Jivaraja Jaina Granthmala, No. 20
JAINA VIEW OF LIFE
T. G. Kalghati, M.A., Ph.D.
Reader in Philosophy, Karnatak University,
and Principal, Karnatak Arts College, Dharwar
Dr. A. N. Upadhya & Dr. H. L. Jain and Pt. Kailaschand Shastri
LAL CHAND HIRACHAND DOSHI
Jaina Sanskriti Samraksaka Sangha, Sholapur.
First Edition 1969
Second Edition 1984
In this brochure are presented eight essays on different aspects of Jainism. The Anekanta attitude is really the saviour of philosophical positions which are-being pushed to the brink of extinction by extremists. Syadvada and Nayavada, the two wings of Anekanta, are the effective instruments for bringing out the secrets of reality by reconciling extreme alternatives. Jainism accepts both Spirit and Matter as real. The spirit or Atman has been subjected to deeper analysis in the three-fold distinction of bahir-, antar- and parama- atman. It is an embodiment of knowledge. the fivefold classification (mati, sruta, avadhi, manahaparyaya and kevala) of which is of special interest for an epistemologist. The concept of Kevala-jnana envisages an ideal type of knowledge for the functioning of which there are no temporal and spatial limits. Karma, as conceived in jainism, is a subtle variety of matter which is in association with spirit from beginningless time. It has evolved itself into an automatically functioning Law and shapes the destiny of the spirit. It is by the termination of the Karmic association through austere life and self concentration that the Atman passes through various stages of spiritual progress (gunasthana) and attains its innate nature, the fullest effulgence of knowledge. This course of progress is the veritable path of religion, full of rigorous discipline in thought, word and act: this constitutes the ethical code of Jainism, based on Ahimsa which is the highest criterion for judging the mutual relations in the realm of living beings. It is by correctly understanding reality and by leading the life of self-discipline, according to the stage to which one belongs, that one realizes the highest spiritual status, summum bonum.
Thus it will be seen how these essays, though independent in themselves, have an inherent connection between them. They give us in brief the Jaina View of Life and should enable readers to appreciate an important undercurrent of India's phiIosophical heritage.
Dr. T. G. Kalghatagi is a keen investigator in philosophy. It is extremely good of him to have brought his equipment in the philosophical study to bear upon Jainism in its various aspects. We are thankful to him for giving this volume for publication to the Jivaraja Jaina Granthamala.
Within a short time after the death of our earlier President, Shriman Gulabchand H]Rachand Ji (on 22-1-1967), the Sangha suffered an irreparable loss (on 23-6-1968) in the sad demise of Shriman Manikchand Virachandaji who worked hard for the Sangha from its inception. His zest for life, courage of conviction and firm actions were a strength to the Sangha.
We are grateful to our President, Shriman Lalchand Hirachandaji for his enlightening guidance in all our deliberations. Heavier responsibilities have devolved on the broad shoulders of Shriman Walchand Devchandaji who is helping us in every way for the progress of the Granthamala. We are so thankful to him.
A. N. Upadhye
H. L. Jain
PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION
Man is 'homo sapiens'. He has built civilizations and destroyed them too. Magnificent empires were built, mighty in their day. It was difficult to doubt their power. But their day is done and their courts 'the lion and the lizard keep'. We have seen the phenomenal advancement of science in our own day. As we gaze at the incredible rapidity of scientific progress we are losing touch with the spiritual side of man. We are on cross-roads of life, between two worlds; ' one dead and the powerless to be born' . We see everywhere social and political chaos. There is distrust and frustration, and for a decade or more we have lived on the brink of another world war more disastrous than the earlier too, which would mean total destruction of human race. Whether it would mean pralaya we do not know. But when it comes we can only see the broken bits of civilization, if we are to survive this catastrophe. And all this is due to a wrong approach to the understanding of the problems of life and experience.A new kind of a materialism is being emphasised today where in we pay exclusive attention to material comforts and ignore the higher values. But to understand life and nature we have to transcend the narrow partial points of view and adopt a synoptic view of life. We have to realize that others' points of view have also to be considered and respected. Dogmatic approach of looking at the problems leads to intolerance and then to violence. Jainas have preached the synoptic view of life in their theory of Anekanta. It emphasises the catholic outlook towards life. Intellectual nonviolence, respect for other points of view are the key-note of this doctrine, and that would be a panacea for all the ills of our social
and political life today. Jainism is an ancient religion which prevailed even before Vardhamana Mahavira, the twenty-fourth and Parsva the twentythird Tirthamkaras. It is a pre-Aryan religion coming from the Sramana current of thought, and sramana thought was prevailing in India long before the Aryans came to this country The antiquity of Jainism as reflecting the Pre-Aryan thought of the upper class of North-Eastern India has now been established beyond dispute. Jaina tradition is unanimous in making Rsabha the first Tirthamkara as the founder of Jainism. Long before the Aryans reached the Ganges or even Sarasvati. Jainism had been taught by prominent saints or Tirthamkaras, prior to the historical twentythird Parsva of the eighth or ninth century B. C. Many Western scholars like Jacobi Vincent Smith Forlong and Zimmer have accepted the Pre-Aryan prevalence of Jainism. Radhakrishnanaccepts the view that Jainism prevailed in India even before Parsva and Vardhamana, the last two Tlrthamkaras. Hiralal Jain has interpreted the mention of Kesi and Kesi Rsabha in the Rgveda as referring to the first Tirthamkara. When Buddhism arose Jainism was already an ancient sect with its stronghold near about Vaisali which was visited and admired by Buddha.
The Anekanta outlook of the Jainas pervades their entire philosophy and life. The whole texture of Jaina philosophy and ethics is woven in the Anekanta attitude. We have accordingly analyse in this treatise some of the conceptions in Jaina philosophy and ethics as rejecting the Anekanta outlook. Jiva has been considered from the noumenal and the phenomenal points of view. From the noumenal point of view, it is pure and perfect, and from the phenomenal it is the agent and the enjoyer of fruits of Karma. Our experience can be graded into levels as the sense and the supersensuous experience. Jiva in its empirical existence is involved in the wheel of Samsara through the Yoga (activity). This involvement is beginningless, though it has an end. The end is freedom from the wheel of life and the attainment of Moksa. For this we have to remove the Karma that has accrued to the soul. The Jainas have worked out an elaborate theory of Karma almost making it a science. The Anekanta view pervades the analysis of Karma. Karma is a substantive force. It is material in nature. It consists of fine particles of matter which are glued to the soul as soot to the surface of the mirror. The influx of Karma leads to bondage of Jiva to the wheel of life. This bondage of soul to Karma is determined by the i) nature (prakrti), duration (sthiti), intensity (anubhagha) and quantity ( pradesa) of Karma. Karma has its psychological aspect also in the Bhava karma.
Moksa is to be achieved through the triple path of right intuition, right knowledge and right conduct. The belief in the Tattvas is the right faith, knowledge of the real is right knowledge and freedom from attachment and aversion is right conduct. The path of virtue is the path which leads to self-realization. The five Vratas are fundamental for the Jainas. However, the practice of the Vratas and the ethical life have been graded in two levels as duty of a muni (ascetic) and the life of sravaka (lay follower). 'The purpose is to realize the highest gradually and with ease. In this analysis of ethical concepts we find the application of the spirit of Anekanta.
The same can be found in their interpretation of Ahimsa as an ethical principle. The Jaina attitude to the conception of God expresses the spirit of Anekanta. The Jainas are against the Theistic conception of God. But each soul in its pure and perfect form, is divine. Still the 'Tirthamkaras are worshipped not because they are gods but because they are human, yet divine -- to be kept before us as ideals for emulation. Apart from the worship of the Tirthamkaras, we find a pantheon of gods as a social survival and a psychological necessity.
Life is to be considered as a struggle for prefection. We do not get ready made views. We have to look at life through many coloured glasses and as a “vale of soul making". This is the picture of Jaina outlook on life as presented in this book. It may, perhaps, give a discrete picture. The purpose has been to see some of the problems in the light of synoptic point of view as expressed in the Anekanta.
The metaphysical elements of Jainism have not been discussed in detail as the main object of this work has been to present the Jaina view of life. However, principle of asrava, bandha, samvara and nirjara have been incidentally woven in the texture of the scheme while describing the entanglement of the soul in samsara and the efforts to attain Moksa. Jiva and Moksa are the prius and the end of the noumenal world. We have studied them at length.
This problem has been engaging my attention for some time past, and it has developed in the form of this book at the inspiration and guidance of Dr. A.N. Upadhye of Kolhapur. I gave a synopsis of this work in my talk at the Jaina Boarding at Kolhapur during the Paryusana festival in 1963. I have made use of two chapters from my earlier book Some Problems in Jaina Psychology. I am grateful to the Registrar, Karnatak University, Dharwar for permitting me to use this material from my previous book I have incorporated in this book some of my articles already published in different philosophical Journal by retouching them here and there to form a part of this book.
I am grateful to the Editors and Publishers of these Journals for their permission to use my articles in the book. I must express my gratitude to the late Professor Charles A. Moore, of the University of Hawaii, Honolulu (U. S. A.) for permitting me to use my article Thc Doctrine of Karma in Jaina Philosophy published in Philosophy East and West, a Journal of Oriental and Comparative Thought, Volume XI, Numbers 3 and 4 July,October-1965. I have intended, in this book, to weave out some of my papers published earlier so as to bring out a coherent picture of the Jaina view of life as expressing the Anekanta outlook. I must express my sense of profound gratitude to Dr. A. N. Upadhye for all the encouragement and guidance he has given me. I thank the authorities of the Jaina Samskrti Samraksaka Sangha, Sholapur, for publishing this work. I thank my colleague Shri S. R. Gunjal, M.A., M.Lib.Sc. for assisting me in going through the proofs.
T. G. KALGHATGI
PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION
I have pleasure in presenting the second edition of the Jaina View of Life. I am greatful to the scholars of the Jaina Studies for their kind appreciation. In this edition I have revised some portions of the papers included in the first edition. I have added the following papers in this edition – 1. Right understanding – some hurdels, published in studies in Indian Philosophy (L.D. Institute of Indology, Ahmedabad 1981) and 2. Jaina Mysticism published in the procedings of the Indian Philosophical Congress 1961 - 1965.
I am greatful to The Jaina Samskrit Samrakshaka Sangha, Solapur for having got the book published in the second edition. I sincerely thank M/s. Manohar Printing Press, Dharavad specially Shri Ravi Akalwadi, for the dareful and fine printing of the book.
Savanur Nawab Plots
T. G. Kalghati
Ret. Professor of Jainology and Prakrits
University of Mysore.
Meaning of philosophy -- philosophy in India -- historical survey -- a priori way leading to Absolutism far removed from the common sense -- empiricist way -- logical positivism -- leading philosophy to the brink of extinction -- the way out to be found in the synoptic philosophy as expressed in the Anekanta view of the Jainas.
1. Plato and Aristotle have traced the beginnings of Philosophy to the feeling of wonder which arises in the mind of man when he contemplates on the nature of things in the world. But wonder at the level of primitive men is in the instinctive stage and does not give rise to higher speculation. It is only at a higher level when man has gained command over nature does philosophy begin. It is the fruit of society's maturer age. As Hegel said, philosophy makes its first expression when experience and thought have fully matured in their process. The owl of Minerva does not start upon its flight till the evening twilight has begun to fall.
Philosophy is a reflection on experience in order to comprehend the ultimate reality. We may say it is a synoptic view of life. It is, in the lines of Mathew Arnold, to see life steadily and to see it whole. In a narrower sense it is academic pursuit of the solutions of the ultimate problems of life.
Philosophy is not merely an unusually obstinate effort to think consistently, not a construction of a super-strucure of thought, nor is it a mere collection of noble sentiments. For Plato and Bradley philosophy was the knowledge of reality, of that which is. For the Logical Positivists the function of philosophy is only linguistic analysis. Philosophy, however, would not be complete except as a synoptic view of life, as a world view. In this sense alone can philosophy be a guide to life.
In India, philosophy was and has been well grounded in life. It has permeated the lives of the people. It has never been a mere academic pursuit nor a luxury of the mind. It was intimately connected with life. It is to be lived. Mundaka Upanisad speaks of 'Brahma Vidya' as the basis of all knowledge. Kautilya makes philosophy the lamp of all sciences. Philosophy has been called darsana in the sense of the spiritual perception and vision of the seers, and the highest triumphs of philosophy are possible only to those who have achieved in themselves a purity of the soul.
Realization of the Atman is the highest end in Philosophy, there is no other way. In this sense, philosophy is darsana and intimately connected with life.
2. Philosophic enquiry has proceeded in two directions: i) The first uses a priori and deductive methods. It is analytic in approach and is the way of the rationalists. ii) The second adopts inductive methods and is the empiricist way. In ancient Indian thought, philosophic speculation relied on Sruti and Smrti.
The course of philosophy has been long and arduous. From Plato and the Upanisads to the present day, philosophers have sought to find solutions to the perennial problems of philosophy, and by pursuing
the one way or the other have reached either the summits of speculation removed from human experience, or have ultimately faced the impossibility of metaphysical speculation.
i) We may first consider the a priori approach to the study of philosophy. In Western thought, deductive and a priori methods were first used by Parmenides and his desciple Zeno, who made, for the first time, a distinction between sense and reason. The philosophic speculations of Plato were largely based on a priori methods. He abstracted sense from reason and built a world of ideas independent of the physical world. In the Middle Ages of Europe, philosophy was sustaining itself under the shadow of theology and Aristotle's deductive methods. In the modern Age, Descartes and Spinoza built systems of rationalism. From cogito ergo sum he went on to heaven and looked at the physical world with confidence, which is, indeed, a way far removed from that of common sense. Descartes split the-world into two substances distinct from each other and postulated a God separate from each of them. Spinoza's task was to establish a connection between God and the world on the basis of mathematical deduction. The result is, Spinoza's Substance became a lion's den to which all tracks lead and from which none returns. In Hegel and Bradley we go much further away from common sense. We see the superstructures of philosophic speculation, and we are left in the world of appearance only to gaze at the ivory towers in which these philosophers lived. Thus the a priori speculative method led us far from the madding crowd to the dizzy heights of the 'Absolute '.
In India, we were saved from the separation of the speculative and the practical, because philosophy, with us, is essentially spiritual: "it takes its origin in life and enters back into life."  In Samkara we come to a great speculative system. Still, we do not feel ourselves strangers here, as we are not cut off from the ideals of life. "Samkara presents to us the true ideal of philosophy, which is not so much knowledge as wisdom, not so much logical learning as spiritual freedom."
ii) Empiricism uses a posteriori and inductive methods. In the Theaetetus, Socrates explains the Protagorean doctrine that knowledge is through perception, and shows the impossibility of arriving at any objective truth. For the Sophists, Sense experience was the only source of knowledge; while Gorgias asserted the impossibility of any knowledge or communication whatever.
In ancient Indian thought the Carvakas led us to a similar conclusion. For them, Lokayata is the only sastra and perceptual evidence the only authority. This would logically lead to scepticism and nihilism; but they did not go to the whole length, because their immediate aim was to break down the ecclesiastical monopoly and still assert the spiritual independence of the individual. The Buddhist empiricism was to have gone the way of Gorgias in the Madhyamika School, but for the predominance of the ethical ideal and the goal of nirvaa. Nagarjuna's philosophy is 'now nearer to scepticism and now the mysticism'. The rigour of logic would have led him to nihilism, but for; his spiritual fervour and thirst for nirvana.
English empiricism repeats this logical movement but does not save itself from its own conclusions. We can see the empiricist method steadily marching from Locke to Berkeley to Hume. Berkeley denied matter, and Hume denied everything except impressions and ideas. Reid, summing up the English empiricist movement, states that ideas, first introduced for explaining the operations of the human understanding, undermined everything but them selves, pitifully naked and destitute, "set adrift without a rag to cover them." Knowledge became impossible and philosophy could go on further without a radical reconsideration of its fundamental position.
But the Human tendency has been recently revived, by the Cambridge philosophers, who brought philosophy to the brink of extinction. Wittgenstein's Tractatus discusses problems of meaning, the nature of logic, facts and propositions and the task of philosophy. It states: 'What can be said at all can be said clearly, and where of one cannot speak, there one must be silent'. 'The world is the totality of facts not of things'. There must be simple entities called objects because there are names, and there must be narrles because propositions have a definite sense. Names have no sense except in the context of propositions; and propositions are related to facts as ' pictures of facts' . He states that all the-truths of logic are tautologies, and logical proofs are only mechanical devices for recognizing categories. Mathematics consists of equations, and the propositions of mathematics are also without sense. The metaphysician talks nonsense in the fullest sense of the word, as he does not understand "the logic of our language". Metaphysical suggestion is like the composition of a new song. We are told that he made no essential change in his attitude towards the aim of philosophy. Russell writes that the influence of the Tractatus on him "was not wholly good", and that the philosophy of the Philosophical Investigations remains to him completely unintelligible.
Logical Positivism is a philosophical movement emanating from 'The Vienna Circle' . It was a thorough going empiricism backed by the resources of modern logic and tempered by exaggerated respect for the achievements of Science. Ayer's Philosophy is the logical outcome of Hume's empiricism. Like Hume, he divides all genuine propositions into two classes i) a priori propositions of logic and pure mathematics, which are analytic and therefore necessary and certain; and ii) propositions concerning empirical matters of fact which may be probable but never certain and need to be tested by the verification principle. No statement which refers to a 'reality' transcending the limits of all possible sense experience can possibly have any literal significance. Ayer shows that the Logical Positivist charge against the metaphysician is not that he attempts to employ the under-standing in a field where it cannot probably venture, but that he produces sentences which fail to conform to the conditions under which alone a sentence can be literally significant. A metaphysician talks nonsense, because he is deceived by grammar. Thus, Logical Positivists claim that they have completely overthrown speculative philosophy.Philosophy, to them, is only logical
analysis; not a theory, but an activity. Its function is analysis, Logical clarification of concepts, propositions and theories proper to empirical science. Thus, philosophy is identified with logical syntax, the higher-level discussion of language, and the perennial problems of philosophy are dismissed as nonsense. Philosophy classes are, accordingly, converted into super-grammar classes.
However, Logical Positivism has ceased to become a fashionable philosophy today, because i) its attack on meta-physics has damped the vigour and chastened the style of its remaining adherents, and ii) its approach to language is unnecessarily rigid and doctrinaire. Even Ayer is doubtful about carrying through the programme of phenomenalism and uneasy about the verification principle. 
Still, the impasse that Logical Positivism has reached is unfortunate, because:
i) The doctrines of Logical Positivism have led to dogmatism and intolerance; so that metaphysical questions are dismissed as unworthy of attention of sensible men. Theories like the verification principle, the emotive theory of ethics and logical construction are simply announced as if they formed a part of revelation denied to other philosophers except Hume.
ii) Sense experience, as the criterion of truth, has led to solipsism, as it did in the case of the Sophists and Hume. Sense experience is private and cannot be communicated. The more radical among them, like Carnap and Neurath, were hence led to physicalism, which is nearer to behaviourism in psychology.
iii) For logical Positivists, as for other empiricists, sense experience is the only criterion of knowledge. Modern Psychical Research, on the other hand, affirms the possibility of extra-sensory experiences. In addition, there are certain other experiences, like the speculation, moral and aesthetic. The problem of supersensuous experience is not new to us in India. All schools of Indian philosophy, except the Carvakas and Mimamsakas, believe in it. Supersensuous experience transcends the categories of time, space and casuality: " Our sense organs are narrowly specialized to serve biological and practical ends, and our normal consciousness is also largely specialized. In the face of these facts, it would be narrow and fanatical to insist on sensory experience and the verification principle as the only criteria of knowledge. Like the men chained against the walls of the save in The Republic, the empiricists refuse to see beyond what they would like to affirm.
iv) Moreover, for the Logical Positivists tbe verification principle has been a dogma and a commandment. But tbe principle of verification is not a self-evident statement, -nor is it capable of verification by sense experience. The logic of the analytic philosophy is itself based on a metaphysic, certain presupposltions about the universe.
v) Nevertheless, the effects of Logical Positivism have been serious.
It has engendered a negative climate of opirltion, and was likely to shatter the old beliefs in the social, moral and religious spheres with nothing else to fill the gap except analysis of propositions. It has produced a 'waste land of mind, of which T. S. Eliot's poem is at once a description and, by implication, a denunciation.
3. A survey of the course of philosophy in the past shows that philosophy continually faced this impasse. The a priori deductive method took us to the lion's den. At the height of its speculation, it built superstructures of philosophy and was cut off from common sense. The empiricists were led to solipsism and to the feverish denial of metaphysics.
To save philosophy from this impasse, we have to adopt a synoptic view towards the problems of philosophy. We should realize that reality is complex and life is a many-coloured dome. Idealism was unable to see the trees in the wood, while empiricism could not see the wood in the trees.These were two ways of approaching the problem; but they are not the only ways, nor were the approaches absolute. This is the synoptic outlook. In this sense, philosophy is to see life steadily and see it whole. Broad says, "If we do not look at the world synoptically we shall have a very narrow view of it". He thinks that a purely critical philosophy is arid and rigid.
The Jaina view of anekanta comes nearer to this approach. Anekanta consists in a many-sided approach to the study of problems. Intellectual tolerance is the foundation of this doctrine. It is the symbolisation of the fundamental non violent attitude. It emphasizes the many-sideness of truth. Reality can be looked at from various angles.
Whitehead's fundamental attitude in philosophy is essentially the same as the anekanta view of life. Whitehead' defined speculative philosophy as the endeavour to frame a coherent, logical, necessary system of general ideas in terms of which every element of our experience can be interpreted.
We have to note that the function of philosophy is not merely an academic pursuit of reality. It is a way of life. Philosophy has had the dual purpose of revealing truth and increasing virtue. Philosophers have sought to provide a principle to live by and purposes to live for. For this practical end, philosophers have striven to achieve a synoptic view of the universe. The consciousness of the finiteness of our being makes us yearn for the beyond, in the spirit of the Upanisads, from the unreal to the real, from darkness to light, and from death to iternal life.
For this, we have to look to the spiritual experience of the great seers. Broad says there is one thing which speculative philosophy must take into most serious consideration and that is the religious and mystical experiences of mankind. It is they who are in constant touch with the innermost depth of life and to them we are to look for guidance. Such 'enlightened ones' or 'sages' are the first-hand exponents of philosophy.
1. Aristotle: Metaphystis, i, 2
3. RADHAKRIISHNAN (S): Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 45.
4. Brhadaranyaha ll. IV-5 atma vare drstavyah.
5. RADHAKRISHNAN(S): Indian Philosophy, Vol (1945) P. 25 2.
6. RADHAKRISHNAN(S): Indian Philosophy, Vol, II, (1947) P.447
7. Prabodhacandrodaya, Act II.
8. RADHAKRISHNAN(S): Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 644.
9. REID: Works, p. 109.
10. STENIUS (Eric) : Tractatus-A critical exposition of its main lines of thought (1960) p. 226.
11. RUSSELL (B) : My Philosophical Development (1959) pp. 216-217.
12.. Encyclopedia of Western Philosphy and Philosphers. Edited by URMSON (J.C.) (1960).
13. AYER .(J.A) : Language, Truth and Logic, p. 35.
14. AYER, (J.A) : Language, Truth and Logic, p. 48.
15. AYER, (J. A.): Philosophical Essays (1954) No. 142.
16. AYER, (J. A.): Language, Truth and Logic (1946), Preface to second edition.
17, JOAD (C. E. M.): A Critique of Logical Positiuism, p. 149.
18. JOAD (C. E. M ): A Critique of Logical Positivism, p. 29.
19. TYRRELL ( G. N. N.) : The personality of men (Pelican) p. 265.
20. RADHAKRISHNAN(S.) : The Ineternational Insitute of Philosophy and indian Philosophical Congress. Entretiens edited by N.A NILE.
21. JOAD (C> E> M>) : A Critique of Logical Positivism, p. 149.
22. BOARD (C.D.) : Contemporary British Philosphy, ed. MUIRHEAD (j. H.) Vol. I (1924), Critical and Speculative Philosophy.
23. PASSMORE (Joan) : A Hundread Years of Philosophy, (1957) p. 350
24. Process and Reality (1929) Part I, Chapter I, p. 4 and Adventures of Ideas (19330 p. 285.
25. JOAD (C. E. M. ) : A Critique of Logical Positivism, (1950) p. 29.
26. asato ma sad gonaya; tamaso majyotir gamaya; mrtyor ma amratam gamaya.
27. Contemporary British Philosophy: edited by MUIRHEAD (J. H.) (1924) Critical ond Speculative Philosophy.
28. HUXLAY ALDOUS: The Perennial Philosophy, (1959) 10, 11.
APPROACH TO REALITY:
Introduction -- meaning of Anekanta -- historical survey -- development of the Theory of Anekanta -- Nayavada -- analysis of the Nayas -- Syadvada as a logical expression of Nayavada -- Syadavada analysed -- criticism of the theory some observations—Right Understanding – some Hurdels.
I. Jainism is realistic and pluralistic. Its philosophy is based on logic and experience. Moksa is the ultimate aim of life. lt is realised by the three fold path of right intuition, right knowledge and right conduct. Right knowledge is possible by the right approach to the problems of Life. Anekanta, the Jainas believe, gives us the right approach to looking at the various problems of life. Anekanta is the symboliation of the fundamental non-violent attitude of the Jainas. It is the expression of intellectual non-violence.
In surveying the field of Indian philosophy, Dr. Padmarajiah mentions five types of philosophy considered from the point of view of the nature of reality. They are:
l. Philosophy of Being Samkara represents this school of thought of identity.
2. Philosophy of Becoming (change or difference) Buddhism presents this view.
3. Philosophy subordinating difference to identity i) The Samkhya, ii) Bhedabhedavada and iii) Visistadvaita hold this attitude.
4. Philosophy subordinating identity to diflerence i) The Vaisesika, ii) Dvaita of Madhvacarya gives this view.
5. Philosophy coordinating both identity and difference The Jaina view of reality presents this attitude.
Jainism meets the extremes and presents a view of reality which comprehends the various sides of reality to give a synthetic picture of the whole. It recognises the principle of distlnction and develops the comprehensive scheme of Anekanta realism. Anekanta is the 'most consistent form of realism as it allows the principle of distinction to run its full course until it reaches its logical terminus on the theory of manifold reality and knowledge.
Anekanta consists in a many-sided approach to the study of problems. It emphasizes a catholic outlook towards all that we see and experience. lntellectual tolerance is the foundation of this doctrine. lt arose as an antidote to the one-sided and absolute approach to the study of reality of the philosophers at that time. It arose out of the confusion of the conflicting views of the philosophers and religious men on the problem of the nature of reality. The Upanisadic philosophers sought to find the facts of experience. This search gave rise to many philosophical theories. Buddhism tried to present a fresh and a different approach in the Madhyama-pratipada Drsti. The Anekanta view presents a coherent picture of the philosophies, pointing out the important truths in each of them. It looks at the problem from various
points of view. The cardinal principle of the Jaina philosophy is its Anekanta which emphasizes that 'there is not only diversity but that real is equally diversified.'
II. Although Anekanta was a special feature of the Jaina point of view, it is possible to say that some other schools of thought were aware of the view. In Buddhist philosophy the phrase majjhima magga bears the same significance as Anekanta. Pandit Sukeialalji Sanghvi, in his introduction to the Sanmati Tarka, says that the doctrine of Anekanta and the madhyama marga have great resemblance in the fundamental idea underlylng them. Anatmavada of Sanjaya, Vibhajjavada, madhyama pratipada which induced the Buddha to treat all prevalent opinions with respect may be mentioned as expressions of Allekanta attitude. Similarly Bhedabheda-vada of Bhartrprapanca is referred to as Anekanta. Gautama, the Buddha, faced the confusion of thought presented in his time about the ultimate nature of reality. He was silent about these problems. In Dlgha Nikaya, Gautama says 'It is not that I was, I was not, it is not that I will be, I will not be; it is not that I am, I am not.' The Buddha describes his attitude to Manavaka as Vibhajjavada. This is similar to Anekanta, although it is not so clearly defined and developed. No specihc words suggesting the doctrine of Anekanta are found in the philosophic literature of ancient lndia. lt is suggested that the doctrine of evolu-tion as propounded by the Samkhya school implies the-Anekanta attitude. However, the Jainas perfected the doctrine and systematized it. The Buddhist philosopher SantaraKsita makes mention of the Anekanta of the Vipra-mimamsakas, Nigghantas and Kapila Samkhyas. Among the Jaina exponents Mahavira practiced the attitude and is supposed to have expressed it in the Syadvada.
A clear expression of the Anekanta attitude is seen in Mahavira's discussions with his disciples. ln the Bhagavatt sutra, there is a dialogue between the Mahavira and his disciple Gautama.
"Are the souls, O Lord, eternal or non-eternal?"
"The souls are eternal in some respects and non-eternal in some other respects. .. They are eternal, O Gautama,
from the point of view of substance and non-eternal from the point of view of modes."
Again, the problem of body and mind was answered by Mahavlra as -- "The body, O Gautama, is identical with the soul and not identical with the soul in different respects." 
The application of the principle of Anekanta can be seen in their analysis of the metaphysical question concerning the categories. The Jaina theories of atoms, of space and soul, to mention a few instances, illustrate the pervading influence of the Anekanta viewpoint. Atoms are of the same kind: they can yet give the infinite variety of things. Pudgala has certain inalienable features, but within limits it can becorne anything through qualitative differentiation. The transmutation of elements is quite possible in
this view and is not a mere dream of the alchemist.
Space is another instance of a manifold real. It is un-corporeal and formless, yet divisible  and its divisibility is a spontaneous feature. Abhayadeva develops the concepts of manifoldness of space as a polemic against the Naiyayika view of space as one and partless. The souls are individual centres of experience. Like the Leibnizian monads the soul mirrors the entire universe within self as a unique centre of experience. The universe it mirrors is infinitely complex; and its experimental powers must be manifold commensurate with the complicity of the experienced universe.
In the Anga literature of the Jainas the doctrine of Anekanta was briefly and incidentally discussed. But in the commentaries of the Jaina scripture written in Prakrit it has -received greater attention. But when the Sanskrit language found a place in the Jaina literature, it occupied an important position. The commentary on the Tattvarthasutra of Umasvati gives an exhaustive description of the problem. Later, a systematic exposition of the doctrine was given by Jaina scholars like Samantabhadra, Siddhasena Divakara, Mallavadi, Pajyapada, Akalanka, Vidyanandi and others.
The Anekanta view does imply the principles of reciprocity and interaction among the reals of the universe, as given by Kant, although this principle is more implied than expressly stated in Jainism.
In Kantianism as in Jainism, the principle of reciprocity goes beyond the 'coexistance' or the inter-relatedness of the substances and explains the 'dynamical community' among them. But the Jaina is a thorough-going realist. Anekanta-vada is a theory of reality which asserts the manifoldness and complexity of the real. In apprehending the complexity of the universe, it has crystallised itself into the two-fold dialectic of Nayavada and Syadvada; and they are complementary processes forming a normal and inevitable development of the relativistic presupposition of the Jaina metaphysics.
lII. Anekanta emphasizes that the truth is many sided. Reality can be looked at from various angles. Two doctrines result from the Anekantavada: i) Nayavada and ii) Syadvada. Nayavada is the analytic method investigating a particular stand-point of factual situation. Syadvada is primarily synthetic designed to harmonise the different view points arrived at by Nayavada. Nayavada is 'primarily conceptual' and the Syadvada is synthetic and mainly verbal, although this sometimes maintained that conceptual is also verbal and the verbal method is so much changed with epistemological characters. The distinction between the conceptual and the-verbal has mainly a reference to the fact that points of view have to be expressed in language and predicated in specific forms so as to embody them. The concept is formed from this point of view.
Naya refers to the point of view one takes when one looks at the object. A naya is defined as a particular opinion or a view-point of looking at an object. It expresses a partial truth about an object as known by a knowing subject. The Jainas give the example of the b
lind men and the elephant. The blind men feel the animal and describe it, each in his own way. Similarly, we look at objects and describe them in our own way from different angles. Other view-points are also recognized; and they need to be recognized with each in the scheme of a fuller and more valid knowledge which is the sphere of Pramana.
The Jainas have formulated a methodological scheme consisting of seven ways to looking at reality. There was a problem whether the seven Nayas can be reduced in number. There are three traditions. The first tradition adopts seven Nayas. The second eliminates Naigama Naya and reduces the-list to six. In the third tradition we have five, as Samabhi rudha and Evambhuta Naya have been subsumed under Sabda Naya. Umasvati is largely responsible for the first and the third traditions. In the Digambara version of the Tattvartha-sutra seven ways have been mentioned, but the gvetambara version gives five Nayas as mentioned in the third tradition. The different points of view are the Nayas. Various Nayas have been mentioned. As shown above Umasvati first-mentions five Nayas and then adds the subdivisions. The Agamas have mentioned two points of view : Samgraha Naya, the point o£ view of the universal, the synthetic point of view and ii)Paryayika Naya, the view-point of the particular, the analytic point of view. Siddhasena Divakara in his Sahmati Tarka adopted the two points of view and distributed the Nayas under two heads. He described the six Nayas. But the generally accepted classification of Nayas is seven fold. Three of them refer to objects and their meaning, and the others to the words. In the first category we get three: i) Samgrahs Naya, ii) Vyavahara Naya, and iii) Rjusutra Naya. Siddhasena Divakara says that Samgraha and Vyavahara are subdivisions of the Dravyarthika Naya. Samgraha Naya gives the synthetic point of view. It gives, as Radhakrishnanpoints out, the class point of view. In this, we seek to approach the unity amidst the diversity by finding the common element in the variety presented in the world. Absolute monism is the conclusion of this point of view. Exaggerated emphasis on the universal would lead to Samgrahabhasa; and Samkhya and Advaita schools of philosophy are notable instances.[19[ The absolute emphasis on the one and unity dismissing all diversity as appearance, is the position of the absolutists. The Jainas maintain that such a point of view, if it is taken in the absolute sense, presents a partial point of view.
Vyavahara Naya is the empirical point of view. It is the analytic point of view. It emphasises the diversity in the universe presented in the experience. We know things in their details and emphasize their individuality. The attitude of the pluralists and the materialists is the outcome of the view.
Rjusutra Naya is narrower than the Vyavahara Naya. It looks at an object at a particular point of time, and does not see the continuity of the thing. The Jainas say that the Buddhist philosophy of Ksanikavada is an example of the-Rjusutra Naya.
Naigama Naya refers to the end or the purpose involved in the action. We interpret an activity with reference to the-end for which
it is done. For instance, a man who is carrying water and firewood will say that he is cooking if he is asked what he is doing. Siddhasena Divakara adopts a different point of view. Naigama Naya comprehends both the generic and specific qualities.
Another interpretation of Naigama Naya involves non-discrimination between the generic and the specific elements of an object. For example, when we state "The Bamboo grows here in plenty" the generic and the specific features of the bamboo are not within the focus of our attention. The-principle of configuration and the result suggested by Gestalt School of Psychology holds good in this case.
The non-distinction is not, however, absolute and if the-distinction is asserted absolutely there would be a fallacy of Naigamabhasa.
Paryayarthika Naya is the analytic point of view referring to the words: and their meaning. It is a verbal interpretation of the terms used. It has three subdivisions: i) Sabda Naya, ii) Samabhirudha Naya and iii) Evambhuta Naya. Sabda Naya consists in looking at the functional; importance of the terms. The name has a function calling to our mind the object implied by the name However, we very often forget that the meaning of a term is relative and varies with different contexts. We emphasize that the meaning is fixed. That gives rise to fallacies. Samabhirudha Naya is the application of the Sabda Naya. It refers to the-roots of words. For instance, raja as a person who shines is different from the nrpa, a person who rules over men and protects them. Evambhuta not only sees the difference between words with their different etyrnologies; but it sees the difference between one and the same word, if it does not signify the meaning denoted by the root in the vord. For instance, there is a difference between raja. Then he is shining and raja when he is not shining. In this we give a word a fixed meaning, something by usage. For instance, a 'nut' has come to mean in English a showy man.
The Cambridge philosophers and analytic school of philosophy in the present day assert the exclusive application of the form of Paryaya Naya to express Sabda-nayabhasa.
In Evambhuta Naya we restrict the meaning of the word to the very function connected by the name. It is a specialized form of the Samabhiradlla. For instance, a building will be called a house as long as it is used for residential purposes. But if it is used for office purposes, it will not be appropriate to call it a house.
Thus, each Naya or point of view represents one of the many ways from which a thing can be looked at. The Nayas remind us that our points of view looking at the things are relative, and over-emphasis on one point of view as absolute and the only point of view would be a mistake. It would give an abhasa, or appearance of truth, only. It gives rise to, the wrong point of view. According to the Jainas, Nyaya-Vaisesika, Sam. khya, Advaita Vedanta and the Buddhist systems adopt one of the Nayas; but they believe that their point of view is absolute and unerring. However, they prevent only partial truths. The Jainas point out that the controversy regarding causation presenting different views like the asatkaryavada and the satkaryavada, are one-
sided and partial. But an object can be described in different ways. For instance, a gold necklace will be gold if we consider the substance out of which it is made; but if it is looked at from the point of view of the modifications, it may be described differently. Similarly, each Naya has a different extent. Naigama Naya has the greatest, and the Evam. bhuta Naya the least, extent. Naigama dealswith the real and the unreal, Samgraha with the real. Vvavahara deals with part of the real. Rjusutra refers to the present condition of the real, and gabda only to the expression of the real, Samabhirubha a reference to the particular expression. Evambhuta applies to the present activity.
IV. Syadvada is the logical expression of the Nayavada. The various points of view from which the reality can be looked at gives the possibility of a comprehensive view of reality. Such a view needs expression for the sake of clarity and communication. This has been possible by means of seven fold predication. It is called Saptabhangi, because of its sevenfold predication. It is the formulation of the doctrine of the possibility of apparent contradiction in a real whole. The real may as well contain contributions without affecting the nature of the real, because the contradictions arise only because we take partial views of reality. According to the Jainas, other Darsanas present only the gleams of the broken light, while the Jaina view visualises the whole truth in its different aspects. Nayavada and Syadvada are varieties of Anekantavada. Syadvada is complementary to the Nayavada. Nayavada is analytic in character and Syad-vada is synthetic. It investigates the various shades of the truth given by a Naya and integrates them into a consistent comprehensive synthesis. Dasgupta suggests that the relation between them expresses the many alternatives indicated by the Syadvada for any and every Naya. In the Syadvada all the aspects of truth are woven together into the synthesis of the conditioned dialectic.
Some have raised a controversy as to whether Syadvada is synonymous of Saptabhangi or of the entire Jaina philosophy. It is true that Syadvada has an important place in Jaina philosophy, but it can not be equated with the entire Jaina philosophy. Prabhacandra states that Syadvada is synonymous with Saptabhangi. However, this is just a scholastic problem and is needless from the philosophical point of view Syadvada is that conditional method in which the modes, or predications (bhangah) affirm (vidhi), negate (nisedha) or both affirm and negate severally and jointly in seven differcnt ways a certain attribute (bhava) of a thing (vastu) without incompatibility (avirodhena) in a certain context prasnavasat. Reality is complex and its nature cannot be expressed in an unconditioned position. Absolute affirmation and absolute negation are both erroneous. And the 'syat' would mean 'in a certain sense' or 'from a certain point of view'. In this sense Syadvada warns us against building a dogmatic structure of reality in a single concept or judgement. That would be logical dogmatism (nirapeksavada) as against the sapeksavada expressed in Syadvada.
It is difficult to decide which is the earlier of the two-Nayavada seems to be earlier, because Umasvati in his 'Tatvartha-sutra
describes the kinds of Nayas, but makes no mention of the Svadvada and the sevenfold prepositions. Yet it is possible that it existed long before him. Buddhist Suttas mention the doctrine in an erroneous way as the doctrine not of the Nigganthas but of some recluse and Brahmins. In the earlier literature of the Jaina canon there are only a few passages in which there is a reference to Syadvada. They occur in the Bhagavati-sutra, in which it is expressed in the form of three propositions. Among the other early references, Bhadrabahu's Sutrakrtanga Niryukti is prominent. The developed form of the doctrine in the form of the seven-fold propositions is well described in Paiicastikdyasara of Kundakundacarya and Aptamtmamsa of Samantabhadra. Siddhasena Divakara, Akalanka and Vidyanandi are among the later writers who have given a systematic exposition of the doctrine.
Syadvada shows that tbere are seven ways of describing a thing and its attributes. It attempts to reconcile the con-tradiction involved in the predications of the thing. It is possible to describe a thing in seven ways.
1. Syad asti asserts the existence of the thing. The word syat is difficult to translate. It is very often said that it connotes 'perhaps' or probability. But it would be more appropriate to say that it refers to the special context. syat would then mean 'in the context'. From the point of view of the substance, place, time and nature, we may say that a thing is. For instance, the jar exists, as it is made of clay in a particular place and time. Thus substance (dravya), attribute (bhava), time (kala), and space (ksetra) from the context of these relations existence and other attributes are predicated. A house exists, i.e., it is a house as build up and as long as it is occupied for the purpose of residence.
2, But the affirmation of an attribute necessarily involves the negation of its opposite; and such a negation is a logical necessity. Then we get the predication syad nasti. It means in the (other) context the thing does not exist. The jar does not exist if it is to mean that it is made of metal. The house is no longer a house if it be used as a go down. The existence of the house is denied in different contexts. Thus, if existence and non-existence are to be understood in different relations and contexts, there would be no opposition between them. One is a necessary concomitant of the other. These predications are necessary and compatible in another sense. The affirmation of existence and denial of non-existence are meant to rebut the possibility of unqualified and absolute existence and nonexistence. Thus the predications are logically necessary.
The importance of this predication lies in the irrefutable statement of the non-existence of a thing in the other context. 'Non-existence or non-being is a determinate fact with a content and not a void'.
It would not be correct to say that one first and the second predications involve contradiction, because i) they are mutually complementary and ii) the two predications are not absolute assertions. The definition itself includes the clause 'avirodhena'.
It is very often contended that the contradictions, absolute existence and non.existence, are not objective facts, as no existence is known to have absolute existence and absolute non-existence as its characteristics. The opposition is unreal and the predication of the unreal opposition is not necessary. But, as Prof. Mukerji points out, it cannot be denied that it is possible to conceive the existence and non-existence of a thing though not on to logically real. The predications are therefore logically necessary to rebut such a conception of absolute existence and absolute non existence.' The Vedantist believes in the absolute existence of the one reality. The Sunyavadin does not believe in the existence of the absolute. The Jainas contend that the two may be predicated in different contexts. The first two predications are logically valid and psychologically necessary, as they serve to exclude absolute existence and absolute non-existence. The mention of the word syad functions as a necessary condition and works as a corrective against the absolute way of thought. We may here refer to the logical opposition of Hegel, who said that affirmation and negation are ultimately reconciled by a higher unity, for they are the aspects of the same reality. However, the reference would be limited to the dialectical process, because the Jaina is a realist and believes in the validity of empiricai experience.
