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First Steps To
Jainism (Part-2)
SANCHETI ASOO LAL
BHANDARI MANAK MAL
Appendix F: Anekanta (Part I)
-Dr. Nathmal Tatia
Introductory
The concept of anekant occupies a central
position in Jaina philosophy. Although it is not possible exactly to determine
the date of its origin, there is no doubt that the ontology of early Jainism
was deeply influenced by this principle. Originally an ethical mode of speech,
being concerned with what one ought or ought not to speak, it assumed an
ontological role in the Ardhamagadhi Agamas, through three stages of
development, viz. vibhajyavada (the method of answering a question by dividing
the issues), nayavada (the method of defining the framework of reference), and
syadvada (the prefixing of the particle syat, meaning "in a certain
reference", to a preposition, indicative of its conditional character). The
anuyogadvaras (doors of disquisition) also played a vital role in this matter.
This ontological orientation was further strengthened by Umasvati, Siddhasena
Divakara and Mallavadin, and the concept was converted into a full-grown
dialectic by Samantabhadra with whom the classical period of the doctrine
begins. The ontological concept now acquires a logic-in epistemological
character, and Jain philosophy is now indentified with anekantavada (the
doctrine of non-absolutism) or syadvada (the doctrine of conditional
statement) or saptabhangi (the doctrine of sevenfold predication). Anekanta as
the negation of an absolutistic position or the rejection of a biased or
truncated view of things is found in the Buddhist, Yoga and Nyaya schools as
well in various contexts. A dispassionate assessment of the worth of a
philosophy from various viewpoints was the objective that the propounders of
anekanta set before themselves. And their efforts in that respect were
laudable in that they succeeded in preserving some of the most valuable non-Jaina
doctrines as well as texts, selected by them for critical comments, which were
otherwise ravished from the world by the cruel hands of destiny.
The Origin
Jainism primarily is an ethical discipline,
and as such all its tenets had a beginning in someone or other of the moral
principles upheld by it. Thus the assertion or denial, affirmation or negation
of a philosophical belief was to be carefully made in consonance with the
rules prescribed for the right way of speaking in order to avoid false
statements or unwarranted speculations having no bearing on the spiritual path
of salvation. The metaphysical speculations about the beginning and end of the
cosmos, or its eternality and non-eternality or the existence and
non-existence of the soul before and after death, and such other issues that
exercised the minds of the thinkers of those days were not considered worth
while equally by Mahavira and Buddha. The latter's repugnance to such problems
is attested by the ten avyakrtas (indeterminables) mentioned in the Majjhima
Nikaya (II pp, 107ft, 176ft) and the former's in the Acaranga (1.8, 1.5) and
Sutrakrtanga (11.5, 1-5) where such speculations are considered as impractical
and leading to laxity in moral conduct. While this basic attitude of the
Buddha remained unmodified throughout his teaching, Mahavira appears to have
allowed a relaxation in conformity with his realistic outlook in the interest
of a dispassionate estimation of the worth of those speculations and the
discovery of the cause of their origin. Consequently whereas the followers of
the Buddha were interested more in the repudiation of the current antipodal
doctrines than in their proper appreciation, the followers of Mahavira devoted
their energies to a proper evaluation of these concepts with a view to finding
out a solution of those contradictory views. This led to the origin of the
Madhyama pratipat (the middle path which eschewed both the antithetical
alternatives) of the Buddhists on the one hand, and the philosophy of anekanta
(non-absolutism which attempted at synthesising those alternatives into a
comprehensive notion) of the Jainas on the other.
The Three Stages :
Three distinct stages of development of the
doctrine of anekanta are discernible in the early Jaina Agamas.
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Vibhajyavada:
Vibhajyavada which is perhaps the earliest phase of the doctrine is found
mentioned in the Sutrakrtanga (1.14.22) where a monk is asked to explain
things through the principle of division of issues (vibhajjavayam ca
viyagarejja). The Bhagavati Sutra provides many an illustration where a
question is dealt with in this way. On being asked by Gautama whether a
person who says that he has taken the vow of desisting from committing
injury to all sentient beings is a bonafide observer of the vow or a
malafide imposter, Mahavira replied that if such person was incapable of
distinguishing between the sentient and the insentient, or between the
mobile and immobile living beings, he is the latter, but otherwise he is a
true observer of the vow (op. cit., VII. 2.27). Similarly, on being asked by
Jayanti which of the two, viz. slumber and wakefulness, was preferable, he
replied that for the sinful, it was the former, while for the virtuous the
latter (XII2.2/53-55). These and similar instances which are in galore in
our text are obviously case of answer by division. It should be noted here
that the alternative answers to the divided issues are sometimes introduced
in the Agama by the particle siya (Skt, syad) meaning "in a certain
reference". The expression siyavaya in the Sutrakrtanga (1.14.19) : na
yasiyavaya viyagrejja one should not explain anything without taking resort
to siyavaya (Skt. syadvada, that is the principle of conditional
predication)' also deserves mention. It is obviously synonymous with the
expression vibhajjavaya noted above and is the forerunner of the syadvada of
later times. This also confirms our vies of vibhajyavada as the earliest
phase of anekantavada.
