We now come to the
philosophy of stand- points which is the first step in scientific
metaphysics. Any one who has at all bestowed a thought on the nature of
philosophy, must have arrived at the conclusion that it aims at the
perfection of knowledge to emancipate humanity from `the slavery of
superstition and awe of nature's might, and that knowledge itself
signifies nothing other than a sense of familiarity with the nature of
things as they exist in the world. Now, everything in nature exists in
relation to a number of other things, and is liable to be influenced by
them in different ways. Besides, all things present different aspects when
looked at from the point of view of their nature and when studied in
respect of the forms they assume under the influence of some other thing
or things. Furthermore, when they are described by men, they are generally
described from a particular point of view, though the unwary are led to
imagine this one-sided description of their nature as exhaustive, many
even falling into the pitfall of logical 'suicide' by basing their
deductions on a set of rules or formulas which are applicable to facts
gleaned from a particular stand-point, but not to any other. We can
observe for ourselves the nature of confusion which is likely to result
from an ignoring or mixing up of different stand- points by means of the
two following illustrations:
(1) Let us take for our
first illustration the famous text,
Jiva
is Brahman (soul of God), which certain people preach without the least
possible qualification. But obviously the statement is true only in so far
as the natural qualities of the soul are concerned; it is not true in
respect of the present manifested condition of an ordinary
Jiva
who must exert himself in the right direction to attain to his natural
purity. As water in its essence is pure gaseous matter, so is a
Jiva,
with regard to his pure natural qualities, a perfect God; but as water, as
water, cannot be said to be air, so cannot a
Jiva
involved in the samsara
be said to be pure Brahman. This illustrates the effect of a one-sided
absolutism of thought which ignores all other points of view; and its
far-reaching consequences can be seen in the monistic speculations of
certain philosophers who have based their system of metaphysics on the
natural attribute of the soul, altogether ignoring the standpoint of
evolution. These gentlemen, unable to explain the different conditions of
beings and things arising in the course of their evolution, have actually
found themselves forced to describe the world as an illusion, pure and
simple.
(2) Our second
illustration is intended to emphasize the effect of confounding the
different standpoints. Suppose we say: 'Here is a jar of iron; if we
remove its iron-ness, it will cease to exist.' This is a perfectly true
statement, as any body can see for himself. But if we now say: `Here is a
jar of x; if we remove its x-ness, it must cease to exist.', the
conclusion might be true in some cases, and not in others, for x may
represent only such non-essential qualities or things as butter, or some
living being's name. Obviously, a jar containing butter would never cease
to exist by the removal of its contents, nor would one belonging to a
person ever become a non-entity by changing hands' and yet it is perfectly
permissible, in speech, to say ' a jar of butter' and 'a jar of John'.
This one instance suffices to illustrate the nature of confusion, which is
likely to result in philosophy by indiscriminately mixing up, or
confounding, the results of research made from different points of view.
`This is a jar of iron', is a statement, which is true from the point of
view called
dravyarthika
Naya,
which takes into consideration the substantive attributes of things, while
`the jar of butter', 'the bucket of John', and thee like, have no
reference to the nature of the substance or substances of which the jar or
the bucket might be made, but only describe them in respect of their
contents or owner's name.
There are seven principal
stand- points, which are employed by men in their description of things.
These are:
(1)
Naigama
(the non-distinguished) which describes things without distinguishing
between their general and special properties.
(2)
Sangraha
(the collective) which deals exclusively with the general qualities of
things.
(3)
Vyavahar
(the particular) is the standpoint of particularity. The difference
between the Sangraha
and the Vyavahar
Naya
lies in the fact that while the former describes things in respect of
their general properties, the latter only concerns it self with their
particular attributes.
(4)
Rijusutra
(literally the straight, hence the immediate) studies things as they exist
in the present, and without regard to their past and future aspects.
(5)
Sabda
(literally the verbal, hence the point of view of a grammarian) pays
exclusive attention to number, gender, tense, etc., of the words employed.
(6)
Sambhiruda
is the stand- point of an etymologist who distinguishes between synonymous
words on etymological grounds.
(7)
Evambhuta,
literally such like, hence the point of view which describes things by
words expressing their special functions, e.g., to call a man a devotee
because of his being engaged in devotion.
These are the main kinds
of Naya;
and it is clear that each of them, taken by itself, is insufficient to
impart full knowledge of things, and has to be taken as furnishing only
partial information about their nature. They are current because of the
practical requirements of human intercourse and the usage of society,
which would be thrown into a state of chaos if lengthy descriptions were
insisted upon, instead of short words, to describe things. Philosophy,
which aims at the perfection of knowledge, however, cannot afford to
follow the conventions of men designed to expedite their intercourse with
their fellow beings, and must get hold of the actual truth by combining
the results of investigation made from different points of view. A
thorough insight into the philosophy of stand- points is also necessary to
estimate the true value of the statements of our predecessors in the field
of metaphysical research. Mankind would find, that almost all the
confusion of thought, and we might also say the animosity existing between
the followers of different religions, would cease to exist as soon as they
would test the scriptural text which most of us blindly adhere to with the
aid of the touch-stone of Naya
Vada (the philosophy of
stand-points). If they would only insert the word 'somehow' before any
scriptural or prophetic, statement, they would find their minds becoming
trained in the right direction to inquire into the stand-point of the
prophet who made any particular statement. The word somehow' (Syat
is Sanskrit)
would show that the statement was made from a particular point of view,
and would at once direct the mind to find out what that stand-point is. It
would also enable us to reconcile many a seemingly contradictory statement
in the scriptures of the same creed as well as in those of different
faiths; for it does often happen. that a statement which is wrong from one
particular point of view, is not so from another, e.g., one observer might
say that a bowl full of water contains no air, both being right from their
respective stand-points since water is only gaseous matter in its essence
though manifested in the form of a liquid substance owing to the action of
atoms of hydrogen and oxygen on one another.