3. The third predication is syad asti nasti: 'It is, it is not'. This refers to different contexts simultaneously. For instance, in a certain sense the jar exists and in a certain other sense the jar does not exist. The building is a house in so far as the purpose of the construction was for residence. 'But it is not a house as it is actually used as a go down. It is very often maintained that the predication is a mere summattion of the first two. But the Jainas would appeal to experience and say that it gives a separate and necessarg predication. It refers to a separate entity arising from the two but not the summation of the two. For instance, a garland of flowers may be said to be flowers, as it contains flowers, and also not merely flowers at the same time, because the flowers enter into a new relation with each other to form a whole. Similarly, in the description of the soul and the ultimate-reality contradictory predicates have been made.
4. The fourth is a new predication. It expresses the indescribability of a thing. It is syad avaktavyam. It is possible that the real nature of the thing is beyond predication, or expression in the form of words. For instance, in the case of the jar, it exists in the svadravya, svarupa, svakala and svaksetra and no existence is predicated in the the paradravya, pararupa, para ksetra and parakala. Yet its nature may be such that it cannot be easily described.
It is contended that the fourth predication is only an abbreviated form of affirmation in megation. The third predication shows the successive presentation, while the fourth givesthe simultaneous presentation of the two. But, as Prof. Mukerji points out, it is still logically necessary because it presents the facts of experience, that
existence and non existence are equally possible to be predicated in the same degree. Moreover, experience shows that the inexpressible asserts that the attributes are existing together, and a new element has arisen due to the synthesis. For instance, intoxicating liquor may be formed due to the combination of jaggery and ghataki flowers. But it is not a mere combination of the elements. It has in itself an identity of its own which cannot be described easily. In metaphysical; speculation, the 'unknowable' of Herbert Spencer may be likened to predication of this type. Prof. Bhattacharya  writes, 'The given indefinite' -- 'the unspeakable' or avaktavya as it has been called, as distinct from the definite existence. presents something other than consecutive togetherness: it implies saharpana or co-presentation, which amounts to non-distinction or indeterminate distinction of being and negations. The common sense principle implied in its recognition is that what is given cannot be rejected simply because it is inexpressible by a single positive concept.
The primary modes of predication are three: syad asti Syad nasti and syad avaktavyam. The other four are obtained by combining the three.
The third predicate asti nasti offers successive presenta-tion. In the fourth predication 'inexpressible' (avaktavyam) we get the expression of simultaneous predication. Dr. Padmarajiah discusses the four stages through which the concept or 'inexpressible' has developed: i) The naive negative attitude in the Rgveda as expressed in the song of creation (Book V, 129). ii) A positive attitude as expressed in 'sadasadvareyam' in the Mundaka Upanisad. It conceives with being and non-being as irherent in reality, owing to the positive character, this tendency has been discussed is the Acbhaya phase of the concept. iii) The third phase is the logically sophisticated phase of the 'negative tendency' as shown in the expression like sa esa neti neti (Br. Up. lV 5-15) In this phase here is the clear awareness of the inexpressible nature of the ultimate as efforts to express the reality would be beset with contradictions. The Vedanta conception of anirvacaniya the Buddha's avyakrta and Nagarjuna s conception oi the ultimate as being catuskoti-vinirmukta came under this stage. iv) The last phase in 'the dialectical evolution' of the idea of the inexpressible is expressed in the avaktavya of the Syadvada. It is a relativistic (sapeksa view and not the absolute view as presented in anirvacanlya. The Jaina states that sat and asat, in these combinations, are inevitable and distinctive feature of our objective experience. Again the avaktavya may show the inability to embody, within one symbol, the two fundamental aspects of reality with equaprominence. But this limitation is itself a necessary step in the dialectual movement of Syadvada.
K. C. BHATTACHARYA states ' If the inexpressible is objective as given, it cannot be said to be not a particular position nor to be non-existent. At the same time it is not the definite distinction of position and existence. It is a category by itself.
5. The fifth predication is formulated as syad asti avaktavyam. From the point of view of its own contexts (dravya, rupa, kala and ksetra)
a thing is and is indescribable. It asserts the copresence of the two attributes, existence and inepressibility. Both are real and necessary attributes. Existence relates to an object in the context of substance in respect of its internal determinations. Inexpressibility is an attribute which relates substance, in relation of identity and distinction, to its changing modes.
6. The sixth Proposition expresses the negative aspect together with inexpressibility. It is syad nasti avaktavyam. In the context, it is not and is indescribable. In relation to the paraaravya pararupa, paraksetra and parakala it is not: it is indescribable.
7. The seventh proposition asserts existence, non-existence and inexpressibility. It reads: sltad, asti, nasti, avaktavyam. In the contexts, it is, is not and is inexpressible. With reference to the sva-rupa, sva-dravya, sva-ksetra and sva-kala it exists, and with reference to the para-dravya, para-rupas, para-ksetra, para-kala non existence can be predicated. Yet, in its real nature it may be such that it cannot be easily described. As Mukerji says, this predication gives a fuller and a more comprehensive picture of the thing than the earlier ones. The predicated attribute is a synthesis of the three attributes; still, it is not a mere summation of the attributes. It brings out the inexpressibility of a thing as well as what it is and what it is not.
Affirmation and negation and inexpressibility are the three fundamental predications. This implies that all negation has a positive basis. Even imaginary concepts like the sky flower possess a positive basis in the two reals, the sky and flower, although the combination is unreal. All things which are objects of thought are in one sense, and are not in another sense.
V. The doctrine of Syadvada has been criticized in various ways:
1. It is said that the theory of sevenfold predication can only be the cause of doubt and not of certainty, the assertion of contradictory predicates implies that the present predicating is in doubt. BELVALKAR says that Syadvada is sceptical and non-committal in its attitude. With this diagnostic and negative attitude one cannot have any dogma; and Samkaracarya lays his finger accurately on the weakest point in the system when he says "As thus the means of knowledge, the knowing subject, and the act of knowledge, are all alike, indefinite, how can the Tirtham. kara (Jina) teach with any claim to authority, and how can his followers act on a doctrine the matter of which is altogether indeterminate. Prof. Hiryanna makes Syadvada a variety of scepticism. If all our knowledge concerning reality is relative, they say the old Indian critics like Sam. kara, amanuja etc.), the Jaina view must also be relative. To deny this conclusion would be to admit, at least, one absolute truth; and to admit it would leave the doctrine with no settled view of reality and thus turn it into a variety of scepticism.
But it may be pointed out that the conditions of doubt are not present
in this assertion. For instance, a man sees a tree in the dusk and doubts whether it is a man or a branchless tree. This is due to the lack of determination between -the specific features of the object as the perception is faulty. But in the case of the sevenfold presentation the attributes of existence and non-existence are each defined by their specific determinations. The condition of these determinations makes doubt impossible.
2. It is said that the sevenfold predication of the Jainas is beset with contradictions. Affirmation and denial of the attribute in the same object is not logically possible. It would be a selfcontradiction. In this context we may refer-to the criticism of Samkara and Ramanuja. Samkara's criticism can be analyzed into three stages. 1) He tries to point out the intrinsic impossibility of the predication because of the inherent contradictions involved in it. Mutually contradictory and conflicting attributes cannot exist together. But if we take into consideration the different contexts referred to, we may say that the contradictions can be easily reconciled. In experience we get examples of existing conflicting attributes. For instance, the branches may be in motion but the tree does not move. The same individual may be father in relation to X and son in relation to Y. 2) He points out the futility of the doctrine because the doctrine is indefinite. The unlimited assertion that all things are of non-exclusive nature gives indefinite assertion like syad asti and syad nasti. Hence a man who holds such a doctrine of indefinite context does not deserve to be listened to any more than a drunken man or a mad man.
Recent writers on Indian philosophy have re-iterated the entire charge made by gamkara and Ramanuja and have shown that it is a kind of eclecticism, 'a putting together of several partial truths' without a proper synthesis. It is therefore characterized as a sort of compromise philosophy. The half-hearted attempt of Jaina enquiry as expressed in. Saptabhangi stops at giving partial truth together and does not attempt to overcome the opposition implied in them by a proper synthesis.
But if we mean by definiteness unconditional and absolute assertion, then the 'indefiniteness' of the doctrine is a logical necessity. As Radhakrishnanpoints out  the criticism of the Saptabhangi doctrine as of no practical utility is an expression of personal opinion and as such need not be considered.
Samkara also says that the Saptabhangi doctrine is inconsistent with the other views of Jaina philosophy. The assertion of existence, non-existence and indescribability are alike applicable to the doctrine of the soul and the categories. Similarly, the final release may exist and not exist and may be indescribable.
The dialectic of Syadvada is inconsistent with the Jaina philosophy. It could not have sprung from the same teacher and the same philosophical background. "As a mere 'anaikantika' (sic) theory of predication, the Syadvada must return upon itself and end in doubting
the doubter himself. Prof. Radhakrishnanafter mentioning the strong points of Syadvada, says "Yet in our opinion the Jaina logic leads to a monistic idealism (by which he means 'the hypothesis of the absolute') and so far as the Jainas shrink from it they are untrue to their own logic". But in the Saptabhangi tarangini we read a counter argument: If the final release and heavenly bliss are eternal and existing, where is the chance for samasara and the attempt to obtain moksa? If the other alternative is the only truth, what is the purpose of preaching such an ideal which is impossible to attain? Radhakrishnanpoints out that the Saptabhangi doctrine is not in consistent with the other views of the Jainas. It is a logical corollary of the Anekantavada. All that the Jainas say is that everything is of a complex nature and the real reconciles the difference in itself. Attributes which are contradictors in the abstract co-exist in the world of experience.
Ramanuja also pointed out that contradictory attributes such as existence and non-existence cannot at the same time belong to one thing any more than light and darkness. However, he seems to accept the distinction between dravya and paryfiya, substance and modes. He also sees that the substance has permanence; paryaya implied change.
But the predications give severally partial truths. The truths presented by them are alternative truths from different points of view; and the seven predications would present a complete comprehensive picture of reality. It is neither scepticism nor agnosticism, for each individual truth is valid. It is supplemented and harmonized by the other predication into a single comprehensive picture of reality, as we get a harmony in orchestra by the combination of different notes.
With all their criticisms, BELVALKAR makes Syadvada a most searching characteristic. Radhakrishnan observes "Samkara and Ramanuja criticized the Saptabhangi view on the ground of the impossibility of contradictory attributes co-existing in the same thing". After quoting the relevant passage from Ramanuja he proceeds to say: "The Jainas admit that a thing cannot have self-contradictory attributes at the same time and in the same sense. All that they say is that everything is of a complex nature, and reconciles differences in itself. Attributes which are contradictory in the abstract co-exist in life and experience. The tree is moving in that its branches are moving and it is not moving since it is fixed to its place in the ground." 
VI. In Western thought, at the time of the Greeks, when there was intellectual confusion due to the conflicting theories presented by the different philosophers, several approaches to problems were possible. Parmenides had emphasized 'Being'; Heraclitus had talked of change; Empedocles and Anaxagoras had thought that the reality consists of a plurality of substances. The atomists left the intellectual confusion. It was difficult to reconcile these conflicting views. Protagoras escaped the problem and said, Homomensure. The Sophists left the wise to wrangle with them and the quarrel of the universe let be.
But the Jainas did not accept such an escapist attitude. They faced facts squarely and tried to find out what was common between the conflicting views of the philosophers. This was the Anekanta attitude of the Jainas.
The Jainas appeal to experience and say that a priori reasoning independent of experience is incompetent to yield insight into he nature of the real. The Jainas steer clear of conflicting views of reality. They make us aware of the fact that intellectual dogmatism is not healthy and a many sided approach to the problem will develop in us a sense of tolerance and respect for others. Intellectual Ahimsa is most necessary, especially in an age when conflicting ideologies are trying to claim the monopoly of truth for themselves and give rise to intolerance and hatred. We live in a world of fear, distrust. It is time we tried to understand each other in an atmosphere of give and take. We must find out what is common between us rather than emphasize the differences. The Anekanta view is not sceptism, because it is not founded on doubt and distrust ; it is not solipsism, because it is based on an objective determination of things; but it presents acatholic approach to the problems of life. Bertrand Russell has mentioned that truth or falsity refers to propositions and this is based on facts. An affirmative proposition corresponds to the objective facts : it is to be true. Similarly, a negative proposition must have a corresponding objective fact if it is to be true. He mentions this as 'negative fact'. Thus we find that contradictory predications are not merely subjective, but they have an objective basis.
Thus we find that Anekantavada manifests itself as the most consistent form of realism in Indian Philosophy. It has allowed the principle of distinction to run its full course until reaches its logical terminus, the theory of minifoldness of reality and knowledge. It postulates the multiplicity of the ultimate reals constituting the cosmos. The Anekanta view of reality permeates every aspect of life and experience.
Whitehead's theory of coherence comes nearer to Anekanta attitude of the Jainas. He elucidates his attitude to reality by presenting the complete problem of the metaphysics, of substance and of flux as a 'full expression of the union of two notions.' Substance expresses permanence and flux emphasizes impermanence and change. Reality is to be found in the synthesis of the two. he interprets the lines:
'Abide with me;
Fast falls the eventide'
by showing that the two lines cannot be torn apart in this way; and we find that a wavering balance between the two is a characteristic of the greater number of philosophers. Whitehead shows that reality can be best understood by the integral view-point in which the ultimate postulates of per-manence and flux are harmoniously blended. Heraclitus emphasized the partial truth of change and flux. Perminedes
presented permanence and being as the reality. Reality is to be found in the blending with the two view points into a comprehensive whole.
For Whitehead, coherence would mean that the fundamental ideas presuppose each other. In isolation they are meaningless. It does not mean they are definable in terms of each other, though they are relevant to each other. 'No entity' can be conceived in complete abstraction from the system of the universe, and that it is the business of speculative philosophy to exhibit this truth. This character is its conherence'.
He also says: 'The systematisation of knowledge cannot be conducted in watertight compartments. All general truths condition each other; and the limits of their application cannot be adequately defined apart from their correlation by yet wider generalities. 
This is the attitude of the Jainas also. The Jaina emphasis on the material and spiritual as a synthesis of opposites leads to a concrete universal involving unity in diversity. It is comparable to Jasper's 'unfanatical absoluteness'. Jainas in their theory of Anekanta illustrate a 'non-attach-ment of partial truths; and they have made creative use of -the contradictions by removing the sting out of them, Heideggar presents a similar point of view. 
In our political life, Pancasila, as our late Prime Mini. ster has pointed out, is the panacea for the ills of our day life. And Pancaslla expresses the spirit of Anekanta
1. Tattvarthsutra. 1.
2. PADMARAJIAH (Y. J.): Jaina Theory of Reality and Knowledge.
Jaina Sahitya Vikasa Mandsla, Bombay) (1963) p. 274.
3. MOOKERJEE,: The ,Jaina Philosophy of Non-absolutism (Bharati Mahavidyalaya) (1944) p. 70.
4. Sanmati Tarka : edited with introduction by Pandit SKHALALJI SANGHVI and Pandit DOSHI.
5. Pramanaminmamsa of Hemacandra : (Singhi Jaina Granthamala 1939) p. F. n. 3.
6. Digha Nikaya Potthapada Sutta. 9 and Majjhima Nikaya, Sutta 99.
7. Syadvada Manjari edited by Prof. A. B Dhruva, Introduction.
8. Bhagavati Sutra, VIII. 7, 495, snd Bhagadati Sutta VII, 2, 273.
9. HIR1YANNA (M.): Outlines of Indian Philosophy (Allen Unwin) 1931 P. 212.
10. Prameya-kamala-martanda : Prabhacandra ed. 1948, pp, 563 and 642 .
11. PADMARAJIAH (Y. J.). Jaina. Theories of Reality and Knowledge p. 283.
12. PADMARAJIAH (Y. J.): Jaina Theories of Reaiity and Knowledge,.p.86.
13. Ibid, P, 303,
14. UPADHYE (A. N.): Ptauacanasara of Ktsndhkundacarya, ed. (Bombay) 1935. Introduction.
15. Prameyakamalamartanda of Prabhacandra, anirakrtapratipaksavastavasamgrahi jnaturabhipraya nayah!"
16. PADMARAJIAH (Y. J.) Jaina Theory of Reality and Knowledge, pp. 325.
17. Tatvartha dhigama-sutra, 1, 34 35.
18. Sanmati Tarka, Ch. 1, verse 3, 4. Compare Visesauasyaka Bhdsyo, .gatha 75.
19. Pramana tattualokalankara, Vadidevs Silri. VII, 17 and 18 Also refers to Syadvadaratnakara of the same suthor.
20. PADMARAJIAH (Y.J). : Jaina Theories of Reality and Knowledge, p. 315.
21. DASGUPTA (S): History of Indian Philosophy, 1921, Vol. I, p. 181.
22. Nyayakunumudacandra: (Bom. 1935), NO. 655, syadastiyadi saptabhengamayo vadati.
23. PADMARAJIAH (Y. J.); Jaina Theories of Reality and Knowledge p. 315.
24. Syadvadamanjari, (ed. DHRUVA) 1933, p. 142-43.
25. HIRIYANNA (M) : Outlines of Indian Philosophy (Allen Unwin) 1931, p. 163.
26. PADMARAJIAH (Y.J) : Jaina Theories of Reality and Knowledge p. 338.
27. PADMARJIAH (Y. J.): Jaina Theories of Reality and Knowledge, 338,
28. Satkari MUKEEJI : Jaina Philosophy Non-Absolutism, Ch. VI
29. Majjhima Nikaya, Sutta 99, digha Nikaya, Sutta 9.
30. K.C BHATTACHARYA : The Jaina Theory of Anekanta Vada, p. 13.
31. Satkari MUKERJI: Jaina Philosophy of Non-absolutism, p. 166.
32. PADMARAJIAH (Y. J.): The Jaina Theory of Reality and
33. BHATTACHARYA (K.C) : The Jaina Theory of Anekantavada, p. 14.
34. "The Undercurrents of Jainism" (an article in the Indian Philosophical Review, Vol. I, No. 1, 1947, edited by A.C WIDGERY and R. D. RANADE, Bombay), p. 33.
35. HIRIYANNA (M.) The Essentials of Indian Philosophy, (Allen and Unwin) 1949, p. 69.
36. RADHAKRISHNAN(S) : Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 304.
37. Samkara's Bhasya on Vedanta Sutra, ii, 33; Ramanuja's Bhasya on Vedanta Sutra, ii, 2, 31.
38. Brahamasutra of Badarayana, BELVALKAR'S edition (1931) Notes.
39. RADHAKRISHNA (S.) : Indian Philosophy, Vol. I (Allen and Unwin) 1931, p. 305.
40. RADHAKRISHNAN(S.) : Indian Philosophy, Vol. I (Allen and Unwin) 1931, p. 304.
41. WHITEHEAD (A.N.) Process and Reality, Part II, Ch. X, Sect. I.
42. WHITEHEAD (A.N.) : Process and Reality (1929) Part I, Ch.I, sect.I.
43. Ibid. Sect. IV.
44. Marshall Margaret WILEY; Visvabharati Quartorly, Calcutta Vol. No. XXYIII-2, 1962-63, pp. 116-138.
THE JAINA THEORY OF THE SOUL:
Conception of soul in philosophy -- Jaina theory of soul -- considered from noumenal and the phenomenal points of view -- Upayoga as characteristic of soul -- bahiratman, antaratman and paramatman -- compared with distinction between `ME' and 'I' of William James -- seat of the soul-classification of Samsari Jivas -- freedom of soul from Samsara.
I. The problem of the soul has been a perennial problem in religion and speculative philosophy. Primitive man ha made a distinction between body and soul. The burial of the dead with their belongings and even the mummification of the Egyptians are based on such a distinction between body and spirit. The philosophical concept of the soul has developed from such primitive distinctions.
Anthropological evidence shows that the notion of Sol and spirit was first formed by primitive man as an explanation of certain features of his experience like dream an sleep. For him soul is an ethereal image of the body. It is ethereal, tennous or filmy; and it possesses the power (flashing quickly from one place to another. Yet it was not conceived as purely immaterial. In Plato we find the emphatic primacy of the psyche or soul in the dialogues from the Apology onwards to the Laws.
In the Homeric thought psyche appears as a shadow double of the body. But Socrates and Plato recognized the soul as mans real selfSocrates said that we should aim at the perfection of our souls. Plato shows that of all the things that man has 1 next to the gods, his soul is the most divine and most truly his own.' Body in fact is the shadow of the soul. Jowett says that Plato was concerned wit emphasizing the priority of the soul to the body, towards the end of his life, as he gave importance to the idea of good in the Republic and of beauty in the Symposium.2 Plato said that the soul is immortal because its very idea and essence is the self-moved and self moving, that which is the foundation and the beginning of motion to all that moves besides.3
Plato reversed the primitive conception of the soul as shadowy double of the body and identified the true as the soul, but he preserves and accentuates the original animistic dualism. Approaching the question with the scientific spirit, Aristotle started with the living organism and defined the psyche as the principle of life. He distinguished the different levels of psychical functions, from the vegetative to the rational. The soul is the actualisation of the potentiality of life, and, therefore defined as the 'entelechy', 'as the fulfilment of the body'. The idea of the soul is intrinsically independent of the body implies the conception of its substantiality. Conceiving the soul as a simple and indestructible substance, the scholastic metaphysics was argued to demonstrate its immortality. So did Plato emphasize the simple and unitary nature of the soul.
In modern psychology, the idea of the soul is no longer important. In its place has come the notion of self or 'the centre of interest.' The word 'soul' is ambiguous. Sometimes it stands for mind, sometimes for self and sometimes for both. The English word points to an entity as the cause or vehicle of physical or psychical activities of the
individual person. The soul is a spiritual substance. In Indian thought the word atmanhas undergone various changes. It is little used in the Vedas. It primarily meant breath. In the Upanisads another word, prana, is used for breath, and atman stands for the innermost part of man. Man was atmavat. For the Upanisadic seers, the soul as a propocition for all experiences Indian philosophies, with the exception of Miayavada of Samkara and Ksanikavada of the Buddhists, fundamentally agree about the nature of the soul as a pert manent, eternal and imperishable substance. But the primitive Aryans believed that the essence of man is continued after death in a shadowy existence in some subtle bodily form. This is not the soul of the later philosophers. Jacobi calls it psyche. This is the development of the primitive motion of life after death lingering in some form. It is found even today in the practice of sraddha. The psyche frequently spoken of as purusa and of the size of the thumb (angustha-matra). At the time of death it departs from the body. In the oldest Upanisads the psyche is described a eonstituted by the prdnas, psycho-physical factors. Still these factors were not regarded as principles of personality .
II. The idea of the soul has occupied an importar position in Jaina philosophy. Jainism aims at the liberation of the soul from the cycle of birth and death. The saving the soul is the Christian ideal. In the Apology, Plato makes Socrates say that his mission was to get men to care for their souls and to make them as good as they can be.
Jainism is dualistic. There is a dichotomous division of categories. All things are divided into living and nonliving, souls and non-souls. In the first verse of the Dravya samgraha, we read, "The ancient among the great Jainas have described the dravyas as jiva and ajiva." Jiva is a category and jiva personalized becomes human. Jainism believes in the plurality of souls. Souls are substances distinct from matter. Souls influence one another. But they are quit distinct from one another and not connected in any higher unity. They may be called spiritual monads. Jainism emphasizes the diversity of souls. Amongst the Muslim theologians, Nazam and his school maintained that the soul is spiritual substance.
Jainism considers the soul from two points of view : the noumenal (niscaya naya) and the phenomenal (vyavahar naya). The Dravyamcyogatarkana of Bhoja describes the distinction as mentioned in the Visesavasykabhaisya by saying that the niscaya narrates the real things and the vyavahar narrates things in a popular way. In the Samayasarc Kundakundacarya points out that the practical standpoint is essential for the exposition of the inner reality of things, canonAryan is never capable of understanding without the non-Aryan tongue. 
The existence of the soul is a presupposition in the Jaina philosophy. Proofs are not necessary. If there are any proofs, we can say that all the pramanas can establish the existence of the soul. " Oh Gautama, the soul is pratyaksa", said Mahavlra, " for that in which your knowledge consists is itself soul ". What is pratyaksa need not be proved like the pleasure and pain of the body. It is pratyahsa owing
to the aham-pratyaksa, the realization of the I, which is associated with the functions pertaining to all the three tenses. William James and James Ward present self-consciousness in this form. Ward talks of the 'internal perception' or self-consciousness. The last order of knowledge of the duality of subject and object is an indispensable condition of all actual experience however simple. It is. therefore, first in order of existence. It is the subject of experience that we call the pure ego or self. William James says, "For, this central part of the self is felt. It is something by which we also have direct sensible consciousness in which it is present, as in the whole life time of such moments. Thus, one who ignores the self-evidence of the soul is like one who says that sound is inaudible and the moon is devoid of the moon. The existence of the soul can be inferred from the behavior of others. Similarly, the soul exists because, " it is my word, O Gautama" 
The jiva is described from the noumenal and phenomenal points of view. From the noumenal point of view, the soul is described in the pure form. The phenomenal describes the empirical qualities of the soul. From the pure point of view, it is not associated with body or any physical or mental qualities. Mahavlra points out to the third Ganadhara that the soul is different from the body and its sense is just as Devadatta recollects an object perceived through the five windows of the palace, which is different from the palace and the five windows, so also a person recollecting an object perceived through the five senses of the body is different from the senses and the body. The Buddhist impermanence of the soul is also refuted. Buddhists had said that there was no self except the khatldas. Kundakundacarya points out that from the noumenal point of view the soul and the body are not one, although in worldly practice the soul having a beautiful body is called beautiful and fair like the beautiful body of the living Arhat. In the Chandogyopanisad, in the dialogue between Yajnavalkya and Janaka, the idea of the self is progressively brought out by showing that it is not a physical entity nor a dream-state.
From the noumenal point of view, the soul is pure and perfect. It is pure consciousness. From the real point of view, the soul is unbound, untouched and not other than itself. The soul is one and not composite. In the Sthanainga we get a description of the soul as one (ege atta). The commentator describes it as 'ekavidhah atmanah. In Sama-yasara, Kundakundacarya describes the absolute oneness of the soul "on the strength of my self-realisation". This does not contradict the plurality of souls in Jainism. Only emphasizes the essential identity of souls. Jivas in all-their in living all characteristics are essentially the same. If the souls were one, then, "O Gautama, there would not be sukha, duhkha, bandha, moksa etc. ' Individual souls are different like the kumbhas.
The nature of jiva has been well described by Nemi candra in his Dravyasamgraha. He describes the soul both from the noumenal and phenomenal points of view. He say that jiva is characterized by upayoga, is formless and is a agent. It has the same extent as its body. It is the enjoyer of the fruits of karama. It exists in samsara. It is siddha and has a characteristic of upward motion. We get a
similar description in the Pancastikayasara of Kundakundacarya. Jiva is formless. It is characterized by upayoga. It is attached to karma. It is the Lord, the agent and the enjoyer of the fruits of Karma. It pervades bodies large or small. It has a tendency to go upward to the end of loka, being freed from the impurities of Karma. The Tattvarthasutra describes the nature of the soul as possessing upayoga as its essential characteristic.
Every Jiva possesses an infinite number of qualities. Glasenapp, in his Doctrine of Karma in Jaina Philosophy, mentions eight important characteristics:
1. The faculty of ominisicence (kevala-jnana)
2. The faculty of absolute undifferentiated congnition (kevala-darsana).
3. Superiority over joy and grief.
4. Possession of belief in complete religious truth (samyaktva), and irreproachable moral conduct (caritra)
5. Possession of eternal life (akasayasthiti).
6. Complete formlessness (amurtatva)
7. Unrestricted energy (viryatva).
8. Complete equality in rank with other jivas.
The first characteristic of the soul is upayoga. The word upayoga is difficult to define. It is the source of experience. The cognitive, conative and effective aspects spring from it. It is differentia of the living organism. Umasvati says that upayoga is the essential characteristic of the soul. Upayoga has conative prominence. Upayoga is that by which a function is served: upayujyate anena iti upayogah. It is also described as that by which a subjct is grasped.  In the Gommatasara: Jivakanda, Upayoga is described as the drive which leads to the apprehension of objects. It is the source of the psychical aspect of experience. It gives rise to the experience of objects, and the experience expresses itself in forms of jnana and darsana. Upayoga is of two types: anakdra, formless, and sakdra, possessed of form. Anakara Upayoga is formless, indeterminate cognition. Sakara Upayoga is indeterminate cognition, a defined form of experience. It would not be out of place to point out that upayoga is not the resultant of consciousness as it is some-times maintained. This was one of the earlier attempts to translate upayoga. Nor is it a sort of inclination arising from consciousness. It is the conative drive which gives rise to experience. It is, in fact, the source of all experience. The Jaina philosophers were aware of the driving force of experience, the force by which experience is possible. This may be likened to the 'horme' of the modern psychologists. It may be called horme in the sense that McDougall has used the term. It is a
vital impulse or urge to action. Nunn has stated that horme is the basis of activity that differentiates the living animal from dead matter. It is like Schopenhauer's 'will to live', and Bergson's 'elan vital'. Jnana and darsana are manifestations of upayoga.
The biological studies of the lower animals from the amoeba onwards show that all animals are centres of energy in constant dynamical relation with the world, yet confronting it in their own characteristic way. A name was needed to express this fundamental property of life, the drive or a felt tendency towards a particular end. Some psychologists called it 'conation' or the conative process. But this drive may not always be conscious.
There is the presence of an internal drive in such processes. "To this drive or urge, whether it occurs in the conscious life of men and the higher animals we propose to give a single name.....horme".' This activity of the mind is a funlamental property of life. It has various other names like 'the will to live' 'elan vital', the life urge and the libida. Horme under one form or another has been the fundamental postulate of Lamarck, Butler, Bergson and Bernard Shaw McDougall took great pains to present the hormic theory of
psychology as against the mechanistic interpretaion of life and mind.
The hormic force determines experience and behavior. We get conscious experience because of this drive. The conscious experience takes the form of perception and understanding. Horme operates even in the unconscious behavior of lower animals. In the plants and animals we see it operate in the preservation of organic balance. In our own physical and mental life we find examples of horme below the conscious level. We circulate our blood, we breathe and we did, just our food, and all these are the expressions of the hormic energy. It operates at all levels both in the individual and the racial sense. But the horme expressed and presented by the Jaina philosophers could not be developed and analysed in terms of the modern psychology, because their analysis of Upayoga was surely an epistemological problem tempered with metaphysical speculation. They were aware of the fact that there is a purposive force which actuates and determines experience. This is clear from the distinction between jiana and darsana as two forms of upayoga.
Citta or cetana as a characteristic of the soul is important in Indian philosophy. In the Dravyasamgraha, jiva is described as possessing cetana from the noumenal point of view. Cetana is a sort of inclination which arises from upayoga. This inclination branches in two directions-jnana and darsana. Darsana may be said to be undifferentiated knowledge Jnana is cognition defined. The jiva has infinite jnana and darsana. But certain classes of Karman, like jnanavarantya and Darsandvarantya tend to obscure and confuse the essential nature of the jiva. From the phenomenal point of view, darsana and jnana tend to manifest themselves in eight kinds of jnana and four kinds of darsana.
The possession of Upayoga raises the question whether the Jiva possesses upayoga and is yet different from it, or whether it is
identical with it. The Nyaya theory does not recognize the identity of quality and its possessor. Jainism assets that only from the phenomenal point of view they are separable. In Pancastikayasara we read "Only in common parlance do we distinguish darsana and jnana. But in reality there is no separation." The soul is inseparabl from Upayoga. Horme is an essential characteristic of the living organisms. It is manifested in the fundamental property experienced in the incessant adjustments and adventures that make up the tissue of life and which may be called drive or felt tendency towards an end. Animal life is not merely permeated by physical and chemical processes it is more than that. Even the simplest animal is autonomous.
The soul is simple and without parts. It is formless as the soul is immaterial it has no form. This quality has been mentioned in other systeins also. The Jaina thinker were against the Buddhist idea of the soul as a cluster of khandas. Buddists do not refer to the permanent soul. It is a composite of mental states called khandas. In moder Western thought, Hume says, "When I enter most intimating into what I call myself, I always stumble upon some percetion or other of heat or cold, light, or shade, love or hatred pain or pleasure. I never catch myself any time without perception, and never can observe anything but the perception," Hoffding stated that the ego has been looked out for in vain as something absolutely simple. The nature of the ego is manifested in the combination of sensation, ideas and feelings. But Herbart maintains that the soul is a simple being not only without parts but also without qualitativ multiplicity. Modern Psychology has emphasized substan-tiality, simplicity, persistence and consciousness as the attributes of the soul. Descartes has said, "I am the thing that thinks, that is to say who doubts, who affirms....who loves, who hates and feels...," He designates this thing as substance.
Hamilton advocated the four characteristics with the greatest explicitness. Other prominent names are those of Porter, Calkins, Angell and Aveling.
From the phenomenal point of view, jiva is also described as possessing four pranas. They are sense (indriya), energy (bala), life (ayus) and respiration (ana). The Pancastikayasara gives the same description. The idea of prana is found in Indian and Western thought. In the Old Testament (Genesis. Book I) we read, "The Lord God breathed into the nostril the breath of life and man became a living soul." In the primitive minds we find the conception that the wind gave men life. When it ceases to blow, men die. In the Navaho legend there is a description of the life force according to which we see the trace of the wind in the skin at the tips of fingers. Pranas refer to psychophysical factors of the organism. The jiva assumes the bodily powers when it takes new forms in each new birth. Whatever thing manifests in the four pranas lives and is jiva. The four Pranas are manifest in ten forms. The Indriya expresses itself in five senses. Bala may refer to the mind, the body and speech. Ayus and Ana are one each. These pranas in all their details need not be present in all organisms, because there are organisms with less than five sense organs. But there must be the four main characteristics. The most perfectly developed souls have all the ten pranas and the
lowest have only four. This has a great biological and psychological significance. Comparative psychology points out that in the psychophysical development of the various animal species at the lower level, the chemical sense which is affected by chemical reaction is the only sense function; and it later becomes the separate sense of taste and smell Experimental investigations carried by Riley and Forell point out that the chemical sense is used by insects like moths even for mating. Forel has given a topo-chemical theory for explaining the behavior of bees. As we go higher in the scale of life, the chemical sense plays little part. In birds, sight and smell are well developed. In mammals, we find a higher degree of qualitative discrimination of smell. As we go higher still, we get the variability of adaptation which may be called intelligence.
In the Brahmanas and the oldest Upanisads there is a description of the psyche as consisting of five pranas. They are regarded as factors of the physico-psychological life. Occasionally, more than five pranas are mentioned. But still the idea of a permanent self had not shaped itself. In the third Adhyaya of the Brhadaranyakopanisad Yajnavalkya was asked to explain what happend to a person after the body has been dissolved, and the parts of the psyche has been remitted to the fire and wind. He avoids the discussion and suggests that Karma remains after death. This was a step forward towards the formation of the permanent self. Brhadaranyakopanisad also contains a discussion about the constituent parts of the soul. Eight instead of five have been suggested. Vijnana and retah are mentioned. This vijnanamayapurusa comes nearer to the conception of the soul, although personal immortality is not emphasized. In Jainism also, the idea of a permanent soul possessing pranas must have developed on the same lines.
From the phenomenal point of view, the soul is the Lord (prabhu), the doer (karta), enjoyer (bhokta) limited to his body (deahmatra), still incorporeal, and it is ordinarily found with Karma. Asa potter considers himself as a maker and enjoyer of the clay pot, so, from the practical point of view, the mundane soul is said to be the doer of things like constructing house and the enjoyer of sense objects. As the soul produces impure thought-activities and as a consequence, the material Karmas, it also enjoy his thoughts with the help of the material Karmas. Thus, Jiva enjoys its thought created activity. However, from the noumenal point of view, Jiva is the doer of suddha bhavas or pure thought (karmas); and from the phenomenal point of view, it is the doer of pudgala karmas or Karmic matter. The distinction between the formal cause (nimitta), and material cause upadana, has been introduced for the description of the soul. The Jainas say that the soul is the efficient cause of the material Karmas. The Jiva possesses consciousness, and conciseness manifests itself in the form of various mental states. These mental states are responsible for activities which produce material Karmas. It is, therefore, asserted that Jiva is the agent: of thought-karmas, indirectly of the Karmic matter. The Pancastikayacara describes the atman as the agent of its own bhavas. But it is not the agent of Dudgala karmas. Jainism emphasizes the activity of the Jiva as
against the Samkhya view of the passive udasina purusa. As a consequence of activity, the Jiva experiences happiness and misery. But Hemicandra says that it is only from the phenomenal point of view. From the nollmenal point of view, Jiva has consequences and it enjoys eternal bliss. In the Dravyasamgraha we read, "niccayanayado cedanabhavam khu adassa". He joys and sorrows that Jiva experiences are the fruits of dravya-karman Rut Buddhism believe that the agent never enjoys the fruits of Karma. James Ward giving the general characterization of the "varied contents of the general self, says that the self has first of all a) a unique interest and b) a certain in-wardness, further it is c) an individual that d) percists, e) is active, and finally it knows itself.
But the process of entanglement in activity and enjoyment is beginningless. The soul gets entangled in the samsara and embodied through the operation of karmas. It assumes various forms due to the materially caused conditions (upadhi), and is involved in the cycle of birth and death. It is subjected to the forces of Karmas which express themselves, first through the feelings and emotions and secondly in the chains of very subtle kinds of matter, invisible to the eye and the ordinary instruments of science. When the soul is embodied, is affected by the environmental-physical, social and spiritual, in different ways. Thus we get the various types of soul existence. The soul embodies itself and identifies itself with the various functions of the bodily and social environment. Willaim James distinguishes between the self as known or the me, the empirical ego as it is sometimes called, and the self as knower or the I, pure ego. The constituents of the me may be divided into three classes: the material me, the social me and the spiritual me. The body is the innermost part of the material me. Then come the clothes, our home and property. They become parts of our empirical ego with different degrees of intimacy. A man's social me is the recognition that he gets from his fellowmen. A man has as many self as there are individuals and groups who recognize him. The spiritual me also belongs to the empirical me. It consists of the entire collection of con-sciousness, my psyche faculties and dispositmll taken concreate." But the pure self, the sell as the knower, is very different from the empirical sell. It is the thinker, that which thinks. This is permanent, what the philosophers call the soul or the transcendental ego. James Ward also makes a distinction between the self known or the empirical ego, and the pure self. For him, the empirical ego is extremely complex. It is the presented self. ' The earlies element is the presented self, the bodily or the somatic consciousness. But they never have the same inwardness as "the sense of embodiment." We also find a certain measure of individual permanence and inwardness that belongs to the self. We may call this 'the sensitive and the appetitive self. With the development of ideation there arises what we call the inner one, having still greater unity and permanence. This is the imaging and desiring self. At the level of interaction, we come to the concept that every intelligent person is a person having character and history and his aim in life through social interaction. This gives conscience, a social product as Adam Smith has said. At this stage a contrast between the thinker and the object of thought is clearly formed.
This is the thinking and willing self. At this stage, even the -inner ideation and desire become outer, no longer strictly self. The duality of subject and object is the last order of knowledge and is the indispensable condition of all actual experience. It is the subject of experience that we call pure 'ego or self.
The Jaina thinkers made a distinction between the states of the soul as bahiratman, antaratman and paramatman. Bahiratman consists in the identification of the sell with body and external belongings. It is the bodily,self. In this we say, "I am the body, I am lean etc." This identification is due to ignorance. The same soul is in the karmavastha and is characterized by suddha caitanya and bliss. It is free from all sense of other ness. It has discriminative knowledge. This conscious self is antaratman in the samyagdrsti gunasthana. The pure and perfect self which is free from that impurities of Karma is the paramatman. It is characterized by perfect cognition and knowledge. It is freed and is a Siddha. This Paramatman is jnanamaya and is pure consciousness. It cannot be known by the sense. It has no indriyas and no manas. From the noumenal point of view, these are the attributes of the soul. The Jaina approach to the problem is metaphysical. It contains elements of psychological investigation; but the language is the language of metaphysics. modern psychologists, especially the rational psyshoiogists, stopped at psychological analysis and explained the process of realizing the pure nature of the self from the empirical stage to the stage of pure ego. But the transcendental self is not the subject of psychology. William James has said that states of consciousness are all that psychology needs to do her work with. 'Metaphysics or theology may prove the existence of the soul; but for psychology the hypothesis of such a substantial principle of unity is superfluous.
Jainism refers to the size of the soul. Although so are not of any definite size, they contract and expand according to the size of the body in which they are incorporate for the time being. The soul is capable of adjusting its to the physical body, as the lamp placed in a large or small room illuminates the whole space of the room. Nemicanc describes it as the phenomenal characteristic of the soul From the noumenal point of view it is said to exist in innmerable pradesas. In respect of the elasticity of the so Jainism differs from the other schools of Indian thought as Jacobi says, the Jainas have a tenet of the size of the so which is not shared by other philosophers.
Some philosophers like the Vaisesikas, Democritus; the atomists, thought of the soul as atomic. Some others talked of the omnipresence of the soul. Jacobi says that original Vaisesika was not clear on this point. Some Samki writers preferred the soul to be infinitely small, while Isvara Krsna and later writers characterized it as allpervading. The spatial view of the habitation of the soul had occupied the minds of the Upanisadic philosophers.
Upanisadic psychology agrees with the Aristotelian localizing the soul in the heart. It was later thought that was in the brain. Yogic and Tantric books recognized the cerebro-chemical processes, and
consciousness was traced, to the brain. In the Taittirlyopanisad (1. 6. 1. 2) were that the soul in the heart moves by a passage through the bones of the palate, right up to the skull, where the hair are made to part. The soul in the heart is called manomay, In the Kausltaki Upanisad the soul is described as the master of all bodily functions. The sense depends on the soul a 'relatives on the rich'. The self is immanent in the whole body, and is hidden in it. This passage leads to the view like the Jaina view, that the soul fills the body. Different other accounts are given in the Upanisads. In the Brhadaranyaka the self is described as small as a grain of rice or barley. In the Kathopanisad we find that the soul is of the size of the thumb. It dwells in the centrer of the heart. In the Chandogya, it is said to be of the measure of the span between the head and the chin. William James traces the-feeling of self to the cephalic movements. He says that the self of selves when carefully examined is found to consist mainly in the collection of these peculiar motions in the head or between the head and the heart. Descartes maintains that the seat of the soul is the pineal gland. Fichte holds that the soul is a space filling principle. Lotze says that the soul must be located somewhere in the matrix of the arterial brain events. These accounts tend to make us believe that the soul is something material which occupies space. It is sometimes pointed out that the idea of the spatial attributes of the soul constitutes a contradiction. If the soul has no form it cannot occupy space, even the infinite pradesas; and if it is immaterial, it cannot have form. However, this contradiction is due to the difficulties of expressing the immaterial in terms of the material. This has been the perennial problem of philosophy, because the immaterial has no vocabulary of its own. The Greeks had the same difficulty. Plato had to resort to allegories and myths for expressing the immaterial. In Jainism, although the description of the soul is not metaphorical, it is just an attempt to come nearest to immaterialism. It may be that the difficulty is due to the complexity of substance in Jainism. Jainism gives the cross division of substances as spiritual and non spiritual, and again as corporeal and non-corporeal substance like Dharma and Adharma; and there is the corpo real which is called Pudgala. From the phenomenal point of view, jiva comes under the spiritual but corporeal. The corporeal need not necessarily be material. The classification is as follows:-
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Jiva corporeal n-corporeal
matter 1. Akasa
If this division is accepted, there need be no contradiction. Again, when size is attributed to the soul, it is possible that it refers to the sphere or extent of the influence that is intended. In the Pancastikayasara we read that just as a lotus hued ruby, when placed in a cup of milk, imparts its lustre to the milk, the soul imparts its lustre to the whole body. 