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The Nayas :
The nayas (standpoints) constitute the second stage of the evolution of the
concept of anekanta. The earliest and most important way of judging the
nature of things was to consider them under four heads viz., dravya
(substance) ksetra (space). kala (time) and bhava (mode). Thus in the
Bhagwati Sutra (II.1.45), the loka (inhabited cosmos) is considered as
finite in substance and space, but infinite in time and modes. There were
also other heads such as guna (op.cit., II. 10.126), bhava (XIX. 9.102) and
samsthana (XIV. 7.80) which were analogous to bhava. But all these heads
were not called nayas. The expressions used in connection with the nayas
were however dravya and paryaya (equivalent of bhava). The material atoms
are thus stated to be eternal qua dravya (davvatthayae) and non-eternal qua
paryaya (pajjavehim, XIV. 4-49-50) and the souls are characterised as
eternal qua dravya (davvatthayae) and non-eternal qua bhava (bhavatthayae,
VII. 2.58-59). Another pair of nayas, viz. avvocchitti naya (Skt
avyucchitti-naya, the standpoint of non interception) and vocchitti-naya (Skt.
vyucchitti-naya, the standpoint of interception) are also mentioned in the
Bhagavati Sutra (VII. 3.93-94). Thus the infernal beings are eternal from
the standpoint of non-interception (of their existence as souls), but they
are non-eternal from the standpoint of interception (of their present state
of being infernal after the expiry of that form of existence). A third pair
of nayas is also mentioned in the same text, viz. vavahariya-naya (Skt.
vyavaharikanaya, the popular standpoint), and necchaiva-naya (naiscayikanaya,
the factual or scientifie standpoint). Thus from the popular standpoint the
drone is black in colour, but factually or scientifically speaking, it is
possessed of all the five colours, viz. black, blue, red, yellow and white
(op. cit, XVIII. 6.108).
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Saptabhangi:
As the third stage of development of the concept of anekanta, we find a
primitive saptabhangi and syadvada in the Bhagavati Sutra XII. 10.211-226.
Here the things are judged under the categories of `self' (aya Skt. atman)
and `not-self' (no-aya Skt. noatman). An object is characterized as `self'
in some respect (siya aya), `not-self' in some respect (siya no-aya), and
`indescribable , that is, both self and not-self' in some respect (siya
avattavvam aya ti ya no-aya tiya). These three attributes are predicated of
an object, noncomposite or composite, respectively from the standpoints of
existent characters, non-existent characters, and existent-cum-non-existent
characters. In the case of the objects that are noncomposite (for instance,
a monad), the attributes are only three in number, viz. self, not-self and
indescribable. Here `indescribable' means the impossibility of the object
being spoken of or described exclusively as `self' or `not-self', because of
the same object being both (self and non-self) at the same time. These three
attributes however, become six in the case of a dyad (a composite body of
two space-points) as follows : (1) self, (2) not-self, (3) indescribable,
(4) self and non-self (one attribute for each space-point), (5) self and
indescribable (one attribute for each space-point). (6) not-self and
indescribable (one attribute for each space-point). These six ways again
become seven in the case of a triad (a composite body of three space points)
in the following way : (1) to (6) as above, and (7) self, not self and
indescribable (one attribute for each of the three space points). Here the
fourth, fifth and sixth ways have each two more subdivisions. Thus the
fourth, voz. self and not-self, has the following two additional
subdivisions-(1) self (for two space-points) and not-self (for the remaining
one space point). The fifth and sixth ways also have similar subdivisions.
The text referred to above gives the divisions and subdivisions of the
tetrad, pentad and hexad also. The basic ways however do never exceed the
number seven as in the case of the triad, though the number of subdivisions
gradually go up on account of the various possible combinations of the
space-points. The basic seven ways enumarated above are the prototypes of
later seven bhangas of what is called saptabhangi (the doctrine of sevenfold
predication). What is to be carefully noticed in this connection is the fact
that according to the Bhagavati Sutra, the joint predication of the
attributes `self' and `not-self' to a monad is not possible because the
monad has only one space-point. Such predication is only possible of a dyad
which has two space-points. Similarly, the simultaneous predication of three
attributes is only possible in the case of triad which has three
space-points. The implication is that the joint predication of two
contradictory attributes to the same space-points is purely a case of
`indescribability' and not an illustration of a dual predication of self and
notself. The dual predication is meaningful only if the object has two parts
in order that each individual attribute may find its own accommodation. The
later Jaina philosophers, however, did not find any difficulty in such
predication, and they made the dual predication (`is' and `is not' used by
them in place of `self' and `not-self' ) irrespective of the noncomposite or
composite character of the object. Some of them also interchanged the
positions of the third and fourth attributes.
