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First Steps To
Jainism (Part-2)
SANCHETI ASOO LAL
BHANDARI MANAK MAL
Appendix C: Modern Physics
and Syadvada (Part-1) - Dr. D.S. Kothari
The most incomprehensible thing about the
universe is that it is comprehensible. - A. Einstein (b. 14.3.1879, d.
18.4.1955).
The one certain thing is that a statement
like "existence is meaningless" is itself devoid of any meaning. - Niels Bohr
(b. 7.10.1885. d. 18.11.1962).
Complementarity principle in
Syadvada
The principle of Complementarity which we
owe principally to Niels Bohr is perhaps the most significant and
revolutionary concept of modern physics. Philosophically, it should be noted,
it is very close to the concept of Syadvada. Bohr had great faith in the
future role in human affairs of the practical philosophy of complementarity.
It can enable people to see that seemingly irreconcilable points of view need
not be contradictory. These, on deeper understanding, may be found to be
complementary and mutually illuminating. The complementarity approach allows
the possibility of accommodating widely divergent human experiences into an
under-lying harmony, and bringing to light new social and ethical vistas for
exploration and for alleviation of human suffering. Bohr fervently hoped that
one day complementarity would be an integral part of everone's education and
provide guidance in the problems and challenges of life. For Bohr the
complementarity approach which accomplished one of the greatest revolutions in
natural philosophy was also of the utmost relevance for every aspect of man's
life.
Modern Physics (relativity and quantum
theory) provides as never before, far-reaching examples of, and insight into,
Syadvada. Also Syadvada makes it much easier to grasp the complementarity
principle in physics. Above all Syadvada and so the complementarity approach
is a guide for the pursuit of truth and ahimsa in all their varied aspects.
H. Yukawa, the Japanese physicist who
predicted the existence of the mesons on the basis of the principle of
complementarity, was asked whether young physicists in Japan found the same
great difficulty in comprehending the idea of complementarity as physicists do
in the West. He replied that Bohr's complementarity always appeared to them as
quite evident. "You see we in Japan have not been corrupted by Aristotle
(Aristotle's Logic)", he added. How much more would it be true of India if
Syadvada was a part of Indian education but our formal education (till
recently ?) has hardly any Indian roots.
It is interesting to recall that Bohr as a
student attended Hoffding lectures on formal logic and on the history of
philosophy. He liked Spinoza's concept of the psychophysical parallelism, but
later rejected it, as parallelism is not a true expression of complementarity.
He read Kierkegaard. He was much impressed by Paul Muller's "Tale of Danish
Student", a delightful humorous story of Hegelian dialectics. A soul-searching
research scholar struggles desperately to unravel the intricacies of human
thinking. How can a thought arise in the mind ? "And before you think it, you
must have had an idea of it, otherwise how could it have occurred to you to
think it ? And so it goes on to infinity, and this infinity enclosed in an
instant". And while the scholar is trying to prove that thoughts cannot move,
in that very process the thoughts are rapidly moving. We are involved in an
inexplicable contradiction. (L. Rosenfeld, Physics Today, Oct, 1963.). All
this is so similar to the celebrated Zeno's paradox on the impossibility of
motion of objects.
Language and Reality
At this point a few words about ambiguities
and contradictions inherent in ordinary language may be in order. Bohr's first
and continuing preoccupation with philosophical problems related to the use of
language for unambiguously describing our experiences. A fundamental
difficulty in this regard arises from the inescapable fact that man is both
actor and spectator in the universe, an idea that was Bohr's favourite
reflection. Thus, when I am `seeing' a thing, I am also `acting' : my choice
to see the particular thing is an `act', on my part. We often use the same
word to describe a state of our consciousness and of the associated,
accompanying behaviour of the body. How to avoid the ambiguity? Bohr drew
attention to the beautiful analogy of the concepts of multiform function and
Riemann surface. The different values of a multiform function and distributed
on different Riemann planes of a Riemann surface. Similarly we may say that
the different meanings of the same word belong to different `planes of
objectivity'. "The use of words in everyday life must be subject to the
condition that they be kept within the same plane of objectivity, and as soon
as we deal with words referring to our own thinking, we are exposed to the
danger of gliding on to another plane. In mathematics, that highly
sophisticated language, we are guarded against this danger by the essential
rule never to refer to ourselves. But just as the gist or Riemann's conception
lies in regarding all the branches of a multiform function as one single
function, it is an essential feature of ordinary language that there is one
word only for the different aspects of a given form of psychical activity. We
cannot hope, therefore, to avoid such deep rooted ambiguities by creating `new
concepts'. We must rather recognise the mutual relationships of the planes of
objectivity as primitive, irreducible ones, and try to remain keenly aware of
them" (Rosenfeld p-49).