Jiva is characterized by upward motion. Nemicandra describes the pure soul as possessing urdhvagati. In the Pancastikayasara it is said, when the soul is freed from all impurities it moves upwards to the end of Loka. For Plato, the soul was, above all, the source of motion. It is only the self that moves. In the Phaedrus, Socrates says in his second speech, "The soul is immortal for that which is ever in motion is lmmortal." The self r ever ceases to move and it is the fountain and the beginning to motion to all that moves. the movement of the soul in samsara is due to its association with Karman; but by nature it has the upward motion which it adopts beyond which no movement is possible in pure space which is devoid of the medium tormotion. The Jaina conception of the soul as possessing urdhvagani appears to be more an ethical expediency than a metaphysical principle or a psychological fact.
All these attributes belong to the nature of every soul and they are clearly seen if the Jivas are pure and free. However, most of the Jivas are not pure and free. They are contaminated by some foreign elements which veil their purity and perfection. The foreign element is karman, very fine matter, imperceptible to the senses, and which enters in the soul and causes great changes. The souls are then involved in the wheel of samsara. They become samsarins.
III. The samsari jivas are classified on the basis of various principles, like the status and the number of sense organs possessed by them. They are sthavara jivas, immovable souls. This is the vegetable kingdom. Sir J.C. BOSE has pointed out that the vegetable world has capacity for experince. They are one-sensed organisms. Earth, water, fire and plants
are such jivas. They possess the sense
of touch. This view is peculiar to Jainism. Trasa jivas, (moving souls) have two to five senses. Worms, oysters. conches etc., possess taste and touch. Ants, bugs and lice have three sensestaste, touch, smell and sight. And birds, beasts and men have all the five senses. Again, five sensed organisms may possess mind. They are called samanaka. They may be bereft of mind (amanaska).
Plato talked of a determined number of souls. 'The souls that exist must always be the same. They cannot become fewer, nor yet cant hey become more numerous'. In the Timaneus he said that the number of souls is equal to the number of the stars.
In Gommatasara, Jivakanda, we get a detailed classification of samsari jivas. This classification is shown on next page.
Comparative psychology points out that there have been various stages in the development of animal life. The first simple animals, the protozoa, are possessed of one sense. In fact, till we reach the insect species we find that the chemical sense predominates. Positive, negative and food reactions are mainly due to the chemical sense. As we go up the animal scale, we find sensory discrimination in qualitative distinctions. Even the other senses get discriminated and developed as we proceed in the development of animal life. Similarly, the distinction between the jivas, as parydpta and aparypta, has great psychological significance. Gomma tasara thus illustrates the paryapta developed, "as the things like the room, jars, and clothes are full or empty, so the jivas should be understood to be complete or incomplete.1 Jiva becomes paryapta with the absorption of Karmic matter for building up its body, sense, respiration and manas. One sensed organisms become complete with the possession of food, drink, body, sense and respiration. The possession of these attributes maker the first four-sensed organisms paryapta or complete. For five-sensed organisms all the six are necessary. In the absence of these the Jivas are incomplete. Comparative psychology has shown that sensory discrimination has been a gradual process. Miss Washburn points out that ability to distinguish between the different sensory experiences depends on several factors, like the nature of the sense organs and the ability to make varied reaction movements. On the basis of these investigations, three different classes of senses, like the chemical sense, hearing and sight, have been mentioned. The chemical sense is manifested in the combined senses of taste and touch. As sensory discrimination becomes more complex. the mental life of the animal becomes more developed and pronounced.
(possessing one sense) |
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Badara Suksma |
___|___________ __|_____________ |
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Paryapta (1) Apryapta (2) Paryapta (3) Aparyapta (4)
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Possessing 2 senses Possessing 3 senses Possessing 4 senses Possessing 5 senses
|______________ ______|_______ |________________ |
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Paryapta (5) Aparyapta (6) Paryapta (7) Aparyapta (8) Paryapta (9) Aparyapta (10) |
| | | |
Paryapta Aparyapta Paryapta Aparyapta
(11) (12) (13) (14)
IV. These characteristics of the soul are mentioned from the practical point of view. Defilement of the soul takes place when the Karma pours into the soul. This is called asrava. The soul then begins to experience mundane and emotional experiences like the passions. The Karma which comes into contact is retained. The soul is eternally infected with matter. Every moment it is getting new matter. In the normal course of things, it has no end. But the deliverance of the soul from the wheel of samsara is possible by voluntary means. By the process of samvara the soul can stop the influx of Karma; by nirjara it can eliminate the Karma already glued to the soul. Then all
obstacles are removed and the soul becomes pure and perfect, free from the wheel of samsara. Being free, with its upward motion the jiva attains the liberation or moksa. In the last lines of the Gommatasdra: Jlvakanda , it is said that the liberated soul remains pure and free.
Pure and perfect souls live in eternal bliss. But they do not lose their identity as the Vedantin would emphasize. In the eighth Khanda of the Chandogyopanisad, it is said that when a man departs his speech is merged in mind, his mind in breath, his breath in fire, which in the highest being is sat. Now, that which is the subtle essence has its self. It is the self, "and thou, Oh Svetaketu, art that." In the eleventh Khanda also, we read that when the body withers and dies and the living self leaves it, the living self dies not. Jacobi says that here we come nearer to the concept of the soul. It differs from the Jaina concept in that the soul here does not possess a permanent personality, for in mukzi the jiva is merged in Brahman and its individuality is lost. For the Jaina, McTaggart's analogy of the 'college of selves' would appear to be apter, although what type of spiritual unity there is in Moksa, Jainism cannot say. McTaggart seeks of the unity of the absolute as that of a society. All the selves are perfect, and "if an opponent should remind me", he writes, ''of the notorious imperfections of all the lives of all of us, I should point out that every self is in reality eternal and that its true qualities are only seen in so far as it is considered as eternal.~ Sub specie eternitatis it is progressing towards perfection as yet unattained. The never-ceasing struggle of the soul is an important tenet in Jainism. The universe is not, then, an amusing pantomime of infallible marionettes, but a fight for perfection, in which "something is eternally gained for the universe by the success". The Jaina outlook is melioristic.
1. The Laws, 959.
2. Dialogaes of Plato. Vol. v. (2nd Ed.) p. 120.
3. The Phacdrus, 245.
4.SETH PRINGLE-PATTISON (A) : The Idea of Immoriality (Oxford), 1922 p.73
5. JACOBI (Hermann) : Studies in JainismThe Place of Jainism in Indian Thought.
6. JAINI (J.L.) : Ed. Samayasara, 38.
7. Ganadharavada, 6.
8. Ward (James): Psychological Principles, p. 370 (1918).
9. JAMES (William): Principles of Psychology, Vol. I, Ch. X, p. 298
10. Ganadharavada, 34.
11. Ganadharabada, 109, and Sutrakrtanga, 33.
12. Samayasara, 39, 42.
13. As quoted in Abhidhanarajendra, Vol. II, ' tta'.
14. Samayasara, 5.
15. Ganadharavada, 33.
16. Dravyasamgraha, 2.
17. Pancastikayasara, 27-28.
18. Tattvarthadhigamasutra, Ch. II, 8.
19. Prajna, 27, Visesavasyakavhasya.
20. Gommatsara : Jivakanda, Ch. XX, Verse 672 vatunimittam vhavo jado jivassa jo du uvajogo.
21. NUNN (Petcy) : Education: Its Data and First Principles, pp. 2829, 3rd Ed.
22. ROSS (James S.) Groundwork of Educational Psychology, p. 47.
23. Pancastikayasara, 41.
24. MCDOUGALL (William) : An Outline of Psychlogoy, Ch. 3.
25. HUME (David) : Treatise on Human Nature, Book 1, Pt. IV, 6.
26. DESCATES : Meditations II.
27. SPEARMAN (C.): Psychology Down the Ages Vol.1 Ch. XXI, pp. 39192.
28. Pancastikayasata, 30.
29. RANADE (R.D.): A Consturctive Survey of Upanisadic Philosophy p. 181, (1926).
30. Pancastikayasata, 27 and Samayasata, 124.
31. Dravyasangrah 8,9.
32 Pancastikasarya. 6,28
33. JAMes Ward : Psychological Principles, Ch. XV p. 368
34. JAMES (William): Principles of Psychology, VOL. p. 292
35. JAMES (Ward) : Psyvholohivsl Principles, Ch. II
36. Paramatmaorajasam 31,
37. JAMES (William) : Briefer Course, p. 203.
38. Dravyasamgraha, 10.
39. JACOBI (Hermann) : Ed. by JINA VIJAYA MUNI ; Studies in Jainism, p. 83.
40. Ibid. p.84.
41. RANADE (R. D.) : A Constuctive Survey of Upanisadic Philosophy p. 138, (1926).
42. JAMES (William) : Principles of Psychology, Vol. I, p. 301.
43. Pancastikayasara, 33.
44. Ibid, 79.
45. The Republic : 611.
46. Timaeus: 41.
47. Gommatasara, p. 118.
48. WASHBURN (Miss) : The Animal Mind, Ch. V, (1936)
49. na jivo mriyate.
50. PRINGLE-PATTISON (A.Seth) : Idea of God, 2nd Ed., Ch. XX, p. 391.
CRITIQUE OF KNOWLEDGE:
The Jaina attitude as empiricist and realistic concept of mind -- mind as a quasi-sense organ -- the phases of mind. Dravya-manas and Bhava-manas -- instrumental nature of mind -- consciousness -- cetana – self-consciousness -- nature of knowledge -- sense and supersense experience -- nature of sense perception -- stages of sense perception -- supersense experience and Avadhi, Manah-paryaya and Kevala as supersense experiences -- some observations on the basis of modern researches in Parapsychology.
I. The Jaina attitude is empirical and realistic. The Upanisadic philosophers found the immutable reality behind the world of experience. Gautama, the Buddha, denounced everything as fleeting and full of sorrow. Mahavira stood on common sense and experience and found no contradiction between permanence and change. The Jaina philosophy is based on logic and experience. Moksa is the ultimate aim of life. It is realised by the three-fold path of right intuition, right knowledge and right conduct. Right knowledge is one of the major problems of Jaina philosophy. It is necessary to understand the Jaina theory of knowledge and experience for the proper understanding of Jaina thought. The Jaina epistemology is very complex and developed gradually in response to the demand of time.
The problem of mind eludes the grasp of philosophers and psychologists because it can be analyzed into both metaphysical and psychological problems. Metaphysically, it refers to mind as the principle of the universe standing in relation to the phenomenal world. This is the cosmic principle which is emphasized by the idealists as the primary principle. Psychologically, it is the individual mind, the individual's system of psychic states in relation to the world of sense. Philosophers could not make a distinction between the two aspects of the problem.
The Indian thinkers were groping to grasp the intangible, the ineffable and the immaterial. The distinction between mind and matter, the mental and the physical, was vague and unclear. In the pre-Upanisadic thought, the principle of Rta became the principle of order in the universe. It is the underlying dynamic force at the basis of the universe. "Even the Gods cannot transgress it." We see in the conception of Rta the development from the physical to the divine.2 It is by the force of Rta that human vrains function". Man knows by the divine force of the same immanent power which makes fire to burn and river to flow.  The interpretation of the famous Rgvedic hymn of creation. : 'nasad asin no sad asit tadanim" and again of "kamans tad agre samavartatadhi manaso retah prathamam yad asit. Sato bandhumasati niravindahrdi pratisya kavayo manisa" gives a description that for the first time there arose kama which ahad the preimeval germ of manas within it. Similarly the word krtu is shown to be the antecedent of the word manas or prjana. In Sat. Bra. 22.214.171.124. there is a statement that when a man wishes, "may I do that, may I have that," that is Krtu, when he attains it, that is Daksa. The same term later changed its meaning to manas and prajna.
The analysis of the Jaina theory of mind shows that there has been a conflict between the metaphysical and the psychological approaches to the problem. It is predominantly: realistic approach. The mind and its states are analyzed to the empirical level. The Jaina ideal is Moksa, freedom of the soul from the impurities to Karma. The purity and the divinity of the soul are the basic concepts of the Jaina philosophy, and mind had to be linked with the soul and interpreted in the metaphysical terms.
The function of mind, which is an inner organ, is knowing and thinking. Sthananga described it as samkalpa vyapdravati. Anuvamsika gives the citta vijnana as equivalent of the manas: "Citta manovijnanam iti paryayah." The Visesavasyakabhasya defines manas in terms of mental processes. It is taken in the substantive sense. The Nyayakosa defines manas in the sense of the inner organ which controls the mental functions.
It is difficult to define mind. If at all it is to be defined it is always in terms of its own processes. Even the psychologists of the present day find it difficult to give a definition of mind without reference to the mental processes. Older psychologists meant by mind something that expresses its-nature, powers and functions in the modes of individual experiences and of bodily activity. McDougall also says that we are bound to postulate that "something"; and "I do notthink", he writes, "that we can find a better word to denote something than the old fashioned word mind ." ' McDougall defines mind as an organized system of mental and purposive forces. Wundt says that mind is a pre-scientific concept. It covers the whole field of internal experience.
The Jainas did not merely postulate the existence of mind without any evidence. They found the evidence in theexperiences of the world. They also give the empirical proof for the operation of the mind. The contact of the sense organ with the soul alone does not give cognition in the relevant experiences because there is the absence of manas. Something else is necessary for the cognition, and that is the mind. Again, the mind has the functional connotation which speaks for its nature "Just as speech signifies the function of speaking, fire express the function of burning and the light shows the light." 
Orthodox schools of Hindu philosophy postulate the existence of mind as an internal sense organ. In the evidence of cognition the contact of the soul with the sense organs is not sufficient. We must posit the existence of a manas, some additional condition which brings them together. For in stance, a man may not hear a sound or see an object when the mind is pre-occupied. when the mind is elsewhere, as we read in the Upanisads. There is also the positive evidence in the
facts of memory and of experiences like pleasure and pain. As mind is not tangible, the proof of mind has always to be indirect, and not direct. McDougall infers the structure of the mind from its functions. He writes that we have to build up our description of the mind by gathering all possible facts of human experience and behavior, and by inferring from these the nature and structure of mind. He thus makes a distinction between the facts of mental activities and the facts of mental structure. It is comparable to the structure and the functions of the mechanical joy; and one who wishes to ascertain the nature of the machiner within it, can only watch its movement under various conditions . 
Mind is characterized by mental processes like doubting imagining, dreaming and expecting. It is also characterized by pleasure and pain and desires. 'These are the distinguishing marks of mind. The Nandisutra describes mind a that which grasps everything sarvartha-grahanam manah.. In the Tattvarthastitra, we are told that cognition of what is stated on authority, as in scriptures is the object of mind srutam anindrlyasya. In Maitrt Upanisad mind is described in its reflective aspect as source of all mental modifications. He sees by mind, by mind he hears, and by mind too, he experiences all that we call desire, will and belief, re-solution, irresolution. All this is but mind itself. In modern psychology also, Wundt says that mind will be the subject "to which we attribute all the separate facts of internal experience." Mind, in the popular thought, is no simply a subject in the logical sense, but a substance in real being, and the various activities of the mind are its expressions or notions. But this involves, he says, some metaphysical presuppositions. For him, mind is a logical concept of internal experience. The Abhidhanarajendra mention that the word manas has a functional significance, because it describes the functions of the mind like thinking, imagining, and expecting. And from this functional significance of the mind the structure of the mind is inferred. The Jaina thinkers make a distinction between two phases of the mind dravya manas and bhava manas (manah dvividham dravya-manah bhava.manas ca). In the Visesavasyakabhasya, we get a description of the two phases of the manas. The material mind, which may be called the mental structure, is composed of infinite, fine and coherent particles of matter meant for the function of mind dravyatah dravyamanah. It is further described as a collection of fine particles which are meant for exciting thought processes due to the yoga arising out of the contact of the jiva with the body. in the Gommatasara: Jiva-kanda also there is a description of the material mind as produced in the heart from the coming of mind molecules like a full blown lotus with eight petals.
Such a description of mind as dravya manas and bhava manas,
the structural and the psychical aspect, can be compared to the description of mind given by some modern philosophers. C. D. Broad, in his Mind and its Place in Nature presents a similar view. It is a modification of the instrumental theory according to which mind is a substance that is existentialy independent of the body. For Broad, mind is composed of two factors neither of which is and for itself has the property of mind, but which when combined exhibits mental properties. The factors are the bodily and the psychic factors. It is comparable to a chemical compound like NaCI and H2O in which the individual components lose their individual identity when composed of living body possessed of i) the nervous system and something else and ii) the psychic factor, which possesses some feeling like mental. The bodily factor is described as "the living brain and the nervous system". About the psychic factor Broad seems to be vague. neither mental characteristic normental events seem to belong to it. It is likely to be sentience only. However, the psychic factor must be capable of persisting for a period at least after the death of the body and it must be capable, when separated from the body, of carrying 'traces' of experience which happen to the mind a which it was formerly a constituent. In other words, it must comprise the 'mnemic mass'. Broad's view comes nearer to, the Buddhist vinnana rather to the Jaina view of bhava manas corresponds with all the psychic factors in the Buddhist view, vinnana has a more permanent nature. In the Digha-Nikaya it is mentioned that after death the body is dissolved, mind ceases but vinnana, the coefficient of the desire to enjoy, clings to produce its effects in some other embryo waking elsewhere. With this difference of the psychic factor, the Jaina distinction between the dravya manas and the bhava manas corresponds with Broad's theory of the composition of mind. I speaking of the mental structure, McDougall has likened it to the structure of a machine. However, McDougall also warns us that it should not be taken in the sense of material structure or arrangement of parts. He likens it more to the composition of a poem of music. "The structure of the mind is a conceptual system that we have to build up by inference from the date of the two orders, facts of behavior and the facts of introspection."  The same can be said of the composition of the manas.
Each Jiva has its own mind, although the Internal nature of mind is one: mano laksanatvena sarvamanasam ekatvat" because the essential nature of mind is the expression of the mental stales. In the Sthananga we read, ege jivanam mane." In this way and according to the situation, the Gods, men and Asuras have each his own mind. In the Tattvarthasutra, the classification of the souls, five sensed organisms with minds is mentioned : sanjninah samanaskah . In the five-sensed organisms only some possess minds. Comparative psychologists
like Kohler and Alverdes have shown that mind in the developed form is possible in the case o higher animal having insight. Naiyayikas also believe that each organism possesses a mind and sensitive organs in order that it may be in a position to cognize the objects and to experience self has one mind, because a single mind of atomic magnitude cannot be shared by all. This mind in each self can function only inside the organism with which the self is connected. If there was one common mind for all, there would be simultaneity of cognition. A similar argument was presented by the Jaina thinkers in favor of the Jiva being bhavamanorupa. If the Jiva was sarvagata, there would be cognition of everything by everyone. Their arguments were metaphysical and epistemological than psychological. But modern psychology as analyzed the same problem from the psychological point of view. McDougall writes, "It seems probable that mind has the same nature wherever and whenever it exists or manifests itself, whether in animals, men or superhuman beings, whether in the new-born infant, the fool other wise man. On the other hand, the structure of the mind seems to be peculiar to each individual;" not only is it different in the various species of animals (if they have minds) and in man; but eh structure of the mind of one man at each stage of his career of life-history, it is not quite the same as at any other stage. 
The ancient Indian philosophers were faced with problems concerning the insumental nature of the mind. It was generally believed that, like other sense organs, mind was also a sense organ, and the instrument of the soul. In the Upanisads we find references to the mind as one of the organs along with he other sense and motor organs (jnanendriyas and karmendriyas) Prasna Upanisad mentions manas as a central organ. Reference to the manas as the driver of the ten organs in the Maitri Upanisad may also be noted. Orthodox Hindu philosophy accepts mind as the internal organ. Similarly, Vidyanandi maintains that buddhi and ahamkara cannot be regarded as sense organs. The Nyaya-Vaisesika philosophers who make buddhi, ahamkara and manas together to constitute the internal organ anthakarana. But Jayanta believes that mind is an internal organ. Similarly, Vidyanandi maintains that buddhi and ahamkara cannot be regarded as sense organs. The Nyaya-Vaisesika philosophers regarded min as the internal organ. But Gautama did not include it in the list of the sense organs. Kanada is also silent. Vatsyayana includes manas under the senses. He calls it the inner sense by which we apprehend the inner states by the instrument of the manas. Vatsyayana believes that mind is as good a sense organ as the eye and the like, though there are certain differences. But the Jainas believed that the minds is a no-indriya in the sense that it is different from the five sense organs. Its sense contents and functions are not entirely identical with those of indriyas. The prefix no here does not mean not, but is at times rendered as isad. it is a quasi sense organ.
Still they accept the instumental function of the mind. In the Gommatasara: Jivakanda, we get a description of mind as the no-indriya. It is though the mind that mental knowledge and mental activity arise. But in the case of the mind there is no external minifestation as in the case of the other sense organs. The function of mind is assimilative. The Pramanamimansa describes mind as the thing which grasps everything. In the vrtti of the same it is said, "mano'nindriyam iti no indriyam iti ca ucyate''. In the Tattvarthasutra, the function of mind, which is anzndriya, is described as the sruta cognition. The second function is the mati and its modifications. It is called the organ of apprehension of all objects because all sense experiences are apprehended by the mind. The Jainas accepted the instrumental nature (karanatva) of the mind. But it is said that the karana is of two types bafiya karana and antafikarana, and even the dravya manas is described as the antahkaraba, the internal organ. Being the internal organ, it is different from the other sense organs. However, such a description of mind need not be interpeted in the sense that, according to the Jaina view, mind is not a sense organ; in fact, it is more than a sense organ. Its function is not specific like that of the other sense organs. It is sarvartha-grahanam, as it is stated in the Pramanamimamsa.
II. In the Dravyasamgraha, Nemicandra says that soul in its pure form has the quality of consciousness. Brahma-deva, in his commentary, writes that from the ultimate point of view, Jiva is distinguished by its quality of consciousness. It is the most direct and nearest reality of which any one who has introspected is most immediately aware.
Consciousness has been the most important of discussion for philosophers, psychologists as well as scientists. Attempts have been made to solve the problem from various angles. In the Aitareya Aranyaka, an effort is made to understand the different stages of the development of consciousness in the universe. In the evolution of herbs, trees and all that is animal, the dtman is gradually developing. In the herbs, only sap is seen; in the animated beings, citta is seen, in man, there is gradual development of atman, for he is now endowed with prajna. Similarly, in the Chandogyopanisad, Prajapati describes the progressive identification of atman with body consciousness. The psycho-physiological method is adopted in the Taittiriya.  Finally, the atman as Jnanamaya and anandamaya is emphasized. The Jaina classification of the Jivas places the problem of the evolution of consciousness on a scientific basis. Jivas have been classified into one, two, three, four and five-sensed according to the number of the sense organs possesed by them. Jivas possessing the five senses are divided into those having mind and those without mind. It is now realized that the rise of consciousness is late in the evolution of life from physical evolution to the evolution of life, mind and
Cetana as a fundamental quality of the soul is pure consciousness, a kind of flame without smoke. This consciousness is eternal although it gets manifested in the course of the evolutionary process of life in the empirical sense. This empirical consciousness arises from the contact of the sense organs with the objects. Cetana in its pure form gets embodied with the Atrnan and comes into contact with the empirical life, with the sense organs and objects. It manifests itself in the form of jnana and darsana. Jnana and Darsana are, therefore, aspects of cetana and cetana is the spring-board from which they arise. It is like the flood of light in which objects are illuminated. It is the psychic background and the psychic halo of cognition in its two aspects, jnana and darsana. Cetana, therefore, is the light of consciousness that the soul possesses and through this light the cognition of objects arises.
The anaiysis of the states of consciousness has been important problem for philosophers as well as the psychologists. Consciousness has three aspects the cognitive, the effective and the conative. They are modes of consciousness In perceiving, believing or otherwise apprehending that such and such a thing exists and has characteristics, one's attitude is cognitive. In the effective attitude one is either please or displeased about it. But one is also active about it, tries to know more about it, and tries to alter it in some respect. This attitude is conative. But Stout says that though these three modes of consciousness are abstractly and analytically distinct phases in a concrete psychosis, they are not separable. They do not occur in isolation from each other. Mind is an organic unity and its activities have the closest degree of organic inter action. However, in every psychosis one of the aspects may be predominant. In the pleasure of pursuit, feeling presupposes conation. Sometimes, feeling is dependent on certain conative attitudes involved in the Ferceptual process. Similar reciprocity is found in conation and cognition .
Indian thinkers were aware of the distinction of states in consciousness. The Jainas recognize three forms of consciousness. They make a distinction between consciousness as knowing, as feeling and as experiencing the fruits of Karma (karma-phala-cetana), and willing. Conation and feeling are closely allied. As a rule we have first feeling, next conation and then knowledge. McDougall has emphasized that feeling is the core of all instinctive activity. In fact, in all experience there is a core of feeling, while the cognitive and conative aspects are varying factors. In the Aitareya Upanisad there is mention of different modes of experience. Sensation, perception and ideation are different modes of intellection. It recognizes feeling and volition as the other two forms of experience. The seers of Upanisads
give a classification of seven mental functions. At the basii is intellection. The Chandogyopanisad emphasizes the primacy of the will. The Buddhists also recognized such a distinction. We have perception and conception, feeling and affection, and conation or will. In the Buddhist theory, will is the most dominant aspect of conscious experience, the basal element of human life. RADHAKRISHNAN in his lndian Philosophy suggests that vijnana, vedana and samskdra roughly correspond to knowledge, feeling and will. Childers in his dictionary brings the concept of conation under samskara. Mrs. Rhys Davids believes that, although there is no clear distinction between conation in the psychological sense and will in the ethical sense, still in the Pitakas there is consistent discrimination between psychological importance and ethical implication. Professor Stout has given up old tripartite classification of mental states and reverts to the ancient bipartite analysis of mind bringing the effective and conative elements together under the name of interest. RADHAKRISHNANsays that, if we discard the separation of cognition and make it the theoretical aspect of conation, we get to the Buddhist emphasis on conation as the central fact of mental life.
In the Nyaya-Vaisesika theory also there is a description of the manifestation of the three aspects of self as knowledge, desire and volition. We have to know a thing before we feel the want of it. In order to satisfy the want, we act. Thus, as HIRNANNA says, feeling mediates between cognition and conation. Thus, the modes of consciousness have been the problem of philosophers and psychologists. There is a general agreement regarding the division of consciousness into three modes, although different philosophers have emphasized different aspects in the concrete psychosis. Buddhists have emphasized conation. In the Upanisads all the aspects have received their due prominence, The primacy of the intellect is emphasized in the Chandogya and Maitri Upanzsads. In the Chdndogya, again, we get a description of the primacy of the will. But this has reference to the cosmic will rather than to its psychological aspect. The Jainas emphasize the close relation between conation and feeling. The Nyaya theory describes the function of feeling as a mediating factor between cognition and conation.
III. Self-consciousness: The term self-consciousness is very ambiguous. It may mean consciousness of the self as an object given in introspection. In this sense, the self, the empirical ego, becomes both an aspect of experience an also an object of experience. Self-consciousness may mean transcendental and pure self consciousness. It is not a object of knowledge. It is the ultimate subject presupposed in acts of knowledge. Again, consciousness may mean the ultimate eternal consciousness, which is a metaphysical concept. It is also used in the empirical sense as consciousness which is changing-' Some of the earlier philosophers
have not made a clear distinction between the metaphysical and the psychological sense of consciousness. In the Upanisads, the atman is described as the basis and the ultimate presupposltion in all knowledge. It is the absolute knower, and how can the knower itself be known? It cannot be comprehended by intellect. It is the serr and the knower. Yet, the atman can be known by higher intutition. It is knowable as the pratyagatmanam apprehended by adjyatmayoga. The Buddhists recognize the distinction between subject and object within the consciousness. They do not believe in the transcendental self. Their view of consciousness is like the stream of consciousness of William James. Yogacaras believe that self is a series of cognition or ideas. There is no self apart from cognition. They reveal neither the self nor the non-self.
Some Nyaya philosophers, specially the Neonaiyayikas, believed that the self is an object of internal perception manasapratyaksa. The Vaisesikas also maintain that, although the self is not an object of perception but of inference, it can be apprehended by Yogic intuition. The Samkhya philosophers maintain that consciousness is the essence of self. It is self-intuition. Self is inferred through its reflection in buddhi. But Patanjali accepts the supernormal intuition of the self through the power of concentration. The self can know itself through its reflection in its pure sattva and also -when mixed with rajas and tamas by supernormal intuition (Pratibha-jnana). So, the pure self can know the empirical self, but the empirical self cannot know the pure self. There is the contradiction involved in the self being both subject and object and the reflection theory does not much improve the situation. Vacaspati tries to avoid the contradiction by saying that transcendental self is the subject, and the empirical self the object, of self-apprehension.
According to Prabhakara, self is necessarily known in every act of cognition. Cognition is self-luminous. It not only manifests itself, but also supports the atmana much as the flame and the wick Neither the self nor the object is selfluminous. There can be conciseness of an object without the conciseness of the self. In every act of cognition there is a direct and immediate apprehension of the self. But the self can never be known as object of knowledge. It is only to be known as a subject. It is revealed by triputa samvit.
The Jaina holds with Prabhakara that cognition is always apprehended by the self. Cognition reveals itself, the self and its object. Every act of cognition cognizes itself, the cognizing subject and the cognized object. But the Jaina denies that consciousness alone is self-luminous. He regards self as non-luminous. Self is the subject of internal peception. When I feel that I am happy I have a distinct and immediate apprehension of the self as an object of internal
perception, just as pleasure can be perceived though it is without form.. "Oh Gautama, said Mahavira, "The self is pratyaksa even to you. The soul is cogninable even to you".  Again, unlike the view of Prabhakara, the Jainas hold that it is the object of perception, and it is manifested by external and internal perception. To the question 'how can the subject be an object of perception ?', the Jaina replies that whatever is experienced is an object of perception.
William James made a distinction between the empirical self, the me, and the transcendental self the I. The self is partly the known and partly the knower, partly object and partly subject. The empirical ego is the self as known, the pure ego is the knower. "It is that which at any moment is conscious" Whereas the me is only one of the things which it is conscious of. But this thinker is not a passing state It is something deeper and less mutable. Prof. Ward holds that the pure self is always immanent inexperience, in the sense that experience without the experient will be unintelligible. It is also transcendental, in the sense that it can never be the object of our experience. The Jainas were aware that consciousness of self is not possible by ordinary cognition. Therefore, they said, it is due to internal perception.
Self-consciousness does not belong to the realm of pure con-sciousness which is foundational and without limitation. That is the cetana which is the essential quality of the soul. But when we descend to the practical levels the realm of vyavahara, we find the distinction between subject and object in consciousness. The question whether the self is perceived by direct experience like the internal perception of the Jainas, or by the immediate intuition, (pratibha jnana) of the Vedantins, is raised as a consequence of this distinction. In all this, the question is answered from the empirical point of view. On this basis. we may say that there are two aspects of consciousness: a) pure and transcendental consciousness, and b) ernpirical consciousness. Atman is pure consciousness. Jiva is consciousness limited by the organism. Atman is the subject of consciousness. It is also the object of internal perceptions but only in the sense that it is immanent in consciousness though not clearly cognized as object. Jiva is both the subject and the object of consciousness, because it is the cognizer as well as the cognized.
IV. The Atama theory of knowledge is very old and probably originated in the pre-Mahav1ra period. The Jnana pravada formed a pair of the Parvasruta which formed a part of the ancient literature. Jinabhadra, in his Visesavasyakabhasya, quotes a Purva Gatha on jndna. There seems to have been no difference of opinion between the followers of Parsva and Mahavira regarding the division of knowledge. Both of them accept the five-fold distinction of knowledge. The Agan as have also presented the five divisions of knowledge.
Knowledge is inherent in the soul, but owing to perversity of -attitude arising out of the veil of Karman, we may get wrong knowledge, ajnana. Knowledge is perfect when the veil of Karmans totally removed. It is imperfect even when there is partial subsidence or destruction of Karman. The soul can get perfect knowledge directly when the veil of Karma is removed. That is Pratyaksa jnana. But eirlpirical knowledge, experience of this world. is possible with the help of the sense organs indirectly. Such knowledge was called paroksa jnana. Matijnana (sense experience), and Srutajnana (knowledge due to verbal communication), are paroka jnana; while Avadhi (extra sensory perception) Manahpai-yaya (telepathy), and Kevalajnana (omniscience), here called pratyaksa. But later, in
order to bring the Jaina theory of knowledge in line with the theories of other systems o£ Indian thought, they modified their Conception of Pratyakasa and Parolisa Jnana. In the Anuyogadvara Sutra, we find a change in terminology. Mati and Sruta began to be called pratyaksa as they were possible through the operation of the sense organs. Jinabhadra calls the two sarnvyavahara pratyaksa. Alongside of Jaina, we have direct intuition of the object. It is Darcana. Darsana has similar subdivisions. The general classification of knowledge and intuition mentioning their perversities, is shown in Table I on next page. The subsidence and destruction of the veil of Karman is a necessary condition of knowledge and intuition. Wrong knowledge is characterized as samsaya (doubt), viparyaya (perversity), and anadhya. vasaya (wrong knowledge caused by carelessness and indifference). Owing to the lack of discrimination between the real and the unreal, the soul with wrong knowledge, like the lunatic, knows things according to its own urhirns. Perversity of attitude veils the faculty of perception and knowledge, and knowledge becomes vitiated. It becomes ajnana.
Pratayaksa : We may now consider sense perception or pratyaksa jnana, as the Nandisutra 4-5 calls it. It is knowledge obtained through the operation of the sense organs and the manas. Hemacandra describes in the Pramanamimamsa that pratyaksa is that which is immediate, clear and unambiguous. He analyses the various definitions of pratyaksa of other schools and shows that they are not adequate. The Naiyayika definition of perception as unerring cognition which is produced by the sense object contact and the like, he asks, which is not of the nature of cognition, function as efficient instrument for the determination of the object? The Buddhists have given a definition of perceptual cognition as that which is free from conceptual construction and is not erroneous. But Hemacandra says that this definition is irrational since it has no bearing on practical activity. It has no pragmatic value. Jaimini defines perception as that which is engendered
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| Samarana Pratyabhijna Tarka Anumana Agama
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Samvyaaharika Paramarthika Svartha Parartha
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Indrya Anindryar Sakala Vikala
nibhandana nibandhana | ______|__________________
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Avagrah | | | Avadhi Manahparyaya
Iha Avaya Dharana
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Avadhi Manahaparaya Kevala Mati Sruta
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Jnana Ajnana Jnana Ajnana jnana Ajnana
(Vibhangavadhi) (kumati) (kushutra)
in the mind of a person upon the actual contact of the sense organ with the object. This definition is also too wide, since it overlaps such cognition, as doubt; and illusions also occur as a result of sense contact. The older exponents of the Samkhya school define perceptual cognition to be modification of the sense organs such as the organ of hearing. But sense organs are devoid of consciousness, therefore, their modifications cannot be conscious.
If, on the other hand, it is assumed to derive its conscient character from its association with a conscious principle like the self, then the status of the organ of knowledge should be accorded to the self. Therefore, Hemacandra said perceptual cognition is immediate and lucid. In Platos, dialogue, Theaetetus, Socrates said that, `if knowledge and perception are the same, it leads to an impossibilty, because a man who has come to know a thing and still remembers it does not know it, since he does not see it and that would be a monstrous conclusion. In the Nandisutra a distinction is made between indriya-pratyaksa and anindriya-pratyaksa. Indriya-pratyaksa is cognition which is immediate and direct and arises out of the operation of he five sense organs. There are, therefore, five types of sense perveption-the visual, aditory, tactual, olfactory and gustatory. The experience that does not need the sense organs and is immediate may be called extra-sensory perception. It is also pratyaksa, because it is immediate and direct. It is of three types avadhi, manah-parydya and kevala-pratyaksa. The old Jaina thinkers thought that knowledge born with the help of the five senses as well as the manas may be called matijiana. But in indriya-pratyaksa they included knowledge born of the five sense organs, as the mind is not for them exactly a sense organ. It is a quasi-sense organ. Umasvati defines matijnana as knowledge caused by the senses and mind, since mind is a quasi-sense, no-indriya. The commentator Siddhasenaganin mentions three types of mati: (i) knowledge born of the sense organs, (ii) knowledge born of the mind, and (iii) knowledge due to the joint activity of the sense organs and mind. However, from the Bhasya of the Tattvarthasutra the find that Matijnana can be distinguished into different types, as (i) knowledge due to sense organs, little sense perception; (ii) knowledge due to the mind only. like cinta; (iii) knowledge due to the joint activity of the mind and the senses. Memory and recognition can be included in Matijnana. Sense perception (indriya-pratyaksa), as a species of Matijnana is of five types based on the nature and function of the five sense organs. The five senses possess he capacity of sense experience because the Cognition of the stimulation must be conditioned by the relevant instruments. The Jaina analysis of sense perception has a great psychological significance, although perception was a logical and metaphysical problem for the Jainas as for other Indian philosophers. In fact, even in the West, philosophers were first busy with the logical and the metaphysical analysis of the problem of perception, but with the advancement of psychology as a science may have realized that perception is more a problem for psychology. Bertrand Russell says that, 'the problem of perception has troubled philosophers from a very early date. My own belief is that the problem is scientific, not philosophical, or, rather, no longer philosophical. 
The contact of the sense organs with the object is a condition of perception as mentioned by the Naiyayikas, although, according to the Jainas, such a contact is not necessary in The case of visual experience. Helracandra said that objects and light are not conditions of experience, because of lack of coordinance between the two.But it is not denied that they are remote conditions, like time and space, which subserve the subsidence and destruction of the knowledge obscuring Karmas. They are in directly useful to the visual organs,
like collyrium. Perception of a particular object is, in fact, according to the Jainas. due to the destruction and subsidence of the relevant knowledge-obscuring Karmas, Jnanavaranya Karma. This implies a psychological factor. An appropriate physical condition in the destruction and subsidence of knowledge-obscuring Karma is a necessary factor of the perceptual experience. It also depends on the competency of the appropriate psychical factor. The psychic factor of selective attention is needed before we get the sense experience. This is possible when all psychic impediments are partially or wholly removed through the destruction and subsidence of knowledge-obscuring Karma. Such a psychic factor may be described as a mental set which is necessary for the perceptllal experience. Emphasis on the mental factor in perception has been mentioned in the Upanisad also. In Western thought Aristotle was clearly a-vvare that perception is not possible merely through the sense organs. For him, perception consists in being moved and affected. Sense perception does not arise from the senses themselves, as organs of sense perception are potentially and not actually. Locke writes that, whatever alterations are made in the body, if they reach not the mind whatever impressions are made in the outward part, if they are not taken notice of within, there is no perception. For we may: burn our body with no other effect than it does a billet unless the motion be continued to the brain; and there the sense of hurt or idea of pain be produced in the mind, wherein consists actual perception. In modern psychology, Prof. Woodworth gives formula 'W-S-O-R-W' for explaining the fascinating problem of how an individual perceives an objective fact. At any given moment a man is set for the present situation. He might be listening to a low hum just as a smooth tone. But if he tries to make out what the sound can be, he is more likely to perceive it as the hum of an aeroplane.
According to the Jainas, sense perception can be analyzed into four stages as (i) avagraha, (ii) that (iii) avdya, and (iv) dharana . These stages of sense experience arise through the operation of the sense organs and the mind. The earlier forms like Avagraha, develop into the subsequent forms, and all of them partake of the same essential nature. Avagraha refers to the first simple and primitive stage of experience. This may be said to be merely the stage o£ sensation. Next comes Iha. In this stage there is a mental element, and it refers to the integrative factors of the mind. In the third stage, we get a clear and decisive cognition of the object. This is Avaya. It implies the presence of the inferential element in perception. Dharana is retention of what is already experienced in the perceptual cognition. In fact, it is not actually a stage of perceptlial experience although it is included in perceptual experience.
Psychologists point out that perception is not a simple process nor is it merely the sensedatum. It consists in the organization and interpretation of sensations. It is 'knowledge about' and not merely 'knowledge of acquaintance', as William James said. Perception involves certain psychological factors like association, discrimination, integration, assimilation and recognition. Perception also involves inference. We perceive a table, and when are perceive
the object as a table, we recognize it and we get a defined picture of the object. As Angell said, perception is a synthetic process, and the combination of the new and the old is an essential part of the synthesis. This process of combining has often called. by early psychologists, 'apperception'. This problem will be referred to later. Structural psychologists like Wundt and Titchner analyzed perception into sensations. They said that perceptions combine and fuse together a number of sensory elements as in the process of forming H2O. It is not merely a sum of sensations. It gives a new psychological product, a creative synthesis, Like the mental chemistry of J. S. MILL. Later, the Gestalt psychologists gave a new turn to the psychology of perception. They hold that every perceptual experience is an unanalyzed whole; it has a quality of its own. The Jainas were concerned with giving a logical and episteirological analysis of the perceptual experience-There-fore, they were more interested in giving the conditions and the stages of knowledge. Their analysis was more on the basis of logic, of coirlmon sense and on insight; and yet, the stages of perception mentiorled by the Jaina philosophers very much Correspond to the analysis of perception, given by the traditional psychology and the structuralist
Avagraha-Sensation: Avagraha is the first stage of sense experience. It may be said to be analogous to sensation. It is the level of sensation in which perceptual experience can be analyzed. Umasvatl defines avagraha as implicit awareness of the object of sense. He says that grahana (graspmg), dlocana (holding). and avadharana (prehending), are synonyms of avagraha. It Is indeterminate. The object presented through sense stimulation is cognized in an undefined and indeterminate way. In this stage, we are merely aware of the presence of the object without any association, without cognizing the specific features. and in fact without even being aware of its association and name. In the Avasyaka-Niryukti, Avagraha has been defined as awareness of the sense data. Jinabhadra insists that Avagraha is indeterminate in its character. He is not prepared to consider that it has reference to any specific features of the object, because even relative reference is enough to promote the experience to the stage of Avaya.