The anuyogadvaras and
niksepas
The early Jaina philosphers were fond of
explaining things according to predefined lists of heads. Such heads were
called anuyogadaras, doors of disquisition 20 (or 14) marganasthanas 24 (12 or
14) jivasthanas and 14 gunasthans may be quoted as illustrations of such
lists. There are, however, other lists which had direct philosophical
significance. Umasvati, in his Tattvarthadhigamasutra, 1,7,8,16,26 has given
such lists, which can mostly be traced back to the Jain Agamas. These doors of
disquisition played an important role in the evolution of the doctrine of
anekanta. The Jaina doctrine of four niksepas is the final outcome of the
speculations concerning the doors of disquisition. The niksepas were many, but
finally they were reduced to four nama, sthapana, dravya and bhava,
(Tattvarthandhigamasutra,1.5). The following dictum of the Anuyogadvarasutra,
8, deserves mention. One should fully apply to a subject whatever nikesepas
are known about that subject; and to those subjects whose niksepas are not
known, one should apply the four (viz. nama, sthapana, dravya and bhava). The
Jaina thinkers took a very wide view of the subjects they took up for
discussion and employed the niksepas as the media for the determination of the
meaning of words involved in such discussion. The doctrine of anekanta owed
much to the precise definition of the connotation of the technical terminology
employed in the evaluation of antithetical doctrines, and the niksepas
fulfilled this task as auxiliaries to the nayas.
In non-Jaina Thought
Let us now see whether the elements of the
anekanta way of thinking are there in the non-Jaina schools of thought that
flourished in those days.
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The Vedic thought :
The sceptical outburst of the Vedic seer in Rgveda.
I. 164.4 : Who has seen that the Boneless One bears the Bony, when he is
first born, where is the breath, the blood and soul of the earth, who would
approach the wise man to ask this (ko dadarsa prathamam, jayamanam
asthanvantam yad anastha bibharti, bhumya asur asrgatma kvasti, ko vidvamsam
upagat pratsum etal) ? poses a problem to be solved in mystic experience, or
through anekanta or rejected as absurd and insoluble. The scepticism of the
Nasadiya hymn (op. cit., X. 129) has also a similar tone. In the Upanisads
we find rational thinkers as well as mystics. The Uddalaka (Chandogya, VI. 2
1,2) was partly a rationalist philosopher who advanced logical proof for the
reality of Being (sat), and partly an uncritical empiricist when he ascribes
thought to that Being to multiply and procreate and produce heat (tejas)
which produces water (ap), and water food (annam). Yajnavalkya Brhadaranyaka,
(II.4.12-14=IV.5 13-15) asserts that the self cannot be known as it is the
subject, and whatever is known is necessarily an object. This may be called
rational mysticism. This background of scepticism and rational mysticism was
responsible for the Jaina and Buddhist patterns of thought that emerged and
are found recorded in the Ardhamagadhi and Pali canons. We have made a brief
survey of the Jaina way of thinking and shall now see its parallel in early
Buddhism, followed by a similar study of the Yoga and Nyaya schools.
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The Buddhist Thought :
The Buddha calls himself a vibhajyavadin (vibhajjavado.....aham.....naham
ekamsavado-I am an analyst or propounder of my views by division of issues,
and not one who takes a partial view of things - Majjhima Nikaya, II, 469).
When the Buddha is asked for his opinion whether the house-holder is an
observer of the right path, he says that it is not possible to give a
categorical answer to the question inasmush as the house-holder with wrong
faith (miccha-patipanno) does not follow the right path, while one with
right faith (samma-patipanno) definitely does so. This vibhjyavada is not
essentially different from that of the Jainas.
In the Suttanipata p. 396, we find people
stuck to their individual truths or opinions (pacceka-saccesu puthu nivittha).
The Udana, pp. 143-145, gives the parable of the blind men and the elephant.
Ten blind persons touch various parts of the elephant and give ten
conflicting accounts based on their experience of the ten parts which they
happened to come into contact with. Each of them took the part for the whole
and as such they were all with their perceptions vitiated and partial (ekangadassino).
The parable is suggestive of a definite stage in the evolution of Buddha's
thought, which approached too near to the thought pattern of Mahavira to be
able to maintain its distinct individual character. The ultimate thought
pattern of the Buddha, however, is to be judged by his attitude to the ten
or fourteen famous avyakatas (indeterminables) mentioned in Majjhima Nikaya,
II, pp. 107-113 and 176-183, and Candrakirtis' Prasannapads, p. 446,
Poussin's Edition.
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The Yoga School :
The Yogabhasya (IV. 33; for the Buddhist counterpart of four kinds of
questions, see Digha Nikaya, III, p. 179, and Anguttara Nikaya, II, p. 84)
classifies questions under three heads : (i) there are questions which admit
of a clear definitive answer (ekanta-vacaniya), (ii) there are questions
which are answerable only by division (vibhajya-vacaniya), and (iii) there
are questions which are unanswerable (avacaniya). The question 'shall
everybody be reborn after death', is vibhyajya-vacaniya, that is, answerable
by division. The person who has experienced the distinction between spirit
and matter will not be born, the others however would take rebirth. The Yoga
philosopher there opens for himself the way to the anekanta type of
thinking, which, however, he does not pursue any further. The Sankhya-Yoga
doctrine of parinama (change) again is essentially a vindication of the
concept of anekanta, barring its insistence on the absolute pre-existence of
the effect in the cause. The Sankhya-Yoga conception of purusa as an
absolutely unchanging entity is of course an exception
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