Bohr often used to tell how the ancient
Indian thinkers had emphasized the futility of our ever understanding the
"meaning of existence". And he would add that the one certain thing is that a
statement like "existence is meaningless" is itself devoid of any meaning.
In his Gifford Lectures (1955-56) on Physics
and Philosophy Heisenberg has discussed at some length the problem of language
and reality in modern physics. He emphasised that the concepts of natural or
ordinary language "are formed by the immediate connection with reality; they
represent reality. It is true that they are not very well defined and may
therefore also undergo changes in the course of the centuries, just as reality
itself did, but they never lose the immediate connection with reality"
(p.,171). On the other hand because the concepts of science are for the
precisely defined, idealised, their connection with reality is in general,
only in a limited domain of nature. Heisenberg says : "Keeping in mind the
intrinsic stability of the concepts of natural language in the process of
scientific development, one sees that after the experience of modern
physics-our attitude toward concepts like mind or the human soul or life or
God will be different from that of the nineteenth century. Because these
concepts belong to the natural language and have therefore immediate
connection with reality. It is true that we will also realise that these
concepts are not well defined in the scientific sense and that their
application may lead to various contradictions, for the time being we may have
to take the concepts unanalysed as they are; but still we know that they touch
reality. It may be useful in this connection to remember that even in the most
precise part of science in mathematics, we cannot avoid using concepts that
involve contradictions. For instance, it is well known that the concept of
infinity leads to contradictions that have been analysed, but it would be
practically impossible to construct the main parts of mathematics without this
concept - Whenever we proceed from the known into the unknown we may hope to
understand, but we may have to learn at the same time a new meaning of the
word `understanding'. We know that any understanding must be based finally
upon the natural language because it is only there that we can be certain to
touch reality,and hence we must be sceptical about any scepticism with regard
to this natural language and its essential concepts. Therefore we, may use
these concepts as they have been used at all times. In this way modern physics
has perhaps opened the door to a wider outlook on the relation between the
human mind and reality". (p. 171-73)
Modern Physics has warned us against the
dangers of overestimating the value and utility of precise scientific concepts
: for example, the fundamental concepts of classical physics no longer hold in
quantum mechanics. In describing atomic phenomena "if one wishes to speak
about the atomic particles themselves one must either use the mathematical
scheme as the only supplement to natural language or one must conbine it with
a language that makes use of a modified logic or of no well-defined logic at
all. In the experiments about atomic events we have to do with things and
facts, with phenomena that are just as real as any phenomena in daily life.
But the elementary particles themselves are not as real; they form a world of
potentialities or possibilities rather than one of things or facts". (p. 160)
A favourite maxim of Bohr of interest in
connection with Syadvada is the distinction between the two kinds of truths,
profound truths and trival truths. For a profound truth its opposite or
negation is also a profound truth. For a trivial truth its opposite is false,
an absurdity. Statements expressing the highest wisdom often involve words
whose meaning cannot be defined unambiguously. "Thus the truth of a statement
of the highest wisdom is not absolute, but is only relative to a suitable
meaning for the ambiguous words in it, with the consequence that the converse
statement also has validity and is also wisdom". Bohr illustrated this with
his statement. "There is a God", a statement of great wisdom and truth, and
the converse 'There is no God' also a statement of great wisdom and truth.
(For him who believes that there is no God, his God is 'no-God'. The aspects
of God are infinite, inexhaustible, inexpressible). This reminds of an oft
quoted dialogue between Lord Mahavira and his favourite disciple Gautam. (Nathmal
Tatia, Studies in Jaina Philosophy, Jain Cultural Research Society, Banaras,
(1951) pp. 22-23.)
"Are the souls, O Lord, eternal or non-enternal
?"
"The Souls, O Gautama, are eternal in some
respect and non-enternal in some respect."
"With what end in view, O Lord, is it said
that the souls are enternal in some respect and non-eternal in some respect ?"
"They are enternal. O Gautama, from the view
point of substance, and non-eternal from the view point of modes, and with
this end in view it is said, O Gautama, that the souls are eternal in some
respect and non-eternal in some respect".
"Is the body, O Lord, identical with the
soul or is the body different from it ?"
"The body, O Gautama, is identical with the
soul as well as it is different from it".