Sensations, as William James said, are the first things in Consciousness. This does not mean that all our experience is only fusing and compounding of sensations. Our experience can be analyzed into sensations, and these form the elements of our sensory experience. As Stout says, sensations are of the nature of immediate experience, like the experience of cold : and warm, a specific tinge of pair, or a touch located in the body or at the surface of the body. The term Sensation is also extended to cover the visual data, sound, taste, and smell which may enter into immediate experience. Sensations vary not only with the variations in the presented objects but also in accordance with the state of the individual. During the period of two hundred years between the publication of Lockes Essay and of James's Principles, two further characteristics, new largely of antiquarian interest, were gradually attributed to sensation. Sensations were held to be the simple elements of which complex ideas are formed, as well as the matter or crude stuff out of
which the associative machinery fashions the organized and meaningful world of everyday experience.
Avagraha has been further distinguished into two stages: i) vyanjanavagraha and ii) arthavagraha. Vyanjanavagraha is the earlier stage. It is a physiological stimlulus condition of the sensation of the immediate experience . In the Visesavasyaka Bhasya we get a description of Vyanjanavagraha. There it is said that what reveals an object, as a lamp reveals a jar, is Vyanjanavagraha. It is, only the relation of the sense organ and the object in the form of sense stimulation such as sound. In the Nandisutra. we get an example of the earthen pot and drops of water, mallaka-drstanta. It gives a description of the state of Vyanjanavagraha. A clay pot is to be filled with water. In the beginning, when a person pours out one drop of water, it is absorbed and there is no sign of existence of water. He goes on pouring drops of water and at a certain stage a drop of water will be visible. Then the water begins to accu-mulate. We may call this stage when the water becomes visible the 'threshold of saturation'. The drops of water below the threshold are all absorbed, similarly, a person who is asleep receives sound stimulation successively for some time. The sound atoms reach the ears. InnurnerabJe instances have to occur before the ears become full of sound atoms. At a particular stage, the person becomes conscious of the sound. So far he was not aware of the sound although the auditory stimulation was pouring in. We may call this stage of first awareness 'the threshold of awareness'. The sensation of sound starts the moment the threshold is crossed and the become aware of the sound. That is the immediate experience of sound, arthavagraha. So far there was no awareness of the sound although the conditions of stimulation for such awareness were operating below the threshold. ' The stimulus was pouring in constantly although no awareness of sound was possible up to a particular stage. Such a preparator; stage of sensation presents physiological and stimulus conditions for the sensational stage. It is indeterminate and undefined. Vyanjanavagrah has been just described as implicit awareness, the physiological and stimulus condition of awareness. It gradually develops into awareness and gives the sensation. It is very often described as 'contact awareness'. However, it would not be appropriate to call this 'awareness' although there is the stimulation flowing in. Awareness gradually emerges later, through he accumulation of stimulation. It is merely potentiality of awareness, or implicit awareness.
As soon as a person becomes conscious, the stage of vyanjana vagraha is over, and it transforms itself into arthavagraha. This maybe called the stage of sensation proper. It is awareness of the object. In the Nandisutra there is a statement that, in this stage, we are aware of the sound as 'this is sound or 'colour' or 'touch, but not exactly cognize the nature of the sound, colour or touch. But in the Visesavasyakabhasya, this kind of determinate awareness, as 'this is sound' is denied in the stage of sensation. It is merely awareness of the occurrence of the cognition because-it lasts only for one moment. It is, therefore, indeterminate and indefinite. It does not reach the stage of cognition of specific content.
On the basis of such a distinction regarding the two stages of Avagraha. it is stated that VyanJanavagraha lasts for indefinite moments, gradually proceeding towards the level of consciousness. The physiological and stimulus conditions of awareness in the form of sensation continue to accumulate for a number of moments till the threshold of awareness is reached. But once the stage of awareness in the form of sensation is reached. it lasts only for an instant. Which is an indivisible point of time and is infinitesimal.
Western psychologists, like Stout. describe sensations as something of the nature of immediately experienced warm or cold, a specific tinge of pain. touch located in or at the surface of the body rather than anything outside. Psychologists have extended the term to cover the visual data. the sounds and the smells that may enter into immediate experience. Stout further says that all recognition of sensation as of a certain kind. and all apprehension of it as continuing to be of the same nature or as changing in nature at different moments. involves a reference beyond this experience. For, sensation is immediate experience and nothing more. At any one moment there is no other immediate experience except just the experience itself at the moment.1 Sensations are genuine and factual. While mental constructs are spurious and artificial. Sensations are new-uncontaminated and untouched by those mental processes which render ideas suspect. They are not structured by perception, dimmed and blurred through detention. Abridged through forgetting or artificially anranged as a result of fortuitous associations. From Hume to Russell modern empiricism has tended to regard the inchoate beginnings of knowledge in unformed sensation as more authentic than the cognitive refinement which recent enquiry provides.
Iha: Cognition of objects in empirical experience is not com-plete with the mere awareness at the sensational stage. In fact, pure sensations are not possible. As Stout says, we have hardly any pure sensations. Sensations absolutely devoid of meaning, either original or acquired. except perhaps in the case of children. Sensations transcend the immediate experience because they are inseparably connected with thought. They have a reference to external objects. They mean something beyond themselves.
In this sense, our empirical experience will not be complete with avagraka. Avagraha is not self-subsistent. It involves meaning and it has reference to object. It brings in 'iha', a factor involving meaning. The next stage in the experience. then, is 'iha.' In avagraha a person simply hears a sound In Iha 'he cognises the nature of the sound also.  Jinabhadra says that Iha is enquiry for the distinctive features of the object  Akalalika defines Iha similarly.84. Hemacandra defines it as striving, for the cognition of the specific details of the object apprehended by sensation. It would be apter to use 'associative integration' as standing for Iha. And Iha is the stage in the formation of perceptual experience. It brings in associative integration of sensory element experienced in the stage of sensation.
Avaya: From the stage of associative integration, Iha, we come to the
stage of interpretation. Sensations are interpreted and a meaning assigned to the sensation. That would be perce-ption. Sensation is the first impression of something the meaning of which is not cognised. Perception is the interpretation of the sensation in which the meaning is known. Avaya follows in that wake of Iha. In this stage we reach a determinate experience. The striving for a cognition of the specific nature of the object results in the definite perception of the object The avasyaraniryukti defines avaaya as determinate cognition.5 In the Sarvartha siddhi we get the description of avaya as the cognition of the true nature of the object due to the cognition of the particular charac-teristics. Trattvarthasutra Bhasya describes avaya as the stage of ascertainment of the right and exclusion of the wrong. Avaya may be compared to the apperception involved in perceptual experience. Perception is a complex experience. The older psychologists analyzed perception as involving apperception. Apperception is assimilating new experience to old experience.
Dharana: Retention, dharana, is the next stage in perceptual experience. The Nandisutra deines retention as the act of retaining a perceptual judgement for a number of instants or innumerable instants. According to Umasvati retelltion develops through three stages as i) the nature of the object is finally cognised, ii) the cognition so formed is retained, and iii) the object is recognized on future occasions,. The Avasyakaniryukti defines dhdrapa as retention. Jinabhadra says that retention is the absence of the lapse of perceptual cognition. Like Umlasvati he also mentions three stages of retention as i) the absence of the lapse of percephial judgement. ii) the formation of the mental traces and iii) the recollection of the cognition on the future occasions. In this decription the absence of the lapse. avicyuti, mental trace. vasana, and recollection smrti are three stages included in the conception of dharana.
Thus, some logicians make dhdrana a mere retention of perceptual experience; while some others would make it also a condition of recall of that experience at a future time. Hemacandra recalls his view of retention as the condition of recall with the view as the absence of retention of the lapse mentioned in the-Visesavasyaka Bhasya. He says that retention is the absence of the lapse of perception. But it is included in the perceptual judgement avaya. That is why it has not been separately mentioned by him. Avaya when it continues for Some length of time may be called retention as the absence of the lapse of experience. It may also be said that absence of the lapse is also a condition of recall in the sense in which he defines Dharana. Mere perception without the absence of the lapse gives rise to recollection. Perceptual judgements which are not attended by relective mental stage are almost on the level of unattended perception, like the touch of grass by a person in hurried motion. And such perceptions are not capable of giving rise to recollection.
Hemacandra's description of Avaya and his analysis of Dharana comes nearer to the psychological analysis or parception especially of the structuralist school. Perception is a concrete experience in which sensations are organized and interpreted Mesniring is assigned to sensations. Without the factor of meaning, interpretation of the sense
impressions perception would be impossible.
The Jainas have given an exhaustive description of the four stages of Avagraha, perceptual experience, so far discussed. Each of them is of six types as they arise due to the five sense organs and due to mind. Again. VyanJanavagraha is of four types only. Thus there would be twenty-eight forms of perceptual cognition. Each of the twenty-eight forms again is of twelve types according to the nature of the object they can have. Therefore the Jainas have mentioned that there are three hundred and thirty-six types of sense experience, namely Matijnana or Abhinibodhikajnana. This elaborate classification has no psychological significance. Although it has logical and mathematical interest. The Jaina logicians were fond of presenting elaborate mathematical calculations. This is found in their elaborate classification of Karma as given in the Gommata Sdra: Kartna Kdnda. Glasenapp in his 'Doctrine of Karma in Jainism' has given a detailed analysis of this division. The same tendency must have inspired the Jaina logicians to give such an elaborate classification of Avagraha.
V. SUPER-SENSE EXPERIENCE: The problem of super-sensible experience is not new in Indian Psychology. In the process of self-realization, man acquires certain experiences and powers which; are not possible for the common with the normal function of the sense organs. All systems of Indian philosophy. except the Carvakas and the Mimamsas, accept the possibility of such experiences. Sridhara argues that by the force of constant meditation on the self, akasa and other supersensible objects, we acquire knowledge of them, because the varying grades of consciousness must reach the limit beyond which it cannot go. Jayanta Bhatta showed that we can develop different degrees of perception leading to Yogic perception which sees all objects past. future, remote etc. He gives instances of cats which can see in darkness and the vultures from long distances. Yogis can see all objects, including the superserisible like dharma. Such is the nature of divine perception also with the difference that the divine perception is eternal, while the Yogic perception is acquired through the practice of meditation.
Prasastapada divides Yogic perception into i) yukta inecstatie condition; and ii) viyukta, of those who have fallen from the ecstatie state. In the state of ecstacy one can see ones own self, other selves, akdsa, time and atoms. Those who are not in ecstacy can see the supersensible and hidden objects through a peculiar contact of the self, manas, sense organs and the objects. Naiyyayikas divide Yogic perception into: i) perception of those who have attained the union with the supreme Being; and ii) those who acquire it with some Yogic efforts. The former have constant perception. Arsajnana as intuition of sages has also been recognized.
Vijnanabhiksu states that the Yogis can come into contact with distant objects by virtue of a power acquired through meditation. This peculiar power of the mind consists in its all pervasiveness. Through such powers under the influence of Dharmla, the Yogis can perceive objects in all times and places through the connection of the mind
In the Patanjala Yoga, mind is described as a continuous stream of functions flowing into five stages: i) ksipta, ii) mudha, iii) viksipta, occasionally steady iv) ekagra concentrated, and v) nirudha, withdrawn. In the fourth and the fifth stages mind is withdrawn from the objects and concentrated on one of the objects. In the fourth the mind gets the conscious ecstasy (samprajnata-samadhi) and in the last there is the supra-conscious state of ecstasy (asamprajnata-samadhi). The concentration proceeds from the gross objects to the subtler. In the different stages o£ samprajnata samadhti the Yogi acquires miraculous powers (siddhis) like clairvoyance, telepathy. understanding the language of animals, memory of past lives and a host of other powers. The Vedantins generally recognize two kinds of samddhi: sarn-prajfidta and asamprajnata while different distinctions have been made by the Yoga psychologists.
Among the Buddhists, Anuruddha divides consciousness into two levels: i) subliminal consciousness and ii) supraliminal consciousness, which is supernormal consciousness. The Yogi has to pass through three stages in the supraliminal consciousness : i) rupacitta, where he sees visible and material forms. Clairvoyance may be included in this form of experience. ii) arupacitta In this stage the Yogi sees things which are invisible and formless iii) In the final stage of lokottaracitta he reaches the stage of transcendental consciousness which is above the three world. This may be compared to omniscience, the bodhi. A monk has to go through the severe physical and mental discipline in order to pass through the different levels of consciousness. Concentration -of mind has to proceed through that of gross objects to highes level of concentration of the four noble truths In graded way.
According to the Jainas there are two levels of experience: pratyaksa which is pure experience of the soul without the help of the sense organs. Then, on the lower level, we have the empirical experience which is possible through the sense organs. It is no; really direct experience of the soul. It is paroksa indirect experience, as the sense organs are impediments in the direct experience of the pure soul. It is also called samvyavahara pratyaksa, empirical experience. When the veil of Karma is removed, the soul in its pure form gets direct experience without the help of sense-organs. These experiences are supersensuous experiences. They have been classified into: i) avadhi which is analogous to clairvoyance. ii) manahparyayatelepathy, and iii) kevala. omniscience.
AVADHI: Avadhi is a form of supersensible perception In this, we apprehend objects which are beyond the reach of the -sense organs. However we perceive things in Avadhi which have form and shape. Things without form like the soul and dharma can not be perceived by Avadhi. This can be compared with clair-voyance. Due to the varying degrees of he destruction and subsidence of the karmic veil. the individual 1 can perceive supersensible objects in different degrees. The highest type of Avadhi can perceive all objects having form. The Jainas interpret the capacity of perception in Avadhi in terms of space and time. They
have developed a technique of mathematical calculation of the subtleties of time and space. Regarding space Avsdhi can extend over a space occupied by innumerable pradesas of the size of the universe. With reference to time. it can perceive through innumerable points of time both past and future. Avadhi can perceive all the modes of the things according to the degree of intensity of perception. The lowest type of Avadhi can perceive an object occupying a very small fraction of space like the angula or finger-breadth. Regarding the capacity in terms of time. me-lowest type of Avadhi can last for only a short time like a second. It cannot extend beyond a second. Similarly it cannot know all the modes of the objects. It can only cognise a part of the modes. Thus Avadhi, which may be compared to clairvoyance, differs with different individuals according to the capacity of the persons perceiving. The capacity is, in turn, determined by the relative merits acquired by the persons.
Modern psychical research has carried perception beyond opaque wall. Precognition and fore-knowledge have been of great interest to parapsychology. Even Kant was greatly interested in ostensible clairvoyance by Swedenborg with reference to queen Lovisa in 1761 and the clairvolant cognition of the Stockholm fire.  In Indian society we get many instances of such forms of perception and dreams. A scientific study of such forms o£ perception is necessary.
The Jainas do not make Avadhi a form of super-normal rerception, because, beings living in hell, and even the lower animals, are capable of possessing Avadhi. Heavenly beings and beings in hell possess Avadhi naturally from birth. They are endowed with it from birth. It is bhava pratyaya in them. In the case of human beings as well as the five-sensed lower organisms Avadhi is possible due to the destruction and subsidence of the relevant veil of Karma. It is acquired by merit. It is called guna-pratyaya  The Visesavasyaka Bhasya gives a detailed description of Avadhi from the fourteen points of view and its varieties with reference to temporal and spatial extension. The Pancastikayasara divides Avadhi into three types with reference to spatial extension desdvadhi paramavadhi and sarvavadhi. The Nandi-Sutra gives six varieties of Avadhi that are possible in the case of homeless ascetics. It mentions subdivisions of these.
The psychic phenomena called 'French sensitiveness or some times called as 'psychometry' may be included as a form of Avadhi-although in the psychometry mind and the sense organs play their parts. C. D. Broad accepts that clairvoyance is non-sensuous perception. Clairvoyan experiences are facts. Eminent philosophers like Sidwick, Price and Broad have accepted that there are cases of such experiences.
MANAHPARYAYA: Next form of supernormal perception-which is manahparyaya. It is the direct experience of the modes of mind substance working in other individual mind. The Avasyaka Niryukti gives a brief description of the nature of Manahparyaya knowledge. Manahparaya cognises the objects of thought by the minds of other people.  The Visesavasyaka Bhasya states that a person possessing
Manahparyaya directly cognises the mental states of others without the instrumentality of the sense organs and the mind.
In Western thought such a form of cognition was called 'thought transferences'. Myers coined the phrase 'Telepathy' for describing such experience. Tyrrel gives many instances of Telepathic cognition. He also mentions instances of collective telepathy which he calls collective telepathic calculations. In the publication called 'apparitions' published by the Society for Psychical Research many interesting examples of telepathic cognition have been mentioned.
Manahparyaya, telepathic experience, is not easy to get and is not common for all. A certain physical and mental discipline is the condition for getting such capacity of intuition. In the Avasyaka Niryukti we are told that Manahparyaya is possible only for human beings of character, especially for homeless ascetics. Human beings acquire this capacity due to merit and by the practice of mental and moral discipline. The Nandt Suta gives detailed description of the conditions of the possibility of Manahparyaya in the case of human beings. The conditions for the possession of Manahparyaya are i) the human beings in the Karma-bhumi must have fully developed sense organs and a fully developed personality i.e., they must be parydpta. ii) They must possess right attitude, samyag drsti. As a consequence they must be free from passion. iii) they must be self-controlled and they must be possessed of radhi, extra ordinary powers the discipline and the occult powers attainable by the Yogis mentioned in the Patanjala Yoga is analogous to such a description of the qualifications of the human beings possessing Manahparyaya. Siddhasena Divakara says that lower organisms possessing two or more sense organs are also found to possess Manahparyaya. But the traditional Jaina view does not accept the possibility of Mahahparyaya in the case of lower animals. Rhine says that it possible to find instances of the possibility of such perceptions in the case of lower animals especially the higher vertebrates. Several experiments have been carried in this connection and several instances have been quoted.
The Sthananga recognizes two varieties of Manahparyaya as rjumati and vipulaati. Umasvati makes a similar distinction. He says that Rjumati is less pure and it sometimes falters. Vipulamati is purer and more lasting. It lasts up to the rise of omniscience. We also get such a description in the Pancastikdyasara. Rjumati gives a straight and direct intuition of the thoughts of others, while in Vipulamati the process of knowing the ideas of others is manifested in an irregular way. Pajyapada describes the nature of Manahparyaya as the intuitioner or objects of the activities of the sense organs of speech, body and mind. He says that Vipulamati knows less number of objects than Rajumati, but whatever it knows it knows perfectly and vividly. Vipulamati is more penetrating and it is more lucid than Rjumati. Rjumati falters. One who is at the upward stage of spiritual development has acquired Vipulamati while one who is sure to descend in the spiritual development gets the Rjumati Manahparyaya. 
In the West the phenomena of extra-sensory perception like
clairvoyance, telepathy, precognition and mediumship have been accepted as facts, even psychologists like McDougall are inclined to believe that extra-sensory perception like clairvoyance, telepathy and fore-knowledge seems in a fair way esablished. Prof. H.H. Price says that evidence for clairvoyance and telepathy is 'abundant and good'. Prof Richet admits that telepathic experiences certainly exist. Dr. Rhine has done good work in extra sensory perception. ~ says that extra-sensory perception in the form of clairvoyance and telepathy is an actual and demon strable occurrence It is not a sensory phenorrienon. 
KEVALA: According to the Jainas the soul, in its pure form is pure consciousness and knowledge. It is ominscient. But it is obscured by the karmas as the moon or the sun is liable to be obscured by the veil of dust, fog or a patch of cloud. When such a veil of karma is removed omniscience dawns. That is kevala jnana. That is a stage of perfect knowledge and a stage of kaivalya.
Omniscience intuits all substances with all their modes.. Nothing remains unknown in omniscience. It is knowledge of ali substances and modes of the past, present and the future,. all in one It is lasting and eternal. It is transcendentaI and pure. It is the perfect manifestation of the pure and the real nature of the soul, when the obstructive veils of Karma are removed. This omniscience is coexistent with the supreme state 'of absolute clarity of life monad'. This is precisely the release. No longer is the monad dimmled with the beclodding passions but open and free and unlimited by the particularizing qualities that constitute individuality'. The moment the limitation that makes particular experience possible is eliminated perfect intuition of every thing is attained. The need of the experience is dissolved in infinite this is the positive meaning of kaivalya. Zimmer says that one is reminded of the protest of the modern French poet and philosopher Paul Valery in his novel Mansieur Tests. 'There are people', he writes, who feel that the organs of sense are cutting them off from reality and essence ... knowledge. a cloud obscuring the essence of being; the shining moon, like darkness or a cataract on the eye ! Take it all away so that modern theory of knowledge from which it arises. is remarkably close to the old idea which Janism holds: that of the limiting force of our various faculties of human understanding.
Mimamsakas are not prepared to accept the possibility of the occurrence. The Mimamsakas raised a series of logical objections to the possibility of omniscience. According to the Mimamsakas omniscience cannot mean the knowledge of all the objects of the world either at the same time or successively. Nor can omniscience be knowledge of archetypal forms and not of particular things. There can be no omniscience because knowledge of the-past, the present and the future can never be exhausted. Moreover. if all objects were known in omniscience at one moment then the next moment it would be uncanscience and blank. The omniscience, gain, would be tainted by the desire and aversions o£ others in knowing them.
But Jainas refute the argument of the Mimamsakas regarding the problem
of the occurrence of omniscience. In the Pramna Mimamsa we get the refutation of the Mimamsa arguments against the occurrence of omniscience. Similarly Mimamsakas have been replied by Prabhacandra in Prameya-kamala-martanda. The Jainas say that it is not correct to deny the occurrence as the Mimamsakas do. Omniscience is the single intuition of the whole world because it does not depend upon the sense organs and the mind. The pure intuition of the omniscient self knows all the objects simultaneously by a single stroke of intuition since it transcends the limits of time and space. Prabhacandra says that the Mimamsaka objection that the omniscient soul would be unconscious the next moment of the occurrence of omniscience is not correct, because it is a single unending intuition. For the omniscience, cognition and the world are not destroyed the moment the omniscience is possible. Similarly. the Jainas contend, as against -the Mimamasakas, that the omniscient soul knows the past as existing in the past and future as existing in the future. The omniscient self is absolutely free from the bondage of physical existenceas past. present and future. In fact, the Mimamsakas also admit that in recognition we apprehend the past as well the present in one cognition, and a flash of intuition called pratibha jnana in enpirical life can apprehend future as future. It is therefore possible for the omniscient soul who is entirly free from the fetters of Karma to have a super-sensuous vision of the whole world, past, present and future by a single unending flash of intuition. In the Pramana Mzmamsa the possibility of the occurrence of omniscience is logically proved by the necessity of the final consummation of the progressive development of knowledge. There are degrees of excellence in knowledge and the knowledge must reach its consummation somewhere. That is the stage of omniscience when the obscuring Karmas are totally annihilated.
The Nandt Sutra mentions two types: i) Bhavastha. omniscience of the liberated who still live in this world as for instance the omniscience of the Tirtharnkaras. ii) Omniscience of the' one who is totally liberated which may be called Siddha. The Bhava-' sutha omniscience is again of two types as i) Sayogi and ii) Ayogi. There are subdivisions in both these. Similarly Siddha omniscience is of two types as i) Anantara-Levala and ii) Parampara-kevalas each having its subdivisions.
The Jaina view of omniscience may be compared to the Nyaya view of the divine knowledge, and the Yoga theory of divine perception. Divine knowledge is all-embracing intuition. It is perceptual in character as it is direct and as it is not derived through the instrumentality of any other cognition. The divine perception grasps the past. the present and the future in one eternal 'now'. The soul, according to the Jaina, is itself divine and perfect and there is no other transcendental being than the individual soul. Each soul is a God by itself although it is obscured by the Karmic veil in its empirical state. The Kaivalya state of the individual soul may be compared to the divine omniscience. However. the Naiyayikas and Pratanjali accept that man has sometimes the flash of the intuition of the future, and he can attain omniscience by constant meditation and the practice of austerities. The Jainas believe that the removal of
obscuring karmas by meditation, three-fold path and self-control, the individual soul reaches the consummation of omniscience, the state of Kaivalya. That is the finality and the end. But others like the Naiyayikas posit a divine omniscience which is higher, natural and eternal.
It is not possible to establish the possibility of omniscience on the basis of empirical methods of investigation which psychology and empirical science follow. However, its logical possibility cannot be denied. Progrsssive realization of greater and subtle degrees of knowledge by the individual is accepted by some psychologists especially with the introduction of Psychical Research for analyzing extra-sensory perception. A consummation of this progressive realization would logically be pure knowledge and omniscience, a single all-embracing intution.
1. Tattvarthasara, 1.
2. RADHAKRISHNAN(S.) : Indian Philosophy. Vol. I, p. 79.
3. SAKSENA (S.K) : Nature of Consciousness in Hindu Philosophy, p.16.
4.. Ibid., p.17.
5. Ibid., p.17.
6. Visesavasyakabhasya 3525. Mananam va mannaye va anena mano Also Abhidhanarajendro, Vol. VI, mana, p.75.
7. MCDOUGALL (W) : Outlines of Psychology, 12th Ed., p.35.
8. WUNDT : Physiological Psychology-Introduction, p.3.
9. Abhidhanarajendra, Vol. VI, p.82.
10. BHADURI (S.) : Nyaya Vaisesika Conseption of Mind as appearing in B.C. LAW, Vol. II, p.38.
11. MCDOUGALL (W.) : Outline of Psychology, 12th Ed., p. 36.
12. Abhidhanarajendra, Vol. VI, p.83.
13. Nandisutra, p.24.
14. Tattvarthasutra, Ch. II, Sutra, 21.
15. Maiti Upanisad, Ch. VI, p.30, as quoted by R.D. RANADE in Constructive Survey of Upanisadic Philosophy, p. 118, (1926).
16. WUNDT : Physiological Psychology, tr. by TITCHNER, Introduction, p. 3.
17. Abhidhdnarajendru, Vol. Vl, p. 74.
18. Visesavasyakabhasya 3525 ; A. Ma.; and Abhidhanarajendra Vol. VI, p. 4, Commentary: tad yogyair mananayogyair manovarganavhyo frhitair anatah pudglair nirvrtitam tad dravyamano vhanyate.
19. Gommatasara : Jiva-kanda. Verse 443.
20. BROAD (C.D.) : Mind and its Place in Nature, Ch, XIII, and XIV Section E.
21. Also Proceedings of the Aristoelian Society, 1926. Symposium : Is mind a compound substance? Views of Dr. HIKKE quoted.
22. RHYS DAVIDS (Mrs.) : Buddhist Psychology. Ch. Mind, p. 21.
23. MCDOUGALL (W.) : Outline of Psychology, 12th Ed., p. 42.
24. Abhidhanarnjendra, Vol. VI, p. 82 and Sthananga I, 6. ege deva-sura-manussanan tamsi samayamsi.
25. Tattvarthasutra, Ch. II, Sutra 11.
26. BHADURI (S.): Nyaya Vaisesika Conception of Mind as appearing in B.C Law Volume.
27. Abhidhanarajendra, VI, p.75 : Sarvagrahana-prasamgatah api tat asamgatam.
28. MCDOUGALL (w.) : Outline of Psychology, 12th Ed., pp. 35-36.
29. DEUSSEN : Philosophy of the Upanisad, 58, Maitri Upanisad, 2-6.
30. Gommatasara 444, no-indriyatti snna tassa have sesainsiyanam va vattattavhavado.
31. Pramanamimamsa 24 and Vrtti,
32. Tattvarthasutra II, 21 and Pramanamimamsa-vrittsrutamiti-hi visa yina visayasya nirdesah.
33. Abhidhanarajendra, Vol. VI, Manas p. 76 : karanattanao kimtu karanm dvidha vhavati-sariragatam antahkaranam tadbahir bhutam bahya-karanam ca tatredam dravyamanontahkar anamevatanah.
34. Dravyasamgraha, Verse 3, niccaya-nayado du cedanan jassa.
35. Aitareya Aranyaka, 2.3.2.
36. As quoted by SAKSENA (S.K.) in Nature of Conciousness in Hindu, Philosophy, p.24.
37. STOUT (G.F.) : Manual of Psychology, 4th ED., p. 106.
38. Pancastikayasara, 38.
39. Op. cit. 29.
40. RANADE (R>D>) : Consturctive Survey of Upanisadies Philosophy-Chapter on Psychology.
41. RADHAKRISHNAN(S.) Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p.400.
42. RHYS DAVIDS (Mrs.) The Birth of Indian Philosophy, p.6 (1936).
43. Chandogyopanisad VII. 5-1 : Maitreya Upanisad VI. 39.
44. SAKSENA (s.k.): Nature of Conciousness in Hindu Philosophy, Ch. V.
45. Brhadaranyakopanisad, 2,4.14.
46. Prasnopanisad, 6, 5.
47. Kathopanisad, 3, 12.
48. Ganadharavada, Ch. I.
49. JAMES (William) : Principles of Psychology, Chap. X.
50. WARD (James) : Psychological Principals, p. 380 (1920).
51. TATLA (N.) : Studies in Jaina Philosophy, p. 27.
52. Visesavasyakabhasya, 121.
53. Sthanangasutra, II, 1.7.
54. Tattvarthasutra, I, 9-12. Anuyagadvara Sutra, p. 194. Nandisutra 4
55. Ibid. 32 ; Paneastikayasara.
56. Pramanamimamsa, I. 1. 29, and its commentary.
57. Theaetetus, 16 b.
58. Tattvdrthasdtra, 1.14.
59. Tattvartha-Tikh, 1.14.
60. Pramanamimamsa, 21 and commentary.
61. What is Mind? Article by B. RUSSELL in the Journal of Philosophy Vol. LV. No, 1.
62. Nyaya Sutra, III. I. 68-69. indriydrtha-samnikarsam.
63. Pramdnamimdmsd, I, 25 ndrthdlokau jilanasna nimittam avyatirek
64. Ibid. old commentary.
65. Aristotle's Psychology.
66. LOCKE (John) : An Essay concerning Human Understanding Ch. IX Perception.
67. WOODWORTH (R.S.) : Psychology : A study of Mental Life, p. 403.
68. Tattvarthasutra, 15.
69. Pramanamimamsa, I, 1. 20 and commentary.
70. Tattvarthasutra Bhasya, I. 15.
72. Avasyaka-Niryukti, 3.
73. STOUT (G.F.) : Manual of Psychology, p. 123.
74. Sense datum theory and observational fact. Some contributions of Psychology to Epistemology : Journal of Philosophy, Jan. 1958.
75. Tattvarthasurtra, I, 17-18. arthasya vyanjanavagrahah.
76. Visesavasyakabhasya, 191. 193.
77. Nandisutra, 34, mallaka-drstanta.
78. Nandisutra, 35.
79. Visesavasyakabhasya, 253.
80. Nandisutra, 35.
81. STOUT (G.F.) : Manual of Psychology, p. 124.
82. WALLRAFF (Charles F.) article in the Journal of Philosophy, January 1951, p.23.
83. Nandisutra, 35
84. Visesavasyaka Bhasya, 180.
85. Tattvartharajavarttika J, 15. 2.
86. Pramanamimamsa, 127.
87. Visesavasyaka Bhasya, 179.
88. Sarvarthasiddhi, 115.
89. Tattvartha Sutra Bhasya, 115.
90. Visesavasyaka Bhasya. 179. Dharanam punardharanam.
91. Pramanamamsa, I. 1.29 and commentary.
92. Tattvartha Sutra, I, 27, rupisv avadheh also Avasyaka Niryukti. 45 and Nandi-Sutra, 46.
93. Nandi-Sutra, 16.
94. New Frontiers of the Mind by J.B RHINE (Pelican) p.41.
95. Religion Philosophy and Psychical Reasearch by C.D BROAD KANT and
96. Tattvartha-Sutra, 173 and Bhasya-ksayopasama-nimitta Nadi-Sutra, 8. Sthananga 71.
97. Visesavasyaka Bhasya 572. Nadi-Sutra, 63.
98. Visesavasyaka Bhasya, 569.
99. Nandi-Sutra, 15, Tattvartha-Sutra Bhasya, I, 23.
100. Avasyaka Niryukti, 76
101. Visesavasyaka Bhasya, 669, 814.
102. The personality of Man (Pelican) by TYRREL, p. 65.
103. Avasyaka Nirykti, 76.
104. Nandi Sutra, 39-40.
105. Extra Sensory Perception by J. B. RHINE, p. 177.
106. Sthananga 72.
107. Tattvartha Sutra I, 25 and its commentary.
108. Pancastikayasara 45.
109. Sarvarthasiddhi on Tattvarthasutra, 1, 25.
110. Studies in Jaina Philosophy by Nathmal TATIA, p. 68.
111. Riddle of Life by William MCDOUGALL, p. 235.
112. Philosophy, October 1950.
113. Thirty Years of Psychical Research by RICHET, pp. 23-24.
114. Extra-sensory Perception by RHINE, p, 22.
115. Pramana Mimamsa, 1, 15 and commentary
116. Tattvarta Sutra, 230, with Essays also Avasyaka Niryukti, 77. .
117.Philosophies of India, ZIMMER, p.251
119. Pramana Mimamsa I 1, 15 and commentary.
120. Philosophies of India by ZIMMER, Edited by Joseph CAMPBELL, Part III, p. 261.
121. Prameya-kamala-martanda p. 67.
122. Prameya-kamala-martanda p. 67.
123. Prameya Mimamsa I, IXVI and commentary.
124. Nandi Sutra Gathat XIXX, 1923 and idscussion.
125. Nyaya Manjari, p. 200.
126. Yoga-Sutra I, 24.
THE DOCTRINE OF KARMA IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY:
Karma to explain provident inequalities in life -- meaning of Karma --Potter's view and Jung's interpretation analysed -- origin and development of Karma theory -- Jaina theory of Karma -- types of Karma -- operation of Karma -- soul's entanglement in the wheel of samsara -- problem of the relation of soul and Karma analysed -- some criticisms of the theory discussed -- a note on the theory of Lesya.
I. "O Gautama, just as a sprout has a seed for its hetu, as there is a hetu for happiness and misery; since it is a karya. That hetu is the karman." We find in this life persons. having the same means for enjoying happiness, do not get the same type of happiness. Misery comes in unequal ways. This difference cannot be without any hetu which is not seen. This very unseen hetu is karman. Misery, in his life, is too much of a fact to be ignored. It is also true that there is abundant inequality in the status and experiences of individual men. which is inexplicable by our empirical methods of enquiry. Good men suffer and the evil prosper like the green banyan trees. It is necessary to explain this provident inequality in the status and development of individuals.
Attempts have been made to refer this inequality to man's first disobedience and the fruit of that forbidden tree. Others have denied the existence of evil and the consequent inequality; still others would like us to think of this world as training ground for perfection. But life is not a pleasure garden and God a sort of a Santa Claus whose main duty is to please his creatures. It is necessary to find a solution on the bais of autonomous nature of man and his responsibility to shape his own destiny. The Indian thought has found it in the doctrine of Karma.
II. The doctrine of Karrna is one of the most significant tenets of Indian thought. It has profoundly influenced the life and thought of the people in India. It has become the 'logical prius of alt Indian thought ' It is the basal presupposition of Buddhism, Hinduism and Jainism (of course with minor differences). As man sows, so does he reap: our actions have their effects. These effects cannot be destroyed. They have to be experienced and exhausted. If we cannot exhaust the effects of our actions in this lifewe have to complete the cycle of births and deaths to earn the fruit for all that we have done. No man inherits the good or evil of another man. The doctrine of Karma is. thus, closely associated with the transmigration of souls. Every evil deed must be expitiated. and every good deed must receive its reward. If it is not possible to reap the fruits in one single empirical existence, it must be experienced on earth in a fresh incarnation. Plato has made a reference to this theory in the Laws, perhaps under the influence of orphic mysticism, and refers to 'the tradition which is firmly believed by many, and has been received from those who are learned in the mysteries. In Indian thought, the
Jainas have developed the doctrine of Karma on scientific basis.
Karma etymologically means whatever is done, any activity. It got associated with the after-effects of actions, both physical and psychical. Every Jiva (living being) is constantly active, expressing the activity in the three-fold functions of body. speech and mind. It leaves behind traces of after-effects in the physical and psychic forms. Every action, word or thought produces, besides its visible, invisible and transcandent effects. It produces wilder certain conditions certain potential energies which forge the visible effects in the form of reward or punishment. As in the case of a bond which continues to operate until, but loses its validity on, the repayrrlent of the capital sum; so does the invisible effect of an action remain in potential form after the visible effect has disappeared. Actions performed in this life would be the causes of future life, and the present life is the result of actions performed in the previous life. So is the chain of life connected in the series of actions and their effects realized. The Karma doctrine involves the idea of an eternal metempsychosis. Kerl Potter in his Presuppositions of India's Philosophies has tried to interpret Karma as a form of habit. Human being faces challenges from many sides which have to be met by birth, social action and by the application of scientific techniques in order to be free from the bondage in life. But the more subtle challenges lie underneath the surface, and 'arise from' habits themselves, which continues after the conditions that' engender them have been removed, and which engender new habits which in turn must be removed somehow. This round of habits breeding habits is a part of what is called in Sanskrit samsara, the wheel of birth, which is governed by Karma, the habits themselves.' Karma is described in the Jaina philosophy as a kind of dirt which accretes to the otherwise pure Jiva by virtue of one's actions. In the Bhagavad-gita the dirt is described as of three kinds. "one may think of these as types of habits"2 I have not been able to understand how Potter interprets Karma as a type of habit. One must be steeped in the Indian tradition in order to understand the nature and significance of Karma.
C. J. Jung, while distinguishing, personal and the collective unconscious, hints at the possibility of comparing the archetypes of the collective Unconscious to the Karma in Indian thought. The collective unconscious stands for the objective psyche. The personal layer ends at the earliest memories of infancy, but the collective layer comprises the pre-infantile period that is the residue of ancestral life. The force of Karma works implicitly and determines the nature and development of personality. The Karma aspect is essential to the deeper understanding of the nature of an archetype.  Although it is possible to say that Karma has essentially
a reference to individual differences and hence a personal acquistion, yet each individual has a common heritage which he shares with the community and which shapes his being. The archetypes refer to the common heritage. To this extent they refer to the Karma aspect.
However. Jung was primarily concerned with and interpretations of dreams and fantasies in presenting his theory of the collective unconscious. 'Had he developed the archetypes of the collective unconscious. he would have reached the doctrine of Karma, the store-house of the physical and psychical effects of the past.
It is difficult to say when and where the Karma doctrine originated in India. Some have traced the origin of Karma in the principle of Rta. Rta is the cosmic principle. It prevades the whole world, and gods and man must obey it. It is the anticipation of the law of Karma. In the Rgvedic hymns the doctrine of Karma is yet in its infancy as Rta. The doctrine does not appear in the old hymns of the Rgveda. The Vedic seers were mainly interested in the good of this life, and when death came they went the way of their fathers to the world where Yama, the first to die, ruled. The doctrine must have developed against a number of other doctrines about creation. Some regarded time as the determinant factor of creation. Others believed in nature (svabhava) as the prominent factor. There were other theories as well. The Jainas rejected these doctrines and said that even time and svabhava are determined by Karman. Concept of Karma must have existed at least a thousand years before the beginning of the Christian era, world has since become the basis and centre of religious thought. It is probable that Karma and rebirth must have been pre-Aryan doctrines which were important in the Sramana culture later assimilated in the Brahmana thought by the time the Upanisads were clearly formulated. The Indian view of Karma was doubtless of nonAryan provenience, and it was a kind of a natural law.  Transmigration of the soul was perhaps one of the oldest forms in which the belief in the after-life was held. Karma was closely linked with this doctrine. With the gradual emphasis of asceticism under the influence of the Sramana culture, came the awareness of one's responsibility to shape one's personality here and here-after, However, the doctrine has been widely accepted in ancient Indian thought, except for the Carvaka. In the Samnyasa Upanisad we are told that the Jivas are bound by Karma A man becomes good by good deeds and bad by bad deeds;  and while thus we live, we fetter ourselves with the effect of our deeds. In the Mahabharata, the emphasis is on the force of Karma. Of the three kinds of Karma, prarabdha, samcita and agami mentioned in the Bhagavadgtta, agami and samcita can be overcome by knowledge In Buddhism, as there is no substance as soul, that transmigrates is not a person but his Karma. When the series of mental states which constitues the self resulting from a
chain of acts ends, there would still be some acts and their effects which continue; and the viltiana projects into the future due -to the force of the effects of Karma. The Buddhists distinguish acts accompanied by asrava (impure acts) from pure acts which are not accompanied by asrava. Samsara is the effect of Karrna. Our pleasant happiness and misery are the fruit of what we have ourselves done in the past. Operation of Karma can be considered as a principle of moral life, as force limiting and particularizing personality and as a principle of conservation of energy in the physical world. But Buddhism maintains that involuntary actions, whether of body, speech and mind do not constitute Karma, and therefore cannot bring about the results accruing to Karma. It only means that unwilled actions do not modify character. Karma theory has been expressed in a variety of ways 'from the most extreme realism which regards Karma as a complexity of material particles infecting the soul to the most extreme idealism' where it is a species of newly produced invisible force, in its highest unreal. The Jainas give a realistic view of Karma. It has existed from the preBuddhistic time. The idea of the pollution of the soul due to Kamla has been largely allegorical in other religious philosophies in India. while the Jainas 'have adopted it in the real sense of the world' and have -worked out into an original System. The Jaina conception of Karma must have been completely developed after a thousand years of Mahavira's nirvana. The Sthananga. Uttaradhyayana sutra and the Bhagavatlsutra contain general outline of the doctrine, and the details have been worked out in the KarmagranthaPancasamgraha and the Karmaprakrzi. In working out the details, there have been two schools of thought: Agamikas and ii) Karmagranthikas.
Jainism is, in a sense, dualistic. the universe is costituted of the two fundamental categories: jiva (living) and ajiva (non-living). Soul (jiva) has been described from the noumenal and the phenomenal points of view. From the pure and ultimate point of view, jiva is pure and perfect. It is characterized by upayoga the hormic energy. It is simple and without parts. It is immaterial and formless. It is characterized by cetand. It is pure consciousness. From the phenomenal point of view Jiva is described as possessing four pranas. It is the lord (prabhu). Limited to his body (dehamatra), still incorporeal. and it is ordinarily found with Karma. The Jiva comes in contact with the external world,-Ajiva. The Jiva is active. and the activity is expressed in threefold forms the bodily, in speech and mental. This is called yoga. Yoga brings in after-effects in the form of Karmic particles which veil the pure nature of the soul. The souls are contaminated by the Karma which is a foreign element, and are involved in the wheel of samsara. This contamination is beginningless, though it has an end. It is difficult to say how and when souls got involved in the heel of samsara. Caught in the wheel of Samsara the soul for
gets its real nature and the efforts to search for the truth are obscured by the paissions. The inherent capacity of the soul for self-realization is also obstructed by the veil of Karma.' It is subjected to the forces of Karma which express themselves first through feelings and emotions, and secondly, in the chains of very subtle kinds of matter invisible to the eye and the instruments of science. It is then embodied and is affected by the environment, physical and social and spiritual. We, thus, get various types of soul existence.
