of sense organs possessed by them. They are the sthavara jivas, immovable souls. This is the vegetable kingdom. Sir J. C. Bose has pointed out that the vegetable world has capacity for experience. They are one sensed organisms. Earth, water, fire and plants are such jivas. They possess the sense of touch. This view is peculiar to Jainism. Trasa jivas (moving souls) have two to five senses. Worms, oysters, conches etc., possess taste and touch. Ants, bugs and lice have three senses-taste, touch and smell. Mosquitoes, bees and flies possess four senses-taste, touch, smell and sight. And birds, beasts and men have all the five senses. Again, five sensed organisms may possess mind. They are called samanaska. They may be bereft of mind (amanaska).
In Gommatasara : Jivakanda, we get a detailed classification of samsari jivas. This classification is shown in Table I.
Comparative psychology points out that there have been various stages in the development of animal life. The first simple animals, the protozoa, are possessed of one sense. In fact, till we reach the insect species we find that the chemical sense predominates. Positive, negative and food reactions are mainly due to the chemical sense. As we go up the animal scale, we find sensory discrimination in qualitative distinctions. Even the other senses get discriminated and developed as we proceed in the development of animal life. Similarly, the distinction between the jivas, as paryapta and aparyapta, has great psychological significance. Gommatasara thus illustrates the paryapta, developed, “as the things like the room, jars, and clothes are full or empty, so the jivas should be understood to be complete or incomplete. “ Jiva becomes paryapta with the absorption of karmic matter for building up its body, sense, respiration and manas. One-sensed organisms become complete with the possession of food, drink, body, sense, and respiration. Similarly, the possession of these attributes makes the first four-sensed organisms paryapta or complete. For five sensed organisms all the six are necessary. In the absence of these the jivas are incomplete. Comparative psychology has shown that sensory discrimination has been a gradual process. Miss Washburn points out that ability to distinguish between the different sensory experiences depends on several factors, like the nature of the sense organs and the ability to make varied reaction movements. On the basis of these investigations, three different classes of senses, like the chemical sense, hearing and sight, have been mentioned. The chemical sense is manifested in the combined senses of taste and touch. As sensory discrimination becomes more complex, the mental life of the animal becomes more developed and pronounced.
These characteristics of the soul are mentioned from the practical point of view. Defilement of the soul takes place when the karma pours into the soul. This is called asrava. The soul then begins to experience mundane and emotional experiences like the passions. The karma which comes into contact is retained. The soul is eternally infected with matter. Every moment it is getting new matter. In the normal course of things, it has no end. But the deliverance of the soul from the wheel of samsara is possible by voluntary means. By the process of sarizvara the soul can stop the influx of karma; by nirjara it can eliminate the karma already glued to the soul. Then all obstacles are removed and the soul becomes pure and perfect, free from the wheel of samsara. Being free, with its upward motion the jiva attains the liberation or moksa.
[Please this table see file name ‘wide table page no. 13,57,73’]
In the last lines of the Gommatasara: Jiva kanda, it is said that the liberated soul remains pure and free.
Pure and perfect souls live in eternal bliss. But they do not lose their identity as the Vedantin would emphasize. In the eighth khanda of the Chandogyopanisad, it is said that when a man depart hence his speech is merged in mind, his mind in breath, his breath in fire, which in the highest being is sat. Now, that which is the subtle essence has its self. It is the self, “and thou, Oh Svetaketu, art that.” In the eleventh khanda also, we read that when the body withers and dies and the living self leaves it, the living self dies not. Jacobi says that here we come nearer to the concept of the soul. It differs from the Jaina concept in that the soul here does not possess a permanent personality. for in mukti the jiva is merged in Brahman and its individuality is lost. For the Jaina, McTaggart’s analogy of the ‘college of selves’ would appear to be apter, although what type of spiritual unity there is in moksa. Jainism cannot say. McTaggart speaks of the unity of the absolute as that of a society. All the selves are perfect, and “if an opponent should remind me”, he writes, “of the notorious imperfections of all the lives of all of us, I should point out that every self is in reality eternal and that its true qualities are only seen in so far as it is considered as eternal.” Sub specie eterrritatis it is progressing towards perfection as yet unattained. The neverceasing struggle of the soul is an important tenet in Jainism. The universe is not, then, an amusing pantomime of infallible marionettes, but a fight for perfection, in which “something is eternally gained for the universe by the success.” The Jaina outlook is melioristic.