Atom and Complementarity
Let us, for the time being, limit ourselves
to the domain of logical-empirical experience, that is communicable, objective
facts, and ask what is the radically new situation we meet with in dealing
with atomic phenomena (quantum physics) as distinct from everyday experience
(classical physics). When we speak of a 'table or chair', any meaningful
statement and its negation cannot both be correct at the same time. If the
statement 'the chair is in this room' is correct, then the statement 'the
chair is not in this room' is false. Both cannot be true at the same time. But
this fundamental principle of logic and common-sense, is, in general, violated
in atomic phenomena. Atoms in general behave in a manner completely foreign,
totally repugnant, to common-sense and classical logic.

Consider an idealised situation which brings
out the essentials. There is an �atom in a closed box�. the box is divided by
a partition into two equal compartments. The partition has a very small hole
so that the atom can pass through it. The hole can be closed if desired.
According to classical logic the atom can be either in the left compartment
(L) or in the right compartment (R). There is no third alternative. But the
new physics forces us to admit other possibilities to explain adequately the
results of experiments. If we at all use the word `box' and `atom', then there
is no escape whatsoever from admitting- in some strange way which totally
defies description in words - that the same atom is at the same time, in both
the compartments. What we are speaking of is not a case of the atom being
sometimes in the left compartment and some times in the right compartment,but
being in both the compartments at the same time . It is an idea crazy beyond
words. And so it is. But there is no escape.
Consider the 'box and atom' situation a
little further. We suppose a beam of light illuminating the box (which we may
take to be transparent), and we study the angular distribution of the
intensity of light scattered by the atom in the box, We make three
experiments. Firstly, the atom is placed in L with the hole closed; secondly,
the atom is placed in R with the hole closed; and thirdly, the atom is placed
in the box with the hole open so that it can move freely in the whole box. The
observed intensity-distribution of light for the third case is truly
astonishing. The intensity distribution is not a mixture, a sum, of the
distribution for this first and the second case, the composition of the
mixture depending on the fraction of time spent by the atom in each of the two
compartments. The distribution is in fact altogether different. It shows an
interference feature which can be only explained by assuming that the incident
light is scattered from the atom present, at the same time, in both the
compartments : The atom is, in some strange way, in the two compartments at
the same time. It shows in this case a behaviour fundamentally different from
that of a 'particle'. A particle cannot be at two places at the same time. The
new aspect of the atom revealed in the third experiment is called the 'wave
aspect'. A wave fills all available space. Totally unlike large objects,
objects on the atomic scale show a dual aspect, a particle aspect and a wave
aspect. The two aspects which are totally contradictory in every day
experience are complementary at the level of atoms. Why so ? because nature is
so constituted that experiments which demonstrate the particle aspect and
those which demonstrate the wave aspect are mutually incompatible. We can have
only the one set-up or the other, and never the two can be combined or built
together into some super-apparatus to demonstrate both the aspects at the same
time. We ask : What is it that makes these experiments mutually incompatible ?
It arises from the far reaching, and totally unexpected, fact that an act of
observation, even an ideal observation supposed to be made with `perfect'
instruments is inevitably accompanied by certain minimum disturbance. The
disturbance cannot be eliminated, cannot be analysed or allowed for. It is
inherent in the nature of things. It disturbs in an unpredictable way, the
state of the system under observation. We cannot even think of an experiment a
thought experiment, as it is called-that can be made free of the concomitant
minimum uncertainty. The effect of this inevitable disturbance is altogether
negligible for a big object, but for an atomic object the effect is drastic.
It drastically modified the state of the system under investigation. (This is
technically called the `reduction of the wave packet'). It is because of this
disturbance, an integral feature of an act of observation, that an experiment
to study the wave aspect of an atomic system is incompatible with a set-up to
study the particle aspect.
We spoke of the wave-particle duality.
Consider the usual arrangement for obtaining interference fringes. For the
light beam each photon must pass through both the holes (at the same time) to
produce interference fringes. This is observed on the plate P. Suppose we wish
to find out how a photon can simultaneously go through the two holes. How can
this happen ? For this purpose, we determine the momentum of the plate P in
the Y-direction. The plate had to be kept rigidly fixed to observe the
fringes. But to observe the momentum of the plate, it must be completely free
to move in the Y-direction. Further, if we are to be able to decide whether
the photon came from the direction of the hole A or from the hole B, the
uncertainty in the momentum in the Y-direction of the plate should be small
compared to hy0/c.
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