Karma. according to the Jainas, is material nature. It is matter in a subtle form and it is a substantive force. It is constituted of finer particles of matter. The kind of matter fit to manifest Karma fills the universe. It has the special property of developing the effects of merit and demerit. By its activity due to the contact with the physical world, the soul becomes penetlated with the particles of Karmic body (karma sarlra) which is constantly attached to the soul till it succeeds to be free from it. 'No where has the physical nature of Karma been asserted with such stress as in Jainism.  A moral fact produces a psycho-physical quality, a real and not merely a symbolic mark, affecting the soul in its physical nature. This point of view has been worried in detail in the form of mathematical calculations, in the karmagrantha.
The Jaina tradition distinguishes two aspects: i) the physical aspect (dravya-karman) and ii) the psychic aspect (bhava-karman). The physical aspect comprises the particles of Karma (karma pudgala) accruing into the soul and polluting it. The psychic aspect is primarily the mental states and events arising out of the activity of mind, body and speech. They are like the mental traces of the actions, as we experience the mnemic traces long after the Conscious states experienced vanish. The physical and the psychic Karma are mutually related to each other as cause and effect. The distinction between the physical and the psychic aspects of Karma is psychologically significant, as it presents the interaction of the bodily and the mental due to the incessant activity of the soul.
This bondage of the soul to karman is of four types, according to nature (prakrti), duration (sthiti), intensity (anubhaga or-rasa) and quantity (pradesa).
Karma can be distinguished into eight types: 1) Jnanavaraniya, that which obscures right knowledge; 2)darsanavaraniya, that which obscures right intuition; 3) vedaniya, arousing effective states like feelings and emotions; 4) mohaniya, that which deludes right faith; 5) ayuskarman, determining the age of the
individual; 6) nama karman, which produces various circum stances collectively making up an individual existence like the body and other special qualities of individuality; 7) gotra-karman,. which determines the family. social standing, etc. of the individual; and 8) antaraya-karman which obstructs the inborn energy of the soul and prevents the doing of good actions.
Each kind of Karma has its limits in time within which it must exhaust itself. The accumulated Karma brings a transcendental-hue or hallo to the soul which is called lesya. There are six lesyas. These lesyas have predominantly a moral resultant.
Karma is substantive force. It has the property of developing the effects of merit and demerit. The Karmic particles build up a special body which is called karma-sarira which does not leave the soul till its emancipation. Karma has its psychic effects also. Bhava-karma is immediate to the Jivas, while Dravya-karman belongs to the body. Five classes of Karmic conditions are mentioned On account of the rise (udaya), suppression (upasama), ;annihilation (ksaya), suppression and annihilation (ksayopasasna) and psychological effect (part,nama), the soul has five conditions of thought and existence. In the usual course of things, Karma takes effect and produces results. The soul is said to be in aupasamika state. Karma may be prevented from its operation for sometime. In this state it is still present, like fire covered by ashes. The soul is in the aupasamika state. When Karma is annihilated, it is in a ksayika state. The fourth state is the mixed state. The last, unconditioned, state leads to moksa.
The aim is to seek freedom from the miseries of this life, to seek deliverance. But the path to Moksa is long and endless. We have to free ourselves from the Karma that has already been accumulated and to see that no more Karma is added. The soul gets bound by the constant flow of Karma. This is called bundha. Mental states, like passion, attachment and aversion, which prepare the ground for the binding of the soul by Karma are called psychic bondage (bhava-bandha); and the actual binding by the particles of Karma is called dravya-bandha. When passions overcome us the particles get glued to our souls and bind them just as a heated iron ball when immersed in water, absorbs water. But the first step to the realization of the self is to see that all channels :through which Karma has been flowing have been stopped so that no additional Karma can accumulate. This is samvara. There are two kinds of Samvara: bhava-samvara which is concerned with mental life, and dravya-samvara which refers to the removal of Karmic particles. This is possible by self-control and freedom from attachment. The practice of vows (vrata), carefulness (samiti) self-control (gupti) observance of ten kinds of dharma, reflection (anupreksa) and
removing the various obstacles like hunger and thirst and passion will stop the inflow of Karma and protect us from the Impurities of fresh Karma. Here, right conduct (caritra) is helpful.
The next important task is to remove the Karma that has already accumulated. The destruction of Karma is called nirjara. Nirjara is of two types: bhava-nirjara and dravya nirjaraThe Karma may exhaust itself in its natural course when the fruits of karma are completely exhausted. This is called savlpaka or akama nirjara when no efforts would be required on one's part. The remaining Karma has to be removed by mean of penance. This is avipaka-nirjara. The soul is like a mirror which looks dim when the dust of Karma is deposited on its surface. When the Karma is removed by Nirjara the soul shines in its pure and transcendent form. It then attains the goal of Moksa. The Ghati Karmas are first removed. Still, the Aghati Karmas, like ayus, nama, gotra and vedanzya have to disappear. Last of all is the final ayogi state of kevala.
The influx of Karma affects the soul and brings bondage. The soul's activity (yoga) is due to its inherent energy (virya). The infinite energy of the soul gets imperfect expression by which Karma accumulates and affects the soul; and this imperfect expression of energy is responsible for the various processes of the Karmic matter.
Karmic matter undergoes various processes due to the different types o£ activity. The Pancasamgraha describes eight processes of expression of energy karma in its limited form. These processes lead to corresponding Karmic processes. The soul activates Karmic matter at every moment of its worldly existence and assimilates it with different types of karma which express themselves in due course in due course and bring the disabilities and defilement of the soul.
The influx of Karma (asrava) into the soul and the consequent bondage involve certain processes like i) transformation (samkra-mana) of one type of Karma into that of another, ii) endurance of Karma for a certain time (satta), iii) endurance without producing the effect (abadha) and iv) coming into effect (udaya). This transformation is a process by which the soul transforms the nature, duration, intensity and extensity of Karma into those of another. This transformation is generally restricted to the change of one sub type of Karma to another subtype of the same kind. For instance, in the Vedanya Karma. soul can transform the Karma producing pain (asata vedaniya) into that producing pleasure(satavedaniya). In the Jnanavarniya Karma it can transform caksu-darsana into acaksu-darsana. A person having right intuition (samyag-darsana) can either transform the karma leading to perversity (mithyatva) to that leading to partially right and wrong intuition (samyagmithyatva). But we are told any Karma cannot be transformed into any
other. One cannot transform karma obscuring intuitive experience (darsana moha) with the Karma obstructing conduct (caritra-moha) into that of any Karma (determining life duration). This explanation is scientifically plausible and logically acceptable We find that electrical energy can be transformed into heat or light energy. Transformation of one Karma into another requires energy and this energy is determined by the degree of the purity of the soul. A person having perversity of attitude (mythyatva) cannot convert, cannot change the mithyatva karman into the mixed or samyakva because the person with wrong belief is not pure and not capable of such transformation. Conversely, a person with right belief (samyaktva) cannot easily transform the Karma to any of the pure forms.
Transformation of Karma may also affect increase (udvartana), decrease (apavartana), duration (sthiti) and intensity of the function (aunbhaga) o£ Karma. The Jainas have worked out a scientific and detailed analysis of these processes with a view to explaining the process of the operation of Karma.
Karma may be made to express its effect prematurely. By this process the souls attract back the Karmic particles which are to fructify later. Karma is made to realize its effect prematurely. Through gradual subsidence and destruction of Karma, the soul reaches the state of perfection where in all the Karmas are removed and no additional Karma accumulates. The inherent energy of the soul gets perfect expression. It is possible that one who is free from energy obstructing Karma may still continue to act in this world. The enlighted one is perfect. He may continue to work for the welfare of all creatures. But his is a purely detacbed activity and therefore free from any contamination leading to the colouration of the soul (lesya).
III. The analysis of Karma and the involvement of Jiva in the wheel of Samsara due to the impact of Karma on it raises a more fundamental question as to how the soul which is immaterial and simple is affected by the material Karma. Some seem to think that such a contact between contradictory entities is logically difficult to accept. But souls are imperfect because the particles of Karma which are foreign to the nature of the soul enter into the soul and cause great changes in it. The Karmic matter produces in the soul certain conditions even as a medical pill given to an individual produces manifold physical and psychic effects. In the state of bondage the soul is infected with a kind of susceptibility to come into contact with matter. This susceptibility finds expression in the affective states. Through the Yoga (kaya-van-manh-karma yogah the soul puts into notion the material substrata of its activityand fine particles of matter are drawn to unite themselves to become Karma, and enter into union with the Jiva. This mixing up is
ore intimate than milk and water than between fire and iron ball. The matter once entered into the soul separates itself into a greater number of particles, karma-prakrti, with varying effects. Their number and character are determined by the conduct of Jiva. If the activity is good, Jiva assimilates good Karma; if it is bad, there is bondage of Karma.
The soul's embodiment in the wheel of Samsara is an empirical fact; and beginningless nature of this bondage is also a fact a presupposition as some would like to say. The problem as to how the immaterial soul gets mixed with Karma and is involved in the empirical life has been considered from different points of view. Schools of philosophy have analysed it on the basis of their metaphysical views. For the Buddhist, soul is namarupa, psycho-physical in nature. Nescience (avidya) is the seed of worldly existence; and nescience is formless like consciousness, for, according to the Buddhists the formless can alone affect the formless. The material rupa cannot affect the formless nama. But the Jaina-contends that emancipation would not be possible, as the seed for the emancipation would then be within consciousness itself. The Yogacara school avoids the difficulty by making the physical world unreal. But the Jina is a realist and he asserts the reality of the material world. He says that it would be consistent to believe that the material would affect the mental, as consciousness would be affected by intoxicating, drugs.
The Nyaya-Vaisesika believes that conditions of bondage belong to the soul, and the unseen potency expressing in merit and demerit belongs to the soul Passions like anger and greed condition the bondage of the soul. But the Jaina points out that as passions according to them are qualities of the soul, conditioning its bondage, they must be rooted in something material, for conditions of the passions must be distinct from the qualities of the soul. There is no bondage without the interaction between spirit and matter; and there is no interaction without bondage. According to Jaina, the worldly existence is possible in the relation of identity-cum-difference between the spiritual and the material. The Nyaya Vaiesika regards merit and demerit as arising out of the activity of the body and mind, though it does accept any form of identity between spirit and matter. The Jaina does not understand the situation. The Samkhya-Yoga presents a duality between purusa and prakrti. The conscious principle is involved in the evil of the world, though it does not belong to it. The Purusa is not real affected by the changes in the world. The spiritual is ever kept aloof from the material, and conditions of worldly existence is a state of bondage and as such presupposes a fall of the principle of consciousness. For the Vedantin the world is only empirically true, and karma belongs to the empirical existence and as such an illusion.
The Jaina philosopher bases his stand on experience and avoids absolute conceptions of soul and karma. He admits concrete relation between the soul and Karma. Soul is affected by the influx of Karma. The change effected in the soul is determined by the nature of the Karmic matter, and the nature of Karma is in turn determined by the passions. Similarly, the nature of passion is determined by the nature of Karma. This is a reciprocal relation affecting the soul and matter. In this conception, the distinction between the material karma (dravya-karman) and psychic Karma (bhavakarman) is very significant. The former is associated with avarana; the latter is associated dosa (defect). Every act brings with it the after-effects in physical and psychic aspects. The physical aspects of the traces is Dravya-Karma; while the psychic traces are the Bhava Karma. The material Karma and the psychic counterpart are related as cause and effect.  In a passage in the Karmagrantha, a question regarding the cause of the Karmic influx has been raised. How is it possible that particular particles of Karmic matter-entering the soul can transform the selves into various forms of Karma? And we are told that this is possible through the mysterious power of the soul and through the peculiar quality of matter itself. We find matter of one form is transformed into another; water is transformed into clouds and rain again. Why, then, cannot matter of Karma besmearing the Jiva be transformed into different types of Karma? We are then told that all further discussions would not be necessary.
The discarding of rational argument, in this connection, is justified, because Jainism does not pretend to have attained this doctrine by human rational means. It is not through the limited comprehension of an average man that the view has been presented but by revelation or on the authority of a Kevalin.
lV. Karma theory has been found by some to be an inadequate explanation for the prevalent inequalities in life. It is suggested that the theory suffers from serious defects.
1. Karma leads to the damping of the spirit and men suffer the ills of life with helpless equanimity of attitude simply because they get the awareness that it is beyond their power to change the course of their life as it is determined by Karma. Karma leads to fatalism. It does not give any incentive to social service. The general apathy of an Indian towards the natural, social and political evils is mentioned as an example of the impact of Karma on our life. The famous temple of Somanatha was destroyed; and there was no visible resistance because the common man in India was over powered by the belief that everything that happens is the result of Karma.
But this is more an over-statement of a fact, if not a mis
statement. It is not true to say that the Karma theory does not give any incentive to social service. The Upanisads enjoin social service. The Jaina ethics is based on service and sacrifice, although on the highest level one has to transcend social morality. The five vows to be observed by an ascetic and the layman (sravaka) imply the recognition of dignity and equality of life. Schweitzer maintains that the attitude in the ancient Indian thought was that of world and life negation. Still the problem of deliverance in the Jaina and the Buddhist thought is not raised beyond ethics. In fact it was the-supreme ethic. The deliverance from reincarnation is possible through the purity of conduct, and the soul cleanses itself from the besmirching it has suffered and altogether frees itself from it; What is new then, in Jainism is the importance attained by ethics. -- an event full of significance for the thought of India. And Karma is not a mechanical principle, but a spiritual necessity.' It is the counterpart in the moral world of the physical law of uniformity. Unfortunately the theory of Karma became confused with fatality in India when man himself grew feeble and was disinclined to do his work. Still the importance of Karma as after effects of our action and determining the course of life cannot be easily underestimated. Karma has to be looked at as a principle involving explanation of action and reaction. Fatalistic theories of life was presented by Makkhali Gosala, a contemporary of Mahavira. He considered himself a rival of Mahavira. He said that happiness and misery are measured to one as it were in bushels. The duration of life and the transmigration of souls have their fixed forms. No human effort can change them. Mahavira and the Buddha opposed Gosala most vigorously.
2. It is also said that the Karma theory is inconsistent with individual freedom of the will. It does not guarantee true freedom to the individual which is essential to his moral progress.  Karma works as the inexorable law of causation, in its essential mechanical way. And in the background of caste system, the boon of individual inequality becomes a curse; if Karma had not to work with caste, a varnasrama-dharma, a wrong idea of the self and transmigration, we might reconcile Karma with freedom. But as it is, it is not possible. The theory in entirety cannot escape the charge of 'determinism' from the point of view of higher morality. Older Buddhism and Jainism were much concerned to defend self-regulative character of Karma; salvation was essentially through self-reliance: and there was fear of the antinomian tendencies of the notion of reliance on others (e.g. the Lord). The answer to the charge of fatalism was that by our own efforts we can annihilate the existing Karma and neutralise its effects.
But it is difficult to determine the nature of this objection. We are told that from the point of view of higher
morality Karma theory cannot escape the charge of determinism. Yet, the objection is determined by and based on the individual's status in a particular caste. It is more a sting against caste system than a criticism of Karma theory. The objector appears to confuse the essential from the accidental. It is a fallacy of Ignoratio Elenchi. Caste system is a sociological problem, and it is not essential for understanding the nature and operation of Karma. In fact determinism is, here, interpreted in a narrow sense as a mechanical operation of Karma to produce its effects, as does the law of gravitation. The present condition and nature of an individual is determined by the past Karma, yet the individual is free to act in such a way as to mould his own future by reducing or destroying the existing Karma. The present is determined, but the future is only conditioned. In general, the principle of Karma reckons with the material in the context in which each individual is born. 'But the spiritual element in man allows him freedom within the limits of his own nature. There is room for the lowliest of men even of animals to rise higher and purify his self. Attempts were made to reconcile the law of Karma with freedom of man. Karma is compared to a fire which we can, by our effort, fan into a flame or modify it. Human effort can modify Karma. For the Jaina, such a saving of the soul is possible by one's own efforts. Grace of God has no place in Jaina ethics. Self-effort in the direction of purification of the soul is the one way towards perfection. A thief, for instance, undermines his own character and being every time he commits theft. No amount of prayer and worship will erase the effect that has been accumulated, although it may create a mental atmosphere for eliminating such future possibilities. Jainas have, therefore given a detailed theory of conduct distinguishing it: into two grades as that of the muni, an ascetic, and of a sravaka -- a householder.
3. It has been objected that the Karma theory connects actions and its consequences in a rather mechanical way. In its mechanical aspect, it mistakes the means for the end. In this it is presumed that repentence is the end and paying the due penalty-is only a means. It is said that Karma theory overemphasises the retributive aspect of punishment.
But, here again, we find a confusion between ends and meansRepentence has its place in life. but it is not the end to be achieved. Repentence does purify the mind and has the effect of a catharsis. This would be a means for the future development of an individual. Even as a means it is not all. The Jaina theory of Karma emphasises that by individual efforts at moral and spiritual development, we can reduce the intensity of karma, suppress its effects or even annihilate. We have seen that one can, by suitable efforts. transform the energy of one form of Karma into that of another, as we can transform electrical energy into that of heat or light. Repentence is not to be taken as the final end. It
only creates an atmosphere for moral efforts towards selfrealization. It is at best a powerful psychological means which would help us in the attainment of spiritual perfection. If repentence were sufficient to lead to purification, the after-effects of past action cannot be accounted for, nor can they be explained away, as that would be contrary to the laws of physical and moral nature.
4. Karma doctrine implies that sin is a finite offence that can be made good by private temporary punishment. It presupposes that we can make good our sin which is entirely beyond our power.
It is also said that the dominant impression that one gets of the Karma doctrine is that the individual is in the grip of power, which, heedless of his own wishes, is working out a burden of an immemorial past. 
Pringle-pattison shows that the whole emphasis of the Karma theory is on retribution. There is nothing redemptive in its operation, and the process becomes an endless one, leading to no goal of ultimate release. He quotes Deussen and says that expiation involves further action which in turn involves expiation and thus the process is endless. The clock work of requital. in running down always winds itself up again, and so in perpetuity. Accumulation of merit may ease a future life, but it would not suffice to effect a release from the wheel of life. Even when a new world follows after the deluge in the cycle of worlds, it does not start with a clean balance-sheet, as the operation of will proceeds from the point where it was suspended. Karma only perpetuates the curse of existence. So, the Karma doctorine seems open to the criticism to which the vindictive theory of punishment has been subjected in modern times ' To conceive this universe as primarily a place for doling out punishment is to degrade it to the level of a glorified police-court.
The dominant note in the objection is that to make good our sin is beyond our powe; and the emphasis on the retributive element in the doctrine of Karma makes this world frightful and miserable, 'as a glorified police-court'. But this is far from truth. It is not beyond our power, as we said earlier, to improve our states of existence. The Jainas have shown that self-effort can shape the future. The present is with us and the future is in our hands.
Retributive theory is a more consistent theory of action and reaction and not merely of punishment, than Reformative theory. Man gets what he merits to get; and to with-hold it would be injustice to him, unless he makes his own efforts to modify the effects of his actions. Reformative theory may be full of noble and soft sentiments, it may be comforting to be told that by the grace of God, we would be better. But that destroys the individuality and dignity of an individual and
he would become a tool in the hands of a Higher Power or his agent in this world. We refuse to be treated as things. Moreover, it is good to te men, though it is unpleasant to do so, that they are alone responsible for their present state To put the responsibility on the individual is hard truth. And Radhakrishnansays that Karma ls not so much a princip]e of retribution as one of continuity.
5. Some have said that the doctrine of Karma leads to unbridled individualism;, It fails to see that we all belong to a community, that there is what is called joint Karma corporate sin or guilt. It allows the fortunate ones to boast of their 'self-merited happiness'.  Explanation for the inequality is referred to the 'vicarious suffering'. The ethical justice is to be found in the crucification of Christ; and the Cross is a symbol of taking over the sufferings of men upon oneself so as to lighten the sufferings of men.
But according to the Jainas, as also in other Indian thought, except in the Carvaka, self realization is to be attained through a moral effect which is essentially social in its content. We have seen that the Jaina ethics is essentially social in its significance. Moksa is to be attained through the practice of goodness, charity, compassion and humility, although the Moksa is attained by one who practices the virtues and the three-fold noble path. It is, therefore, more accurate to say that Karma theory awakens a man to his responsibilities to himself and to others, and does not make him isolated and self-centred.
We may also add that Karma does not imply a hedonistic outlook on life. Reward for pleasure is not a life of pleasure nor is the punishment for sin, pain. The theory is not to be confused with hedonistic or a judicial theory of rewards and punishments.: Pleasure and pain are determinants of animal experience, but for human life the end to be attained is nohing short of perfection. His efforts are to be directed to the attaimnent of this highest end. The universe is, in the words of Tennyson. 'a vale of soulmaking' and not a pleasure garden.
V. Therefore, the Karma theory is an explanation of the moral justice in the universe. It is the conception of an all controlling law of natural retribution which links together the successive earth lives of each individual soul. It ‘satisfied my sense of justice and threw light on the problem of unmerited suffering.' For the modern European varieties of Karma theory, 'It is not the mechanical idea of an identical soul-substance passing from body to body, but the mystical idea of suffering with and for others', that forms the real attraction of the doctrine. And perhaps that may be the true explanation of its ascendancy in the East as well.
Judged by the historic standards, the Karma theory did much to raise man status and to wean him from coaxing gods through sacrifice and prayer. It insisted on individual expiation, and emphasised the moral continuity of life here and hereafter.
Karma is in fact a striking answer to the ‘fathomless injustice to the nature of things' and it appeals 'to the overpowering sense of the necessity of justice.' 'The conception of an all controlling Iaw of natural retribution which links together the successive earth lives of each individual soul, both satisfied my sense of justice and threw light on the problem of seemingly unmerited suffering.
Having discussed the arguments and counter arguments of the logical Justification of the doctrine of Karma, we may say that, from the real point of view (niscaya-naya) logical justification of the doctrine is not possible nor necessary. It is the expression of the highest knoIedge and experience of the seers. We must accept it as authority. When the ascetic, named Kaladevala, saw the newborn Siddhartha Gautama he was at once delighted and sad, delighted because he saw the vision of Siddhartha as one to be the Buddha, and sad because he saw that he would not live to see that glorious day. This need not be taken as mere fable. It has a great significance in presenting the experience o£ a seer. The story is told of Pythagoras remonstrating with a man ~-how as beating a dog, because in the howling of the animal he recognised the voice of a departed friend. The spice of malice in this anecdote is perhaps misplaced. And, "Oh, Agnibhuti, Karma is pratyaksa to me, the omniscient being, just as your doubt is pratyaksa to me.
VI. We may add here a note on the much discussed doctrine of Lesya.
We have seen that the perfect soul may continue to work for the welfare of all creatures. But he is detached from all activity and is free from any contamination which leads to the coloration of hallo for the soul (lesya).
1. According to the Jainas, the soul is a substance distinct from matter. Matter and soul influence each other, yet are quite distinct from one another The soul is a spiritual monad. From the noumenal point of view, the sou1 is pure and perfect. It is pure consciousness. It is characterised by upayoga and is formless. Upayoga is the hormic force. But the purity of the soul is defined by the influx of karma It gets entangled in the wheel of Samsara and embodied through the operation of Karma. This entanglement is beginningless, though it has an end. lt is subjected to the forces of Karma through feelings, emotions and activity (yoga). The soul is associated with Karma and forms a subtle body called the karma-sarira comparable to the linga-sarira of the Samkhya
school. The immediate presence of the Karmic matter in the soul throws a reflection, as it were, on the soul, as a colour ed flower does in a mirror or a crystal. The subt1e Karmic matter is invisible to the eye and to tbe instruments of Science. The influx of Karma affects the soul in various forms and produces certain type of 'aura' or coloration about it. This coloration or hallo is the lesya. But this coloration does not affect the soul in its pure nature. The colour of the reflection does not belong to the soul. When the soul becomes free from Karmic matter and reaches the Siddhahood, it becomes free from this forein element of coloration.
2. Lesya is of two kinds: dravyalesya and bhava lesya. Dravya Lesya refers to the Karmic material affecting the organism. Bhava Lesya refers to the psychic conditions affecting the organism and thereby radiating the colour, which may be called transcendental coloration. Thus, the effect of Karma in matters affecting the nature of the organism-though it cannot be said that Lesya refers to the colour of the body. We are told that the denizens of hell are black in colour. Celestial beings get different colours on the basis of the impact of a different Karma. So is the case with human beings. ' This distinction may be referred to the racial colours and the innumerable distinctions in the individual shades of colour. Bhava Lesya refers to the psychic conditions affecting the individual in creating an aura around the organism. The psychic conditions create reflexes, and they, in turn, may give rise, through some form of radiation, to some kinds of coloration round the organism rhis may not be ordinaiily visible to the eye, but only to persons disciplined in Yoga. Further distinctions are ;made in lesya. Six types of primary colours are suggested. Three of them refer to evilminded persons. The remaining are attributed to morally good persons. The six lesyas are: I) black (krsna), 2) blue (nila), 3) dove-grey (kapota), 4) yellow (pita), e) pink (padma) and 6) white (sukla). For instance, a man who is wicked and cruel gets the black lesya. A man who is affected by anger and envy and who loves pleasure gets the-blue lesya. One who is base and dishonest has grey. On the contrary, a well-disciplined man develops the red lesya. One who has subdued the passion has yellow. One who is engrossed in meditation of the Dharma and truth has the white lesya. But the fully liberated souls have no lesya at all.  The ethical or moral significance of this doctrine has been emphasized in this distinction. The Lesyas are treated as an index of temperament and character. Lesyas have a moral bearing. The Jainas give the example of six travellers in the forest. They see a tree full of fruits. The man with a black Lesya intends to uproot the tree; that with a blue, to cut the trunk; that with a grey, to cut the branches; that with a yellow, to take the twigs on|y; the man with the pink Lesya intends to pluck the fruits, while the one who has a pure white Lesya is content to take whatever
fruits have fallen on the ground.
There are degrees of expression of Lesya in terms of time and intensity. We are told that in the case of black Lesya the duration varies from half a muhurta to thirty-three sdgaropamas. The effect of the blue Lesya varies from half a Muhurta to ten Sagarpamas plus one Palyopama and a part of an asamkhyeya. So is the variation in the duration of other Lesyas.  The Jainas have given a fabulous mathematical calculation of the effects and the generation of Lesya. think they were fond of such arithmetic formulations.
3. There has been a controversy regarding the antiquity and the nature of lesya. Leumann found a resemblance between the six Lesyas and Gosala's division of mankind into six classes. Jacobi was perplexed by the resemblance and thought it difficult to bring the Lesya doctrine into harmony with the rest of their creed 
However, as Dr. Upadhya points out, these early scholars on Jainism were misled by their supposition that the Lesyas represent the colours of the soul. Tradition never says that the soul itself has colour. Colour and sense qualities are associated with Karmic matter flowing into the soul. Karma is a subtle type a matter and the soul has a subtle body known as the karma sarira. We have seen that the immediate impact of Karma throws a reflection on the soul, as a coloured flower does on crystal. The colour does not form part of the crystal; so Lesya is not part of the soul. It may also be noted that the liberated soul is free £rom Karmic matter and also from any form of Lesya. Thus,the conception of Lesya is closely associatcd with the Karma theory.
In Buddhism too, Karma is classified according to colours:1) black, 2) white. 3)-black and white, and 4) not black and not white  The same classification was adopted in the yoga school. But these systems do not accept the material nature of Karma. Therefore, DASGUPTA suggests that the idea of the black and white Karma in the Yoga philosophy was probably suggested by the Jaina view. 
4. The problem of interpreting the Lesya thRory in terms of modern psychologyespecially of para-psychology, has been engaging my attention for some time past. The bhava-lesya has a psychological significance. It is an aura created round the soul due to psychic effects and Yoga. It is dependent on the activity of the mind. The six primary colours are effects of the Karmic influx arising out of the mental states and events. Every psychosist brings some after-effects which are both physical and psychic; it is possible to show, by proper analysis and investigation, that such psychic phenomena exist and are detectable. The effects of psychic states are transformed. through some form of radiation into the `aura' of co1our spreading round the organism, like the halo
supposed to surround a prophet. We have heard that the gods and the prophets like Jesus. Mahavira and Buddha, had halo round themn?. The Jainas have said that the enlightened ones still living in this world get a white halo around them. But those who are liberated are without any Lesya or coloration. They are alesyi. Such aura or coloration may not be visible to the eye, not detectable by the ordinary instruments of science. But men disciplined in the Yoga and those who have developed an extra sensory capacity may see it. We may perhaps find some methods pertinent to para-psychology by which may discover the possibility and existence of such phenomena. lt would, therefore, be a problem for the parapsychologist's research.
I have recently read an autobiographical note by LAMA MANGALABJUNG RAMPA, who states that he could see, owing to the Yogic discipline he had undergone, the `aura' of colour round an individual. It varied with individual difference in mental states at the moment. He once saw blue rays of light elmanating from a Chinese delegation which had gone to see the Dalai Lama. He then appealed to the Dalai lama not to take the delegation at their word, as they were full of fraud.
It would not, therefore, be a presumption to suggest that the Lesya phenomena should be investigated by the methods of para-psychology.
I may also point out that some have suggested a resemblance between the Iesya doctrine and the theosophical view of the transcendental colours in the individual. We may refer here to the theosophical writings of Mrs. Besant. The Jainas say that the soul is immaterial; consciousness and its states are also immaterial and colourless. Colour is in matter; and matter certainly acts and reacts on the soul by the inflow and bondage (bandha) of the Karmic matter due to passions and modifications in the mental states.
1. Visesavasyakabhasya : Ganadharavada 1611-12 and commentary.
3. CAVE (Sidney) : Living Religions of the East, p.31.
4. The Laws, 870.
5. GLASENAPP (Von. H.) The Doctrine of Karma in Jaina Philosophy: (1942) Preface to the German Edition.
6. Presuppostions of India's Philosophies (Prentice Hall) 1963.
7. Presuppostions of India's Philosophies (Prentice Hall) 1963, p. 11, p. 13.
8. JUNG (J.C) : Two Essays on Analytical Psychology : Personal and collective (or transcendental unconscious) p. 76. Footnote.
9. RADHAKRISHNAN(S.) : Indian Philosophy, Vol. (1941); pp. 109, 110.
10. TATIA (N.) : Studies in Jaina Philosophy (1951) p. 220.
11. GLASENAPP Von. (H) : The Doctrine of Karma in Jaina Philosophy Preface to he German Edition.
12. NINISM SMART : Doctrine and Argument in Indian Philosophy, (Allen and Unwin) (1964): p. 163.
13. Samnyasa Upanisad: II 28; Karmana badhyate jantuh.
14. Brhadaranyaka Up, ii, 2, 13.
15. Yamakami Sogen; Systems of Buddhist Philosophy (1912) pp. 50-66.
16. The Aryan Path; April 1961, The Buddhist Doctorine of karma by Bhadanta Bhikshu Sangharakshita; p.152
17. Glasenapp, Von; The Doctorine of karma in jaina philosophy, p.15.
18. Dravyasmagraha, 2
19. Tattvartha-sutra, 6. 1.
20. Tattvartha-sutra, 6. 1.
21. GLASENAPP. Von. (H) : The doctrine of karma in Jaina philosophy. Foreword by ZIMMERMAN.
22. Astashasri (N.S. Press, Bombay 1915) : p.51, anyonyakaryakara nabhavajnapanarthatvat.
23. Karma grantaht, 3.2
24. Pancasikayasira, 62
25. Karma Prakrti: Bandhanakarana . Sankrampante nyokarmarupataya vyavasthitah prakrti sthity-anubhagapradesa anyakarmarupatya vyavastha pyante yena tat samkramanam.
27. Karmaprakrti: Bandhanakarana: Cf. Sankramanam. tadbhedavartanapavartane, te ca karmanam sthityanubhagasraye.
28.Karmagrantha II o8 b.; Tattvarthasutra; VIII.25.
29. Glasenapp. Von (H): Doctrine of Karma in Jaina Philosophy ntroduction.
30. Prameyakamalmartanda of Prabacandra  edn. p. 243
31. Astasahasri (N. S. Press,, Bombay 1915), pp. 50-51.
32. Tattwartha-sloka-warttika: (N. S Press Bombay 1918, p. 447.
33. Karmngrantha: I I .78.9.
34. GLASSENAPP. Von. (H); Doctrine of Karma in Jaina Philosophy - Introduction.
35. SCHWEITZER: Indian Thought and its Development, pp. 8283,
36. RADHAKRISHNAN(S): Hindu View of Life, p. 73.
37. RADHAKRISHNAN(S); Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 224.
38. RADHAKRISHNAN(S): Hindu View of Life, p. 76.
39. PAUL (C. S.) The Suffering God (1932), p. 6O.
40. PAUL (C. S.): The Suffering God, ( 1932) p 60.
41. SMART NINIAN: Doctrine and Argument in Indian Philosophyp
42. RADHAKRISHNAN(S); Hindu View of Life, 75.
45. Karama Grantha, II
46. SIGFRID ESTBORN, THe Doctorine of Salvation, (1858) p. 68
47. A Seth Fringle Patison: The Idea of Immortality, (1922) p. 115
50. Ibid. p.119
51. Ibid. p.120
52. Radhakrishnan(S) Idealistic View of Life, (1961) p.218
53. Sigfrid Esborn: The Christian Doctorine of Salvation, (1958), p. 70
54. Radhakrishanan S: Idealistic View of Life, p. 219
55 . A. SETH FRINGLE-PATTISON: The Idea of Immortality, p. 122.
56. PAUL C. S.: The Suffering God (1929), p. 67.
57. HOLMES (EDMOND): The Quest of an Ideal, p. 98.
58. WARREN (H. C.): Baddhism Translations (1922) P.48
59. Visesavasyaka bhasya, Ganadharavada. 1611-1612.
60. Upadhya (A. N.): Proceedings and Transactions 7th All India Oriental Conference 1933, pp. 392395.
61. Gommatasara :Jiva Kanda, XV, also Uttaradhyaana Sutra, Chap. XXXIV.
62. Uttaradhyayana Sutra . LeCt. XXXIV. SBE VOI. Il, footnote.
63. RADHAIKRISHNAN (S): Indian Philosophy. VOI. I. (1941), P. 320 Footnoto.
64. Gommatasara .Jivakanda. Chap. XV, PP. 507-509.
65. Uttaradyayana Sutra, Lect. XXXIV.
66. Gommatasara . Jivakanda, XV, and Karmakandaa II, 503-505.
67. S.B E. VOI, XLV. IntrOd. PP. XXX.
69. UPADHYA, (A. N.) . Proceedings and Transactions 7th All India Conference (1933), pp. 393-397.
70. Pravacanasara (i) 55-56. (ii) 40.
71. Digha Nikaya (iii) 20.
72. DASGUPTA History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I p. 74
73. JAINI (J. L,), Outlines of Jainism, p. 45.
74. Thoughtforms by Mrs. BESANT and C. W. LEADBESTER 1905.
THE PATHWAY TO PERFECTION:
The end as Moksa -- need for physical and mental discipline -- Jaina Yoga as compared with Patanjali Yoga -- stages of Yoga -- Dhyana -- types of Dhyana -- psychological analysis of Dhyana -- Yoga and Sivayoga compared -- Gunasthana as stages in the spiritual progress -- analysis of fourteen Gunasthanas -- the final stage – Jaina Mysticism.
I. Moksa is the ideal of life. Supernormal experiences, like the yogaja-pratyaksa, arsa jnana, and avadhi, manahparyaya are only incidental. Kevala is symptomatic of the realization of the consummate end of life. Moksa is to be realized through self-discipline in the affective, the cognitive and conative sense. Samyag-caritra is as important as Samyagdarsana and jnana. The way to self-realization is primarily ethical. If deliverance is to be achieved, the lower matter is to be subdued by the higher spirit. When the soul is free from the weight which keeps it down, it rises to the top of the universe where the liberated dwell. The radical conversion of the inner man is the way to freedom."
The Jainas were aware that physical and mental discipline are-necessary conditions of moral discipline. Knouledge and faith are preliminary steps on the path of self-realization. Ordinary sources of knowledge are not adequate to comprehend the nature of truth. Reason fails here. Kant shoued that categories of understanding are fraught with antinomies. One has to transcend reason and seek the truth in the supernormal forms of experience. Implicit faith in the truth to be sought is necessary. It is the starting point of self-realization. Samkara's prescription of the four qualifications of a student of philosophy as stated in the commentary on the first Sutra of the Vedanta Sutra, is very pertinent in the case of those who seek the truth. There are different processes which lead us from faith to the reatization of the final end. Meditation (dhyana) is an important factor in this process. One cannot grasp the truth unless one meditates on it; and one cannot realize it unless one grasps it. Meditation on the nature of the Self is the highest form of Dhyana. One reaches the stage of mieditation on the self when one is free from passions and is self-controlled, self-control is in turn, possible through the practice of physical and mental discipline. Thus the ancient Indian philosophers developed a science of self-realisation called Yoga. They have been in general agreement regarding the principles and practice of Yoga. The Yoga prescribed by Patanjali regards moral and physical discipline to be indispensable preliminaries to the spiritual progress. The Jainas are in agreement with the fundamental principles and practice of this system. Among the Jaina authors Haribhadra gives a comparative study o£ Yoga in his works. The .Jnananava of Subhacandra and the Yoga-sastra of Hemacandra are valuable contributions to the study a£ Yoga as a science of spiritual progress.
II. In ancient India, Yoga was a science of self-realization. The word occurs in Rgveda meaning 'bringing about connection'. In the Atharva-veda it is stated that supernatural powers are attained by the ascetic practices'. Later it was used in the sense of yoking a horse. The senses have been compared to the unbridled horses and Yoga is the means of controlling the horses. In the Jaina literature, Haribhadra defines Yoga as that which leads one to emancipation', and the terms dhyana and samadhi were more in vogue than yoga. It is only in the Yoga-sutra of Patanjali that we find the proper location of Dhyana in the whole process called Yoga. However, Patanjali probably did not start the Yoga school, but he must have collected the different forms of practices and gleaned the diverse ideas which were and could be associated with Yogas. Yoga, as we see now, is to be cosidered as a fully developed science of self-realization.
The Yogatattva Upanisad mentions four types of Yoga: 1) Hathayoga is one in which the primary aim is to control bodily activities. 2) Mantra-yoga aims at healing the diseased by means of mantra or incantations of certain esoteric hymns. It is based on the influence of suggession as psychological factor. 3) Layayoga is based on the physiological analysis of human organism. The aim is to effect concentration on an image through the Mantras and to be absorbed and lost in them. 4) The last is the Rajayoga. It is Pitanjala Yoga. Its aim is higher; and it consists in achieving spiritual beatitude, though bodily control is a part of Patanjati's Yoga. According to S. Dasagupta, the Yoga practices grew in accordance with the doctrines of the Saiva and Sakta schools and assumed a peculiar form as the Mantrayoga. They grew in another direction as Hathayoga through constant practices of nervous exercises and produced mystical and magical feats. The influence of these practices in the development of Tantra was also great. Jaigisavya in his Dharmasastra mentions different parts of the body like heart, tip of the nose, palate, forehead and the centre of the brain as centres of memory where, concentration can be made. 
Moral discipline is a necessary condition for the practice of Yoga leading to spiritual realization. The purpose of moral discipline ls to remove the bondage due to Karma. The Jaina theory of morality is centred round the principle of ahimsa, non-violence. Patanjali also gives prominence to nonviolence in moral discipline. The Jainas have distinguished two levels in the practice of morality: i) for the lay follower (sravaka), and ii) for the ascetic (muni.). However, some general principles are embodied in their theory of morality, Five Vratas (vows) are to be practiced more rigorously by the Muni bnt with less rigour by the layman. In the former case they are called Mahavratasr and in the latter Anuvratas. The five vows are: i) ahimsa. (nonviolence), ii) satya, (truth, iii) asteya (non-stealing), iv) brahmacarva (celibacy) and v) aparigraha (abstinence from personal possessions. A number of ways have been prescribed for the observation of the vows. For instance, regulation of movement (iryasamiti)? and control of thought (manogupti) are prescribed for the practice of non-violence. What is important is the cultivation of equanimity and indifference to the things of the world. Friendship(maitri) right understanding (pramoda) compassion (karunyai and indifference towards evil (madhyasthya)are qualities seeking self-realisation, This in brief is the moral practice as a background to self-realization. In the Yoga Sutra, yama and niyama are the ethical preparations for Yoga, Without this moral training , practice of Yoga will not succeed. Yama is negative in value and Niyama gives the code of observances. The five vows mentioned by the Jainas are also given by Patanjali. The Yama is universal validity regardless of differences of caste and country, age and condition. Niyama is for self-purification. The observances are austerity (tapas), contentment (samtosa), purification (sauca) and ,devotion to God (Isvarapranidhana). By practising Yama and Niyama one develops vairagya or detachment and freedom from desires. It may be noted that surrender to God is not an end in itself. It is only to be means to the attainment of the proper conditions for self realization. In this sense, Patanjali's Yoga is a scientific discipline. The idea of God is a useful hypothesis which give a focus, a pulley ring as it were, on, which the weight of consciousness can be lifted. Similarly for Haribhadra, Yoga consists of religious activity so far as it leads one to final emancipation, though there is no place for God in Jainism. Haribhadra gives prominence to five types of practices in Yoga: i) sthana. (proper posture) ii urna (correct utterance or sound, iii) artha (proper understanding and iv) alambana(concentration, of abstract attributes of Tirthakara The first two of these are external activities preparatory to the, practice of concentration. The last three are inner activity (jnana Yoga). Those who have reached the fifth stage of Gunaasthana (spiritual progress, viz., Desaaviratasamyagdrsti, can practice Yoga Sthana and Urna are qualifying conditions for practising Dhyana (concentration).The Jnanarnava describes the conditions of Asana. A selfcontrolled man may select a suitable place, like the top of mountain, the bank of a river, etc. for the practice of concentration. Some asanas like paryarika, vira, subha and kamala are said to be most suitable. The object of an asana is to enable one to be free from physical discomfort and the conquest mental distraction.
