Section - VI

 

VI.31. Where it is certain that (Hetu) is in (Vipaksa) (we have the fallacy of Nischita vipaksa vritti hetvabhasa), e.g. "Sound is perishable because it is knowable like a pitcher.

 

VI.32. Because it (the quality of knowability) is ascertained in things like Akasa which are imperishable.

 

VI.33. Where the matter is involved in doubt (we have the fallacy of sankita vipaksa vritti e.g. an omniscient being does not exist for he can speak.

 

VI.34. Because there is no opposition of being able to speak with omniscience.

 

VI.35. Akinchitkara (Hetvabhasa) consists of (use of) hetu (middle term) in connection with a Sadhya (major term) which had already been established and which is opposed by Pratyaksa etc.

VI.36. Capability of being heard by the ear is established regarding sound, as it is sound.

 

VI.37. Because (Hetu) does not do anything (in such a case).

 

VI.38. As for example, fire is cold as this a thing. In such cases (Hetu) cannot do anything.

 

VI.39. This fault arises only in definition. For in use by those conversant its reasoning, the fault is proved by fault of Paksa (minor term).

 

VI.40. Fallacies of Dristanta (illustration) in Anvaya consists of non-establishment of Sadhya, Sadhana or both of them.

 

VI.41. Sound is unproduced by man because it has no form like sensual pleasure, atom or pitcher.

 

VI.42. Viparitanvaya also: "That which is unproduced by man has no form".

 

VI.43. Because this will be applied in lightening etc.

 

VI.44. In Vyatireka, Siddha and the Vyatirekas of the same, like atom, sensual pleasure and Akasa.

 

VI.45. Viparita Vyatireka: the quality of not being without form, is not unproduced by man.

 

VI.46. The fallacy of Bala-prayoga consists of absense of one of the five limbs (of syllogism).

 

VI.47. This place is full of fire as it is full of smoke. Where there is smoke there is fire. As for example, a kitchen.

 

VI.48. Or, this is full of smoke.

 

VI.49. So it is full of fire and it is full of smoke.

 

VI.50. As clear understanding of the real thing is not established from it.

 

VI.51. Fallacy of Agama arises from words of a person seized by attachment, hatred, mistake etc.

 

VI.52. As for example, Run boys. There are a large quantity of sweetmeats on the river-bank.

 

VI.53. Or, one hundred elephants are standing on the tip of the finger.

 

VI.54. Because (these) want (the element of Pramana) viz. true knowledge.

 

VI.55. Sankhyabhasa (Fallacy of number) is maintaining `Pratyaksa is the only pramana etc.

 

VI.56. Because according to the view of the followers of Charvaka philosophy the other world is denied from Pratyaksa and knowledge of others cannot be derived (from Pratyaksa), so these cannot be the subject matter of it (Pratyaksa).

 

VI.57. Like Vyapti in case of the followers of the Buddhist, Sankhya, Nyaya, Prabhakara (school of Mimamsa philosophy) and Jaimini (school of Mimamsa philosophy) who accept Pratyaksa, Anumana, Agama, Upamana, Arthapatti and Abhava exceeding one by one (in their doctrines respectively).

 

VI.58. Knowledge of others being the subject of Anumana etc. will become another Pramana.

 

VI.59. Tarka also being understood from Vyapti will become another Pramana. For that which is not Pramana cannot establish anything.

 

VI.60. Because there is a difference according to difference of illumination.

 

VI.61. Visayabhasa (fallacy of object) (happens) where Samanya or Visesa or both of them (are) separately (accepted).  

 

VI.62. As it appears like the same, and as it does not do any work.

 

VI.63. Accepting it to be Samartha (effective) will lead to creation (of result) at all times, being independent.

 

VI.64. On accepting dependency on other (causes), the quality of being modified will have to be accepted as otherwise, this does not exist.

 

VI.65. Because, that which is ineffective in itself cannot cause anything as the former.

 

VI.66. Phalabhasa (fallacy of result) is either separate or not separate from Pramana.

 

VI.67. If we accept inseparableness, its (separate) use cannot happen.

 

VI.68. Its imagination by its opposite cannot (be accepted) for (we) shall have to assume (then) non-result by its opposite (e.g.) another result.

 

VI.69. Just as Apramana is derived from Pramana by holding the opposite.

 

VI.70. So, really there is no difference.

 

VI.71. (If) difference (be accepted), it will not be derived as in the case of another soul.

 

VI.72. There will be Atiprasanga (if we urge) Samavaya.

 

VI.73. Pramana and its Abhasa being shown as faulty and being made free from or connected with fault will be Sadhana or its Abhasa in case of the Vadi and Dusana (fault) or Bhusana (adornment) respectively of Prativadi (opponent).

 

IV.74. Other (varieties) which exist, are to be understood by reasoning (from other works).