Similarly,pranayama is a preparation for the concentration of mind. Subhacandra, like Patanjali realised the importance of Pranayama. Three forms of Pranayama were suggested: i) Puraka ii) Kumbhaka and iii) Recaka. ' Pratyahara is given an important place in the stages of Yoga. Here the senses are withdrawn from the external object and fixed on the internal function. However, the ethical preparation, asana, pranayama, and pratyahara are only accessories to Yoga and not themselves elements of it. ln the practice of Dhyana, the first stage is concentration on the image of a Tirthakara. This is the concrete symbol for concentration. After achieving steadfastness in this concentration, one should practice concentration on the abstract qualities of a Tlrthankara.The practice of Yoga is closely connected with the various stages of spiritual realization (gunasthana). Dhyana ls in its primary stage in the seventh Gunasthana apramatta-samyata). The urge to self-realization leads us to the eighth stage of Gunasthana, called Apurva-karana: greater self-control and a more definite progress on the path of self-realization are possible in this stage. Steadfastness of concentration gradually develops till one reaches the twelfth stage of (gunasthana. called ksina-moha in which the passions are altogether subdued. ln this stage, the transcendental self is possible to be realized. We have. here, analambana yoga. This is the state of omniscience. It is often compared to the asampra-jnata-samadhi of Patanjali. Still, there is a higher stage of self realization. In the fourteenth stage of Gunasthana called ayoga-kevali all activity is stopped; and the soul attains final emancipation. It is analogous to the dharmamegha of the Patanjali's system, to the amrtatman of another system and to the para of still another.
As one goes ascending in the stages of self-realization and the practice of yoga, one gradually develops the perspective of truth (drsti). This gradual development has been classified into eight stages: mitra, tara, bala, dipra, sthira, kanta, prabha and para. The eight drstis are compared to the eigbtfold stages (astanga of Patanjali's Yoga. As we go higher in the stages of Drsti the perspective of truth becomes clearer; and, finally, in the last stage one reaches the Samadhi, the consummation of Dhyana.
Practice of Yoga may be actuated by i) love ( prtti. ii) rev rence (bhakti). iii) duty prescribed by scriptures (agama) and iv) no consideration (asamga). When the spiritual activity is done out of love or reverence, it leads to wordly or other worldly prosperity (abhyudaya). If it is done as a duty or with no motive whatever, it leads to final emancipation.
But Haribhadra is aware of some difficulties in the practice of Yoga and the attainment of supernormal experience. He says that we have to overcome some physical and mental inhibition before practising the Yoga exercises. The mind of the common man (prathagjanacitta) is vitiated by many defects. Eight defects 'have been mentioned: i) inertia (kheda, ii) anxiety (dveg) iii) unsteadiness (ksepa). iv) distraction (utthana). v) loss of memory (bhranty). vi) attraction for what is not desirable (anyamud) vii) mental disturbance (ruk) and viii) attachment (samga)
In the practice of Yoga one is likely to acquire some physical and mental powers which are beyond the common man. But these are distractions and would lead us away from the final goal. The Jainas were primarily concerned with the purification of the soul and the development of detachment from the things of the world. They were against the use of paranormal powers and miracle. This was the general view of other lndian philosophers as well Patanjali mentions the acquisition of such powers by the Yogi and warns him against temptations associated with these powers.26] The Yoga believes that the citta of man is like a millstone. If we put wheat under it, it grinds it into flour; if we put nothing under it, it grinds on until it grinds itself away.
In the highest stage omniscience (kevala) is attained. This is not merely a negative state of knowledge. In this, one gets experience of everything, past, present and future, as if in a moment. In the highest form of samadhi, according to Patanjali, all possibility of confusion between the self and the activity of the citta ceases.
Concentration of mind (Dhyana) is an essential factor as a means to spiritual realization. The lower self sometimes gets the vision of perfection in its purified state and aims at the attainment of this ideal. On the attainment of prominent vision knowledge the self rises to its own pure state ( paramatma). Dhyana is the concentration of thought in a particular object, for a certain length of time. The duration of concentration depends on the bodily constitution, The maximum time of concentration can be, for one antarmuhurta (about forty-eight minutes) Dhyana is further inauspicious (aprasasta) and auspicious (prasasta). Aprasasta Dhyana leads to the influx of Karma (asrava) and the bondage of the, soul to the wheel of life (bandha) The auspicious Karma brings about dissociation and destruction of Karma. Arta-Dhyana and Raudradhyana are the varieties of evil concentration. Arta-dhyana is painful concentration, as when we experience the pain in the loss of a loved object or in the anguish of an unsatisfied desire. Raudradhyana is vengeful concentration as when, smarting under the injury of insult we contemplate on taking revenge. They express the pain of unsatisfied instinctive urges and are rooted, in the animal nature of man. The Jaina analysis of the lower types of Dhyana has a great psychological importance and need to be studied in the light of recent research in depth of psychology. Dharmadhyana and Sukladhyana are conditions of spiritual progress. The nature of revelation, the fact of suffering the operation of Karma and the structure of the universe are objects of Dharma-dhyana, Umasvati defines Dharmadhyana as a collection of scattered thoughts (smrtisamsnvahar ) for the sake of meditation on the objects of concentration. Jnana (knowledge), Darsana (intuition) Caritra (good conduct) and Vairagya (non-attachment) are needed for developing the steadfastness of mind for attaining concentration. A beginner has to select a suitable lonely place and convenient time. Several places made holy by the sages create a better atmosphere for Dharmadhyana. Dharmadhyana is possible from the fourth to the seventh stage of Gunasthana. As one goes higher up in the spiritual development, one should have developed sufficient physical and mental strength to aim at the final emancipation. The Jaina analysis of right concentration (Dharmadhyana) is intimately woven in the moral texture in this life. One has to practice the four-fold virtues: maitri (friendship), pramoda (appreciation or the merits of others), karuna (compassion) and madhya sthya (undisturbed equanimity) as the pre-requisites of this type of concentration.' And in the graded levels of concentration the consummation is reached when the pure and perfect self is the object of concentration. The same type of concentration is to be reached in Sukladhyana, except for the fact that in the Sukladhyan we get perfect concentration.
In the Sukladhyana the range of the objects of concentration is narrowed to the concentration of the -atom. just as poison spread over the body is first collected at a point by a mantra and then removed by a more powerful Mantra. For this type of concentration one must have good physique and must be at least in the seventh stage of Gunasthana. Four types of Sukladhyana have been mentioned. In the first two types mind concentrates on the minutest entity like the atom. 'Then it gets pure and perfect enlightenment, the last two stages lead to final emancipation. The self becomes motionless as a rock and is free from any activity of mind, body and speech, as in the state of highest Samadhi.In the practice of Dhyana first stage is concentration on the image of Tlrthakara. This is the concrete symbol for concentration. After achieving steadfastness in this concentration, one should practice concentration on the abstract qualities of a Tirthakara. The practice of Yoga is clearly connected with the various stages of spiritual realization. Dhyana in its primary stage, is in the seventh Gunasthana. Steadfastness and concentration gradually develop till one reaches the twelfth stage of Gunasthana. In this stage, the transcendental self is possible to be realized.
The analysis of Dhyana so far given has a psychological and moral significance. Body and mind have to work together. Physical strength is the precondition of mental concentration. The Jainas have not been negative in this respect. The body is not merely meant to be cast away as something unholy. Self mortification is not an end in itself, but is only to be understood as a means to an end for the attainment of perfection. Moral life has also to be emphasised as an important means to the attainment of the highest ideal of perfection. The problem has been looked at from different points of view. In this sense, the spirit of Anekanta pervades the analysis of the psychological conditions of perfection as expressed in Dhyana.
Having studied the practice of Yoga as the pathway to perfection in the light of the eightfold principles of Patanjali's Yogawe may add a comparative note on Jaina Yoga and Sivayoga as presented by the Virasaiva philosophers. The object of this study is to present a synoptic picture of the pathway to perfection and to see how the spirit of Anekanta pervades the application of this principle.
As civilization advances, there is a gradual change in the manifestation of thought and action. In the early stages of civilization, life was simple and confined itself to interaction between fewer individuals. The environment was smaller, the material facilities were comparatively meagre. Self expression could be narrowed to the withdrawal of the mind from external. Yoga was an instrument to attain peace of mind. But as we advance in external developments, life became complex, and men were rooted and absorbed in the overt activities of life. It was difficult for most men to practice physical and mental discipline on a scale possible in the early stages of civilisation, when problems were few and life was simple. New ways to self-realisation had to be adopted, conforming to the social structure and suited to the individual living, in complex societies. This gave prominence to the devotional method (bhakti-yoga) as a means to the realisation of the self. Revival of bhakti-marga as a means of purification and love, may be for absorption in the highest, is an important step in the development of the self. Bhaktiyoga is implied in the Sivayoga which the Virasaiva saints preached. The second principle of Sivayoga is Sakti. Some have suggested that Yoga must have its origin in i) Hiranyagarbha and ii) Rudra. The former has a predominantly cognitive orientation and the latter is permeated with cognition and will. Hiranyagarbha Yoga is presented in the Patanjala Yoga and the Rudrayoga is shown in the Saivagamas. Where the first ends, the second begins.
The ultimate end of a Virasaiva is liberation from the bonds of the life. Positively it is union with the Highest, which may be described as aikya. The realization of this end lies in self-surrender and mergence of the self in God. It is Sivatva. The end to be attained is not merely to discard nor to transcend, the life of existence, but to divinise the human and to spiritualize the material. The way to realise this end is through the spiritualization of the human and devotion to the Highest. It is achieved through a special form of Yoga called Sivayoga.
Yoga may be identified with Sadhana. According to different traditions of thought different forms have been recognised. Virasaiva philosophers recognise different forms of Yoga and their efficacy in their own way. But Sivayoga has distinct features which make it suitable for the way of selfrealization followed on the basis of self-surrender (sarana and devotion (bhakti) coupled with the necessary energy of self realisation (sakti). It emphasizes a synthesis of discipline and devotion. The Kaivalyakalpavallari of Sarpabhusana Sivayogi is a poetic presentation of the four types of Yoga, showing their inherent defects.
Hathayoga may enable one to control the bodily and mental functions and make it possible for one to get paranormal powers. It does not lead us to the path of spiritual progress. In his advice -to Goraksa, Allama prabhu exhorts him to give up the acrobatics of physical and mental exercises which may stupefy human beings but will not lead to the path of spiritual progress. Men practicing Hathayoga cannot be convinced of their folly, as a blind man cannot see his image in the mirror.
The same can be said of those practising Mantrayoga. Those who practice Mantrayoga through the incantations of hymns, like Om, Om namah sivaya, etc., practice suitable Asanas and at specific times of the day. But it will lead to mechanical development of certain types of mental habit and not to the final spiritual progress. In the Layayoga one practices concentration of mind on an image of a God or any object of concentration by the physiological processes. ida, pingala and nadi. This is a lower form of concentration which is analogous to the Arta-dhyana of the Jainas. But such a type of Yoga and concentration is not useful for developing one's way to self-realization. It is not possible to reach Moksa by this method Allama Prabhu exhorts the hermits in the forests not to be fascinated by such practices of self-mortification.
PatanJali's Yoga has been considered as Rajayoga. In this self-realization is to be attained, not by the objective use of the mind, but by the suppression of the activities of mind. All mental states and events have to be held up so as to remove the impediments in the way of this end. The eightfold path enunciated by the Patanjali's Yoga gives the methods of attaining this highest end of Samadhi, almost developing the steps into a science of mental control. Still, in the Patanjali's Yoga, as also among the Jainas, though physical health is not the end of human life, it is still one of the essential conditions. It is to be treated as only a means to an end. Even surrender to a spiritual power like God is to be considered as a useful step for concentration, and not an end in itself. The idea of God is a useful hypothesis for Patanjali.
Sivayoga is different from the four types of Yoga so far described, although it contains the essential elements of Rajayoga as a method. The cardinal principles of Sivayoga are:
(i) Belief in the existence of the Supreme Being, God, and the ultimate end of the human life as union with the Highest (Linganga-aikya) .
ii) Devotion and self-surrender to the Highest as a principal way to this end bhakti, and we may mention sarana interpreted as self-surrender.
iii) Sakti (or psychic and spiritual energy) leading the devotee to the final goal. Sivayoga, as we mentioned earlier, is a synthesis of the devotional and the conative aspects of human efforts to self-realization.
iv) Astangayoga of Patanjali is also made use of to the extent necessary. The final end is the aikya sthala. It is to be realised by the devotee. Physical and mental discipline has to be practiced to the extent necessary to reach this goal.
The first principle of Sivayoga is belief in the existence of God, and the ultimate end is to be united (aikya) with God. In the Patanjali's Yoga, the ultimate end is to free the self ( purusa) from the bonds of prakrti (matter). The idea of God v as not an integral part of the Samkhya, and consequently of the Yoga philosophy. Devotion and self-surrender to God is an integral element of Sivayoga. But self-surrender need not involve self-sacrifice to the deity even at the cost of selfeffacement. The earlier forms of self surrender did sometimes involve sacrifice of one's body, of one's child, etc. The story of Bedar Kannappa shows that such forms of self-surrender were present in the early devotional literature. Siva-yoga does not admit of such expressions. Allama Prrbhu shows the way to Goggayya by pointing out that prasada is the right way and ahuti is the wrong way. This attitude emphasizes that non-violence is the fundamental principle of the Virasaivas also. In self-surrender there is selfeffacement and the elimination of the ego-sense. 'This is evident in the hummility Basavesvara shows to Allama Prabhu.
In Sivayoga the power of will for spiritual progress (samkalpa sakti) is an important element for the realisation of the highest end. In this, the physical and the mental are not negated, but transmuted and transcended. The bodily and the mental are purified and divinised through the power of the cit sakti. The force of samkalpa sakti is expressed through piyusa-granthi the pineal gland. The fuller expression of potential powers in the pineal gland will lead the individual to the acquisition of omniscience and spiritual force leading to the state of union with the Absolute. The integral Yoga of Shree AUROBINDO also emphasizes the primacy of samkalpa sakti in the programme of self-realisation. In Sivayoga, as also in integral Yoga, the bodily and the mental are not denied. To this end, we have to use the methods of Astanga of Patanjali for self-purification. It is not necessary to go through the impossible process of the eight stages of Raja-yoga in all their rigidity. That would distract us from the main path, reaching union with God. What is needed is a simple process of Yoga which is possible for even the common men, women and children. This type of Sadhana is possible through Istalingapuja-karma and the concentration through trataka. 
In the Sivayoga-darpana we get a description of the characteristics of Sivayoga. Five forms of Sivayoga have been mentioned: 1) sivajnana, 2) sivadhyana, 3) sivapuja, 4) sivavrata and 5) sivacara. The attainment of Sivayoga is possible through the practice of samyaknadanusamdhana which consists in right worship and concentration. There are five forms of nada. The symbol of Om is significant. Yoga through sambhavi mudra is a significant step in Sivayoga. In the eye is the infinite energy of the sun, the moon and the fire. The detailed description of the practice of Sivayoga as given in this book would be beyond the scope of this work.
However, it is stated that the importance of Sivayoga can be known by Siva only and not by others. This process of Yoga would lead us to the supreme experience. Therefore it is also called Sivanubhava Yoga.
In this sense, we can also say that there is some agreement between Sivayoga and the Yoga preached by Patanjali in that the fundamental stages are accepted in both. But we may say that Sivayoga has democratised Patanjali's Yoga in the sense that it has given men the possibility of reaching the goal. It has emphasized the importance of Anubhava as a mystical element in the culmination of this process of Yoga. 1
The analysis so far made shows that the Jaina Yoga and the Siva Yoga aim at perfection. To be free from the empirical and the contingent and to reach perfection are the negative and the positive elements in the final goal of self-realization.
But the Jaina way is individualitic and rigoristic. The bodily and the mental are empirical adjuncts to be eliminated if possible and also to be used in the process of reaching the highest, as one uses a ferry boat to cross the river and does not carry the boat along with him after reaching the other side, out of gratitude for the boat. Therefore, it is apter to say that the Jainas do not discard the body and aim at its crucifixion only. For them, as for others, the body and bodily health are as necessary for Yoga as discarding of the mental activity is necessary (cittavrtti-nirodha).
For a Virasaiva the final end is unity with the Absolute. Belief in God and surrender to God are cardinal principles in Sivayoga-The Jainas do not believe in a supreme deity, like God. There is no place for divine grace either. We have to depend on our own efforts, as every soul is divine.
The ontological status of the individual soul in the moksa is different in the two religions. The Virasaiva aims at union with the Absolute (aikya), while for the Jaina each soul retains its individuality in the highest stage. This has perhaps given the Jainas the need to emphasize the methods of the astangayoga as a discipline and a method.
We can say that the end of human life, according to Indian philosophers, except perhaps the Carvakas, is liberation from the bonds of empirical existence. Moksa, as the ideal, is difficult to attain. Few have attained it; and the attainment of such a trans empirical end had to be adjusted according to the needs of individuals in the light of the prevailing social structure. Therefore, to compare one type of Yoga as against the other without understanding the background would be a grievous error. We have to look at this problem in the full perspective of life. Moreover, it is difficult to understand the comparative significance of Yoga unless one lives it.
IV. The soul has the inherent capacity for self realization. But self-realization is a long process. In the course of its eternal wanderings in various forms of existence, the soul at some time gets an indistinct vision and feels an impulse to realise it. The soul has to go through the various stages of spiritual development. These stages are called gunasthana, and they are linked up with stages of subsidence and destruction of the Karmic veil. These are fourteen stages of spiritual development. The first stage is characterised by the presence of mithyadrsti, perversity of attitude. Here we accept wrong belief and are under the false impression that what we believe is right. This is caused by the operation of mithyatva-karman. However, we are right. Still, due to perversity of attitude we do not relish the truthjust as a man suffering from fever has no taste for sugarcane.
The next stage is called sasvadana-samyagdrsti. It is a halting and transitory stage in which one may get the vision of truth but is likely to fall back on falsehood due to the excitement of passions. In the third stage, of samyagmithyadrsti we have a mixed attitude of right and wrong belief. There is neither a desire to have true beliefs nor a desire to remain in ignorance. It is like mixing curds and treacle. This also is a transitional stage. Next comes the stage o£ right attitude, samyagdrsti. One gets a glimpse of the truth. Yet one has not the spiritual strength to strive for the attainment of it. In this stage we have attained knowledge, but we lack moral effort as we have not yet developed self-control. From the next stage onwards there is gradual expression of self-control. We may compare these four stages to the state of the persons in Plato's parable of the cave'. The prisoners in the cave would see their own shadows and the shadows of other men and animals. And they would mistake the shadows for realities. This is the stage of mithyatva. If one were to be released, the glare of the light would distress him; and he would persist in maintaining the superior truth of the shadows. This is the stage of sasvddana. But once he gets accustomed to the change, he will be able to see things, and gaze upon the light of the moon and the stars and the spangled heavens. And once he gets the clear vision, he will realize the folly of his fellow prisoners and pity them.
Desavirata-samyagdrsti is the next higher stage of spiritual development, in which we get partial efforts for self control in addition to the possession of the knowledge of truth. There is a partial destruction of Karmic matter which produces passions. Full practice of virtues would not be possible, because there is the possibility of the influence of passions.
In the next stage, the moral effort takes a more definite shape, although it is not always successful. A person has a more or less steady glimpse of the truth; and he tries to develop self-control and the obstacles to the practice of virtues are overcome in the sixth stage. But even here, the moral life and the spiritual struggle are not fully successful, because their full expression is vitiated by moral and spiritual inertia. This inertia is called pramada. And pramada is overcome in the seventh stage of apramattasamyata. Efforts to reach moral excellence take definite shape. The operation of Karma preventing perfect conduct is very feeble; and minor passions called kasayas are also subdued. We can now practice the five great vows and the twenty-four virtues. The process of adhah pravrtti karana, by which the soul on a lower level can rise higher, begins to operate in this stage.]56]
The eighth stage is called apurvakarana It leads to greater and more definite self-control. The self attains special purification, and is capable of reducing the intensity and duration of Karma. The Gommatasara gives a detailed description of the process of apurvakarana operating in this stage. In this stage, one is affected
only by the mild affective states. It is possible to develop stoic attitude. In the stage of development called anivrtibadara samparaya. it is possible to overcome even the milder emotional disturbances with greater confidence and ease. We have, here established ourselves as moral and spiritual individuals, although sometimes slight emotional afflictions are possible. In the tenth stage of suksmasamparaya, only greed disturbs us and that too slightly. Except for this disturbance, one is passionless and calm. This subtle greed can be interpreted as the subconscious attachment to the body even in souls which have achieved great spiritual advancement. But one is free from even the slightest passions in the eleventh Gunasthana, of upasantamoha. Still the affections are not altogether eliminated. They are only suppressed through the pressure of moral effort. We are mostly free from the baneful influence of the Karma, except the deluding Karma (mohaniya karman). This state is called chadmastha. It is also called vitaraga, as one is able to remain calm and undisturbed through the suppression of Karma. In the next stage, of upasantamoha, there is annihilation of Karma and not mere suppression. And when all the passions and the four types of Ghati-karma are destroyed one reaches the thirteenth stage of spiritual development, called sayogakevali. One is free from the bondage of Karma, yet is not free from-activity and bodily existence as the ayuhkarma is still to be exhausted. In this stage, we find omniscient beings like Tirthamkaras, Ganadharas and the Samanya Kevalins. They attain enlightenment, but still live in this world preaching the truth that they have seen. This state can be compared to the state of Jivanmukta. The Vedantasara describes this state as that of the enlightened and liberated man who is yet alive in this physical world. Though he may appear to be active in this world yet he is inactive, like the man who assists a magician in a magic show yet knows that all that is shown is illusory. Zimmer ,compares the attitude of the Kevalins in this stage to the function of a lamp lighting the phenomenal expersonality solely for the maintenance of the body, not for the pursuit of any gratification of sense or any goal." 
The final stage of self realization is the stage of absolute perfection. All empirical adjuncts, like the bodily functions, are removed. The soul enters the third stage of sukla-dhyana. This state lasts only for the period of time required to pronounce five short syllables.60] At the end of this period the soul attains perfect and disembodied liberation. It is described as the state of Parabrahma or Niranjana. It is not possible to give, as Radhakrishnansays, a positive description of the liberated soul.. It is a state of freedom from action and desire, a state of utter and absolute quiescence. Zimmer shows that, in this state, the individuality the masks, the formal personal features are distilled away like drops of rain that descend from the clear sky, tasteless and emasculate.
1. RADHAKRISHNAN(S): Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 325.
3. Katha. Up. llI.4. . Maitr. Up. 2.
4. Haribhadra: Yogavimsika
5. TATIA (Nathumal): Studies in Jaina Philosophy, p. 262, Footnote .
6. DASGUPTA (S). History of Indian Philosophy; Vol I. P 229.
7. DASGUPTA(S) History of Indian Philosophy. Vol. 1, p. 229.
8. Vatsayana Nayabhasya, III. ii.43.
9. Ratnakarandka Sravakacara, 49.
10. Tattvarthasutra. VIII,6.
11. Yogasutra . II.30. ,
12. Yogasutra . Il.3l as interpreted by RADHAKRISHNAN(S) in Indian Philosophy, Vol. II. P 353
13. STOCKER(Geraldine). Yoga and.Western,.Psychology, p.82.
14. Yogavimsika of Haribhadra. 1-2;
16. Jnanarnava of Subhacandra. XXVIII
17. Jnanarnava of Subhachandra, XXIX,
18. Jnanarnava XXX.
19.. RADHAKRISHNAN(S), Indian Philosophy, Vol. III, p. 357.
20.. Sadasaka Prakarna of Haribhadra, XV.
21. Yogavimiki of Haribhadra, 20.
22. Yogavimiki of Haribhadra II
23. Yogadrstisumuccaya of Haribhudra, 3.9
24, Sodasakaprakarana.of Haribhadra, X.9.
25. Sodasaka Prakarana ol Haribhadra. XIV., 3.
26. Yogasutra of Patanjali, Ch.lll.15, 46 and 5l . tadvairagyadapidosabijaksapa kaivalyam.
27. RADHAKRISHNA (S) . Indian Philosophy, Vol. II, p. 362.
28. Tattvarthasutra . IX,27, Ekagra-intaniroddhyanam.
29. Dhyanasataka 2.3. Antarmuhutrtam,.
30. Tattvaarthvsutra . IX,31-35, With Commentary.
31. Tattavarthasutra . IX. 34-35, commentary.
32. Dhyansataka 30-34 :
33. Jnanarnava . XXVII, 4-l5.
34. Dhyanasataka . 71-72.
35. Dhyanasataka 71-72.
36. Virasaiva . A Quarterly journal of All India Virasaiva Maha Sabha Dharwar, Vol, II, No. 7. December 1961. Article by Shree KUMARASWAMY of Navakalyana matha, Dharwar.
37. Shree KUMARASWAMY, Navakalyanamatha, Dharwar, Vuasaiva Philosophy and Mysticisms p. 52.
38.Sri SARRABHUSANA SIVAYOGI: Kaivalyakalpavallart III Yogaprasthana
39. Prabhulimgalile of Camarasa . edited by BASAVANAL, Goraksana-gati .19 stanza 20. (Kannada) "tannanariyada mandamarigali, ginnu pera ranthastavembudu kannakanada kuruda kannadividida teranante ...
40.. gati 19 stanza 20, nohodali mayaprapamcina dehasiddhiya . padeda-nimbi gahiuindali vajrapindasatwa phalisidode uhisuvoda pralayanu samdek
avillade geluveyo sudu dehasiddhiyanenutala prabhu khandeyava bisuta.
41. Jnanajyoti edited by Shri Santalingswamy and Prof. B. C. Javali (1963) p, 24. Yoga and Sivayoga ,(Kannada), Also refer to SivaYoga pradipike of Shri Channa Sadasiva Yoga pradipike of Shri Channa Sadasiva Yogindra with ommentary ViraSaiva, grantha-prakasika No. 9 (1913) p. 14.
42. Kaivalya Kalpavallam of Sarpabhusana Sivayoga t2. Yogaprati padana-sthala-pallavi.
43. Prabhulimgalile Allamaprabhu, gati 20-32 adopted in the prose edition by Prof. B. C. JAVALI and MALLAVADI ( 1962) Snana japatapa, dhyana vedadhyana enu madidadenu? Nuda toredu kadahokku phalavenu? jivana haniharibavannu tiliyadiddare? sudali nimma karmava."
Also refer to Sivayoga-darpana (Kannada) Saddharma Granthamala 14 (1933) 9-12 pp. 35.
44. STOCKER (Gereldioe) Yoga and Western Psychology . p. 82.
45. Refer to Prabhulimgalile ed . S. BASAVANAL 1956 . II PP. 131136 for detailed description.
47.2 Virasaiva Quarterly ( Kannada) Vol, Il, No. 7, article by Shree KUMARASWAMI of Navakalvanamatha.
48. Ibid. Also refer to article by Prof. VRSABHEENDRASWAMI of Karnatak University in Vol. II, No, 6. Prof. VRSAA8HEENDRASWAMI has suggesated a new interpretation of the word 'garagasa' as canalising the breadth through the the throat to tho centre of the brain.
49. Prabhulingalile. p.200.
50. Samukha Sivayogi: as quoted in Jnanajyoti; 'na bhedah siva-Yogasya rajayogasya tattvatah.'
51, Sanmukha sivayogi ; Akhandesvara Vacana: Ratnakara Varni emphasizes the impossibility of understanding Yoga without living it.
52. Gommatsara-Jivakanda, 17.
53. Ibid . p. 22.
54. Plato, the Republic. VII.
55. Gommatasata-Jivakanda, 30 and Commentary,
56. Ibid. 48. 49.
57. TATIA (N); Studies in Jaina Philosophy, p. 27.
58. Vedantasara 219.
59. ZIMMER (H); Philosophies of India Edt. Campbell, p.446.
60. Dhyanasataka. 82.
61. RADHAKRISHNAN(S); Indian Philosophy, Vo1. I, p. 233.
62. ZIMMER (H): Philosophies of India, p. 260.
IN THIS OUR LIFE:
Jaina ethics -- samyaktva -- samyakcaritra as Munidharma and Sravaka dharma -- ethical codes analysed – mahavratas -- samitis, five types of sense control, and avasyakas -- Sravakadharma -- anuvratas, gunavratas and siksavratas -- eleven Pratimas -- the spirit of Anekanta pervading the Jaina ethics -- a note on Samlekhana as a step to towards self-realization -- Samlekhana as a form of suicide refuted -- a note on Ahimsa -- Ahimsa as Mahavrata and Anuvrata -- interpretation of Ahimsa.
1. We have so far seen the pathway to perfection through practice of Yoga and the stages of self realization. But the transcendental perfection is to be rooted in the empirical life; as cannot ignore the empirical for the transcendental. We have first to learn to live a good life in this world and then we can go higher to spiritual perfection, or else it would be like one aiming at climbing the Mount Everest without setting a foot on the base camp without training oneself for mountaineering. Moral excellence is therefore, as much important as spiritual perfection.
It has been alleged that the Jaina outlook, as of other ancient Indian thought, is negative. In their zeal for the other worldly ends they have ignored the things of the world; life negation and not life affirmation is the dominant spirit of their outlook; and it is throughout pessimistic. For Jainas ultimate spiritual excellence could be attained by the gradual process of getting moral excellence. The good man can reach the destiny of perfection of soul. There is no short cut to moksa. As we have seen in the last chapter, Schweitzer maintains that the problem of deliverance the Jaina and the Buddhist thought is not raised beyond ethics. In fact it was the supreme ethic, and it was an event full of significance for the thought of India. And in Indian thought category of Dharma is important. "So far as the actual ethical content concerned, Buddhism, Jainism and Hinduism are not inferior to others"  Suffering in the world is a fact.: sarvam duhkham was one of the cardinal principles of the Buddha. Misery leads to think of an escape from the bonds of this life. In this sense all philosophy is pessimistic. But, the ultimate ideal of a Jaina is perfection and life-negation is a means to an end. It is the negation empirical values of life and not of the supreme values; and ethics leads to realization of the supreme values. In the West the Helenic ideal was to be a good citizen to attain excellence in this life. The Vedic Aryans aimed at happiness and good life in the world, and heaven hereafter. The Indian seers realized that we have to transcend the empirical to reach pure perfection, or else we have no lasting peace. Yet the empirical is a stepping stone for the transcendental perfection. Moral life therefore, is important as the pathway to perfection. The ways of flesh and mind are to be channelised to the pathway to perfection giving Caesar what is due to him. Ethics for the Jainas is working in righteousness all the days of one's life. Of the triple ways to perfection enunciated by the Jainas, Samyak-caritra is equally important. It is a way leading to moksha: without hunger and thirst for righteousness we shall not enter the kingdom of perfection. Caritra is predominently activistic. lt refers to moral and spiritual excellence. lt implies willed activity, and samyakcaritra (right activity) is an important step one has to adopt in the pathway to self-realisaion. To attain samyaktva is not an easy task. One has to be ripe for it. Samyak-caritra is possible for one who has attained samyagdrsti (right faith) and Samyagjnana (right knowledge). One who has cleared the darkness of the deluding Karma and who possesses knowledge, adopts samyak-caritra. lt consists in avoiding the influx of Karma (asrava) coming as it does from the practice of himsa (injury to life), anrta (untruth), steya (stealing) and other forms of sense pleasures. Samyaktva has been assimilated to the status of a vrata and presented with five aticaras (infraction). They were enumerated as early as the Tattvarthasutra though not found in the canon. Without entering into the minor discrepancies of the Digambara and Svetambara versions of the essential qualities of Samyaktva, we may mention the characters of Samyaktva. Samyaktva (rightness) is characterised by i) samvega (spiritual craving), ii) Sama (stilling of the passion), iii) nirveda (disgust for sense pleasures), iv) bhakti (devotion), v) anukampa (compassion), vi) ninda (remorse for the evil acts of relatives and others), vii) garha (repentence expressed in the form of alocana made in the presence of guru and viii) vatsalya (loving kindness to The living). Samyaktva expresses itself in nihsanka (freedom from doubt), nihkanksa (desirelessness), nirguhana (absence of repugnance), amudha-drsti (absence of perversity of attitude).
The description of the nature of Samyaktva as shovm above has a great psychological significance. It presents the mental setting required for developing character and personality as needed for spiritual progress., The instructive tendencies and emotions have to be channelized and directed by transformation and sublimation with a view to attaining mental equipoise. Ethically considered the characteristics of Samyak-caritra present a background and a canvas for the illumination of one's self towards the goal of attaining perfect equanimity and spiritual strength.
II. Samyakcaritra has been distinguished into two types: i) sakala (complete) and ii) vikala (partial) . Sakala-caritra is the rigorous practice of Dharma and is to be adopted by those who are initiated as monks and who have renounced this world. It is Muni-dharma (the way of an ascetic). But for those who have not renounced the world it is still possible to seek the truth and pursue the path of righteousness though in a convenient and lesser degree. That would be Vikalacaritra, the way of the householder. There are, thus, two levels of moral life. The polarity of house-holder and ascetic is indeed one of the most characteristic features of the Jaina structure. The layman has the obligation to cherish his family, the monk must sever all ties with them. The monk is excessive since his life is a negation of compromise; while moderation must be the key-note of existence for the house holder whose life is rooted in compromise.
Muni-dharma aims at seeking salvation through the practice of strict moral and spiritual injunctions. Of these, the five vratas (vows) are important. They are l) ahimsa (nonviolence); 2) satya (truth) 3) asteya (non-stealing); 4) Brahmacarya (celibacy); and 5) apari graha (non-possession). It is difficult to translate these words in proper form. The Vratas have to be practiced rigorously and withou exception. In this sense the Vratas to be practiced by th ascetic are called Mahavratas (great vows). The reverense towards life (Albert Schweitzer has put it) by which the realm of life was so immeasurably extended, permeates the discipline of Mahavira's order in a way no other ethical prescription does. 'We can observe it-entering into the fields of other vows like truthful speech as arising out of passion. The vow of non-possession is equally important. A monk is not allowed to possess anything, in some cases including a piece of cloth. The vow of chesty has a large effective range. The prescriptions cohering with it do not refer to normal sexuality only, but they frequently also indicate events of sexual pathology . According to one tradition, the fifth was added by Vardhamana Mahavira, the twentyfourth prophet. Parsva the twenty third Tirthakara did not mention celibacy as a vow. In a discussion between Kesi, a disciple of Parsva and Gautama, a disciple of Mahavira, it was made clear that the addition of the fifth did not imply any major deviation from the teachings of the Jinas, but was an outcome of circumstance. It indicated a fall in the standards of monastic moral life as there was sufficient interval of time between the last two Tirthakaras. Later it is sometimes suggested that the sixth vow rai-bhoyanao veramanam (abstaining from taking food at night) was added with the main intention of avoiding injury to life in the dark. This was primarily meant as injunction for the householder as the ascetic takes only one meal a day at midday. It is a special case of ahimsa. In fact the entire ethical structure of the Jainas is centered round the fundamental principle of ahimsa. We find this expressed in the other lnjunctions to be followed by the ascetics. The ascetics have to practice: I) the five mahavratas, 2) five samiti. 3) the control in five senses 4) six avasyakas. other practices like i) loca (plucking the hair on the head with hands),ii) acelakatva (abstaining from the use of covering of any sort, iii) asnana (abstaining from bath). iV) Prthivisayana v) adantadhavana (abstaining from cleaning teeth), vi) sthitibhojana (taking food offered by the lay discip1e, by using the palm only and by standing) viii) ekabhukta (taking one meal a day). The five samitis are irya samiti (restriction on movement),ii)bhasa-samiti (restriction on speech), iii) esana-samtti (taking pure and permissible food). iv) adana-niksepa (careful usemovemen: of the necessary objects like kamandalu, a pot for use of water etc., and v) pratisthapana-samiti (answering the nature calls in solitary places). The practice of vows and other injunctions has to be carefully done by the ascetic without exception. The life of a monk is hard and rigorous in this sense. His object is to attain Moksa, and for this purpose rigorous mortification of the body has to be practiced. The practice of vows is threefold: in body, mind and speech.
The infraction of the practice of vows and other injunctions has also to be threefold: i) by one self, ii) by getting others to commit violation, and iii) by acquiescing in the act of violation.
A Muni is not to cover himself with any type of clothes ordecoration made of cotton, wool, bark of a tree or even grass. He is forbidden to take bath (asnana). He should sleep with care on one side where there is little possibility of injury to living being including the tiniest insects. He should not clean his teeth, nails and other parts of the body nor should he decorate himself in any way (adanta-dhavana) . He should eat taking the food on the palm standing on a clean and purified place, and he should eat only once a day after midday. These are included in the twenty-eight basic mulagunas of a Muni. Rigorous restrictions are imposed on an ascetic; which if imposed on the layman, it would not be possible for him to practice in conformity with his responsibility of household life.
The Dasavaikalika-sutra gives description of the essential qualities required of an ascetic. One who is self-controlled, who is free from passion and is non-attached is a real Muni. He saves his soul and those of others. Such self-controlled persons go to heaven (deva-loka) or are freed from the bonds of life according to the degree of destruction of Karma. One who goes to heaven is reborn and has to continue his struggle for the destruction of the remaining Karma ultimately to attain Moksa.
A true monk should have no desires nor attachments and should wander about as the known beggarHe should live as a model of righteousness. He is not to live by any profession or occupation; possessed of full self-control and free from any ties, he should live the life of a homeless mendicant.
The daily routine of a monk is well regulated and regimented. He has to be severely solemn and is obliged to behave in a strictly -reserved and unobtrusive manner. He cannot indulge in singing, dancing, laughing or any other form of merrymaking. He has to devote much of his time to meditation, study. and in the third part of the day he has to go only for
food and drink.
The Acarangasutra and Dasavaikalika present a detailed picture of the strict rules for taking a midday meal. He has to be modest in behaviour and give precedence to other receivers and even to animals. And such a monk practising the rigours of an ascetic for the sake of a fuller and more perfect life here and here-after-is superior to all others. like a trained 'Kamboja steed' whom no noise frightens,Iike a strong irresistible elephant, like a strong bull and a proud lion.
Four things of supreme value are difficult to obtain in this world: l) human birth. 2) instruction in the Law (dharma), 3) belief in the Dharma and 4) energy in self-control. We must therefore, make the most of what we have not because tomorrow we die but because we become immortal and perfect. The attainment of perfection is in the hands of man; and knowing this, we should avoid sense-pleasures which are short-lived and apparently sweet yet fraught with the danger of losing all that we have, as a man lost his kingdom by eating a mango fruit which was strictly forbidden by his physician and as forbidden fruit whose mortal taste brought death into this world and all our woe. Asceticism is the primary step for the monks on their way to self-realization. External asceticism consists in dropping one's meals, in restricting oneself to a few objects and in begging for food. These are meant for preparing one's mind for selfpurification. The internal asceticism is mainly mental and it aims at purification in the final form. It includes the control of the senses, subjection to confession and atonement, readiness to spiritual service. study and the practice of dhyana in gradual stages. And one who has given up all worldly ties, is well-versed in the Dharma, who practices all codes of ascetic life, is the sramana, a bhikkhu. A monk compiles with the rules of yati as regards postures, lying down, sitting down and is thoroughly acquainted with the samitis and guptis.
There have been conflicting opinions as to how the ascetic practice and the monastic vows originated. Buehler held that most of the special directions for the discipline of the Jaina ascetic are copies, and often exaggerated copies, of the Brahminical rules for penitents. The outward marks of the order closely resemble those of a Sanyasin'. Jacobi seems to support this view when he said 'Monastic order of the Jainas and the Buddhists though copied from Brahmana were chiefly and originally intended for Kshatriyas." This view was presented in the early stages of Indological research but it is difficult to be accepted. What we call Indian philosophy is a synthesis of the Sramana and the Brahmana currents of thoughts. The sramana cult which was primarily ascetic in nature was pre-Aryan. And we should no more assess the Samkhya Jaina, Buddhist and Ajivaka tenets as mere perverted continuation of stray thoughts selected at
random from the Upanisadic bed of Aryan thought currents".  Dr. Upadhye calls this Pre-Aryan current of thought as 'Magadhan religion.'
All cannot renounce the world, nor is it desirable. Most men have to live in this world and work for their spiritual salvation while engaged in daily routine of empirical life. They are the, householders (sravakas). They cannot practice rigorous discipline of an ascetic. They have to practice the vows with less rigour, as far as possible, still without sacrificing the fundamental spirit of the Vratas. The ethical code for the layman is twelve fold consisting of 1) five Vratas which are common for the ascetic and the householder, except for the fact they have to be practiced with less rigour without sacrificing the spirit of righteousness and the main goal of self-realization. Great physical and moral advantages accrue from the observation of vows. It keeps the body and mind healthy and leads one in the direction of maintaining moral strength ultimately to lead to moksa. The vows practiced by the layman are the anuvratas (lesser vows). In addition to 1) five anuvratas he has to practice 2) three gunavratas and 3) four siksavratas.
We may mention some of the aticaras (infractions) of the anuvratas. Some of the aticaras of vrata are:
1. Ahimsa: i) bandha tying up. keeping in captivity men and beasts. However the restraining of cattle by means of ropes and restriction on our children for corrections may be permitted. So may a thief be bound. ii) vadha (beating): It refers to wanton and merciless whipping of animals out of anger and aroused by other passions, although some exceptions like mild beating, pulling the ears or slapping for correction are permissible. iii) chavi-ccheda: This applies to acts of injury to the body with sword or sharp instrument. Operations by a physician would be exceptions. iv) atibhararopana: It refers to heavy and merciless loading of beasts by a burden greater than they can bear. Certain types of occupations have been tabooed for a Jaina layman. v) bhakta-pana-vyavaccheda: It refers to making the animal suffer from hunger and thirst for no reason out of anger or negligence. The context and the implication;, of ahimsa vrata are much wider than the aticaras indicate. We have, therefore, added in the end a critique of ahimsa in the light of its philosophical justification.
2. Satya vrata (truth-speaking) has also a wide connotation. It has been interpreted as abstention from untruth spoken out of passion, and even from truth if it leads to the destruction of the living being. We may mention some of the infraction of this Vrata . i) Sahasabhyakhyana: It consists in casually or intentionally imputing false charges against a person as: `he is a thief, or an adulterer'. Friends of Othello committed this grievous crime and sin against Desdemona even if it were in jest. ii) Svadara mantra bheda: It consists in divulging to others what has been said by one's wife in confidence under special circumstances. iii) Mrsopadesa . It refers to perverse teaching and advice leading to evil consequences. iv) Kutalekhakarana is preparing a false document like forgery etc.
3. Asteyavrata forbids us to commit theft or even to take others' articles not specifically meant for us. It forbids us from i) accepting stolen articles at cheaper rates, ii) instigating other to steal, iii) acquiring property in a country which is hostile to our own. Even grass or wood obtained under such circumstances must be regarded as stolen. Even transgressing the frontiers forbidden by the State is an infraction of this vow. Black market is covert under this aticara. iv) kuta-tula-kuta mana: using false weights and measures and taking exorbitant interest on loans is an infraction of this vow.
These Aticaras are mainly concerned as a warning to the community in which individuals and groups are likely to violate the five vows here and there. Similar infractions of this Vrata have been mentioned with reference to officials as well in the State Corrupt officials are also to be considered as thieves.
4. Brahma-vrata is important in Jaina ethics. It has been considered from the points of view of personal efforts for salvation and of social health. Detailed classification of the vows and the infractions have been worked out. In their analysis we find psychological acumen. The Vrata has negative and positive aspects. In the negative aspect a householder has to abstain from sexual contact with other's wife (aparadara-gamana), and positively he has to be satisfied with his own wife. He cannot even arrange marriages of other women, except in the case of his own children. He should avoid sex literature and sex brooding. The aticara of this Vrata cover most aspects of sexual deviation including that with the lower animals and even with inanimate objects like the figures of women. From the earliest days of Jainism, the horror of incest has been constantly felt, as described by Haribhadra, while mentioning the disastrous consequences of the violation of this.
5. Aparigraha-vrata (the vow of non-possession) is perhaps the most important of the Vratas in the present context of society. As a Mahavrata it is required of a Muni to give up every thing that leads to attachment except perhaps in some cases, a piece of cloth, a kamandalu and a bunch of feathers. He must, avoid both external (bahya) and internal (antara) possession (parigraha). As an Anuvrata, it emphasises nonattachment. One who accumulates property more than required for him, transgresses this Vrata. Parigraha (possession) is something explained as a sort of the fascination for material possession. It is the expression of acquisitive instinct which needs to be curbed or else it feeds in what it gets. A son's greed for material possession will lead to ignore his father; and countless evil consequences follow. If only we know the importance of this Vrata, in the Socratic sense of the word 'know', we would solve most of the problems of social evil. The Gunavratas and the giksavr been mentioned with variations. The Gunavratas are
ii) bhogopaohogoparimona and iii) anarthadandavrata. Digvrata restricts the movements in different directions. The purpose is to reduce the possibility of committing violence, and this is to be achieved by circumscribing the area in which injury to the living can be committed. For example, one is forbidden to climb a mountain or a top of a tree, descend into a well or underground storage of a village to travel beyond a stipulated limit by the Acaryas, and to move at random. There would be infractions of the vow. In the Ratnakarandaka, Digvrata is defined as the resolve to desist from injury by circumscribing one' range of movement. As to the limits of time, it is to be practiced until death. The Bhogopabhoga-parimana-vrata forbids or limits one in the use of 'consumable' goods like food and durable goods like furniture in the house. The Anarthadanda vrata restricts an individual from certain activities, from harmful professions and trades because they would lead to harmful activities which serve no purpose. Four types of Anarthadanda are mentioned in the svetambara texts, while Digambaras have five. We have tried to avoid the discrepancies in the presentation of the svetambara and the Digambara writers on the different problems as they are largely concerned with minor details. The five types of Anarthadanda are: i)apadhyana (evil concentration like arta-dhyana and raudra dhyana; ii) pramadacaritra (negligent mischief or addiction to vices like alcoholism and gambling). It also includes witnessing dancing. sex displays, cock-fighting and other combats of animals. It may include many others bringing about incitement of excessive instinctive activity; iii) himsapradana (encouraging injury to life in any form). It forbids us from supplying poison, weapon: fire, rope, swords and other articles for destruction of life. iv) papopadesa (sinful advice) like instruction in evil trade. It is also mentioned that sometimes such advice, like giving instructions to the farmer to plough when the rains are on, cannot be avoided when a question of being helpful is involved but it should never be given mere out of garrulity. v) duh-sruti (bad reading); it consists in reading kamasastra, sex and spicy literature including yellow journalism and listening to the faults of others. It is the study of works that disturb and spoil the minds with harmful thoughts, worldly attachments, perverse attitude and excitement of passions.
Coming to the siksavratas the sravaka has to practice four of them: i) samayika, ii) dcsavakasika iii) prosadhopavasa, and iv) atithi-.samvi-bhaga. Samayika is one of the important practices for the layman; and it is one of the six avasyakas (necessities) for the layman and also for the ascetic for whom it has to be practiced lifelong. It consists in the attainment of equanimity and tranquility of mind. It is a process of becoming one (ekatvagamana), of fusion of body and mind and speech with the Atman. Samayika may be performed in one's own house or in a temple, in the presence of Guru or in a specially built hall, according to the needs of the time and individual. Sometimes a distinction is made between the ordinary laymen, affluent men, and men of official status. Special procedure for Sarnayika is laid down with the intention of increasing the prestige of the Jaina community by emphasizing the fact that he has adhered to the sacred doctrine . In performing the Samayika one should observe the five samitis and three Guptis and avoid all harmful speech. He should recite pratyakhyana avoiding harmful actions and pratikramana expressing remorse for past deeds and pray(alocana) that whatever acts in speech, mind and body made by him in the past may be atoned for. It is to seek forgiveness for what has been done so far. During the period of samayika the layman becomes like an ascetic. Samantabhadra shows that a layman performing samayika is like an ascetic draped in clothes, although this likeness is only apparent like the description of a woman as candramukhi. Samayika has to be performed at regular intervals of the day. The object of this practice is to gain mental equanimity surcharged with righteousness. Desavakasikavrata is a modified version of Digvrata. It restricts the movement of an individual to a house or village or a part thereof for a period varying from a muhurta (about 45 minutes) to a few days or even a couple of months. The basic idea in such restriction of movement seems to be that it would create mental preparedness for the practice of Vratas more rigorously almost leading to the Mahavrata temporarily in the state of an ascetic. Prosadhopavasa-vrata enjoins one to fast at regular intervals in the month, say on the eighth (astami) and fourteenth day (caturdasi). One should avoid adornment of the body including use of garlands, perfumes etc. One should abstain from engaging one self in worldly duties. This is an important step in the direction of mental purification.
Danavrata covers the most important sing]e element in the practice of religion, for without alms-giving by the laity, there could be no ascetics; and Dharma could not easily be preserved and continued. It is also termed as atithisamvibhaga-vrata or paying due respects to the guest. Specific injunctions have been given regarding the qualifications of an atithi and the mode of giving alms. Varied interpretations have been possible, the Sadhu or monk being, accepted as the best atithi as he is charged with imparting, religious instruction. ln giving alms one should consider the following, five factors: i) patra (the recepient), ii) datr .(giver), iii) datavya (the object given), iv) dana-vidhi (the manner of giving and v) danaphala (the result of giving alms.,. We should consider the place and time while giving alms. Due respect should be given to the recepient and the giver should be free from any taints of passions. He should give with full faith in the act of giving. Act of charity has no ethical value, if it is to be done with questionable motives. If it is to be done out of anger or filled with maudlin sentiments of pity, it should not be considered to be of usual significance. Nor is it possible to justify the act of charity if it were not to produce any tangible welcome result. Thus the ends and means must justify each other. The Jainas present a synthetic picture of the problem of motive and intention in the act of righteousness. The spirit of Anekanta forbids us to take a partial view emphasising either the motive of action or merely the consequences. However, in early days, dana to ascetics formed an important duty of laymen. Food and shelter and books are to be supplied to tbe monks, so that they can devote themselves to study and meditation. Concentration (dhyana) is not possible without the minimum necessary physical comfort. In addition to dana to the ascetics it is good to do charity to the distressed, strangers from other lands, to the lowliest and the lost. This is karuna-dana. Above all dana nullifies greed and acquisitiveness, and acquisitiveness is a manifestation of himsa. And dana gives its unfailing fruits. Paradoxically enough the layman charges himself with restrictions exceeding in number than those accepted by the monk. This is due to the large diversity of the evil life in which the layman still stands.
So far, we have briefly mentioned the twelve conditions of a layman if he is to be a pious sravaka and a good citizen. To these twelve may be added Samlekhana as Vrata which is sometimes included as one of the siksavratas. It is not restricted to the ascetics only. The lay followers of religion may take Samlekhana in the higher stages of their spiritual development. In fact it is regarded as the normal conclusion of one's life except where death makes it impossible to take this vow. With a view to giving a philosophical justification of Samlekhana we add in the end a note on Samlekhana.
A layman who is desirous of attaining the higher stage in the upward path to Moksa will have to go through the eleven stages of moral and spiritual practice resulting from the careful observations of the twelve vows mentioned so far. They are the Pratimas stages of spiritual progress; and Schubring says "Horizontally expanded as it were, these obligations are projected in the vertical by the ladder of the 11 uvasaga-padima". The eleven Pratimas are the injunctions or the ways of conduct progressively leading towards the development of ideal personality. They present a ladder (sopdna-marga) for the layman.
The eleven Pratimas are: 1) samyagdrsti (right attitude). 2) vrata (practice of vows). 3) samayika (equanimity which helps in the practice of vows. 4) prosadha (fasting on certain days of the month), 5) sacitta-tyaga (giving up certain types of food like roots etc ). 6) ratribhojana-tya ga (giving up eating at night). 7) bramacarya (celibacy), 8) arambha tyaga (giving certain types of occupations like agriculture involving injury to living beings.), 9 ) partgraha-tydgas (giving up all possessions except clothes), 10) anumati-tyaga (non-participation in the household responsibilities), and ll) uddista-tyaga. In this stage the sravaka accepts only the minimum of cloth like the loin cloth (kaupina). There are minor variations in the list of practices presented by the svetambara and Digambara sects, and they are not relevant for our discussionSuffice it to say that in the progressive realization of these Pratimas a pious layman is led step by step towards the attainment of samnyasa, i.e., a life of renunciation. There is, in this, a psychological presentation of the principle of varnasrame prevailing in the Hindu way of life because a householder steadily and surely proceeds towards renunciation. 'This transformation is much truer to human nature a there is no sudden transformation which needs acute psychological orientation. 'When one moves from Grhasthasrama to Vanaprasth asrama and then to samnyasa, one cannot just walk into samnayas unless one is a prophet, but one has to prepare oneself for the gradual transformation. Sudden change from one life into the other may create psychological problems as the repressions would accumulate into the dung heap of the Unconscious. The conception of pratimas is, therefore, phychologically sound. This can be easily shown from the fact that the first two Pratimas are mental preparations for the practice of rigorous moral life. Moral control, like continence is always linked with fasting and the control of nourishment. Rich food and clothing have to be avoided as they lead to an easy universe of desires. ln the ninth and tenth stages one has to break away from the household attachments still living with family and friends. He is detached and spends most of the time in contemplation in the temple. He does not take part in the affairs of the house nor does he advise the family members in household affairs even if his advice is sought.. In the eleventh stage he is on the verge of being an ascetic. He has to wear a minimum dress like the loin cloth (kaupina). In the eleventh Pratima two divisions have sometimes been mentioned: i) ksullaka and ii) ailaka. In the former there is only provisional ordination which does not bind the ordinated to the monastic life if he has not the vocation. The second is the quasi-ascetic, the ascetic on probation. Still, in this Pratima certain features of monk's life are forbidden for the layman. He is not allowed to study the mysteries of the sacred texts. He may not go round for alms as a monk does, nor practice trikala yoga, the form of asceticism which emphasises meditation on a hill top in the hot season, under a tree during rains and by a river bank in winter. They are to wish others as a layman would.' The Pratimas are thus, a means to achieve spiritual development which will, in the end, lead the devotee to take a Samlekhana. As a result of the conquest by Moslems who disapproved of nudity and for other reasons layman in the 11th Pratima came, to a larger extent, to take the place of monks. Today social conditions have considerably changed, and we are becoming more secular-minded. It would be necessary to reorientate our values so as to emphasise the spiritual levels of householder's life in the practice of Vrata and the eleven stages of spiritual development.
The Jaina has a conception of an ideal layman and an ideal monk. A layman develops twenty one qualities which distinguish him as a perfect gentleman. He will be serious in demeanor, good tempered, merciful, straight-forward, wise and modest. He is sociable, yet careful in speech, reverent both to old age and old customs. A true ascetic should possess twenty-eight qualities for he must keep the five vows, control his five senses, renounce greed, practice forgiveness and possess high ideals. He must be self-denying and endure hardships, always aiming at the highest ideal of perfection.
In the present survey of the ethics of Jainas we can see the spirit of Anekanta pervading the two levels of moral life the ascetic and the householder. They are not opposed to each other, nor do they present any degree o£ comparison. The distinction between the sravaka-dharma and muni-dharma is only to show that there is a continuity in the spiritual efforts of man. Hunger and thirst for righteousness flowers into perfection only gradually if watered with slow and steady flow of moral and spiritual practice. The lay estate was initially admitted in deference to human frailty and was regarded in theory as a stage of preparation for the ascetic life. Later it gained importance as the foundation for spiritual ends. Layman's ethics was always considered with reference to the prevailing social and religious conditions. Local usage or customary law, the desacara though accorded no mandatory force, has always been admitted as a guide, wherever there is r conflict with the Jaina doctrine and more particularly in the modern period it has been increasingly incorporated in the Sravakacara.
The pervasion of the spirit of Anekanta can be demonstrated by the theory and practice of Ahimsa as the cardinal ethical principle of Jainas. It is considered as the fundamental principle of the religion, ahimsa paramo dharmah. We may, therefore, aptly add a critique of Ahimsa.
The five Vratas have been important for the Jaina way of life. They have undergone modifications as to their application in the practice by householders as and when necessary according to the need of the social structure. And 'changelessness of Jainism is a more than a myth'. Had Jainism become a majority religion in Southern India something akin to Digambara Mahayana might have emerged. Whilst the dogma remains strikingly firm the ritual changes and assumes an astonishing complexity and richness of symbolism. For instance, Danavrata has widened its field from feeding the ascetics to religious endowments,and Yatra ceases to be a mere promenading of the idols through city on a festival day and comes to denote an organised convoy going on a pilgrimage to distant sacred places. And all the time more and more stress being laid on the individual's duty to the community.
Jainism is a tirtha, a way of progress through life, and whilst the yatyacara teaches the individual how to organise his own salvation, the aim of sravakacara is to ensure that an environment is created in which the ascetic may be able to travel the road of Moksa. The emphasis has also to be on the community as well as the individual. This is clear from modifications of the practices and assimilation of the prevailing ritual and practices in Hindu society, as for instance, in the adoption of the right of Upanayana and marriage rites.
The importance of sravakdcara has been enhanced by the fact that it has widespread application to the community, and moral ideas of the lay followers have been suited to the needs of the society for good and perfect social order. They are still useful in the perfect social order. They are still useful in the daily life of man, whether he be a Jaina or non-Jaina. A perfect social order would be possible if we follow the Vratas carefully. The Anuvrata movement started by Muni Tulsi is a welcome crusade against the evils in society, and the most useful effort towards establishing a coherent, healthy and moral social order. The supreme importance of the lay ethics as given by the Jainas has been clear by the aticaras (infractions) elaborately mentioned by the Acaryas.
The ethical ideal of a Jaina is not mere pleasure of the senses nor gratification of the body. Pleasures of the senses are insatiable. More we get them the more we want and the more pained we are. There is glue as it were in pleasure: those who are not given to pleasure are not soiled by it; those who love pleasure must wander about in Samsara, those who do not will be liberated. Like the two clods of clay, one wet and the other dry, flung at the wall, those who love pleasure get clung to the influx of Karma, but the passionless are free. Not the pleasures of the moment nor even the greatest happiness of the greatest number are attractions to the truly pious, for, their ultimate end is to attain perfection and to lead other men to the path of righteousness. Yet the Jaina does not say that pleasures of the senses are to be completely avoided, specially for the lay disciple. And mortification of the body is equally one sided. Rigorous asceticism for a monk is a means to an end and not an end in itself. For a lay followers he may continue his occupation, earn money, Iive a family life and enjoy normal acceptable pleasures of life in good spirit according to the needs and status of an individual in society.
Jainism aims at self-realization, and the self to be realised is the transcendental and pure self. The empirical self is to be cared for and its energy is to be channelised, in the direction of the attainment of the highest ideal of Moksa.
SAMLEKHANA: In the present political life of our country, fasting unto death for specific ends has been very common. The Manu Smrti mentions some traditional methods of fasting unto death in order to get back the loan that was once give The Rajatarangini refers to the Brahmins resorting to fast in order to obtain justice or protest against the abuses. Religious suicide is occasionally commended by the Hindus. With a vow to some deity they starve themselves to death, enter fire and throw themselves down a precipice.
The Jainas were opposed to such forms of death. They called such death as unwise (bala-marana). It has no moral justification. The Uttardhyayana Sutra condemns such practices and states that those who use weapons, throw themselves into the fire and water, and use things not prescribed by the rules of conduct are liable to be caught in the wheel of samsara. Such persons are caught in the mohadharma. Fasting unto death for specific purposes has an element of coercion which is against the spirit of non violence.
However, the Jainas have commended fasting as an important means to self-realization. Among the austerities, fasting is the most conspicuous; the Jainas have developed it into a kind of art. They have reached a remarkable proficiency in it. The Jaina monks and the laymen have to fast at regular intervals for the spiritual progress. More important is fasting unto death. It is called Samlekhana. The Jainas have worked out a scientific analysis of Samlekhana.
Fasting unto death for specific purposes has raised moral problems. The question whether it would be a suicide and as such unjustifiable has been persistently asked with no relevant answer. The Jaina theory of Samlekhana has raised similar problems. It is a much misunderstood doctrine, both in its theory and practice. Radhakrishnanmakes mention of it as a form of suicide. The Rev. Dr. A. C. Bouquet Trinity College, Cambridge, states that the attitude of the Stoic towards his own death seems to be curious-He claims that one is entitled to do, whatever one likes with ones own life. Perhaps the Jaina, 'if interrogated, might say the same thing'. He gives an instance of Zeno who is said to have suffocated himself to death in his old age because he had damaged one of his hands. It can only be said that a better understanding of the Jaina theory of Samlekhana would dispel the misgivings about it as a form of suicide and as an act of disregard for life. It is, therefore, necessary to analyse the theory and practice of Samlekhana as the Jainas presented.
According to Jainas, the individual souls are pure and perfect in their real nature. They are substances distinct from matter. Through the incessant activity, the souls get infected with matter. The Karma, which is of eight types and which is material in nature-accumulates and vitiates the soul from its purity. The souls get entangled in the wheel of Samsara. This is beginningless, though It has an end. The end to be achieved is the freedom from the bonds of this empirical life. It is to be achieved through the three
jewels right intuition, right knowledge and right action.  'The way to Moksa, which is the final end, is long arduous. The moral codes of religious practices, which are rigorous, gradually lead to the self-realization. In the final phase of self-realisation, as also in emergency, the Jaina devotee, a monk or a householder (sravaka) is enjoined to abstain from food and drink gradually and fast unto death. Death is not the final end and destruction of self. It is only casting off the body, freedom from the bonds of life. We are asked to accept a quiet death, as far as possible, within the limit of our capacity. This is Samlekhana.
Samlekhana is a step towards self-realization. It is meant to free oneself from the bonds of the body, which is no longer useful. It is described as the process of self-control by which sense pleasures and passions are purged off and destroyed. It is called samadhi-marana or samnyasa-marana. For a Jaina, the final emancipation by Samlekhana is the ideal end to be devoutly to be wished for. If a pious man, self controlled throughout his life, were to die a common deaths, all his efforts at a spiritual progress would be wasted. He will not be free from the wheel of Samsara because Samlekhana is the highest form of tapas.
But Samlekhana is not to be taken lightly. It is not to be universally practiced without distinguishing individual capacity and motivation. Certain specific conditions are laid
down, which are to be strictly followed if one is to practice such fast unto death. Samlekhana is to be adopted in two cases: a) in cases of emergencies and b) as the end of a regular religious career. The two forms o Samlekhana are equally applicable to the monks and laymen.
a) As an emergency measure, we are to fast unto death only when we are faced with terrible famine, when overpowered by foreign domination, at the time of spiritual calamities when it would be impossible for us to live a pious life and to do the duties as a good citizen. The same should be practiced when we are in the grip of an incurable disease and when we are too old as not to be able to live normal righteous life. In these cases we have to depend on others. We become a burden to society without possibility of reciprocating the good either for one-self or for other. Under such circumstances only should we decide to end this life by fasting unto death. If a monk falls ill and it is not possible for him to continue the practice of his vows and to lead the ascetic life, he should decide to take Samlekhana.  In all these cases, however one has perforce to take the permission of the teacher who will give permission to practice samlekhna only after examining the capacity of the individual. One who has not the strength of will is forbidden to take samlekhana.
b) Samlekhana forms a regular religious career both for ascetic and householders. A sravaka , the householder has togo through a regular religious career through the gradual practice of eleven pratimas (stages of conduct). In the last stage, he becomes practically a monk. At the end of the period, he abstains from food and drink and devotes himself toself mortification. He continues his fast, patiently waiting for death. In the case of the monk , the practice of Samlekhana may last twelve years. For the house holder who has practically become a monk it would take twelve months. Firm faith in jainism, observance of vratas (vows) and samlekhana according to rules at the time of death, constitute the duties of householder. A jaina monk must prepare himself by a course of gradual fasting lasting as long as twelve years. If however, he is sick and is unable to maintain the course of self discipline to which he is vowed hemay fast unto death without any preliminary preparation. The jaina tradition looks at samlekhana as the highest end to be achieved in the course of spiritual struggle and finds there no cause for tears. But it has tobe noted that, even at this stage, such a course of death has to be adopted only with the permission of the teacher. The Acaranga Sutra exhorts the monk to practice this penance asthe final end of the religious course to reach the triumphant end of spiritual struggle. In the Manu Smrti weget a similar instruction for the ascetic. They are asked walk straight, fully determined in the northwesterly direction , subsisting on water and air , until the body sinks to rest. This is the great journey (mahaprasthana) which ends in death. It is taught in sastras, it is not opposed to the vedic rule which forbid suicide. Buhler remarks that voluntary death by starvation was considered at that time to be a befitting conclusion of a hermit life. The antiquity and the general prevalence of the practice may be inferred from the fact that the jaina ascetic too consider it particularly meritorious. Among the Maharastra mystics wemention the name of Jnanesvara who gave up his life voluntarily, though it cannot be compared to the jaina vow of samlekhana. It is necessary to note that, according to jains, samlekhana is to be practiced only when ordinarily death is felt imminent.
At the proper time, having taken the permission of Guru, one must prepare oneself for the practice of this type of end. It needs physical and mental preparation. Gradual development of the self -control is to be affected ; the passions have to be conquered emotions subdued and the urges to be controlled and channelised to the fulfillment of the desired ends. one should contemplate on the importance of virtues. Having called relatives and friends one should seek their forgiveness for any transgressions in conduct -'should forgiveness give and take.' With malice towards none and charity for all one should start the practice of samlekhna. In the Ratnakarandaka Sravakacara, we get the description of mental preparation for the fast, we should conquer all emotional excitement, like fear, anger and grief. We should overcome love, attachment and hatred, with a peace of mind which is not possible by craving for anything empirical, we should reach the mental dignity and calm which is rarely possible in the turmoil of this world.
The gradual process of self mortification is psychologically significant. it is not to be slow death, nor is it meant to intensify the rigour of mortification. The primary motive is to make the person physically and mentally prepared to accept the inevitable end to lighten the burden of pain. it is very important to note that we are told not to desire for death nor for life during the practice of Samlekhana. We are not to be ruffled or agitated with hopes for life or fear of death. We have to be free from the memories of the friendly attachment and the anxiety for the heavenly bliss. Quickly reducing the flesh by increasing the pace of fasting may give rise to emotional excitement and morbid thoughts, which are harmful to the undisturbed spiritual end.
Fasting has, therefore, to be gradual without in any way disturbing the physical and the moral poise. We should first give up solid food and take liquid food like milk and butter milk. Then we should start taking only warm water. In the last stage, even the water has to be given up. We should wait for the end, reciting hymns ( pancanamaskara mantra). All this has to be done gradually and keeping in mind the capacity of the individual.
The analysis of the process of Samlekhana shows that it has two primary stages, which are sometimes referred to as of two types. The first requisite is the mental discipline and then comes the mortification of the body by fasting. Accordingly, a distinction has been made in the practice of Samlekhana as a) the mental discipline (kasaya-samlekhanal which consists in tbe control of the passions and the attainment of the perfect equanimity of mind; b) practice of fasting gradually which leads to the gradual mortification of the body (kaya-samlekhana). The two are complementary to each other, although the mental discipline is a necessary condition of the fast unto death.
A fundamental question whether Samlekhana is not to be described as a form of suicide and as such unjustifiable, has been raised by some. We referred to this doubt earlier. But, from the analysis of the theory and practice of Samlekhana so far given it can be said that Samlekhana cannot be described as suicide. It does not contain the elements to make it suicideIt cannot be called suicide because:
a) Destruction of life may be described as of three types i) self-destruction (atmavadha); ii) destruction of others ( par vadha); and iii) destruction of both (ubhaya-vadha).
But Samlekhana is neither of these. It is not motivated by any desire for killing. It is not filled with attachment or aversion. No passions envelop the person. It is free from any form of craving. Such is not the case in suicide or homicide. Pujyapada mentions that Samlekhana cannot be called suicide because there is no raga, .(excitement of passions) in it. He compares the layman taking Samlekhana to a householder who has stored goods in a ware-house. If there is danger he will try to save the whole building but if that becomes impossible, he does his best to preserve at least the goods. The ware-house is the body and the goals are the Vratas.
b) One who practices Samlekhana must not be agitated by the desire for life nor for death. He should not, for a moment, feel that he would live for some more time; nor should he feel over powered by the agony of the fast; he should get speedy death to free himself from the pain. Desire for life, fear of death, memories of the days that we spent, attachment to the relatives and friends and craving for the glories of the future happiness as consequence of the practice of Samlekhana are transgressions of the vow of Samlekhana. They are to be avoided at any cost.
c) It may also be noted that, according to the Jainas, the body is not to be considered as merely a prison-house to be discarded at the earliest possible moment. It is a means, a vehicle of attaining the highest end of perfection. We are reminded that it is rare to get a human life; it is rarer still that we get an opportunity of the possibility of spiritual progress. We should not wantonly cast away the human body that we have got, without making use of it for the struggle to reach the stages of self-realisation. This is possible by the control of mind and body for spiritual culture.
d) Above all, the jainas are the greatest champions of non-violence. Ahinsa is the creed of the Jaina religion. It is the first Mahavrata (the great vow). It would be inconsistent to believe that those who considered life as sacred and those who condemned himsa (injury of any type) should have no regard for life and preach self-destruction.
e) It is for this reason that the Jaina considered wanton self-destruction by other methods like taking poison and falling down a precipice as a suicide bala-marana and as such unjustifiable.
The word suicide as employed includes all cases of selfdestruction, irrespective of the mental conditions of the person, committing the act. In its technical and legal sense, it means self-destruction by a sane person or voluntary and intentional destruction of his own life by a person of sound mind, the further qualification being added by some definitions that he must have attained years of discretion. ln this sense Samlekhana could not be suicide, as it is not self destruction at all. There is gradual mortification of the flesh without causing any appreciable physical' and mental disturbance. The self is to be freed from the bonds of the body. From the ultimate point of view (niscaya-naya).the self is pure and indestructible. The practice of Samlekhana is compared to cutting or operating a boil on the body, which cannot be called destruction of the body. In this sense Samlekhana is described as the final freedom of the soul from the bonds of life.
Whatever else may be the legal implications of suicide, we have to remember that samlekhana is to be looked at from the spiritual point of view.
We are in a world where spiritual values have declined. The flesh is too much with us. We cannot look beyond and pine for what is not. Samlekhana is to be looked at as physical mortification, self culture and spiritual salvation.
II. A CRITIQUE OF AHIMSA: Ahimsa, non-violence, has been an important principle in the history of human civilization. As a moral injunction it was universally applicable in the religious sphere. Jesus has asked us to love our neighbour as our selves. It has been accepted as a moral principle in Indian thought and religion. Gandhiji has extended the principle of non violence to the social and political fields. For him non-violence was a creed. He developed a method and a technique of non violence for attaining social and political justice. Zimmer says that Ahimsa, non-violence or non-killing is the first principle in the Dharma of saints or sages by which they lift themselves out of the range of the normal human action.
In the history of Indian thought Ahimsa arose out of the needs of resisting the excesses of violence performed in the name of religion and for the sake of salvation at the time of sacrifices. Animal sacrifice was prevalent in the Vedic and to some extent in Upanisadic periods. However, a gradual awareness of undesirability of animal sacrifice was being felt at the time of Upanisads. In the Upanisads we get passages where the virtues of non-violence have been upheld. In the Chandogya Upanisad life is described as a great festival in which qualities like tapas, self renunciation Ahimsa (non-violence) are expressed.
In the Brhadaranyaka Upanisad we are asked to meditate on horse sacrifice. Self-discipline, generosity, straightforwardness and ahimsa are the qualities that one should develop. Radhakrishnanwrites that the authors of the Upanisads had a sufficient sense of the historic to know that their protest would become ineffective if it should demand a revolution in things. In the Bhagavatgita we get a description of the qualities that we should possess in order to be perfect. Absolute non-injury is prescribed by the Yoga system. Himsa is the root of all evil. It should be avoided by all means. Non-injury is the root of all negative and positive virtues. The Samkhya, the Yoga, Buddhism and Jainism agree on this point.
The protests against animal sacrifice were more pronounced and vehement from the Buddhists and the Jainas. The Buddha was against animal sacrifice and the rituals. He described the priests as 'tricksters' and using holy words for pay. In the Maha-vagga we get a description of the instructions the Buddha gave to the disciples regarding the acceptance of food. He asked his disciples not to injure any animal on a purpose or for sport. In Asoka's edicts we get regulations for the protection of animals and birds; forests were not to be burnt, not even chaff containing living things. However, the Protests from the Jainas were more vehement and explicit. In fact non-violence is the cardinal principle of Jainism: Ahimsa paramo dharmah. It has now been clear that non-violence has been preached by the Jainas much earlier than Mahavira. Uttaradhyayana Sutra gives the description of the meeting of Kesi, a disciple of Parsva, and
Gautama, a disciple of Vardhamana, for a discussion regarding the agreement in the doctrines of the two prophets. Parsva was the twenty-third Tirthamkara who lived about two hundred and fifty years before Vardhamana. He preached four moral injunctions or Vratas. Ahimsa was one of them. Vardhamana carried the traditions of Parsva and added one more Vrata. It appears that ahimsa as a moral injunction must have been a pre-Aryan principle which was later assimilated in the Aryan way of life. The Jainas made nonviolence the most fundamental principle of their religious life. They made a systematic analysis of the principle, almost to the point of making it a science. All other moral injunctions were subordinated to ahimsa.
The Jaina theory of ahimsa has influenced the way of Indian thought for centuries. Gandhiji's satyagraha has been built up on the analysis of non-violence by the Jainas. Gandhiji was influenced by the Jaina saints. Zimmer writes that Gandhiji's programme of Satyagraha as an expression of Ahimsa is a serious, very brave and potentially vastly powerful modern experiment in the ancient Hindu science. Polak said that the first five of Gandhi's vows were the code of Jaina monks during two thousand years Gandhiji has himself stated that he derived much benefit from the Jaina religious works as from the scriptures of other great faiths of the world.
But the Jaina theory and practice of ahimsa has often been misunderstood. Even eminent scholars have not been able to look at the practice of ahimsa in the right context. Some of the excesses of the practice of ahimsa have been mentioned with a view to showing that the principle is not selfconsistent. Monier Williams, in his article on Jainism, mentioned that the Jainas outdo every other Indian sect in carrying the prohibition to the most preposterous extremes. The institution of Panjrapol, the hospital for diseased animals in Bombay, has been cited as an example. The Jainas and Vaisnavas help this institution liberally. Mrs. Stevenson said that the principle of Ahimsa is scientifically impossible for a life motto, since it is contrary to the code of nature. Zimmer also mentions some of the curious excesses of the practice of non-violence by the Jainas in Bombay.
It is, therefore, necessary to see the Jaina view of ahimsa in its full perspective and to see if it is really scientifically impossible to take Ahimsa as a creed of one's life, as Gandhiji did.
The Jaina theory of Ahimsa is based on the animistic conception of the universe. Jainism is dualistic. All things are divided into the living and the non-living. The Jainas believe in the plurality of the Jivas, living individuals. The Jivas in the phenomenal world, samsari jivas, are classified on the basis of various principles like the status and the number of sense organs. There are the sthavara jivas, the immovable souls. This is a vegetable kingdom. There are one-sensed organisms, like earth-bodied, water-bodied and the plants. They possess the sense of touch. The animals with movements are called trasa jivas. They have more than one sense and up to five senses according to the degree of development.
The Jivas are possessed of pranas, the life forces. In the Jaina scriptures ten kinds of life forces are mentioned, like the five senses, mind, speech and body, respiration and the age force. The Jivas possess different forces according to the degree of their-perfection.
On the basis of this analysis of the living organisms and the life forces possessed by them, Ahimsa is non injury or nonviolence to any living individual or a life force of the individual by the three Yogas, activities and three karanas. We are not to injure any living organisms however small it may be, or a life force of the organism directly with our own hands, by causing someone to do so on our behalf, or even giving consent to the act of injury caused by others. These are the three Yogas. For instance, we should not kill an animal. We should not mutilate a sense organ of the animal. We should not ourselves do this, we should not cause others to do this nor should we consent to injury caused by others. Practice of Himsa is further qualified by three Guptis they refer to three Karanas. We are asked not to injure any Jiva or prana physically or in speech or in mind. We should not speak about injury nor should we harbour any thought of injuring an animal.
The consequences of violating the principle of non-violence are misery in this world and in the next. He who commits violence is always agitated and afflictedHe is actuated by animosity. He suffers physical and mental torture in this world. After death he is reborn taking a despicable life.
This gives a rigorous principle of Ahimsa to be practiced by all. We are enjoined to abstain from Himsa very strictly, directly or indirectly, in body, mind and speech. In this sense the principle of Ahimsa would appear to be abstract and the practice impossible. Every moment we have to tread on life, however minute it may be. In the struggle for existence, complete abstinence from injury would make life itself impossible. Movement of any sort in this world would be impossible.
The Jainas were aware of this difficulty. They were aware that it would be difficult to accept unqualified practice of non violence in the sense presented so far. In fact, the Jaina scripture did not preach the practice of such unqualified and abstract principle of Ahimsa. The principle of Ahimsa had to be fitted with the possible practice in this world. The right understanding of Ahimsa would be possible if we analyse the concept of Himsa or violence.
In the Tattvartha Sutra we read that himsa is injury or violence caused to the living organism due to carelessness and negligence, and actuated by passions like pride and prejudice attachment and hatred. In Yasastilaka Somadeva defines himsa as injury to living beings through error of Judgement. He says 'yat syat pramadayogena pranisu pranahapanam". This definition of himsa has two elements: i) injury to life and ii) the motivation of causing injury. To injure another life is to cause pain to it, but mere injury may not be characterised as himsa. It has to be considered with reference to motive. It would be called himsa if it is impelled by passions and feelings like attachment, hate and prejudice. if it is due to negligence or carelessness, such injury is contaminated with feelings. Similarly violence caused or induced with a specific and conscious purpose would be himsa. For instance, negligence brings sin; and the soul is defiled even though there may not be any actual injury to life. On the contrary a careful and a pious man who is not disturbed by passions and who is kind towards animals will not suffer the sin of violence even if, by accident, injury is caused to life- We may call this motivation for violence "the mental set" for himsa. This analysis of himsa gives the emphasis on the motive theory of conduct in morality although consequences are not altogether ignored. The utilitarians emphasized that rightness of an action depends on the consequence of the action and not to be determined by the motive. The Jainas have in a sense, combined the two views, from their Anekanta attitude. One of the conditions of himsa is physical injury to life. But more important than the physical injury is the inner motive. Speaking harsh words is himsa; harbouring evil thoughts is also himsa. However, the inner motive for injury to life does bring its own consequence in the form of accumulation of Karma and the defilement of the soul.
We are, thus, saved from the avoidable fear of defiling our souls due to violence for which we may not be really responsible nor even aware of.
The fear and the suffering due to fear of causing injury to living beings, are further reduced by the specific injunctions of the scriptures. According to the Jaina sastras the practice of the vow of Ahimsa is to be graded in two levels. On the higher level are the ascetics, men who have renounced the world. On the lower level are the persons who still pursue the things of this world.
The Acaranga Sutra gives a detailed description of the rules to be followed by the homeless ascetics in the practice of the vow of non-violence. The ascetics have to practice five great vows,. Mahavratas, in all their severity. Ahimsa is the first among the five great vows. The ascetic must try to avoid injuring any form of life including one sensed organisms to the best of his ability and as far as it is humanly possible. For instance, he must walk carefully along the trodden path so as to detect the presence of insects; he must use gentle form of expression; and he should be careful as to the food given to him by others. The injunctions for the practice of non-violence by the Munis are very strict and severe. But, in the case of the householder, a more liberal view is taken in giving instructions for the practice of nonviolence and other Vratas. Non-violence is one of the anuvratas. The house-holder is to see that he does not injure any living being as far as possible and intentionally. In the Ratnakarandaka sravakacara, the house-holder is enjoined not to cause injury himself or be an agent for such injury knowingly, samkalpat. He should be free from sthula-himsa. In his case the prohibition of himsa begins with two sensed organisms, because it would be impossible for him to practice non-injury to one-sensed organisms, intentionally or unintentionally in the conduct of his daily life. He is, therefore, exempted from this restriction.
Even in this practice of non-violence, certain forms of injury are permitted as exceptional cases. For instance, it is recognised as a duty of Ksatriya, the warrior class, to defend the weak even with arms. In the Adipurana there is a description that Rsabha, the first Tirthankara, gave training to his subjects in agriculture, in trade and in the use of arms. However, the house-holders are strictly forbidden to cause injury even in the lowest animals wantonly and on purpose. Himsa caused to animals while doing his duty, accidentally and unintentionally and while in the pursuit of just cause is not considered to be a sin. In the Yasasti-laka,Somadeva forbids the Ksatriya to indulge in indiscreet killing even in battle.
We are here reminded of Gandhiji's words when he said that violence is preferred to cowardice. He exhorted the Indian women to resist the attacks of the gundas even with violence, if necessary. He said 'I do believe that where there is a choice between cowardice and violence, I would advise violence. Hence it was that I took part in the Boer War, so called Zulu Rebellion and the late War. But Gandhiji said that non-violence is infinitely superior to violence. Forgiveness adorns the soldier. For the Jainas also, nonviolence is not the policy of the weak. It needs selfcontrol. A self-controlled man is free from fear, fear of doing injury or injustice. The bases of Ahimsa must be self-confidence and peace of mind. A coward has no moral strength to observe non-violence. One who stands courageous and undisturbed in the face of violence is a true follower of ahimsa. He looks at the enemy as a friend. Gandhiji said that a mouse hardly forgives a cat when it allows itself to be torn to pieces by her.[l11] He said non-violence is the law of our species, while violence is the law of the brute.
Non-violence is not mere non-injury in the negative sense. It has also a positive content. It implies the presence of cultivated and noble sentiments, like kindness and compassion for all living creatures. It also implies self-sacrifice. The Buddha renounced the pleasures of the world out of compassion for all living creatures. Jesus was filled with compassion when he said "whoever shall smite thee in the right cheek, turn to him the other also". He demanded self sacrifice. In the Yasastilaka, Somadeva enumerates qualities that should be cultivated to realise the ideal of ahimsa. The qualities are 1) maitri., a disposition not to cause any suffering to any living being in mind, body and speech, 2) pramoda affection coupled with respect for men eminent for their virtues and religious austerities, 3) karunya. will to help the poor and ) madhyasthya, an equitable attitude. Ahimsa is, thus, a positive virtue and it resolves itself into jiva daya, compassion for living creatures.
It may be noted that the practice of ahimsa is primarily meant to save our souls. Himsa and Ahimsa relate only to one's soul and not to those of others. Ahimsa is kindness to others, but it is kindness to the extent that we save others from the sin of violence. If we give pain to anyone we lower ourselves. Self-culture is the main problem in the practice of Ahimsa. In the Sutrakrtanga it is said that if a person causes violence out of greed or if he supports such violence of others, he increases the enemies of his own soul.
In the Acardnga Sutra we are asked to consider ourselves to be in the position of the persons or animals to whom we want to cause injury. Gandhiji said, "I believe in loving my enemies, I believe in nonviolence as the only remedy open to Hindus and Muslims. I believe in the power of suffering to melt the stoniest heart".
This is the content of the Jaina theory of ahimsa. It is possible to say that the doctrine of Ahimsa is not abstract nor inconsistent with the laws of nature. The practice of Ahimsa is not also impossible. It is true that there have been some excesses in the practice of ahimsa both in the injunctions of the sastras and in the practice by enthusiastic devotees. However, these excesses can be properly understood if they are looked at in the historical perspective. Jainas developed polemic against animal sacrifice and violence caused to animals at the time of worship: their protests were vigorous.'The excesses of practice were meant to overcome the difficulties and to impress on the necessity of saving the animals from the pitiless injuries caused to them. The influence of the Jaina
concept of ahimsa has been tremendous on the history of the religious practices in lndia. Animal sacrifices had to be given up to satisfy the demands of the Buddhists and primarily the Jainas.
That living beings live is no kindness, because they live according to their age of ayus-karma. That they die is no himsa because when the ayus-karma is complete beings die without any exterior cause. Natural death without any cause is not himsa. It is only those who kill or injure that are guilty of himsa, although it may be argued that the animal that is killed dies because its ayus-karma is complete. We should not be the cause of its death. Not to kill or injure any living being is kindness. Ahimsa is beneficial to all beings, to the persons who practice ahimsa and those who are saved by ahimsa. In ahimsa there is a force of the soul. It destroys all anxiety, disorder and cowardice. Ahimsa can over come and defeat the most cruel brute force. (Gandhiji has shown this by the Satyagraha movement against the mighty British Empire. Zimmer said that Gandhiji's Satyagraha confronted, great Britain's untruth with lndian truth. This is the battle waged on the collosal modern scale, and according to the principles from the text books not of the Royal Military College but of Brahman. The Prasna Vyakaruna Sutra gives sixty names ascribed to ahimsa and states that ahimsa does good to all. Gandhiji said uhen Motilal Nehru and others were arrested that victory is complete if non violence reigns superior in spite of the arrest; we are out to be killed without killing; by nonviolence, non-co-operation we seek to conquer the English administrators and their supporters.
It is the sacred duty of every Indian to fight for the nation in this hour of difficulty. On this depends our honour and integrity. This is a war, if it may be called so, not for the sake of war but for the sake of vindicating our right of existence as a free nation. Violence in self defence is not to be considered as unjustified as long as we live and take interest in the activities of this life. And live we must; we must also take due share of the responsibility in social and political life in our country, although the consummation of the ideal would be renunciation. But universal renunciation is equally unjustified from the point of view of social good, unless one is a 'heaven-born prophet' or an ascetic.
However, even in performing the duties of a citizen in defending our country we should see that we use the minimum of violence and sparingly. This is in keeping with the tradition of our country.
Still, this does not mean we have given up the significance of non-violence as a supreme principle of life and spirituality. We are now only to be aware of our imperfection and to adjust our-selves as best as we can in this imperfect life. We pursue the ends of this life, and moving on the wheel of life we have to see that our duty to others is also important in its own way. Considered from the perspective of history and the present conditions of our society, it would appear strange that, we, in India, steeped in spirituality, should be disillusioned and now affirm the primacy of material progress; stranger still, that with our firm faith in non-violence, we should prepare ourselves for the inevitable war. But analysis of non-violence so far given shows that non-violence as preached by the Jainas would dispel our illusions about the impossibility of the practice of non-violence. We have tried to justify the ways of man to man in our preparedness for national defence, specially when we are threatened by the enemies at our frotiers.
Thus, the principle of non-violence is important in the context of the present political situation of the world. That will save the world from the fear of distress and war. Nonviolence as Gandhiji said, is not meant only for saints. It is meant for the common people as well.
Romain Rolland said that the Rsis who discovered the law of non-violence in the midst of violence were greater geniuses than Newton, greater warriors than Wellington. He said with Gandhiji, that non-violence is the law of our species as violence is the law of the brute.  Non-violence would be a panacea for the ills of life.It would bring lasting peace on earth.
1. RADHAKRISHNAN(S) Indian Philosophy. Vol. I. (1941) p.52.
2. Ratnakaradaka-Sravakacara: pp. 47-49. Samantabha
3. WILLIAMS(R); JainaYoga (London Oriental Series Vol.14 1936 p. 34.
4. Based on the analysis in the Jaina Yoga with slight modifications
5. SCHUBRING (W.): Die Lehre der Jainas, Berlin 1935: pp. 180-186. Translation Wolfgang BEURLEN (Banarasidas) 1962, PP-298-300.
6. Ibid, p. 290.
7. Ibid, p. 302.
8. Uttaradhyana Sutra. XXIII. S.B. E. Vol. XLV.
9. Ibid, Introduction JACOBI (H). Footnote XXIII.(22).
10. Mulacara. 1-36.
11. Dasavaikalika-sutra. 10. 1-15.
12. Uttaradhyayana sutra 15.I ( S.B.E. Vol. XLV).
13. Uttaradhyayana-sutra 30,19 and 26 .
14 Acaranga sutra I,44; II.59, 25, 52
15. Uttaradhyayana sutra XI.17 20.
16. Uttaradhyayana sutra, III.1-4
17. Uttaradhyayana sutra VII.ll.
18. Sutrakrtanga: Bk. I.l4. 16. S. B E. XLV).
19. BUEHLER: On thc Indian Sect. of the Jainas: ( 1903) P. 15.
20. JACOB1 (H): SBE Vol. XXII Intr. p. xxxii.
21. UPADHYE (A.N.): Brhatkathkosa . Intr. Pravacanasara . 1943 Preface pp. 12-13.
22. Yogasastra: Hemacandra, iii. 90.
23. Ibid. III.90.
24. Sravakacara . Vasunandin. Edt. HIRALAL JAIN: 209.
25. Avasyakasutra; with commentary, Haribhadra 821,
26. Tattvarthasutra: with commentary. Siddhasena, vii. 22.
27. Sravakadharma Pancasaka (Devachanda Lalbhai No. 102) 1952 14.
29. Avasyaka-sutra with Comm. by Hsribhadra (Agamodya Samgraha 823 b.
30. Tattvartha-sutra: Comm. by Siddhasena. vil. 22.
31. Ratnakarandaka Sravakacara of Samantabhadra . iii, 22,23
32. Ratnakarandaka Sravakacara ot Samantabhadra, iii.31.
33. Ibid, 30.
34. Ratnakarandaka Sravakacara . 33 also refer Sagaradharmamrta of Asadbara. Bombay ed. 1917, v.s
35. Tattvarthasutra with Siddhasena's comm. vii-16.
36. Tattvartha-sutra with Pujyapada's Sarvathasiddhi vii. 2.
37. WILL1AMS(R.) . Jaina Yoga vi. 132.
38. Avaashyaka-sutra with Hemacandra,s commentary, (1916).
39. Ratnakarandaka Sravakacara, iv. 12.
40. Avasyaka-sutra with Haribhadra's commentary p, 833.
41. Ratnakarandaka :Sravakacara, iv, 3-4.
42. Tattvartha sutra. vii. 16 and Bhasya of Siddhasena.
43. WILLIAMS (R.) . Jaina Yoga, p. 149.
44. Tattvarthasutra. vii. 39 with commentary by Pujyapada.
45.Schubring(W) : The Doctorine of Jainas, p.297 (English translation, (Motilal Banarasidas) 1962.
46. Sagaro-dharmamrta: (Manikchanda-granthamala Bombay 1917) vii
47. The Doctrinc of the Jainas by WALTEIER SCHIUBRING, Trans lated from the revised German edition by WOLFGANG BEURLEN, Motilal Banarsidas, 962. p. 285 .
48. Rotnakarandaka Sravakacara, v. 25-28.
49. Sagaradharmamrta vii. 31-35.
50. Ratnakarandaka-sravakacara, v. 25. 26.
51. Sagaradharmamrta, vii, 31-35
52. WILLIAMS (R.) :Jaina Yoga, p. 181.
53. Ibid. p. XVII.
54. Ibid. p. XX.
55. Ibid. XXI P.
56. Jaina Yoga p. XX
57. Uttaradhyayana,sutra, XXV. 41 43 (S.B.E. VoI. XLV.)
58. Thc Manu Smrti. Vl11. 49.
59. JACOBI (H.): E. R. R. VoI. IV p. 484. Death and the Disposal of the Dead.
60. Uttaradhyayana-Sutra XXXVI, (260).
61. JACOBI (H): Studies in Jainism, p. 84.
63. RADHAKRISHNAN(S) . Indian Philosophy, Vol. 1. p. 325 .
64. Bouquet A. C. (Rev).: Stoics and Buddhists paper read at 35th. Session: Indian Philosophical Congress. Waltair. 1969 ( . Journal Selected, papers p. 16.
65. Tattvartha Sutta, 1.
66. Ratnakarandaka -Sravakacara, 123 .
67. Bhagvati Aradhana, 15.
68. JACOBI (H): 'Death and the Disposal of the Dead " ERE, VOL. IV, P. 484.
69. Epigraphic Carnatica, II. Introduction.
70. Sources of Indian Tradition, Part II, A. M. Basiam p.69
71. Acaranga Sutra, 1, 7, 6.
72 Ibid. 7.6
73. The Manusmriti (SEE Vol. XXV) vI,31,
74. The Manu Smrti, Comment.
75. Ibid, Commentary Buhler
76. Namadeva Gatha (Poona 1924) Samadhi Prakarna.
77. Ratnakrandaka Sravakacara, 126.
78. Eatnakarandaka, 126, 127
79. Abhidhana Rajendra. Vol. VlI. p. 214
81. Abhidhana Rajendra, Vol. VII, p. 214.
82. Tattvarthasutra, viii. 22, with commentary by Pujyapada. Also refer to Purusartha-Siddhyupaya of Amrtacandra, 175.
83. Ratnakarandaka :Sravrakacadra. i29 Commentary.
84, (i) Uttaradhyayana Sutra XXXVI (266). (ii) JACOBI, Death and the disposal of the Dead ERE. IV, p. 484. (iii) D80 S. B., History of Jaina Monachism, p. 461,
85. Corpus Juris, Vol. LX, (1932) Edt. Mack. W. p. 595.
86. Abhidhana Rajendra, Vol. Vll, p. 220
87. Chan. Up. iii, 16
89. Chan. Up. iii
90. Indian Philosophy, Vol. 1, p. 148 Allen & Unwin 1941
91. Bhagavadgita Canto 16
92. Yoga Sutra ii, 30 and Bhasaya
93. Rhys DAVIDS. Buddhist India, p. 215.
94. Thc Vinaya Tcxts XVIlI, p. 117.
95. Uttaradhyayana Sutra. XXIII and Comments by JACOBI in S.B. E:. Vol. XLV. Part II. p. 193.
96. History of Pre.Buddhist Indian Philosophy, Barua. Ch.XXVI.
97. Philosophies of India by ZIMMER. P. 172.
98. Mahatma Gandhi by H.S.L. POLAK and others, p. 112.
99. Letter from Gandhiji in Modern Review, October 1916.
100. Studies in Buddhism (1953), Calcutta, p. 105.
101. The Heart of Jainism (Humphrey Milford) 1915, p. 287.
102. Philosophies of India by ZIMMER, P. 251
103. Tattvartha Sutra and Commentary, VII. 5.
104. Ibid. and Sarvarrhasiddhi, VII. 5-9.
106. Promattayogat pranavyaparopanam himsa, T .s. VIl . 8
107. Pravacanasra by Kundakundacarva. 3. 17.
108. Caritradhikara, 53.
109. Adipurana, 16.
110. Young India, August 11,1920, Doctrine of the Sword.
111. Young India. August 11,1920.
112. Mathew, 5, 39-42.
113. Yasastilaka, 334-337.
114. Sutrakrtanga, 1.1.
115 . Acaranga sutra, v. i
116. 'Love and Hate' 1922. Young India, Dccember 1920.
117. Philosophies of India, ZIMMER, P. 172.
118. Prasana Vyakurana Sutra, Ch. 1, Sutra Il.
119. The Doctrine of the Swoad. Young India, Aug. 11, 1920.
120. Muahatma Gandhi by Romain Eolland, p. 48.
MEN AND GODS:
Nature of divinity in Jaina philosophy -- historical perspective -- Jaina arguments against the existence of Creator God -- Divinity of man -- no place for divine grace -- nature of man -- concept of man in philosophy -- Jaina concept of jiva -- man in the physical and social environment -- human values -- Moksa is an ideal -- Jaina conception of moksa -- State of the liberated soul – Epilogue --
the spirit of Anekanta pervading the problems of life and experience -- need for the present day.
I. NATURE OF DlVINITY IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY: Religion as a way of life and not merely as an institution, has been natural to man. It is man's reaction to the totality of things as he apprehends it. It implies an interpretation of nature and the meaning of the universe. lt seeks to go beyond the veil of visible things and finds an inexhaustible fund of spiritual power to help him in life's struggle. And the 'presence' of god gave strength for man in his struggles in this life. The ways of god to man and man to god have been rich and varied. It may be, as Prof. Leuba pointed out, that fear was the first of the emnotions to become organised in human life, and out of this fear God was born. Perhaps love and gratitude are just as natural, as much integral parts of the constitution of man, as fear; and gods were friendly beings. It is still possible that men have looked at gods with a living sense of kinship and not with the vague fear of the unknown pawers. We do not know. But one thing, is certain that in higher religions fear is sublimated by love into an adoring reverence. From the fear of the Lord in The Old Testament to the worship of God 'with godly fear and awe' is not a far cry.
In the Vedic period, we find a movement of thought from polytheism to monotheism and then to monism. The poetic souls contemplated the beauties of nature and the lndo-Iranian gods, like Deus, Varuna, Usas and Mitra were products of this age. Other gods like Indra were created to meet the needs of the social and political adjustments. Many gods were created; many gods were worshipped. Then a weariness towards the many gods began to be felt as they did not know to what god they should offer oblations. Then a theistic conception of God as a creator of the vniverse was developed out of this struggle for the search for a divine being. In ancient Greece, Xenophanes was against the polytheism of his time. Socrates had to drink hemlock as he was charged of denying the national gods. He distinguished between many gods and the one God who is the creator of the universe.
2. THE JAINA ARGUMENTS AGAINST GOD: But the Jainas were against gods in general and even the God as creator. They presented several arguments against the theistic conception of God. They deny the existence of a Creator God and refute the theistic arguments of the Naiyayikas. The Naiyayika argument that the world is of the nature of an effect created by an intelligent agent who is God (Isvara) cannot be accepted because:
i ) It is difficult to understand the nature of the world as an effect: a) if effect is to mean that which is made of parts(savayava) then even space is to be regarded as effect;
a) if the effect is to mean that which is maade of parts (savayava) then even space is to be regarded as effect;
b) if it means coherence of a cause of a thing which was previously nonexistent, in that case one cannot speak of the world as effect as
atoms are eternal;
c) if it means that which is liable to change, then God would also be liable to change; and he would need a creator ta create him and another and so on ad infinitum. This leads to infinite regress.
ii) Even supposing that the world as a whole is an effect and needs a cause, the cause need not be an intelligent one as God because:
a) if he is intelligent as the human being is, then he would be full of imperfectionsas human intelligence is not perfect;
b) if his intelligence is not of the type of human intelligence but similar to it. then it would not guarantee inference of the existence of God on similarity, as we cannot infer the existence of fire on the ground of seeing steam which is similar to smoke;
c) we are led to a vicious circle of argument if we can say that the world is such that we have a sense that some one made it, as we have to infer the sense from the fact of being created by God.
iii) If an agent had created the world. he must have a body. For, we have never seen an intelligent agent without a body. If a god is to produce an intelligence and will, this is also not possible without embodied intelligence.
iv) Even supposing a non embodied being were to create the world by his intelligence, will and activity, there must be some motivation:
a) if the motive is just a personal whim, then there would be no natural law or order in the world;
b) if it is according to the moral actions of men, then he is governed by moral order and is not independent;
c) if it is through mercy, there should have been a perfect world full of happiness;
d) if men are to suffer by the effects of past actions (adrsta) then the adrsta would take the place of God. But, if God were to create the world without any motive but only for sport it would be `motiveless malignity'.
v) God's omnipresence and omniscience cannot also be accepted, because:
a) if he is everywhere, he absorbs into himself everything into his own self, Ieaving nothing to exist outside him;
b) his omniscience would make him experience hell, as he would know everything and his knowledge would be direct experience.
vi) It is not possible to accept the Naiyayika contention that without the supposition of God, the variety of the world would be inexplicable, because we can very well posit other alternatives like
(i) the existence of the natural order and (ii) a society of gods to explain the universe.
But if a society of gods were to quarrel and fall out as it is sometimes contended then the nature of Gods would be quite so unreliable, if not vicious, that we cannot expect elementary cooperation that we find in ants and bees.
The best way, therefore, is to dispense with God altogether.
We find similar objections against the acceptance of a theistic God, in Buddhism also. The Buddha was opposed to the conception of Isvara as a creator of the universe. If the world were to be thus created, there should be no change nor destruction, nor sorrow nor calamity.
If Isvara were to act with a purpose, he would not be perfect that would limit his perfection. But if he were to act without purpose his actions would be meaningless like a child's play.
There is nothing superior to the law of Karma. The suffering of the world are intelligible only on the basis of the law of Karma. Though the Buddha admits the existence of the gods like Indra and Varuna, they are also involved in the wheel of Samsara.
We have, so far, seen that the Jainas, as also the Buddhist were against the theistic conception of God. God as a creator not necessary to explain the universe. We have not to see God there in the world outside, nor is God to be found 'in the dark lonely corner of a temple with doors all shut.' He is there with us. He is there with the tiller tilling the ground and the 'path-maLer breaking stones', in the sense that each individual soul is be considered as God, as he is essentially divine in nature. Each soul when it is perfect is god.
3. The Jainas sought the divine in man and established the essential divinity of man. This conception has been developed specific directions in Jaina philosophy.
As we have seen, the existence of the soul is a presupposition in the Jaina philosophy. Proofs are not necessary. If there are any proofs we can say that all the pramanas can establish the existence of the soul. It is described from the phenomenal and the noumenal points of view. From the phenomenal point of view, it possesses pranas, is the lord (prabha). doer (karta), enjoyer (bhokta). Iimited to his body (dehamatra), still incorporeal and is ordinarily found with Karma. From the noumenal point of view, soul is described in its pure form. It is pure and perfect. It is pure consciousness. It is unbound, untouched and no other than itself. The joys and sorrows that the soul experiences are due to the fruits of Karma which it accumulates due to the continuous activity that it is having. This entanglement is beginningless, but it has an end. The deliverance of the soul from the wheel of samsara is possible by voluntary means. By the moral and spiritual efforts involving samvara and nirjara, the Karma accumulated in the soul is removed. When all Karma is removed, the soul becomes
pure and perfect, free from the wheel of Samsara. Being-free, with its upward motion it attains liberation or Moksa. There is nothing other which is as perfect. There is no other God. The freed souls are divine in nature, as they are perfect and omniscient.
For the Jaina it is not necessary to surrender to any higher being, nor to ask for any divine favour for the individual to reach the highest goal of perfection. There is no place for divine grace, nor is one to depend on the capricious whims of a superior deity for the sake of attaining the highest ideal. There is emphasis on individual efforts in the moral and spiritual struggle for self-realization. One has to go through the fourteen stages of spiritual development before one reaches the final goal in the ayogakevali stage.
However, the struggle for perfection is long and arduous. Few reached perfection; and perhaps, as tradition would say, none would become perfect in this age. Among those who have reached omniscience and perfection are the Tirthamkaras, the prophets, who have been the beacon lights of Jaina religion and culture. They have preached the truth and have helped men to cross the ocean of this worldly existence. They ]ed men, like kindly light, to the path of spiritual progress.
Therefore, they need to be worshipped. The Jainas worship the Tirthakaras not because they are gods, nor because they are powerful in any other way, but because they are human, and yet divine, as every one is divine, in his essential nature. The worship of the Tirthakaras is to remind us that they are to be kept a ideals before us in our journey to self-realization. No favours are to be sought by means of worship, nor are they competent to bestow favours on the devotees. The main motive of worship of the Tirthakaras, therefore, is to emulate the example of the perfect beings. if possible, at least to remind us that the way to perfection lies in the way they have shown us. Even this worship of Tirthamkaras arose out of the exigencies of social and religious existence and survival and possibly as a psychological necessity. We find a few temples of Gandhiji today; perhaps, there would be many more. The Buddha has been deified.
Apart from the worship of Tirthakaras, we find a pantheon of gods who are worshipped and from whom favours are sought. The cult of the Yaksini worship and of other are attendant gods may be cited as examples. This type of worship is often attended by the occult practices and the tantric and mantric ceremonialism. Dr. P. B. Desai shows that in Tamilnad Yaksini was allotted an independent status and raised to a superior position which was almost equal to that of the Jina. In some instances the worship of Yaksini appears to have superseded even that of Jina. Padmavati, Yaksini of Parsvanatha, has been elevated to the status of a superior deity with all the ceremonial worship, in Pombuccapura in Mysore area. These forms of worship must have arisen out of the contact with other competition, faiths and with the purpose of popularizing the Jaina faith in the context of the social and religious competition. The cult of Jvalamalini with its Tantric accompaniments may be mentioned as
another example of this form of worship. The promulgator of this cult was, perhaps, Helacarya of Ponnur. According to the prevailing belief at that time, mastery over spells or Mantravidya was considered as a qualification for superiority. The Jaina Acaryas claimed to be master Mantravadins. Jainism had to compete with the other Hindu creeds. Yaksi form of worship must have been introduced in order to attract the common men towards Jainism, by appealing to the popular forms of worship.
However, such forms of worship are foreign to the Jaina religion. They do not form an organic and constituent features of the Jaina worship. These tendencies have been absorbed and assimilated, in the struggle for existence and survival. We may, here, refer to the inconceivable changes the Buddhist forms of worship have undergone in the various countries of the world, like the Tantric forms of worship in Tibetan Lamaism.
We have still some gods in Jaina cosmogony. They are the devas, the gods living, in heavens like the Bhavanavasi, Vyantaravasi', Jyotiska, and Kalpavasi. But they are part of the Samsara and not really Gods in the sense of superior divine beings. They are just more fortunate beings than men because of their accumulated good Karma. They enjoy better empirical existence than men. But we, humans, can pride ourselves in that the Gods in these worlds cannot reach moksa unless they are reborn as human beings. They are not objects of worship. It is, therefore, necessary for us to know the true nature of man and his place in society in which he lives, moves and has his being.
NATURE OF MAN
I. Dignity and freedom of the human individual has been a common principle for all philosophies and faiths, except perhaps for Nietzsche. Marx emphasised the potentiality of man by denying God. Kant exhorted us to treat every human individual as an end in himself and never as a means. Democracies are based on the equality and dignity of every human individual. In the Mahabharata we are told that there is nothing higher than man. According to the Jainas, the individual soul, in its pure form is itself divine, and man can attain divinity by his own efforts.
2. In India, the aim of philosophy was atma vidya. atmanam viddhi was the cardinal injunction of the Upanisads. Yajnyavalkya explains that all worldly objects are of no value apart from the self. Today we have a new Humanism where we are becoming increasingly aware of the importance of man in this world. Philosophical interest has shifted from nature to God and from God to man. Even the claim of absolute value for science is being questioned. Man and his values are primary, their primacy has to be acknowledged by any philosophy.
But with all these philosophical interests, the real nature of man has been eluding us. Attempts have been made to know him. But there has not been an agreed conception of man easily to be understood and
accepted by the common man.
There were philosophers like Protagoras who reduced man to mere sensations. The Theaetetus describes the Sophist conception of the individual as a complex of changes interacting with other forces, and seeking to satisfy the desires. In English empiricism, Hume denied everything including the human soul, except impressions and ideas. The Human tendency was recently revived by the Cambridge philosophers who brought philosophy, to the brink of extinction. Perennial problems of philosophy including, the conceptions of soul were dismissed as nonsense. Like the men chained against the walls of the cave in The Republic the empiricists refused to see beyond what they would like to affirm. In ancient Indian thought, Carvakas led us to similar conclusions. It is said that the Buddhists denied a permanent soul. The Buddha was silent about the metaphysical problems. His disciples analysed soul as an aggregate of matter, feelings and sensations. Man is a psychological personality, and when it is analysed away Sunya is realised.
However, soul of man has emerged as a permanent and eternal principle imperishable in nature. Socrates, Plato and Aristotle accsepted soul as pure eternal and imperishable principle. plato talked of the immorality of the soul. In india the outlook in Rigveda is empirical. The Gods were invoked to give cows and prosperity in this world. The idea of a permanent soul has yet to be evolved. In the Upanisads the conception of a permanent soul gained predominance. In the Dialogue between Prajapati and Indra we get a progressive development of tbe definition of the soul in four stages as i) bodily, ii) empirical, iii) transcendental and iv) the absolute  'The next step was to identify the self with the Absolute. As Radhakrishnansays, we may not understand the truth of the saying 'tbat thou art tat tvam asi, but that does not give us a sufficient right to deny it.
The idea of the self has been a fundamental conception in Jaina philosophy. Tbe existence of the soul is a presupposition. The soul is described from the phenomenal and the noumenal points of view. All things in this world are divided into living and non-living. From the phenomenal point of view, the soul is described as possessing empirical qualities. It is possesed of four pranas. It is the lord, the doer, and the enjoyer of the fruit of Karma. As a potter considers himself a maker and enjoyer of the clay pot, so the mundane soul is the doer of things and the enjoyer of the fruits of Karma. From the noumenal point of view, soul is pure and perfect. It is pure consciousness. It is unbound, untouched and not other than itself. Man is the jiva bound by matter and it assumes gross physical body. Through the operation of Karma the soul gets entangled in the wheel of Samsara. When it is embodied, it is affected by the environment physical, social and spiritual in different ways. When it identifies itself with the various functions of the bodily and social environment. William James distinguishes between the self as known or the `me', the empirical ego, and the self as knower or the I. On the same basis, distinction between the states of the soul as Bahiratnamn, Antaratman and Paramatman has been made.
3. Apart from the real nature of man it would be necessary to know him as an individual in his physical and social environment . As an empirical individual man lives in this life and is influenced by the environment. To some extent he is a product of the environment, at the same time shaping the other selves. Man cannot be separated from nature. He is a part and parcel of the Interacting forces in nature. In this sense, individual men including the heaven born prophets are products of environment and social heritage. They also contribute to the development of the social life. This universe is a vale of soul making . There is a cosmic purpose in the incessant struggle of the individuals in this world. The purpose as translated in human efforts, is the perfection of men.
We have seen that for the attainment of this end, we need not depend on higher entity called God. Efforts of individual men are more important than the forces that work outside man. This brings us to the problem of the human ideals.
4. As a social being, development of man depends on the ends that he places before himself and the means used for the attainment for those ends. The Greeks, as also the Vedic Aryans were full of zeal for life and its beauties. The consummation of life's end was to perfect life. Truth, beauty and goodness were the highest human values. Subjectivism of Protagoras would have led him to ethical relativism. What is good for one man may not be the same for the other. But Protagoras was a teacher of virtues and was accepted as wise man. Still the earlier Sophists ex-pressed nihilistic Views. Polus, a disciple of Gorgias, admired political power in a tyrant, though evil it may be. Thrasymachus sneered at conventional justice as mere obedience to the wishes of those in power. The tyrant is the happiest man. So was the philosopher Netzsche fascinated by power. He preached the philosophy of power. There were others, like Aristippus, who aimed at leisures as the highest end in life. Pleasure was to be sought by the Carvakas in ancient Indian thought. Greatest happiness of the greatest number was a modified version of this end.
However from pleasure to virtue is a long way. Socratic formula that virtue is knowledge expressed the basic insight into the synthesis of theory and practice. Plato mentioned four cardinal virtues temperance courage, justice and wisdom. Aristotle distinguished virtues into the practical and the intellectual virtues, Both are necessary for the development of man.
In ancient Indian thought, four cardinal human values have been mentioned. Artha, Kama, Dharma and Moksa are to be realised by man. They represent a hierarchy of human values. The ultimate ideal is Moksa. It is freedom from the bonds of life. Moksa as a release from the wheel of Samsara and in its positive aspect as oneness with the Highest was becoming gradually clear in the Upanisads. The state of perfection need not be attained only after shedding off this bodily existence. It is possible to attain such a state in this life only. The conception of Jivanmukti has played an important part in the ancient thought. Kramamukti admits the possibility of Kramamukti. Apart from the highest ideal of moksa, other ideals are to be
progressively realised as various levels of life. Over emphasis of one ideal will lead to a partial development of civilization. All the values are true and need each other. This is the synoptic point of view.
5. In this age of scientific development, we are giving exclusive emphasis on the material ends of life. Artha and Kama have become important. Exclusive importance on one of the other of the human values is likely to lead to a partial development of human personality. We may either go the way of mechanising the human or divinising the man. Western civilization has advanced in scientific development through the democracy of intellect. Life in lndia has gone the way of overspiritualising the human and we lost foot on earth. It is true that the ideal of life is Moksa but it is also true that few of us can attain it in this life. We have, therefore to reorientate our moral concepts so as to lead us to perfection through the progressive realization of the ideal of emancipation in the context of human life and limitations.
We have seen the Jainas have given gradations of moral practice for the realisation of the end of perfection. There are two levels of ethical codes i) one for the layman (sravak dharma) and ii) the other for the spiritually advanced who have given up the attachment of Samsara. It is the muni-dhurmaThe moral practice for them is more rigorous than for the comnmon man. It would be worth analysing these gradations of moral life in the context of the moral structure of present day society.
I think it would be possible to work out a synthesis of the way of all flesh and spirit and find out a proper place for man in this universe. We can only say that with the advancement of science and technology for the sake of man, in our struggle to find out man we have lost him.
6. And to find out man we have to reassert the ideal of spiritual perfection without in any way disparaging the aims of empirical life. This is the Anekanta attitude. All have aimed at Moksa, but few have attained it. Yet it is imperative on the part of us, humans, to know the real nature of the highest perfection as presented in the ideal of Moksa.
III. MOKSA AS AN IDEAL 1. The idea of release of the soul from the wheel of Samsara was common in Indian philosophy except with the Carvaka. Philosophy was not merely an academic pursuit but it had a practical aim of the attainment of Moksa. The ancient Indians did not stop at the discovery of truth but strove to realize it in their own experiences. They followed up tattvajnana by strenuous efforts to attain Moksa or llberation.
But the conception of Moksa was not in the spirit of the Vedic Aryans, as they were profoundly interested in the happiness in this life. The Rgveda Samhita largely presents the invocations of the Gods for the promotion of happiness in this life. Awareness of emancipation as such
is not present in the earliest recorded expressions in the Vedas. Moksa as a release from the wheel of Samsara and its positive aspect as oneness with the Highest, was becoming gradually clear in the Upanisadas. In the Chhandogya Upanisad, it is still not clear. The Brhadaranyaka Upanisad describes the release as freedom from death day or night of waxing and waning, of the moon. In the later Upanisads like the Maitrayani we find new ideas jolting against old ones.
It is therefore possible to say that the conception of moksa or release from the bonds of empirical life is primarily pre Aryan. It was prevalent in India before the Aryans settled here. Indian philosophy is the synthesis of two currents of thought the Aryan and the pre Aryan. The Jaina and the Buddhist thoughts were original and preAryan. They were assimilated in the subsequent Hindu philosophy through the Upanisads. The Dravidian contribution to the development of Indian philosophy was no less important. The influence of forest life, the emergence of female gods and the conception of Avatara were largely due to the Dravidian influence. And so was the conception of Moksa brought from the pre-Aryan thought and developed in the Upanisads and subsequent philosophy.
Jaina religion is very ancient and preAryan. It prevailed even before Parsva and Vardhamana, the last two T1rthakaras. The Yajurveda mentions Rsabha, Ajita and Aristanemi as Tirthakaras. Jainism reflects the cosmology and anthropology of a much older pre-Aryan upper class of North-Eastern India-Jacobi has traced Jainism to early primitive current of metaphysical speculation.
2. For a Jaina, the highest ideal is Moksa, freedom from the wheel of amsara It is to be attained through, through right intuition, right knowledge and right conduct.
Due to the activity, the soul gets entangled in the wheel of Samsara. This process of entanglement is beginningless but has an end. The soul gets entangled in the Samsara and embodied through the operation of karma. It gets various forms due to the materially caused conditions ( upadhi ), and is involved in the cycle of birth and death.
But the Jainas believe in the inherent capacity of the soul for selfrealization. The deliverance of the soul from this wheel of Samsara is possible by voluntary efforts on the part of the individuals. The veil of Karma has to be removed. This is possible when the individual soul makes efforts to stop the influx of karma by samvara and remove the accumulated Karma by Nirjara. When all the obstacles are removed the soul becomes pure and perfect and free from the wheel Samsara. Being free, with its upward motion, it attains liberation or Moksa.
However, the journey of the soul to freedom is long and arduous, because the removal of Karma involves a long moral and spiritual discipline. The journey has to be through fourteen stages of self realization called Guntsthana. The soul has gradually to remove the five conditions of bondage mithyatva ( perversity), avirati,(lack of
control), pramada (spiritual inertia) kasaya (passion) and triyoga (three fold activity of body, speech and mind). In the highest stage of spiritual realization, the soul reaches the stage of perfection and omniscience. This is the consummation of the struggle.
Radhakrishnansays that it is not possible to give a positive description of the liberated soul. The state of perfection is passively described as freedom from action and desires, a stage of utter and absolute quiescence. It is a state of unaffected peace since energy of past Karma is extinguished. In this state, the soul is 'itself' and no other. It is the perfect liberation. Zimmer says that, after its pilgrimage of innumberable existence in the various inferior stratifications, The life monad rises to the cranial zone of the microscopic being, purged of the weight of the subtle Karmic particles that formerly held it down. Nothing can happen to it any more, for it has put aside the traits of ignorance, those heavy veils of individuality that are the precipitating causes of biographical events. ' In the higher stage of perfection, the individuality, the masks, the formal personal features are distilled away.'Sterilized of colouring, flavour and weight the sublime crystals now are absolutely pure-like the drops of rain that descend from a clear sky tasteless and emasculate.
This state is the Siddha state. The liberated soul has no empirical adjuncts. It is neither long nor small, nor black nor blue, nor bitter nor pungent. lt is without body and without rebirth He perceives and he knows all. There is no analogy to describe the condition of the liberated soul. It is difficult to give a positive description of the freed soul. It is the state in which there is freedom from action and desire, a state of rest a passionless inaffable peace. However in terms of positive description, we are told that the liberated state has infinite consciousness, pure understanding, absolute freedom and eternal bliss.' It lives in this state of eternity. This freed soul has beginning but no end, while the soul in the Samsara has no beginning but an end of that state in its freedom. From the noumenal point of view the freed soul is the absolutely unconditioned. It is beyond the causality.
It is difficult to give a clear and graphic description of the liberated soul as language is an inadequate instrument for such description. Attempts have, therefore, been made in various ways to present a picture of the state of Moksa in different systems in Indian philosophy. The Buddhist have been inclined to give a negative description as the extinction of every trace of individuality. It is a state of nothingness. But some Buddhists have repudiated the negative conception of the liberated state, Nirvana. The Madhyamikas consider this stage as inexpressible. Nirvana is not an end ( bhava ) or abhava ( noness ). It is abandonment of all such considerations of the real. The Madhyamika conception of Nirvana comes very close to the Advaita notion of mukti as Brahmanbhava. Nirvana is the transcendent life of the spirit. But Moksa, according to the Advaita, is the absolutely unconditioned and is characterised by infinite bliss. But for Madhyamika, Nirvana is inexpressible and cannot be identified with the Good or Bliss. According to the Naiyayikas, Moksa is a state of
pure existence to which a liberated soul attains and is compared to a dreamless sleep. The critic feels that the Moksa of the Naiyayikas is a word without meaning. Sleep without dream is a state of torpor, and we may as well say that a stone is enjoying supreme felicity in a sound sleep without disturbing dreams.' For the Samkhya, salvation is phenomenal as bondage does not belong to the Purusa. When Purusa is free from the defilement of prakrti, it passes beyond the bondage of the Gunas and shines forth in its pure intelligence. There is no bliss nor happiness in the state of Mukti as all feeling belongs to Prakrti. Jaimini and Sabara did not face the problem of ultimate release. For Prabhakara, Moksa is a state in which there is absolute cessation of all dreams. It is a simple natural form of the soul. Kumarila states that it is a state of Atman in itself free from all pain. Some refer it as a bliss of atman. For Samkara Moksa is a state of direct realization of something which existed from eternity. When the limitations are removed the soul is liberated. It is the state of absolute peace and eternal bliss. When Avidya vanishes, the true soul stands self-revealed, free from the impurities, as the star shines in a cloudless night. The nature of the liberated soul is a state of oneness with Brahman. Moksa is described negatively, as the state of freedom where there is neither day nor night, where the stream of time has stopped and where the sun and the stars are no longer seen.
The state of perfection of Moksa need not be attained only after shedding off this bodily existence. It is possible to attain such a state in this life only. The conception of Jivanmukta has, therefore, played an important part in the ancient thought. Samsara admits the possibility kramamukti ( gradual liberation ). He says that the meditation of `OM' leads one to the Brahmaloka where one gradually attains perfect knowledge. He also admits the possibility of perfection and freedom from pain even in this life. As the potter's wheel continues for a time to revolve even after the vessel has been completed, so also life continues even after liberation for some time. In this stage the perfect being does not acquire new Karma. The Buddhists have also made a distinction between upaidhtsesanirvana and anupadhisesanirvana. The former comes nearer to the conception of Jivanmukti. Similarly the distinction corresponds to nirvana and parinirvana. In the state of upadhisesa-nirvana, there is the total cessation of ignorance and of passions, though the body and the mind continue to function but without passions. This state corresponds to the Jivan mukti of Samkhya and the Vedanta. The Buddha after his enlightenment is a representative example. The Mahayanists added one more type of Nirvana in apratisthita nirvana, the state of Bodhisattva who does not accept the final release although he is entitled for it. He decides to serve humanity out of compassion.
According to the Jainas in the thirteenth stage of Gunasthana called sayuza-kevali all the passions and the four types of Ghati Karma are destroyed, one is free from the bondage of mithyatva, pramada and passions. However, it is not free from yoga and empirical activity and is still not free from embodied existence, as the four types of nonobscuring Karmas, like vedaniya which produces feelings, ayu which determines the span of life, nama determining the physical structure
and the gotra responsible for one's status in life are still operating. One is not free from bodily existence, because the ayu karma is still to be exhausted. But there is no influx of karma. In this stage we find omniscient beings like the Tirthakaras, the Ganadharas and the Samanya kevalins. They attain the enlightenment, but still live in this world preaching the truth that they have seen. This stage may be compared to the Jivanmukti described by the Sankhya and Vedanta systems of thought. It is like the upadhisesa-nirvana o£ the Buddhists. It may also be likened to the apratisthita nirvan of the Mahayanists. Such a perfect being, may appear to be active in this world :in many ways, yet, at root, he is inactive. He is like a man assisting a magician in a magical show, knowing that all that is shown is merely an illusion of the senses. He is unaffected by all that happen . When Gautama the Buddha attained enlightenment, he wanted his enlightenment not to be known to others. But Brahma inspired the Buddha to be the teacher of mankind. This is the stage of sayoga kevalin or jivan mukta. So did the Tirthakaras, Ganadharas and Samanya-kevalins preach the sublime knowledge to the people of this worldZimmer compares this attitude of the Kevalins to the function of a lamp. Just as the lamp lights the room and still remains unconcerned with the what is going on in the room, so the self enacts the role of ' lighting the phenomenal exersonality solely for the maintenance of the body, not for pursuit of any good, any gratification of the sense nor any kindly goal.
In the fourteenth stage of (Gunasthana called Ayoga-Kevali, the self has attained peaceful perfection. The influx of Karma is completely stopped and the self is freed from all Karmic dust. This stage lasts only for a period of time required to pronounce five syllables. At the end of this period the soul attains disembodied liberation. Being now, free with its upward motion the soul attains the liberation or Moksa.
The liberated souls live in perfect peace and purity in siddhasila which is the abode of the omniscient souls. In the Tiloyapannatti, We get the description of the siddhasila, which is also called the moksasthana or nirvansthana. These freed souls enjoy ' a kind of interpenetrating existence on account of their oneness of status.' Their soul substance has a special power by which an infinity of souls could exist without mutual exclusion. The identity of the saved is determined by 'the living rhythm retaining the form of the last physical life and by the knowledge of the past. The conception of the liberated soul and the abode of the souls in sidhasila here they live with all their individuality, is a logical possibility and psychologically significant.
1. We, may not attain Moksa; we do not need to. We can still keep the idea of perfection before us and look to the perfect souls, as ideals to guide us, like the kindly light in this life.
2. Struggle for perfection is a necessary factor in life. Sorrow and imperfection are a flavour to the sauce. They are necessary for onward journey in the spiritual struggle. The efforts for self-realization will have meaning only when this world becomes a vale of the soul
making, and the life a real fight in which something is eternally gained.' Life is to be considered as a struggle towards perfection, and not merely an amusing pantomime of infallible marrionettes. We should realise that 'man is not complete, he is yet to be' in what he is, he is small. He is hungering for something which is more than that he can get. In this struggle for perfection man need not depend on God or any superior being for favours for He rolls as impotently as you or I '. Man has to depend on his own self-effort. The Jaina attitude is melioristic.
3. The synoptic view is the very foundation of Jaina out-look. A Jaina looks at the soul from the noumenal and the phenomenal points of view . It is simple perfect eternal from the noumenal point of view, but not eternal from the empirical point of view. Space is incorporeal and formless; yet divisible, and its divisibility is a spontaneous feature. Reality is complex lie a many coloured dome and can be predicated from many points of view. In the analysis of knowledge Jainas admit levels of experience. Sense experience is empirical in nature and content and cannot yield the noumenal reality, although the phenomena can be apprehended by it. Supersensuous experience including omniscience is direct and gives a synoptic picture of noumenal and th phenomenal worlds. Dravya karma and the Bhava karma are two aspects of the after effects of our action. Above all in their analysis of the way of life Jainas have emphasised the synoptic outlook by introducing the gradations of moral codes as munidharma and sravaka-dharma. This distinction is unique Indian thought and it substantially contributes to the understanding of human nature and its capabilities for the attainment of perfection. The analysis in this sense is psychologically important. Jainas have neither denied the reality cf empirical world nor have they given exclusive emphasis on this world and our life. In understanding life and experience we have to see everything with reference to its i) substance (dravya), ii) nature (rupa), iii) place (desa) and iv) time (kala). That is true of a thing in specific conditions at a specific time may not be true if it were in a different context, and to ignore this is to commit the fallacy of here say. This is the spirit of Anekanta. It expresses a catholic outlook the spirit of intellectual non-violence.
The conditions of society in the present-day world demand that we adopt such a catholic outlook or else we perish. We are in the midst of a life where hatred, injustice and intolerance reign supreme. A new orientation of values would be necessary for us to destroy the inverted values and then 'rebuild to our heart's desire . What we need today is love and sympathy and not prejudice and pomp. We need understanding and a sense of fellowship between the peoples of the world. And Anekanta would give us a ' Weltanschaung ' and a scientific interpretation of things. We will then learn to love our neighbours as ourselves. " And we can still cherish the hope when power becomes ashamed to occupy its throne ' and, when the morning comes cleansing the bloodstained steps of the nation ", We shall be called upon to bring the spirit of Anekanta to sweeten the purity of human destiny.
1. SMITH (U. R.): Religion of the Semites. p. 55.
2. D. MIALL EDWARDS: The Philosophy of Religion, p. 61.
3. Gunaratna, Tarka-rahasya-dipika.
4. Syadvadamanjari of Mallisena on Hemacandra's Anyayoga Vyava-cchedaDvatrimsika. Edt. DHRUVA A. B. Introduction.
5. ibid, 6.
6. Gunaratna, Tarka-rahasya-dipika.
7. Asvaghosa's Buddhacarita gives a detailed description of the topic Dialogues of Buddha. Also refer to Syadvada manjari for sirnilar views.
9. Pancastikayasara, 27 & Samayasara, 124.
10. DESAI (P. B,) ;Jainism in South India (1957) p. 72.
11. Ibid, p. 74.
12.Na manusat srerstharam hi kimcit.
13. Brho Upanisad 2.4.50
14. Radhakrishnanand Raju; The Concept of man.
Introduction p 18
15. Plato; Theaetetus, p. 152
16. Chan. Up. VlII. 3-12.
17. RADHAKRISHNAN(S); Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 170.
18. Plato Republic 346-355
19. HIRIYANNA: Outline of Indian Philosophy p. 18.
20 Bhadrasana Upanisads, 111 .
21. Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, Vol. 8, p. 770.
22. History of Philosophy (Eastern); edt. RADHAKRISHNAN. Ch.1.
23. Zimmer, H. Philosophies of India. Vol. I, p. 287.
24. JACOBI (Hermann): Studies in Jainism.
25. Tattvartha Sutra. I 1.
26.RADHAKRISHNANI S.) Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 333.
27. ZIMMER (H.O): Philosophies of lndia, p. 260.
28. S. B E. xxii. p. 54.
29. Pancastikayasara. 36,
30. Ibid, p. 176.
31. Dravyasamgrnha, 39-40.
32. MURTI (T. R. V.); The Central Philosophy of Buddhism. p. 205.
33.RADHAKRISHNAN(S) Indian Philosophy, Vol, II. p. 152.
34.Samkara's Bhasya, 1.i.4 and 1, 3.19.
37. Ibid. 1.39; 2.13.
38. Madhyamiku Kattka Vrtti, p. 519.
39. Vedantasara. 219.
40. ZIMMER ( H ): Philosophies of India, :p.446
41. Gommatosara, Jivakanda
42. RADHAKRISHNAN(S) Indian Philosophy, Vol. I , P. 333.
44. WlLLIAM JAMES: The Will to Believe, 1889 pg 61. ;
45. Tagore; Nationalism